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A bad bank would be a start—but only that—towards cleaning up India’s ailing financial system

糟糕的銀行將是一個(gè)開始，但唯有如此 才能蕩滌印度衰弱的金融系統(tǒng)

If you owe a bank a hundred dollars, it is your problem. If you owe a hundred million, it is the bank’s problem. If you are one of many tycoons borrowing billions to finance dud firms, it is the government’s problem.

如果你欠一家銀行一百美元，這是你的問題。 如果你欠了一個(gè)億，這是銀行的問題。 如果你是借了數(shù)十億美元為無用公司融資的眾多大亨之一，這是政府的問題。

That is roughly the situation India finds itself in today. Its state-owned banks extended credit to companies that are now unable to repay. Like the firms they have injudiciously lent to, many banks are barely solvent. Almost 17% of all loans are estimated to be non-performing;state-controlled banks are trading at a steep discount to book value. After years of denial, India’s government seems belatedly to have grasped the threat to the wider economy. Plans are being floated to create a “bad bank” that would house banks’ dud loans, leaving the original lenders in better shape. The idea is a good one, but it must be properly implemented and is only the starting-point for broader reforms.

這大致就是印度今日所處的情況。 其國有銀行提供信貸給一些公司，目前卻無力償付。 像他們不愿意放貸的那些公司一樣，許多銀行近乎沒有償付能力了。 所有貸款中幾乎17％的被估計(jì)為不良; 國家控制的銀行交易價(jià)格遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)低于其賬面價(jià)值。 經(jīng)過多年否認(rèn)之后，印度政府似乎才慢騰騰地體會(huì)到它對(duì)更廣泛的經(jīng)濟(jì)構(gòu)成威脅。 創(chuàng)建一個(gè)“壞賬銀行”的方案正在浮現(xiàn)出來。它將存放銀行的不良貸款，使得原貸款人狀況更佳。 這個(gè)想法不錯(cuò)，但它必須得到適當(dāng)執(zhí)行，而且也只是更廣泛改革的起點(diǎn)。

The bad-loan mess has been years in the making. India skirted the financial bust of 2007-08, but then complacency ensued. Banks went on to finance large-scale projects—anything from mines and roads to power plants and steel mills— which often ended in disappointment. Over 40% of loans made to corporate India are stuck in firms unable to repay even the interest on them, according to Credit Suisse, a bank. The result is a “twin balance-sheet problem”, whereby both banks and firms are financially overstretched. Corporate credit is shrinking for the first time in two decades

壞賬麻煩多年來一直在生成之中。印度避開了2007 - 08年的金融危機(jī)，但隨后就志得意滿。銀行繼續(xù)為大型項(xiàng)目融資，從礦山到公路，從發(fā)電廠到鋼鐵廠，而這些項(xiàng)目往往以令人失望的方式終結(jié)。根據(jù)瑞士信貸銀行的數(shù)據(jù)，向印度公司提供的貸款中超過40％深陷在甚至無法償還利息的公司。結(jié)果是一個(gè)“雙生資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表問題”，即銀行和企業(yè)同時(shí)在財(cái)務(wù)上過度擴(kuò)張。公司信用在二十年來首次萎縮。

In an ideal world, the banks would write down the value of the loans. The resulting losses would require fresh funds from shareholders. India is far from that ideal. It takes over four years to foreclose on a loan (a newish bankruptcy law should help). The government is the main shareholder of the worst affected banks, and has been reluctant to inject more cash. Bankers themselves are afraid to deal with loans pragmatically, because that often gets mistaken for cronyism.

在理想世界里，銀行會(huì)減低賬面價(jià)值。 由此產(chǎn)生的損失將需要股東注入新的資金。 但印度遠(yuǎn)不是那么理想。 它需要四年時(shí)間來取消抵押品贖回權(quán)（新的破產(chǎn)法應(yīng)該有幫助）。 政府是受影響最嚴(yán)重的銀行的主要股東，而且不愿意注入更多的現(xiàn)金。 銀行家們自己害怕如實(shí)地地處置貸款，因?yàn)檫@樣做經(jīng)常被誤認(rèn)為是任人唯親。

Clean energy needed

需要清潔能源

The solution so far has been to pretend nothing much is wrong. The banks have rolled bad loans over, hoping that growth would eventually make things right. This is a poor strategy, as anyone who followed Japan in the 1990s and Italy since the financial crisis well knows. It is only a matter of time before the banks’ difficulties derail India’s economic prospects. Hence talk of setting up a bad bank to sort out the mess.

迄今為止的解決方案就是假裝沒犯什么錯(cuò)。銀行將不良貸款拖延期，希望增長最終會(huì)使情況轉(zhuǎn)好。這不是一個(gè)高明的策略，因?yàn)槿魏胃欉^1990年代的日本和金融危機(jī)以來意大利表現(xiàn)的人都應(yīng)該很好理解。銀行之困使印度的經(jīng)濟(jì)前景脫離正常的軌道只是一個(gè)時(shí)間問題。因此，討論設(shè)立一個(gè)壞賬銀行以解決亂局。

Bad banks have been used with success in the past—in Sweden in the 1990s, for example, and in Spain in recent years. But if they are to work, candour and cash are both needed. The candour is required to assign a realistic value to banks’ soured loans. Indian lenders must be compelled, and quickly, to sell loans to the bad bank even at a hefty discount to face value, no matter how much it may wound their pride or dent their profits. That is where the cash comes in. When those write-downs eat up capital, the state must be ready to make up the shortfall even if it means borrowing more to do so.

壞賬銀行有過成功的先例。例如20世紀(jì)90年代在瑞典，以及近年來在西班牙。但如果他們要有所成就，公正和現(xiàn)金都必不可少。公正意味著要為銀行壞賬給定一個(gè)現(xiàn)實(shí)的估值。必須迫使印度貸款人快速，向壞賬銀行出售不良貸款，即便相對(duì)面值給予極大的優(yōu)惠。無論這會(huì)給他們的榮光帶來多大的傷害，也不論多大程度上削弱他們的利潤。這就是現(xiàn)金的來源。當(dāng)那些減值吞噬資本之時(shí)，國家必須準(zhǔn)備彌補(bǔ)差額，即使這意味著借款更多。

That is only a start, however. A bad bank could resolve this crisis. But to make future ones less likely, broader reforms are needed. Some are under way. Political interference (loans to a minister’s buddy, say) and dysfunctional governance (many bank bosses get only one-year stints at the helm, for example) are less of a problem than they once were. But lenders should not be instruments of the state. Private investors should be allowed to play a bigger role in cleaned-up banks, even if that means the government has to give up majority control.

但這僅僅是一個(gè)開始。壞賬銀行可以解決這場危機(jī)。但是為了未來不再犯類似的錯(cuò)誤，需要進(jìn)行更廣泛的改革。一些措施正在推進(jìn)中。政治干預(yù)（比如給部長的密友貸款）和功能失調(diào)的治理（例如，許多銀行老板只能掌權(quán)一年）相比以前不再是一個(gè)問題。但貸款人不應(yīng)成為國家的工具。應(yīng)當(dāng)允許私人投資者在清理后的銀行體系中發(fā)揮更大的作用，即使這意味著政府必須放棄大部分控制權(quán)。

India’s “promoters”, as the founders and owners of big businesses are known, also need to be reined in further. Tycoons have the upper hand in negotiations with their lenders because they know that red tape, patronage and antiquated legal systems make it all but impossible to seize the assets of defaulting firms. In effect, they cannot be replaced at the helm. Resolving this imbalance would make it more likely that dud loans are a headache for banks and borrowers, not for the finance minister. It is good that ?policymakers appear to be waking up to the magnitude of India’s banking problem. Whether they appreciate the scale of the solution is less clear

印度的“推動(dòng)者”，眾所周知的大企業(yè)創(chuàng)始人和所有者，也需要進(jìn)一步被掌控。商業(yè)大亨們?cè)谂c他們的貸款人談判中占上風(fēng)，因?yàn)樗麄冎拦贅游恼?，庇護(hù)和過時(shí)的法律制度使得沒有可能獲取違約公司的資產(chǎn)。實(shí)際上，它們不能在掌舵處被替換。解決這種不平衡后，不良貸款將令銀行和借款人頭疼不已，而不是財(cái)政部長的。政策制定者似乎正在意識(shí)到印度銀行問題的嚴(yán)重程度，這是好的方面。他們是否清楚解決方案的規(guī)模還不是非常明了。