譯者按這是奎因（1908—2000） 1947年12月2日在哈佛大學(xué)哲學(xué)俱樂(lè)部的講演的文字稿，收入W. V. Quine, Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist and Other Essays(一個(gè)堅(jiān)定的外延主義者的自白及其他論文), Dagfinn F?llesdal奎因的學(xué)生and Douglas B. Quine奎因的兒子(eds.), Harvard University Press, 2008.，在這之前未曾公開發(fā)表過(guò)平時(shí)在與同事和學(xué)生的交流中，我一直覺得有必要講清楚邏輯在哲學(xué)中的作用到底是什么下個(gè)學(xué)期我要為哲學(xué)系的部分研究生開設(shè)數(shù)理邏輯課程在備課過(guò)程中，我看到了奎因的這篇文章，真有一種說(shuō)不出來(lái)的酒逢知己千杯少的感激心情在這篇文章中，他講述了現(xiàn)代邏輯在消解哲學(xué)偽問(wèn)題（比如無(wú)或非存在的本性的問(wèn)題），在澄清真正的哲學(xué)問(wèn)題（比如經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義提出的關(guān)于知識(shí)和感覺經(jīng)驗(yàn)之間的關(guān)系問(wèn)題，關(guān)于邏輯和數(shù)學(xué)知識(shí)的本性的問(wèn)題）并將它們引向更精確更深入的研究中的極端重要性這對(duì)于許多長(zhǎng)于玄想疏于論證的中國(guó)哲學(xué)工作者和學(xué)生是很有啟發(fā)的在這篇文章中，我們還看到一個(gè)真正的哲學(xué)家對(duì)待哲學(xué)研究的一絲不茍不斷進(jìn)取的精神這篇文章所呈現(xiàn)的絕不是奎因的最終哲學(xué)觀點(diǎn)，他也沒(méi)有對(duì)別人（包括他在哲學(xué)上所尊敬的人）的觀點(diǎn)采取盲從的態(tài)度，而是無(wú)論對(duì)自己還是對(duì)他人的觀點(diǎn)都采取了一個(gè)開放的態(tài)度正是這種求真的精神和開放的態(tài)度，使得他的哲學(xué)觀點(diǎn)能不斷地得到發(fā)展，直至他生命的盡頭
為了方便大家的理解，我將文章的具體內(nèi)容的摘要置于前面，并對(duì)正文中個(gè)別難解之處作了有節(jié)制的注釋歡迎各位老師和同學(xué)對(duì)我的譯文和講解提出批評(píng)，也歡迎對(duì)文章內(nèi)容展開討論和交流
內(nèi)容摘要和評(píng)論
1—2：開場(chǎng)白，引出主題：邏輯對(duì)哲學(xué)的重要性
3—8：‘nothing’的邏輯分析：‘nothing’在日常語(yǔ)法中的名詞性地位曾誘導(dǎo)在古往今來(lái)的很多哲學(xué)家追問(wèn)所謂無(wú)的本性，但實(shí)際上，任何包含這個(gè)詞的句子都可以改寫成另外一個(gè)與之等值的句子，而新句子不包含與‘nothing’對(duì)應(yīng)的詞，從而上面的那種誘惑就自然消失了
9—15：羅素的摹狀詞理論：羅素通過(guò)對(duì)包含摹狀詞的語(yǔ)境的系統(tǒng)改寫，向我們表明：?jiǎn)畏Q詞項(xiàng)的使用并不必然以這個(gè)詞項(xiàng)有對(duì)應(yīng)的超語(yǔ)言實(shí)體為前提，這就解開了從巴門尼德和柏拉圖以來(lái)的所謂非存在之謎（據(jù)說(shuō)，因?yàn)椴淮嬖诘臇|西也是一個(gè)東西，所以我們不能自圓其說(shuō)地聲稱某個(gè)東西不存在）
16—29：經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義的演變：經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義在洛克和休謨那里的最初表述是：我們的一切觀念都來(lái)自于感覺印象；美國(guó)哲學(xué)家圖克對(duì)這個(gè)表述進(jìn)行了語(yǔ)言學(xué)的轉(zhuǎn)向，他建議對(duì)觀念和印象之間關(guān)系的研究應(yīng)該讓位于詞項(xiàng)和感覺詞項(xiàng)之間關(guān)系的研究；邊沁和羅素則倡導(dǎo)語(yǔ)境定義，即不再拘泥于尋找詞項(xiàng)的根據(jù)感覺詞項(xiàng)的直接定義，而轉(zhuǎn)向?qū)ふ以~項(xiàng)的語(yǔ)境定義，即尋求對(duì)詞項(xiàng)出現(xiàn)的語(yǔ)境的整體的翻譯而間接給出詞項(xiàng)的定義由于直接定義可以看成語(yǔ)境定義的特殊情形，因此句子（而不是詞項(xiàng)）成了意義的基本單位這是經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義的又一次發(fā)展但通過(guò)卡爾納普的工作，人們看清了并不是所有語(yǔ)句都可以翻譯為基本語(yǔ)句，這就表明即使是語(yǔ)境定義也仍是有局限性的，奎因正是通過(guò)對(duì)這一難局的思考提出了他的整體主義，即科學(xué)語(yǔ)句和常識(shí)語(yǔ)句單個(gè)地看，并不能蘊(yùn)含任何基本語(yǔ)句，只有一個(gè)充分大的語(yǔ)句系統(tǒng)才能做到這一點(diǎn)奎因的觀點(diǎn)可視為經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義的第三次發(fā)展經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義的每一次發(fā)展都離不開邏輯技術(shù)的運(yùn)用
30—35：分析真理的本性：康德對(duì)真理實(shí)行了兩個(gè)兩分法，一是所謂分析真理和綜合真理的區(qū)分，二是所謂先天真理和經(jīng)驗(yàn)真理的區(qū)分關(guān)于這兩個(gè)兩分之間的關(guān)系，康德之前的萊布尼茲和休謨都認(rèn)為它們是重合的，即分析真理同時(shí)也是先天真理，先天真理同時(shí)也是分析真理（萊布尼茲稱為“理性真理”，休謨則稱為“觀念的關(guān)系”）康德同意前半句，但不同意后半句，他認(rèn)為有些先天真理并不是分析真理，而是綜合真理根據(jù)康德的見解，算術(shù)真理就是這樣的先天綜合真理數(shù)理邏輯的創(chuàng)始人弗雷格和羅素的工作都直接針對(duì)了康德（羅素和懷特海的數(shù)學(xué)原理一書的最初目的就是為了反駁康德這個(gè)“強(qiáng)詞奪理的庸人”的），他們指出算術(shù)可以還原為邏輯；如果邏輯是分析的，那么算術(shù)也是分析的對(duì)這個(gè)結(jié)論，康德的信徒當(dāng)然仍有回旋的空間但正反兩方的交鋒如果不想淪為毫無(wú)成果的吵架，了解和正視現(xiàn)代邏輯的發(fā)展就成為必要
36—46: 哥德爾定理和分析/綜合真理的劃界：根據(jù)哥德爾不完全性定理，包含集合論在內(nèi)的廣義邏輯系統(tǒng)不可能證明每一個(gè)該系統(tǒng)里的真理這對(duì)分析性的概念是一個(gè)很大的沖擊，因?yàn)橐幌虮徽J(rèn)為是分析真理的邏輯真理，居然也有無(wú)法被證明的情形奎因在這篇文章提出了一個(gè)解決方案，即在不違背分析真理可以得到證明這一經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義直覺的前提下，將邏輯一分為二，前者為基本邏輯，有完全性的證明程序，它的真理都是分析真理；另一部分為集合論，沒(méi)有完全性的證明程序，它的真理是先天綜合真理與這個(gè)二分相重合的是，基本邏輯是本體論上中立的，而集合論則承認(rèn)了抽象實(shí)體的存在應(yīng)該說(shuō)，哥德爾的不完全性定理確實(shí)揭示了量化理論和作為數(shù)學(xué)基礎(chǔ)的高階邏輯之間的深刻差異，奎因本人所指出的兩者對(duì)共相問(wèn)題的不同態(tài)度也是真實(shí)的但奎因這時(shí)仍沒(méi)有走出康德認(rèn)識(shí)論的框架，他仍在使用康德哲學(xué)的術(shù)語(yǔ)來(lái)標(biāo)示這兩者之間的同異（同：兩者都是先天真理；異：基本邏輯真理為分析真理而集合論真理為綜合真理）實(shí)際上，基本邏輯和數(shù)學(xué)的分界，和分析和綜合的分界，是兩個(gè)完全不同的問(wèn)題他后來(lái)的研究表明，分析/綜合之間的區(qū)別最后蛻變?yōu)樽悦髡胬砗筒蛔悦鞯恼胬碇g的區(qū)別，但這個(gè)區(qū)別從認(rèn)識(shí)論的角度看并不是一個(gè)有任何重要性的區(qū)別，真理之間只有自明性程度的差別，這種差別是因人而異的和因時(shí)因地而異的，并沒(méi)有任何一刀切的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)；而承認(rèn)先天真理則更是完全違背了經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義的根本原則
48—52: 本體論承諾：要弄清楚某個(gè)理論有著什么樣的本體論，只消弄清楚它的量化結(jié)構(gòu)和量詞相聯(lián)系的變項(xiàng)所指的范圍就是它的本體論顯然，邏輯對(duì)于弄清楚量化結(jié)構(gòu)，特別是復(fù)雜理論的量化結(jié)構(gòu)是非常重要的奎因在這里為了澄清人們對(duì)他的誤解，強(qiáng)調(diào)了弄清楚一個(gè)理論的本體論承諾是什么和這個(gè)理論的本體論承諾正確與否這兩者的區(qū)別這是他并不同意全部哲學(xué)問(wèn)題都是語(yǔ)詞問(wèn)題的證據(jù)之一遺憾的是，這樣的混淆和誤解在六十年后的中國(guó)仍然普遍存在
53—58：數(shù)學(xué)為什么對(duì)自然科學(xué)不可或缺：一方面，數(shù)學(xué)陳述沒(méi)有經(jīng)驗(yàn)意義，但另一方面，數(shù)學(xué)對(duì)自然科學(xué)卻不可缺少對(duì)這個(gè)矛盾，奎因此時(shí)仍沒(méi)有找到答案他此時(shí)想到的是能建立不預(yù)設(shè)抽象對(duì)象的數(shù)學(xué)；這樣的新數(shù)學(xué)也許會(huì)因?yàn)閷?duì)抽象對(duì)象的免疫力，進(jìn)而擺脫不完全性的夢(mèng)魘其實(shí)，即使做到了這一點(diǎn)，上面的矛盾也仍舊沒(méi)有解決因?yàn)樯厦孢@個(gè)矛盾對(duì)于本體論上中立的基本邏輯也是成立的：一方面，邏輯陳述沒(méi)有經(jīng)驗(yàn)意義（和數(shù)學(xué)不同的是它的絕對(duì)可證明性），但另一方面，邏輯對(duì)科學(xué)同樣不可缺少解決這個(gè)矛盾的鑰匙是他后來(lái)提出的整體主義：一般地說(shuō)，單個(gè)的陳述，不論是自然科學(xué)里的陳述，還是邏輯數(shù)學(xué)里的陳述，都無(wú)法獨(dú)自與經(jīng)驗(yàn)發(fā)生聯(lián)系，它們都只能從它們參與其中的充分大的陳述系統(tǒng)與經(jīng)驗(yàn)的聯(lián)系中獲得間接的意義數(shù)學(xué)和邏輯恰恰因?yàn)樗鼈儗?duì)科學(xué)預(yù)測(cè)系統(tǒng)的不可或缺而分享了全部科學(xué)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)意義至此，它們終于不再被看成是與經(jīng)驗(yàn)沒(méi)有關(guān)系的先天真理了
正文+漢譯
1. The little group of skeptics who run this club have asked me to explain why in the world anybody who is intent on philosophy should allow himself to be sidetracked into taking a course in logic. I know better than to try to satisfy these people by suggesting that a logic course might help a student pass the prelims. For, being philosophers, these skeptics will pursue the issue to its fundamentals, and ask: Why should there be a preliminary exam in logic? The doubt implicit in such a question could never be a genuine doubt, of course; it must be a purely methodological doubt, a Cartesian doubt of the most fanciful order; but the inquisitors in question are quite capable, I believe, of Cartesian doubt.
有那么幾個(gè)參加這個(gè)俱樂(lè)部的懷疑論者讓我解釋一下：為什么在這個(gè)世界上任何一個(gè)專心于哲學(xué)的人，要偏離正題，去學(xué)習(xí)一門邏輯課程？我很清楚，如果我對(duì)這些人說(shuō)，邏輯課能幫助學(xué)生通過(guò)預(yù)備考試，這樣的回答是不能滿足他們的要知道，這些懷疑論者是哲學(xué)家，他們一定會(huì)向根本處追問(wèn)：為什么在預(yù)備考試中要有邏輯這門課呢？當(dāng)然，包含在這樣一個(gè)問(wèn)題里的懷疑不可能是真正的懷疑；它肯定只是笛卡爾式的方法論上的懷疑，而且是這類懷疑中離奇性級(jí)別最高的，當(dāng)然我相信發(fā)問(wèn)者完全具有純正的笛卡爾式懷疑的能力
2. This gives me no cause for complaint. If it is difficult and unnatural to doubt the value of logic, it should be correspondingly easy and natural to establish the value of logic. I’m grateful for having been assigned an easier task than any I might have taken on if left to my own devices.
這樣一來(lái)，我便沒(méi)有什么好抱怨的了如果懷疑邏輯的價(jià)值既困難又不自然，那么，相應(yīng)地，確認(rèn)邏輯的價(jià)值就是既容易又自然的了這個(gè)分派給我的話題，甚至都要比任我自便的話題還要來(lái)得容易，我對(duì)此表示感激
3. To illustrate one important way in which logic contributes to philosophy, let me begin with an over-simple instance of philosophical confusion: “If an event has a cause at all, it must have something as its cause, rather than nothing, for nothing cannot be a cause. But if an event has no cause, nothing causes it. Therefore it is impossible for an event to have no cause”. This, substantially, is the unsympathetic version which Hume gives to an argument in Locke. Whether it is an argument that Locke or any other sensible person could have intended, at least it will help me to begin schematizing one of the uses of logic.
為了說(shuō)明邏輯有益于哲學(xué)的一個(gè)重要方式，讓我先舉一個(gè)超級(jí)簡(jiǎn)單的哲學(xué)混亂的例子：“如果某個(gè)事件有原因，那么它就以某物而不是無(wú)物作為其原因，因?yàn)闊o(wú)物不可能是一個(gè)原因但是如果某個(gè)事件沒(méi)有原因，無(wú)物引起了它所以，一個(gè)事件沒(méi)有原因是不可能的”這在實(shí)質(zhì)上便是休謨對(duì)洛克的一個(gè)論證所作的無(wú)同情心的改寫不論這個(gè)改寫版的內(nèi)容是不是洛克或任何可理喻的人物所意指的，它都有助于我說(shuō)明邏輯的一項(xiàng)用途
4. This argument makes use of the fact that the word ‘nothing’ behaves in ordinary language like a noun. “A causes the event” means that something, viz., this A, is the cause. Analogously it is argued that “nothing causes the event” means that something, viz., this nothing, is the cause.
這個(gè)論證利用了下面這個(gè)事實(shí)：在日常語(yǔ)言中，“無(wú)物”（‘nothing’）這個(gè)詞表現(xiàn)得就像一個(gè)名詞一樣“A引起了這個(gè)事件”意味著：某物，也就是A，是原因類似地，也可以作出下面的論證“無(wú)物引起了這個(gè)事件”意味著：某物，也就是無(wú)物，是原因
Something similar seems to have been going on in Heidegger’s mind when he asked ‘What about Nothing? What does Nothing do？’ and decided that Nothing nothings, and that we have a special way of sensing nothing, this sense being anguish.
海德格爾曾追問(wèn)“無(wú)物怎么樣？無(wú)物做什么？”，他最后得出結(jié)論：無(wú)物無(wú)著，并且我們有感知無(wú)物的一種特殊的方式，這種感覺的名字叫“煩惱”海德格爾的這個(gè)思路與上面的思路看起來(lái)是相似的遠(yuǎn)在兩千多年前的中國(guó)哲學(xué)家老子曾聲稱：“天下之物生于有，有生于無(wú)”，他顯然也是將“有”和“無(wú)”名詞化了
5. Such treatment of the word ‘nothing’ can lead to ridiculous results, as Lewis Carroll has shown; and similar fallacies can be devised with ‘something’ and ‘everything’.
對(duì)“無(wú)物”這個(gè)詞這樣的處理可以帶來(lái)很可笑的結(jié)果，正如劉易斯·卡羅爾所表明的那樣；對(duì)“某物”和“每物”也可以設(shè)計(jì)出類似的謬誤
6. Now, returning to the first example, let’s see how it fares in logical symbols:
Nothing causes x
(y)～(y causes x)
‘Whatever y may be, y does not cause x’. Here there is no term, no substantive corresponding to ‘nothing’, and so no opportunity to draw the false inferences that depend on handling ‘nothing’ like a name. In logical notation the same thing happens also to the false substantives ‘everything’ and ‘something’; they disappear.
現(xiàn)在讓我們回到第一個(gè)例子，看看用邏輯符號(hào)是如何處理它的：
無(wú)物引起x
(y)～(y引起x)
“不管y是什么，y不引起x”這里不存在與“無(wú)物”對(duì)應(yīng)的詞項(xiàng)或?qū)嵲~，所以我們將不再有機(jī)會(huì)作出那些有賴于對(duì)“無(wú)物”進(jìn)行名詞性處理的錯(cuò)誤推理同樣地，假實(shí)詞“某物”和“每物”在邏輯記號(hào)法中也將消失
7. Now let’s see what this sort of therapeutic translation really comes down to. A troublesome or misleading part of ordinary language has been translated into another part which is well-behaved. Another part still of ordinary language:
Whatever you select, it does not cause x.
(Symbols are inessential.) All the serious and proper uses of ‘nothing’ can be translated, sentence by sentence, into this well-behaved part of language. But the translation operates only on the sentences as wholes; the word ‘nothing’ has no translation by itself; and hence this part of language contains no misleading substantive, simple or complex, corresponding the misleading substantive ‘nothing’. Therefore, the perplexities and fallacies attaching to the word ‘nothing’ are by-products of a dispensable part of our language; and in this sense they may be said to be purely linguistic confusions.
現(xiàn)在讓我們看看這種翻譯為什么會(huì)有治療的功效日常語(yǔ)言中某個(gè)引起麻煩或誤導(dǎo)人的部分被翻譯成了表現(xiàn)好的另一部分這另一部分仍屬于日常語(yǔ)言：
無(wú)論你選擇什么，它都不引起x
（符號(hào)化并不是這里的實(shí)質(zhì)問(wèn)題）“無(wú)物”的所有嚴(yán)肅和正當(dāng)?shù)氖褂梅绞蕉伎梢灾鹁渲鹁涞乇环g為語(yǔ)言中表現(xiàn)良好的部分但是，翻譯所針對(duì)的是作為整體的句子；“無(wú)物”這個(gè)詞本身并不能被翻譯；所以在這個(gè)表現(xiàn)良好的部分中并不包含與誤導(dǎo)人的實(shí)詞“無(wú)物”相對(duì)應(yīng)的誤導(dǎo)人的（簡(jiǎn)單或復(fù)雜的）實(shí)詞與“無(wú)物”這個(gè)詞聯(lián)系在一起的困惑和謬誤只是語(yǔ)言中某個(gè)可以省去的部分的副產(chǎn)品；從這個(gè)意義上說(shuō)，那些困惑和謬誤可謂純粹的語(yǔ)言上的混亂
8. The so-called quantification idiom used in modern logic is prompted by technical counteractions of efficient manipulation and deduction. Its efficacy in eliminating the fallacies of ‘nothing’, and the similar fallacies of ‘everything’ and ‘something’, is incidental. But it illustrates the first point which I want to make this evening: the logical analysis resolves certain confusions and philosophical perplexities by showing how to paraphrase language into peculiarly clear and straightforward subsections of language. It resolves the perplexities by showing them to be purely verbal: products of gratuitous idioms.
現(xiàn)代邏輯對(duì)所謂量化習(xí)語(yǔ)的使用，是為了從技術(shù)的角度對(duì)運(yùn)算和推理進(jìn)行更有效的處理至于它也能用來(lái)消除“無(wú)物”“某物”和“每物”等詞引起的謬誤，只是一個(gè)附帶的功用但是這個(gè)附帶的功用說(shuō)明了我今晚想要闡明的第一個(gè)觀點(diǎn)：邏輯分析可以消除某些混亂和哲學(xué)困惑，方法是將語(yǔ)言改寫為它的特別清楚和平實(shí)的某個(gè)子集它可以表明這些困惑只是純粹語(yǔ)詞上的困惑，是一些不必要的習(xí)語(yǔ)所引起的混亂
9. I don’t maintain, as Wittgenstein does, that all philosophical problems are verbal in that sense. But some are. I’ve illustrated the point with a trivial type of example; a more serious example is afforded by Russell’s theory of descriptions, in its bearing on perplexities of non-existence. The perplexity, briefly, is this: How can we consistently say there is no such thing as Pegasus, if there is no Pegasus about whom to say it? Or that there is no such thing as the King of France? How can any such statement of non-existence be true?
我并不像維特根斯坦那樣聲稱所有哲學(xué)問(wèn)題都是像上面那樣的語(yǔ)詞問(wèn)題但有些哲學(xué)問(wèn)題確實(shí)是語(yǔ)詞問(wèn)題我已經(jīng)舉了一個(gè)微不足道的例子來(lái)加以說(shuō)明；而羅素的摹狀詞理論提供了更加嚴(yán)肅的例子，這些例子都與非存在的困惑有關(guān)這個(gè)困惑簡(jiǎn)單說(shuō)來(lái)便是：如果我們所要談的帕格索斯并不存在，我們又如何能自圓其說(shuō)地說(shuō)帕格索斯不存在呢？同樣地，如果我們所要談的法國(guó)國(guó)王并不存在，我們又如何能自圓其說(shuō)地說(shuō)他并不存在呢？一句話，關(guān)于非存在的任何陳述怎么可能是正確的陳述呢？
10. One answer sometimes resorted to is this: there are such things as Pegasus and the king of France after all; they merely happen not to be actual. Actuality, like redness, is merely one special quality of things.
一個(gè)有時(shí)候會(huì)訴諸的答案是這樣的：帕格索斯和法國(guó)國(guó)王畢竟還是存在的，只是它們不具有現(xiàn)實(shí)性而已現(xiàn)實(shí)性，就像紅一樣，也可以是事物的一種特殊性質(zhì)非存在之謎最早可以追溯到古希臘哲學(xué)家巴門尼德他聲稱思維與存在具有同一性，即任何我們能想到的東西都是存在的如果我們能想到帕格索斯，那么帕格索斯一定是存在的；如果帕格索斯不存在，我們就不會(huì)想到它，因此說(shuō)帕格索斯不存在是自相矛盾的我們通常認(rèn)為不存在的事物一定在某種更深刻的意義上是存在的
11. Two reasons why some of us find this unsatisfactory: one, the recognition of a realm of unactualized possibles offends our taste for a tidy, economical ontology; two, the method still avails us nothing if we change the example and speak not of Pegasus or the king of France but of the round square. To accommodate such cases as this we should have, analogously, to recognize not only a realm of unactualized possibles but a realm of impossibles. Few of us, certainly, have so little taste for tidiness as not to be offended by an ontology of this kind. Various awkward problems arise, moreover, apart from mere questions of taste.
有兩個(gè)理由，使我們中的一些人認(rèn)為這個(gè)答案不能令人滿意第一，承認(rèn)未被現(xiàn)實(shí)化的可能對(duì)象敗壞了對(duì)本體論的整潔和儉約的口味第二，當(dāng)我們把例子從帕格索斯和法國(guó)國(guó)王轉(zhuǎn)向方圓時(shí)，這個(gè)方法仍是無(wú)濟(jì)于事正如要容納帕格索斯和法國(guó)國(guó)王需要承認(rèn)未被現(xiàn)實(shí)化的可能對(duì)象一樣，要容納方圓，則要進(jìn)一步承認(rèn)不可能的對(duì)象但不在乎整潔不為這種本體論所冒犯的的人肯定是很少的這種處理問(wèn)題的方法會(huì)帶來(lái)很多棘手的問(wèn)題，不只是口味問(wèn)題
12. Russell goes back to the beginning of the trouble and protests that when we say there is no such thing as Pegasus, or the king of France, there need be no Pegasus or king of France about whom to say it. He first paraphrases all statements containing so-called singular descriptions: the king of France, the author of Waverley: idioms using ‘the’ in the singular. He does not paraphrase these descriptions themselves, but the statements as wholes which contain them; and the statements into which he paraphrases them contain such words as ‘a(chǎn)uthor’ and ‘Waverley’, or ‘king’ and ‘France’, scattered through them, but no single phrase that can be equated with ‘the king of France’ or ‘the author of Waverley’. Thus these translations are statements still about France and perhaps kingship, or perhaps Waverley and perhaps authorship, but there is nothing in them that would tempt us to say that they are about the king of France or the author of Waverley.
羅素回到了這個(gè)難題的最初形式；他指出，當(dāng)我們說(shuō)不存在帕格索斯或法國(guó)國(guó)王這樣的事物時(shí)，所談到的帕格索斯或法國(guó)國(guó)王的存在并不是必要條件他首先對(duì)包含所謂單稱摹狀詞的陳述進(jìn)行解釋單稱摹狀詞是使用定冠詞“這個(gè)”的單稱詞組，“這個(gè)法國(guó)國(guó)王”“這個(gè)瓦弗利的作者”就是這樣的詞組他并不直接解釋這些摹狀詞，而是解釋包含摹狀詞的陳述；原摹狀詞的成分，如“作者”和“瓦弗利”，或“國(guó)王”和“法國(guó)”，仍散布在經(jīng)過(guò)解釋而形成的新陳述中，但新陳述中不再包含與“這個(gè)法國(guó)國(guó)王”或“這個(gè)瓦弗利的作者”這些摹狀詞本身相對(duì)應(yīng)的單一短語(yǔ)所以經(jīng)過(guò)翻譯得到的新陳述也許仍是關(guān)于法國(guó)或王位的陳述，或關(guān)于瓦弗利和作者身份的陳述，但不再包含可能會(huì)誘惑我們認(rèn)為它談到了這個(gè)法國(guó)國(guó)王或這個(gè)瓦弗利的作者的任何成分作為語(yǔ)境翻譯的一個(gè)例子，我們看羅素是如何翻譯“這個(gè)法國(guó)國(guó)王是個(gè)禿子”這個(gè)陳述的：“存在著這樣一個(gè)對(duì)象x，這個(gè)對(duì)象是法國(guó)國(guó)王，而且如果任何對(duì)象y是法國(guó)國(guó)王的話，那么y就是x，而且這個(gè)對(duì)象是禿子”原來(lái)的主謂句變成了一個(gè)存在句，原來(lái)的主詞“這個(gè)法國(guó)國(guó)王”在翻譯句中不再有對(duì)應(yīng)的單一成分，因此我們不必在事先就認(rèn)為，要使我們作出的陳述有意義（真假且不論），必須有一個(gè)和“這個(gè)法國(guó)國(guó)王”相對(duì)應(yīng)的實(shí)體存在
13. ‘Pegasus’ can be handled similarly if we read it as short for a description: ‘the winged horse captured by Bellerophon’. So for all proper names.
“帕格索斯”也可進(jìn)行類似的處理，如果我們將它視為“柏勒洛豐捕獲的那匹有翼的馬”這個(gè)摹狀詞的縮寫的話以上處理也適用于所有的專名
14. The same process is at work here as in the treatment of words like ‘nothing’: paraphrase the context so that no single segment survives answerable to the troublesome substantive in question. The substantive ‘nothing’ itself received no translation, but simply disappeared on translation of the contexts as wholes; and similarly now for the substantive ‘Pegasus’ or ‘the king of France’ or ‘the author of Waverley’. The terms surviving in the translations are terms not giving rise to the perplexities that prompted the analysis; and those perplexity are thereby shown to be by-products of gratuitous, avoidable portions of language.
羅素對(duì)摹狀詞的處理和我們上面對(duì)“無(wú)物”的處理是類似的：改寫包含這些成問(wèn)題的實(shí)詞的語(yǔ)境，使新語(yǔ)境中不再包含與它們相應(yīng)的單一成分實(shí)詞“無(wú)物”本身并沒(méi)有被翻譯，但在對(duì)包含它的整個(gè)語(yǔ)境的翻譯中消失了；同樣地，實(shí)詞“帕格索斯”“這個(gè)法國(guó)國(guó)王”和“這個(gè)瓦弗利的作者”在翻譯中也消失了翻譯所得的新語(yǔ)境中的詞項(xiàng)不會(huì)引發(fā)要求分析的那些困惑；因此，那些困惑只是語(yǔ)言中的可以避免的不必要的部分的副產(chǎn)品
15. Logic is needed to guide such paraphrasing; and the suppler and subtler our logic is, the farther it can carry us in philosophical enterprises of this type.
邏輯對(duì)于指引這類翻譯是必需的，而且我們對(duì)邏輯越是精通和敏感，我們?cè)谶@類哲學(xué)事業(yè)中就會(huì)走得越遠(yuǎn)
16. Now there is also another conspicuous domain of philosophy in which such logical paraphrasing plays a central role. This is in the empiricistic program of constructing the world from experience.
邏輯解釋發(fā)揮核心作用的還有另一個(gè)引人注目的哲學(xué)領(lǐng)域，這便是從經(jīng)驗(yàn)中構(gòu)造出世界的經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義綱領(lǐng)
17. Hume’s notion was that all our ideas are composite of so-called simple ideas, each of which is a straight copy of some simple sense datum. Essentially this was also Locke’s point of view. According to the doctrine, every meaningful word—meaningful in the sense of expressing an idea—evidently ought to be translatable into a complex of words each of which, individually, names a simple sense impression.
休謨主張，我們的全部觀念都是所謂的簡(jiǎn)單觀念的復(fù)合，而每一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單觀念都只是某個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的感覺材料的摹本這實(shí)際上也是洛克的觀點(diǎn)根據(jù)這個(gè)學(xué)說(shuō)，每一個(gè)有意義的詞—即每一個(gè)能夠表達(dá)觀念的詞—明顯地應(yīng)該翻譯為簡(jiǎn)單的詞的組合，而每一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的詞，都命名了一個(gè)獨(dú)一無(wú)二的簡(jiǎn)單的感覺印象
18. But this is an intolerably strict standard of meaningfulness, as becomes apparent the minute you try to put it into practice at all. Whatever our own criterion of a simple impression may be, certainly a mere roster of names of simple impressions isn’t going to be enough. By merely putting such names together, and taking new words as abbreviations of the compounds, we can’t begin to build a serious language; and men like Hume and Locke can scarcely have thought we could.
但是，我們?nèi)绻?dāng)真實(shí)施這個(gè)方案，將會(huì)清楚地看到，這個(gè)意義標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的嚴(yán)格性是令人無(wú)法容忍的不管我們關(guān)于簡(jiǎn)單印象的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是什么，這些簡(jiǎn)單印象的單純的花名冊(cè)肯定是不管用的僅僅把這些名字堆在一起，并引入作為它們縮寫的新詞，我們是無(wú)法開始構(gòu)建真正像樣子的語(yǔ)言的，即使是休謨和洛克這樣的人大概也不會(huì)認(rèn)為我們能夠吧
19. At the very least we are going to need various auxiliary connectives; and in fact we shall need much more.
除了表示簡(jiǎn)單印象的名字，我們最起碼還需要很多輔助性的聯(lián)結(jié)詞；事實(shí)上，我們需要的要比這些多得多
20. Without trying to decide what Hume and Locke wanted, I expect we can agree among ourselves that the most the empiricist can reasonably demand is definition of words in context, sentence by sentence. We suppose a basic language which talks, in specified ways, about direct sense data; and then all further meaningful sentences are to be translatable as wholes into sentences of that basic language. Individual words of the derivative language need not go over directly into complexes of words of the basic language. The word ‘nothing’ did not go over into any continuous segment of quantification notation, but the sentences containing that word were translated systematically as wholes; similarly for descriptions; and the same may be expected when we undertake constructions upon a basic language of empiricism.
我們先不管休謨和洛克是怎么想的，但我希望在我們之間能達(dá)成共識(shí)：經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義者能夠合理要求的，最多不過(guò)是對(duì)詞的逐句逐句的語(yǔ)境定義我們假定有某個(gè)基本語(yǔ)言，它可以用來(lái)具體地談?wù)撨@樣那樣的直接感覺材料；然后所有其他有意義的句子都可以翻譯為基本語(yǔ)言中的句子派生語(yǔ)言中的單個(gè)的詞不必直譯為基本語(yǔ)言中的詞的組合“無(wú)物”這個(gè)詞，還有所有的摹狀詞，在量化記號(hào)系統(tǒng)中并沒(méi)有對(duì)應(yīng)的連續(xù)性成分，但包含它們的句子卻可以得到整體上的翻譯當(dāng)我們?cè)噲D將全部語(yǔ)言翻譯為經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義的基本語(yǔ)言時(shí)，也可以提出同樣的要求，即逐句逐句翻譯的要求
21. This being the case, there is full scope again for all the resources of the supplest and subtlest logic we can contrive; the better we are at logic, the farther we can hope to get in our constructions, and the more of everyday and scientific language we can hope to reduce to that basic language, whatever it may be, which empiricism allows us as a starting point. For, a surprising amount can be done through contextual definition if one has techniques for finding his way through the mazes.
在語(yǔ)境翻譯的前提下，我們還要充分運(yùn)用邏輯的資源，我們對(duì)邏輯越是擅長(zhǎng)和敏感，我們的邏輯構(gòu)造就會(huì)走得越遠(yuǎn)，日常語(yǔ)言和科學(xué)語(yǔ)言能被翻譯為作為經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義起點(diǎn)的基本語(yǔ)言（且不管這個(gè)基本語(yǔ)言的具體內(nèi)容）的部分也就越多如果我們有穿越迷宮的邏輯技術(shù)，語(yǔ)境翻譯就能推展到許多令人乍舌的角落
22. This is strikingly brought out by reading Carnap’s rare and little known Der Logische Aufbau der Welt. Although Carnap by no means succeeds in reducing the whole of everyday or scientific discourse to the very meager basic language of experience which he allows himself, he does get startlingly far along the way. Many of his constructions are complex and ingenious and few of them could have been achieved without high proficiency in modern logic.
卡爾納普的世界的邏輯構(gòu)造一書就達(dá)到了這樣一個(gè)令人乍舌的地步盡管卡爾納普并沒(méi)有實(shí)現(xiàn)將全部日常語(yǔ)言和科學(xué)語(yǔ)言都還原為他所期許的那種表達(dá)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的貧乏的基本語(yǔ)言，但他確實(shí)達(dá)到了一個(gè)令人吃驚的水平他的許多構(gòu)造既復(fù)雜又巧妙，如果沒(méi)有對(duì)現(xiàn)代邏輯的嫻熟的運(yùn)用，這些構(gòu)造基本上是作不出來(lái)的
23. Much had been said in an empiricistic vein in recent centuries, but the Aufbau is so far as I know the first serious effort to put the program of epistemological reduction rigorously into effect. The problem couldn’t even have been seriously tackled without the benefit of modern advances in mathematical logic. As Professor Sheffer remarked an hour ago, the importance of logic to philosophy is simply the importance of basic experience.
在最近幾個(gè)世紀(jì)里，我們聽到了很多經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義的言論，但就我所知，構(gòu)造一書卻是把認(rèn)識(shí)論還原方案嚴(yán)格地付諸實(shí)施的第一次嚴(yán)肅的嘗試如果不是受惠于數(shù)理邏輯的最新進(jìn)展，這個(gè)問(wèn)題根本就無(wú)法予以嚴(yán)肅的對(duì)待正如 謝弗教授一小時(shí)前所評(píng)論的那樣，邏輯對(duì)哲學(xué)的重要性就是基本經(jīng)驗(yàn)的重要性
24. Even so, there is reason to suppose that the program of straight reduction to a basic language of experience can never be carried through in completion—not even granted all the liberality of contextual definition and all the earnestness of modern logic. I expect that empiricists are bound, eventually—as most, including Carnap, already have done—to relax their demand of translatability, and to require only that every meaningful statement be related to the basic language, in some way short of out and out translatability.
盡管如此，我們?nèi)杂欣碛烧J(rèn)為，即使用上比較開明的語(yǔ)境定義的方法和現(xiàn)代邏輯的全部看家本領(lǐng)，直接還原為描述經(jīng)驗(yàn)的基本語(yǔ)言的方案仍不會(huì)完全成功我希望經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義者最終會(huì)放松他們對(duì)可翻譯性的要求，轉(zhuǎn)而只要求每一個(gè)有意義的陳述與基本語(yǔ)言以某種方式發(fā)生關(guān)系，這種關(guān)系不再是徹底的翻譯關(guān)系而事實(shí)上，包括卡爾納普在內(nèi)的多數(shù)經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義者已經(jīng)在這樣做了
25. Just what the basic language should be is itself a question, but this I shall pass over. Another question is: what relations should we demand between the statements of science and the basic language, if full translatability in not to be insisted on?
基本語(yǔ)言應(yīng)該是個(gè)什么樣子，這本身其實(shí)也是個(gè)問(wèn)題，不過(guò)我在這里將略而不論另一個(gè)問(wèn)題是，如果我們不再堅(jiān)持完全的可翻譯性，那么我們應(yīng)該要求科學(xué)中的陳述與基本語(yǔ)言有著怎樣一種關(guān)系呢？
