看到經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人2月3日一篇關(guān)于大學(xué)學(xué)位價(jià)值的文章，頗有感觸，特意翻譯出來。我讀大學(xué)時(shí)，擴(kuò)招已經(jīng)開始，讀大學(xué)成了隨大溜，考不上大學(xué)，對于大部分家庭和孩子來說，都是沒有面子甚至天塌了的大事。至于自己喜歡什么，適合從事什么職業(yè)，要選擇什么專業(yè)，我想很多人和我那時(shí)一樣，懵懵懂懂沒有想過。
大學(xué)真的適合所有人嗎？
上大學(xué)對于年輕人來說越發(fā)重要，但經(jīng)濟(jì)回報(bào)在減少。
Going to university is more important than ever for young people. But the financial returns are falling.
首爾的一間教室，一群青少年正在伏案學(xué)習(xí)，四下寂靜，他們翻閱著過去的試卷，一大摞五顏六色的教科書放在手邊。學(xué)校學(xué)習(xí)時(shí)間從早上八點(diǎn)到下午四點(diǎn)半，但有些學(xué)生要學(xué)到晚上10點(diǎn)才回家。和成百上千的韓國人一樣，他們正在準(zhǔn)備高考，這項(xiàng)多選測驗(yàn)將在很大程度上決定他們是否能上好大學(xué)，甚至是否能上大學(xué)。
IN A classroom in Seoul a throng of teenagers sit hunched over their desks. In total silence, they flick through a past exam paper. Stacks of brightly coloured textbooks are close to hand. Study begins at 8am and ends at 4.30pm, but some will not go home until 10pm. Like hundreds of thousands of South Koreans, they are preparing for the suneung, the multiple-choice test that will largely determine whether they go to a good university or a bad one, or to university at all.
一代人之內(nèi)，學(xué)歷在韓國就變得無處不在，70%的中學(xué)畢業(yè)生直接升入大學(xué)，25-34歲之間有70%的人擁有學(xué)位，這一比例2000年時(shí)還是37%。為了考入名牌大學(xué)，學(xué)生們開始準(zhǔn)備考試的年紀(jì)越來越小。首爾的熱門私立幼兒園都排著長隊(duì)。
Over the course of a single generation in South Korea, degrees have become close to ubiquitous. Seventy per cent of pupils who graduate from the country’s secondary schools now go straight to university, and a similar share of 25- to 34-year-olds hold degrees, up from 37% in 2000. Students scramble to gain admittance to the most prestigious institutions, with exam preparation starting ever younger. Soughtafter private nurseries in Seoul have long waiting lists.
韓國是個(gè)極端的例子。但在其他國家，有學(xué)位的年輕人比例同樣大幅增長。經(jīng)合組織35個(gè)成員國中，25-34歲人群43%擁有學(xué)位，美國則是48%。
South Korea is an extreme case. But other countries, too, have seen a big rise in the share of young people with degrees. In the OECD club of 35 countries, 43% of 25- to 34-year-olds now have degrees. In America the figure is 48%.
1995年至2014年間，經(jīng)合組織成員國政府在高等教育上的投入從GDP的0.9%上升到1.1%，個(gè)人投入也從1.2%上升到1.5%。隨著政府的學(xué)費(fèi)補(bǔ)貼流入教育機(jī)構(gòu)，教育成本隨之增加。1990年以來，美國沒有獎(jiǎng)學(xué)金或助學(xué)金的學(xué)生，學(xué)費(fèi)增長比總體通貨膨脹增長快兩倍。
Between 1995 and 2014 government spending on higher education in the OECD rose from 0.9% of GDP to 1.1%, while private spending rose from 1.2% to 1.5%. As government subsidies for tuition fees flow through to institutions they have helped inflate costs. Since 1990 fees for American students who do not get scholarships or bursaries have risen twice as fast as overall inflation.
政策制定者理所當(dāng)然的認(rèn)為，讓更多的年輕人上大學(xué)能刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)增長，促進(jìn)社會(huì)流動(dòng)。這種觀念直觀上很吸引人。受過良好教育的人當(dāng)然更有可能產(chǎn)出提高生產(chǎn)力的創(chuàng)新成果，科技進(jìn)步也對工作提出了新要求，更多人需要更好的教育看起來是有說服力的，而獲得學(xué)位，是貧困家庭出身的聰明孩子證明自己能力的一種明顯途徑。
Policymakers regard it as obvious that sending more young people to university will boost economic growth and social mobility. Both notions are intuitively appealing. Better-educated people should surely be more likely to come up with productivity-boosting innovations. As technological change makes new demands of workers, it seems plausible that more will need to be well-educated. And a degree is an obvious way for bright youngsters from poor families to prove their abilities.
但國家間的比較證明，這種關(guān)聯(lián)關(guān)系還缺乏有效證據(jù)。富裕國家有更多大學(xué)畢業(yè)生，可能因?yàn)楦杏嘣＃哺恢睊赍X。經(jīng)濟(jì)較好的地方發(fā)展更加緩慢，也可能因?yàn)樵谶@樣的地方，提高生產(chǎn)率的簡便方法更少，而非教育抑制了經(jīng)濟(jì)增長。
But comparisons between countries provide little evidence of these links. Richer countries have more graduates, but that could be because there is more money to spare, and less urgency to start earning. Rich economies grow more slowly, but that is probably because they have fewer easy ways to raise productivity, not because education depresses their growth.
大學(xué)公認(rèn)的事實(shí)
A truth universities acknowledged
政策制定者們經(jīng)常援引的證據(jù)是“大學(xué)生溢價(jià)”，即將學(xué)費(fèi)和學(xué)習(xí)期間放棄的收入考慮在內(nèi)，大學(xué)畢業(yè)生和只接受過中學(xué)及以下教育的人在平均收入上的差距。這種差距通常被描述為高等教育的“投資回報(bào)”，或是獲得學(xué)位后終身收入的年增長率。紐約聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備銀行研究顯示，1980年至2000年間，美國高等教育的投資回報(bào)率大幅增長，之后穩(wěn)定在每年15%左右。換句話說，如果算成投資，學(xué)費(fèi)和學(xué)習(xí)期間放棄的收入要獲得15%的年收益率，才能與獲得學(xué)位后工作生涯中的平均收入相當(dāng)。
The main piece of evidence cited by policymakers is the “graduate premium”—the difference between the average earnings of someone with a degree and someone with no more than a secondary-school education, after accounting for fees and the income forgone while studying. This gap is often expressed as the “return on investment”in higher education, or the annualised boost to lifetime earnings from gaining a degree. Research by the New York Federal Reserve shows that the return on investment in higher education soared between 1980 and 2000 in America, before levelling off at around 15% a year.? In other words, an investment equal to the cost of tuition and earnings forgone while studying would have to earn 15% annual interest before it matched the average value over a working life of gaining a degree.
世界銀行對139個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體的回報(bào)率進(jìn)行了估算，雖然每個(gè)地方各不相同，但數(shù)值都很可觀。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家對數(shù)據(jù)分析發(fā)現(xiàn)，回報(bào)率與有學(xué)位的人占比以及收入范圍有關(guān)。英國、德國和美國的回報(bào)率相近，在撒哈拉以南非洲地區(qū)回報(bào)率在21%左右，那里大學(xué)生緊缺，教育程度低的工人收入很少。在斯堪的納維亞，收入相對平等，五分之二的成年人有學(xué)位，回報(bào)率在9%左右。
The World Bank has produced estimates of this return for 139 economies. It varies from place to place, but is substantial everywhere. The Economist’s analysis of the data finds that returns are linked to the share of people with degrees, and the range of earnings. Returns in Britain and Germany are similar to those in America.In sub-Saharan Africa, where degrees are scarce and the least-educated workers earn little, they are around 21% a year. In Scandinavia, where wages are less unequal and two-fifths of adults have degrees, they are around 9%.
但是，作為中學(xué)畢業(yè)生考慮繼續(xù)上大學(xué)，以及政策制定者考慮擴(kuò)大高等教育覆蓋面的指南，“大學(xué)生溢價(jià)”存在缺陷。即使在一國之內(nèi)，平均值也掩蓋了巨大的差異。大多數(shù)學(xué)生都知道，數(shù)學(xué)或金融學(xué)位很可能比音樂或社會(huì)工作更有利可圖。但較少人意識到，無論什么專業(yè)，對于成績勉強(qiáng)達(dá)到錄取線的學(xué)生來說，“大學(xué)生溢價(jià)”夸大了獲得學(xué)位的經(jīng)濟(jì)回報(bào)。
But as a guide to school-leavers considering going to university—and to policymakers considering expanding access to higher education—the graduate premium is flawed. Even within countries the average conceals wide differences. Most students know that a degree in mathematics or finance is likely to be more lucrative than one in music or social work. What fewer realise is that the graduate premium overstates the financial benefit of embarking on a degree if their school grades barely qualify them for entry, no matter what they study.
比較有學(xué)位和沒有學(xué)位人的收入情況，被大學(xué)錄取但未能畢業(yè)的人，盡管也支付了學(xué)費(fèi)，放棄了學(xué)習(xí)期間的工作收入，其收入和從未被大學(xué)錄取的人差不多。這樣的情況并不少見。美國40%的大學(xué)生在六年內(nèi)未能獲得四年制學(xué)位。發(fā)達(dá)國家的平均輟學(xué)率在30%左右，那些以最低成績被錄取的人最有可能無法畢業(yè)。
In a comparison of the earnings of people with degrees and people without them, those who start university but do not finish are lumped in with those who never started, even though they, too, will have paid fees and missed out on earnings. Their numbers are considerable. In America 40% of college students fail to graduate with four-year degrees within six years of enrolling. Drop-out rates across the developed world average around 30%. It is the students admitted with the lowest grades who are least likely to graduate.
計(jì)算上大學(xué)的回報(bào)率時(shí)，將輟學(xué)者考慮在內(nèi)將帶來較大影響。喬治梅森大學(xué)的Bryan Caplan在新書《反對教育的案例》中指出，基于邊緣學(xué)生的低畢業(yè)率，以及同樣條件下聰明人賺的更多這個(gè)事實(shí)，美國四年制學(xué)位的回報(bào)率在1%到6.5%之間，越優(yōu)秀的學(xué)生回報(bào)率越高。
Including dropouts when calculating the returns to going to university makes a big difference. In a new book, “The Case Against Education”, Bryan Caplan of George Mason University argues that the low graduation rates of marginal students, and the fact that, for a given level of qualification, cleverer people tend to earn more, mean that the return on a four-year degree in America ranges from 6.5% for excellent students to just 1% for the weakest ones.
這種差別部分因?yàn)樽畈畹膶W(xué)生上最差的大學(xué)，這樣的大學(xué)輟學(xué)率也最高。如果能進(jìn)入好的大學(xué)，回報(bào)率可能會(huì)提高。芝加哥大學(xué)的Seth Zimmerman2014年發(fā)表的一項(xiàng)研究中，比較了佛羅里達(dá)中學(xué)畢業(yè)生的收入，他們的成績接近一所好的州立大學(xué)的最低錄取線。那些剛好在錄取線以上的學(xué)生，比差一點(diǎn)到錄取線的學(xué)生更可能到一所好大學(xué)學(xué)習(xí)。他們的畢業(yè)率與更廣泛的學(xué)生群體相似。畢業(yè)后他們的收入也大大超過那些剛好沒有達(dá)到錄取線的人，對于他們，大學(xué)的投資回報(bào)率非常可觀。
Part of that difference is because the weakest students attend the worst universities, where drop-out rates are highest. When they make it into better institutions, the returns may be higher. In a study published in 2014 Seth Zimmerman of the University of Chicago compared the earnings of school-leavers in Florida whose grades were close to the minimum for admission to a good state university. Those just above the cut-off were much more likely than those just below to start courses in good institutions. They graduated at a rate similar to that of the broader student population. They went on to earn considerably more than those just below the cut-off, and their return on investment was substantial.
政策制定者之所以夸大了擴(kuò)大大學(xué)入學(xué)率的好處，高估“大學(xué)生溢價(jià)”并非唯一原因。計(jì)算高等教育社會(huì)回報(bào)的常用方式是，所有畢業(yè)生的收益總和，減去公共補(bǔ)貼。但是學(xué)位某種程度上是一種“分配性商品”，它使一個(gè)人受益的同時(shí)也犧牲了另一個(gè)人的利益。部分溢價(jià)來自于找工作時(shí)相對別人的競爭優(yōu)勢，而不是獲得了提高生產(chǎn)力的技能和知識。完整計(jì)算除了大學(xué)畢業(yè)生的收益外，還應(yīng)該包括非大學(xué)畢業(yè)生的損失。
注：根據(jù)維基百科，“positional good”are goods valued only by how they are distributed among the population, not by how many goods there are in total.“分配性商品”是指，商品的價(jià)值僅取決于它們的分配方式而非商品總量。
Overstating the graduate premium is not the only reason policymakers overestimate the wider benefits of increasing the share of young people who go to university. The usual way to calculate the social returns of higher education is to sum up all the graduate premiums and subtract any public subsidies. But degrees are in part a way to access a “positional good” that benefits one person at the expense of another. Part of the premium comes from gaining an advantage over others in the competition for a good job, rather than the acquisition of productivity-boosting skills and knowledge. A complete calculation would include not just gains to graduates, but losses to non-graduates.
學(xué)位本身也是一種信號，溢價(jià)包括由個(gè)人特征帶來的收入增長效應(yīng)，這種特征更可能為擁有學(xué)位者所有。這并不是因?yàn)樗麄冊诖髮W(xué)獲得了這些特征，而是因?yàn)樗麄儞碛羞@些特征，所以能被大學(xué)錄取。
Degrees are also signalling devices. The premium includes the income-boosting effects of personal characteristics that are more likely to be held by those with degrees, not because they acquired them at university, but because they possessed them on admission.
隨著學(xué)位日益普及，它作為一種信號的重要性也越加凸顯。招聘者并不關(guān)心求職者在高等教育上的投入，而是越來越傾向于將學(xué)位作為條件，以便篩掉那些最不積極或最不稱職的人。哈佛商學(xué)院的Joseph Fuller和Manjari Raman最近的一項(xiàng)研究表明，公司按慣例要求求職者具有學(xué)位，即便那些已在這個(gè)崗位工作的人只有少部分擁有學(xué)位。這增加了大學(xué)畢業(yè)生的溢價(jià)效應(yīng)——不過是以懲罰非大學(xué)畢業(yè)生的方式，而不是提高學(xué)位的絕對收益。
As degrees have become more common,their importance as signalling devices is rising. Recruiters, who pay none of the cost of jobseekers’ higher education, are increasingly able to demand degrees in order to screen out the least motivated or competent. A recent study by Joseph Fuller and Manjari Raman of Harvard Business School found that companies routinely require applicants to have degrees, even though only a minority of those already working in the role have them. This increases the graduate premium—but by punishing non-graduates rather than boosting the absolute returns to degrees.
經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家對美國人口普查數(shù)據(jù)分析發(fā)現(xiàn)，1970年至2015年間，25至64歲有學(xué)士及以上學(xué)位的工作者占比在265個(gè)職業(yè)中的256個(gè)都增加了。其中部分職業(yè)是在其間變化很大的知識性工作，比如航空航天工程師或統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)家，其他工作則并不需要大學(xué)畢業(yè)生，比如服務(wù)員。目前大約16%的服務(wù)員擁有學(xué)位，大多數(shù)情況下是因?yàn)樗麄儫o法找到要求大學(xué)畢業(yè)生的工作。但其他一些諸如記者、護(hù)士、小學(xué)教師等過去只要求在工作中短期培訓(xùn)就能從事的工作，現(xiàn)在也多是大學(xué)畢業(yè)生。今天，擁有大學(xué)學(xué)位常常是基本條件。
Analysis by The Economist of American census data finds that between 1970 and 2015 the share of workers aged 25-64 with at least a bachelor’s degree increased in 256 out of 265 occupations. Some of these are intellectually demanding jobs that changed a lot over that period, such as aerospace engineer or statistician. Others are non-graduate jobs such as waiting tables. Sixteen percent of waiters now have degrees—presumably, in most cases, because they could not find a graduate job. But other jobs that are mostly done by graduates, such as journalism, nursing and teaching in primary schools, used to require only shorter training, often received while working. Today, having a degree is usually an entry requirement.
經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家給出了一個(gè)衡量過度教育的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，它定義了在1970年就主要由大學(xué)畢業(yè)生從事的職業(yè)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)只有35%的大學(xué)畢業(yè)生今天仍然從事這樣的職業(yè)，45年前這個(gè)比例是51%。通過職業(yè)名稱來判斷，2650萬美國工作者——其中2/3具有大學(xué)學(xué)位——從事著半個(gè)世紀(jì)前多由非大學(xué)畢業(yè)生從事的工作。
The Economist has produced a measureof over-education by defining a graduate job as one which was staffed mostly by degree-holders in 1970. We find that just 35% of graduates work in such occupations today, down from 51% 45 years ago. Judging by job titles alone, 26.5m workers in America—two-thirds of those with degrees—are doing work that was mostly done by nongraduates a half-century ago.
這樣的計(jì)算夸大了這種趨勢。科技的發(fā)展無疑使部分職業(yè)要求更高了。但不是所有工作都是如此，至少從收入來看是這樣。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)一個(gè)職業(yè)中更高的大學(xué)畢業(yè)生占比和更高的工資之間只有微弱的關(guān)聯(lián)。相比半個(gè)世紀(jì)前，一半左右的職業(yè)雇傭了更高比例的大學(xué)畢業(yè)生，所以工資水平實(shí)際下降了。
That calculation exaggerates the trend. Advances in technology have doubtless made some of these jobs more demanding. But not all of them, at least judging by pay. We find only a weak link between higher shares of graduates in an occupation and higher salaries. For around half of the occupations that employ higher shares of graduates now than a half-century ago, real wages have fallen.
經(jīng)合組織教育研究中心主管Andreas Schleicher認(rèn)為，“國家缺乏的是技能，而不是學(xué)位”。他說，大學(xué)壟斷高等教育市場是一個(gè)問題，部分原因是大學(xué)并不適用于所有的求學(xué)者，并且大學(xué)輟學(xué)者從已經(jīng)完成的課程中并沒有得到多少經(jīng)濟(jì)收益。
Andreas Schleicher, the head of education research at the OECD, reckons that “countries have skills shortages, not degree shortages”. The way universities have come to monopolise higher education, he says, is a problem in part because universities do not suit all kinds of learners. And university dropouts tend to see little in the way of financial benefit from the part of their course that they have finished.
一種有希望的進(jìn)步是“微證書”或“微學(xué)位”，即短期職業(yè)培訓(xùn)，常用于計(jì)算機(jī)和IT領(lǐng)域。線上學(xué)習(xí)公司優(yōu)達(dá)學(xué)城（Udacity）提供了很多這樣的培訓(xùn)，包括優(yōu)步（Uber）和奔馳認(rèn)可的自動(dòng)駕駛汽車，還有臉書和谷歌認(rèn)可的數(shù)字營銷。EdX，麻省理工、哈佛大學(xué)和其他名牌大學(xué)合作創(chuàng)建的開放在線課堂平臺(tái)也免費(fèi)提供類似課程。交上幾百美元，學(xué)生就可以參加考試證明他們掌握了該領(lǐng)域的知識。
One promising development is that of“micro-credentials” or “nano-degrees”—short vocational courses, often in computing and IT. Udacity, an online education company, offers a variety, including one in self-driving cars approved by Uber and Mercedes-Benz, and another on digital marketing approved by Facebook and Google. EdX, a collaboration between MIT, Harvard and other leading universities, offers similar courses free. Students can take exams to prove their mastery of the material for a few hundred dollars.
作為“新兵訓(xùn)練營”的大學(xué)
Boot campus
目前這樣的課程主要作為學(xué)位的附屬品存在，并不能替代學(xué)位。3/4的edX學(xué)員已經(jīng)有一個(gè)學(xué)士學(xué)位在讀。但與熱門公司合作能極大證明求職者的價(jià)值。
For now, such courses are mostly add-onsto degrees, rather than replacements. Three-quarters of edX’s students already had a bachelor’s degree upon enrolling.But the collaboration with sought-after employers makes it more plausible that they could eventually become establishedas a stand-alone testament to a job applicant’s worth.
同時(shí)，雖然很多大學(xué)畢業(yè)生最終從事的都是過去由非大學(xué)畢業(yè)生完成的工作，甚至根本就找不到工作，不去讀大學(xué)的決定仍然有很大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)?，F(xiàn)在韓國一半左右的失業(yè)者都有學(xué)位。對他們來說，“大學(xué)生溢價(jià)”這個(gè)概念本身就像一個(gè)笑話。韓國一名招聘人員Kim Hyang Suk說，公司客戶服務(wù)職位一半的應(yīng)征者都是大學(xué)生，即使這個(gè)崗位只要求中學(xué)畢業(yè)生。
In the meantime the decision not to goto university remains risky, even though many graduates will end up doing work that used to be done by non-graduates—or struggle to find a job at all. Around half of unemployed South Koreans now have degrees. For them, the very concept of a “graduate premium” may seem a mockery. Kim Hyang Suk, a recruiter in South Korea, says that half the applicants for customer service jobs at her firm are graduates, even though only a secondary-school education is specified.
Kim Hyang Suk說，比起需要培訓(xùn)的應(yīng)屆大學(xué)畢業(yè)生，她更希望招聘有工作經(jīng)驗(yàn)的中學(xué)畢業(yè)生，她并不需要勤奮苦讀的人，她需要“熱情，擅長打電話”的人。但是很少有這樣開明的雇主，大多數(shù)年輕人還是希望拿到學(xué)位。學(xué)位對收入的增長作用可能不如預(yù)期，但沒有學(xué)位，他們的遭遇很可能會(huì)更加糟糕。
She would prefer school-leavers with experience, says Ms Kim, to inexperienced graduates whom she will have to train. She is not looking for swots, but people who are “engaging, good on the phone”. But when few employers are this open-minded, most young people will want a degree. It may not boost their earnings as much as they had hoped, but without one, they will probably fare even worse.
譯者注：本文選自《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人》（2018年2月3日），翻譯水平有限，如有不當(dāng)，歡迎指正。
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