Instructor: Dr. Hans Oversloot

Influenced by the political philosophy of John Rawls, most liberalists are much concerned with questions of justice and social unity. Kukathas, in his book The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom, provides a challenging idea that liberalism can be conceived in a different way. He starts his book with a very straightforward question: ‘What is the principled basis of a free society marked by cultural diversity and group loyalties?’ (Kukathas, 2003, p. 4) Kukathas argues that a free society is an open society and its principle should ‘a(chǎn)dmit the variability of human arrangements rather than fix or establish or uphold a determinate set of institutions within a close order’ (Kukathas, 2003, p. 4). The freedom of association is described as the fundamental principle of a free society, and it has two corollaries: the principle of freedom of dissociation and the principle of mutual toleration of associations. In other words, a liberal society is based on a group of associations; each association has an understanding of the rules between associations, and the freedom of exit must be allowed. State, according to Kukathas, is only one of these associations.

This book is valued by many scholars as a challenge to the liberal thinking of multiculturalism. Geoffrey Brahm Levey argues that a virtue of the book which in large part is framed as a response to Will Kymlicka's influential liberal theory of minority rights – is the rigorous way in which Kukathas seeks to respond to Kymlicka's and others' criticisms of versions of the theory, thus anticipating many objections readers will have’ (Levey, 2004, p. 574). Also, this book is enlightening in the field of nationalism. Kukathas criticizes nationalism in the broader context of criticizing the political community, and he conceives nationalism to be the worst shape the praise of the political community can take (Kukathas, 2003, p. 195). As Paschalis M. Kitromilides addresses, ‘the entire book could be read as a counterpoint to the moral doctrines of nationalism’, and it could be read ‘with deep satisfaction as a speculum mentis that can bring nationalism as a social philosophy to self-awareness and self-recognition (Kitromilides, 2012, p. 373).

There are also many critiques. Deborah Russell comes up with the problem that whether a simple right of exit is enough for the freedom of association and disassociation. He argues, sometimes people may not perceive that exit is possible, and sometimes the cost of exit is too high, which makes the theory problematic to dealing with the issues in the real world (Russell, 2004, p. 540). Jeff Spinner-Halev argues that it is odd for Kukathas to believe that both domestic and international society are like ‘a(chǎn)rchipelago’, because ‘it is hard to know which domestic society Kukathas has in mind, or what this means internationally in this age of globalization and interdependence’ (Spinner-Halev, 2005, p. 596). For me, the most noticeable critique is raised by Richard E. Flathma. Kukathas is criticized to be fear of concentration of power and authority which ‘leads him to leave the exercise of freedom of conscience to individuals and dissenting group’ (Flathman, 2006, p. 398). Kukathas knows that it is often difficult and sometimes impossible to rely on individuals and dissenting groups to achieve freedom of conscience, but he exaggerates the danger of centralized authority to avoid including it.

In my opinion, Kukathas’s book is helpful to understand multiculturalism from a liberal perspective, especially to understand the role of authority in a free society. However, I think some arguments in his theory are debatable. According to Kukathas, the core of liberalism is allowing people to live on their own conscience. He does not elaborate on the nature and origin of conscience in his book. People may have a desire to freely join or exit associations, but conscience can be very complex and may involve a desire to have a glorious community, such as a nation or state. They may have a desire to be led or guided, and on such conditions, the liberal archipelago might not be satisfying. For example, the Chinese have a strong tradition of collectivism, and it might be unacceptable for the Chinese people to believe that the state could be only an ordinary association.

Also, I think it could be dangerous to apply Kukathas’s theory in practice. According to Kukathas, the authority, or other groups, should not intervene in the affairs of a certain group. He even argues that there is no need for common citizenship (Spinner-Halev, 2005, p. 595). However, in the real world, many disadvantaged people are faced with in-group oppression, and they often do not have the ability to exit. For example, female children in some ethnic groups could be tortured and abandoned, simply because the group has such a kind of barbarous culture. In this case, children do not have the ability to exit, and nobody in the group can help them. The authorities, or other groups, are the only hope for these children to get rid of the nightmare. Therefore, I think there should be a balance between authorities and free associations, and it is impracticable to totally exclude common citizenship.

References

• Flathman, R. E. (2006). The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Book Review). Political Theory, pp. 397-98.
• Kitromilides, P. M. (2012). The Liberal Archipelago. A Theory of Diversity and Freedom . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2009 . xii+292pp. ￡48.45 (pbk). Nations and Nationalism, pp. 371-373.
• Kukathas, C. (2003). The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. Oxford [etc.]: Oxford University Press.
• Levey, G. B. (2004). The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. Perspectives on Politics, pp. 573-74.
• Russell, D. (2004). The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, pp. 538-40.
• Spinner-Halev, J. (2005). The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. The Journal of Politics, pp. 595-97.