Yet in making the self-referential (exemplary) normative judgment that others ought to judge as I do (and hence come to feel the same aesthetic pleasure that I do), I am also making the normative judgment that I ought to be judging as others (who have taste) do. That is, I seem to be presupposing that my own subjective tastes (that is, judgments) are also universal, or at least universally communicable. (My own sub- jective pleasures may not and need not be so universally communicable.) In making normative aesthetic judgments, therefore, we seem to be engaged in a non—rule bound way of adjusting our own judgments of tastes to what others ideally would do and of making normative demands on others as to what kinds of judgments they therefore should make. We presuppose, that is, that a community of rational beings would have to mutually adjust their own judgments of taste so as to maintain the normative force of their own judgments.
? ? 然而，在作出一個自指的（典型的）規(guī)范判斷——即他人應(yīng)當(dāng)像我一樣作出判斷（他人因此開始像我一樣感受到相同的審美愉悅）的時候，我同樣也在作出一個規(guī)范的判斷——即我應(yīng)當(dāng)像他人（具有鑒賞力的他人）一樣作出判斷。這就是說，我看來好像在假定我自己的主觀鑒賞力（即判斷力）同樣也是普遍的或至少是普遍地可傳達的。（我自己的主觀快樂不可能且不需要是那么普遍地可傳達的。）所以說，在作出規(guī)范的審美判斷時，我們看來好像涉及一種與非規(guī)則密切相關(guān)的方法，調(diào)整我們自己的審美判斷力以適應(yīng)他人理想地應(yīng)該做的事情，按照他人因此應(yīng)該作出何種判斷來對他人提出規(guī)范的要求。也就是說，我們假定理性存在者的共同體必將相互調(diào)整他們自己的審美判斷力以便維持他們自己判斷力的規(guī)范力量。
This only shows, Hegel argues, that the experience of beauty on Kant’s own terms demonstrates that “the opposition between intuition and concept falls aw^ay.”'^^ I cannot perceive the beautiful by just receptively taking in some experience and then applying a formal norm to that experience. Rather, in order to have the aesthetic perception, I must already have a sense of myself as situated in a larger whole, namely, the community of rational agents in terms of which I adjust my reflective judgments as to what I am experiencing and who, I must presuppose, are also adjusting their reflective judgments to the normative demands I place on them. However, this implies that this reflective judgment cannot therefore be a matter of reflection (in the sense that Hegel uses it), since it does not involve the application of any norm to some given content. The pleasure that comes from the aesthetic judgment about an object is not a sensation, not any kind of elemental “vibration” in experience, but a pleasure that is the feeling that my cognitive powers are working as they ought to\ it is a pleasure that results from my grasp of their harmonious “free play,” from the self-legislating spontaneity of the mind. Most importantly, Kant seems to be saying that I impose a norm on myself by adjusting my judgments in light of a prior orientation toward what I take other rational agents to be doing.? This self-orienting must be presupposed in order for me to make any reflective aesthetic judgment at all. The problem, of course, is, as Kant admits, that this orientation is itself rather indeterminate and general; the important point, however, is that it cannot be a matter of rules, since it is the community of rational agents themselves that are legislating the rules for themselves in a kind of idealized form of mutual imposition as mutual adjustment of judgments.
? ? 以上論述只不過表明，黑格爾認為，康德自己術(shù)語意義上的審美經(jīng)驗證明“直觀與概念之間的對立消失了”。我不可能只是通過愿意接受某種經(jīng)驗且進而把正式的規(guī)范應(yīng)用于這種經(jīng)驗來感知美的東西。恰恰相反，為具有美感，我必須已經(jīng)感覺到我自己置身于更大整體中，即，置身于理性行動者共同體中，根據(jù)共同體，我調(diào)整我按照下列東西作出的反思判斷：我在經(jīng)驗的東西與誰，我必須假定，同樣也在調(diào)整他們的反思判斷以適應(yīng)我對他們寄予的規(guī)范要求。然而，這就暗示反思的判斷因此不可能是反思的問題（從黑格爾使用反思意義上說），因為反思的判斷不涉及把任何規(guī)范應(yīng)用于某種給定的內(nèi)容。那出自關(guān)于對象的審美判斷的愉悅不是一種感覺的東西，不是某種經(jīng)驗元素的“共鳴”，而是一種作為我認識能力像它應(yīng)該作出那樣作出的感覺的愉悅；正是愉悅產(chǎn)生于我對我認識能力和諧的“自由嬉戲”式的把握，產(chǎn)生于對心靈自發(fā)的自律。最重要的，康德看來好像在說我借助一種做法把規(guī)范強加于我自己，即我根據(jù)對我以為其他理性行動者還將做的事情的先驗定向來調(diào)整我自己的判斷?！斑@自我定向必須被預(yù)先假定以便我完全作出任何反思的審美判斷。問題無疑是，像康德承認的，這定向本身是很難確定的和一般的東西；然而，重要的一點在于這定向不可能是規(guī)則的問題，因為正是理性行動者自身的共同體以一種理想化的相互強加形式為行動者們自己制定規(guī)則以便他們相互調(diào)整判斷。
Kant’s conception of aesthetic judgment as involving mutual adjustment of judgments thus gave Hegel a new way of thinking about something that had long bothered him. The author of the “The Oldest System Program in German Idealism” had stated that the state could not be a realization of freedom, since the state was only a Hobbesian or Wolffian social “machine.” But in exploring the Critique of Judgment, Hegel must have taken notice - although he does not mention it in “Faith and Knowledge” - of the crucial footnote in which Kant had explicitly compared his idea of the way in which we judge organisms to be purposive to the way in which “a” society had been similarly “readjusted” by recent political events (almost certainly an allusion on Kant’s part to the American Revolution). In that note, Kant asserted, “For each member in such a whole should indeed be not merely a means but also an end; and while each member contributes to making the whole possible, the Idea of that whole should in turn determine the member’s position and function.”'^’ Hegel would have seen Kant’s enticing analogy between the intrinsic purposiveness of organisms and rational social life to be further support for his notion of the way the Kantian conception of aesthetic judgment should be developed beyond the realm of aesthetic judgments per se.
? ? 康德把審美判斷力設(shè)想成牽涉理性行動者相互調(diào)整判斷，因而為黑格爾開辟了一條新的用以思考某種長期以來始終使他感到迷惑不解的東西的路徑?！兜聡ㄐ闹髁x最早體系綱領(lǐng)》的作者早已挑明，國家不可能代表自由的實現(xiàn)，因為國家只不過是一臺霍布斯式或沃爾夫式的社會“機器”?？墒窃诳疾炜档隆杜袛嗔ε小窌r，黑格爾想必已經(jīng)注意到——雖然他在《信仰與知識》中沒提到——一個至關(guān)重要的腳注，在這個腳注中，康德已經(jīng)明確地把他所設(shè)想的我們借以判斷有目的有機體的方法比作“一個”社會借以被現(xiàn)時政治事件（幾乎肯定是康德部分地暗指美國革命）類似地“重新調(diào)整”的方法。在這個腳注中，康德斷言：“因為這樣一個整體中每個成員實際上都應(yīng)該不僅是手段而且也是目的；當(dāng)每個成員齊心合力使整體成為可能存在的時候，整體觀念反過來又應(yīng)該確定成員的地位和作用?！焙诟駹柎蟾虐芽档聦τ袡C體內(nèi)在目的與合理社會生活所作的誘人的類比看作進一步支撐康德關(guān)于某種方法的看法，依靠這種方法，康德的審美判斷力概念應(yīng)該得以推廣到審美判斷力自身領(lǐng)域以外。
In “Faith and Knowledge,” Hegel still retained much of Schelling’s explanatory apparatus for expressing all these claims even as he was starting to depart from Schelling’s own specihc employment of the apparatus. Thus, he accounted for this mutual adjustment of judgment by invoking Schelling’s notion of there being a “potency” (Potenz) in each level of things that is raised to a higher “potency” by virtue of the tensions within it. The higher “potency” of the original identity of intuition and understanding is “the understanding” itself. The original unity of self-consciousness has its lower “potency” in the multiplicity of sensuous intuitions, and when this original identity “simultaneously sets itself against the manifold, and constitutes itself within itself as universality, which is what makes it a higher potency,” then it constitutes within one and the same consciousness “the understanding,” which itself must be taken only as a more developed function within the whole (or the “identity”) that is conscious life.’^? (And, like Schelling, Hegel is drawn to the image of the magnet as the proper metaphor for this activity.)'^'’ Since this reflective judgment requires some orientation, Hegel concluded, rather strikingly and without much argument, that the idea of the intuitive intellect was not a regulative ideal at all but the “Idea of the transcendental imagination that we considered above.
? ? 在《信仰與知識》中，黑格爾仍然保留了謝林的很多解釋性成分以表述所有這些主張，恰恰其時他在開始擺脫謝林自己對這些成分的具體運用。因此，他借助某種做法來說明判斷的相互調(diào)整，就是訴諸謝林認為的在事物每一層面都存在著“乘方”（Potenzen），而且“乘方”被憑借它自身中張力提升到更高的“乘方”。直觀與知性原初同一的更高的“乘方”是“知性”自身。自我意識的原初統(tǒng)一因感性直觀的多樣性而具有它較低的“潛能”，而當(dāng)原初同一“同時使它自己反對雜多并使它自己在自身中構(gòu)成普遍性”，這意味著使得自我意識的原初同一具有更高潛能的時候，那么自我意識的原初同一在同一個意識領(lǐng)域構(gòu)成“知性”，“知性”本身必須僅僅被看作有著自覺生活的整體（或“統(tǒng)一物”）領(lǐng)域一種更加發(fā)達的官能。（而且，像謝林一樣，黑格爾被引得以對磁鐵的描述作為這種活動的恰當(dāng)比喻。）“因為反思的判斷需要某種取向，所以，黑格爾斷言，頗為引人注目地且單刀直入地斷言，直覺理智概念根本不是規(guī)定的理想，而是‘被我們上面考慮過的先驗想象力概念’。”
What gives “reflective” philosophy its appeal over and against such philosophies of the absolute, so Hegel argued, is its partial, one-sided assumption of the revolution in philosophy that was brought about in Kant’s works. It embodied what he called the “coloration of inwardness” and the tendencies of the most recent “fashionable culture,” namely, the notion that the “subject” must assume his own freedom, learn to think for himself, and choose his own ends. The “philosophies of reflection” therefore are not written off by Hegel as mistakes so much as they are seen as the penultimate stage of (or as evidence for) the completion of the historical process that has seen its political expression in the Revolution. This final stage can only come about through the offices of systematic philosophy, which by introducing us to the absolute reestablishes “the Idea of absolute freedom and along with it the absolute passion, the speculative Good Friday that was otherwise only the historical Good Friday.”'^' Hegel was probing once again his notion of radically reinterpreting religion in terms of idealist philosophy, of finding in Christianity the practice by which this “mutual adjustment” of judgments could be carried out in a modern, reconciliatory way.
? ? 使“反思的”哲學(xué)訴諸絕對哲學(xué)的，黑格爾也力主，是“反思的”哲學(xué)部分地和片面地假定康德著作中發(fā)起的哲學(xué)革命。這哲學(xué)革命體現(xiàn)了他所稱作的“本質(zhì)傾向”和最新“流行文化”的趨勢，即，在他看來，“主體”必須假定他自己的自由，必須學(xué)會獨立思考，必須選擇他自己的目的?！胺此嫉恼軐W(xué)”因此沒有被黑格爾一筆勾銷，沒有被當(dāng)作錯誤東西看待，而“反思的”哲學(xué)被看作倒數(shù)第二階段，那見證了法國大革命中政治表現(xiàn)的歷史過程的完成的倒數(shù)第二階段（或看作對這一完成的證明）。法國大革命中政治表現(xiàn)的歷史過程完成的最后階段只能是通過體系哲學(xué)來完成的任務(wù)，體系哲學(xué)借助把我們引向絕對從而重新確立“絕對自由觀念和跟絕對自由一道的絕對受動性，那僅僅是作歷史受難節(jié)的思辨受難節(jié)”。黑格爾將再度探討他設(shè)想的按照唯心主義哲學(xué)徹底地重新解釋宗教，將再度探討他設(shè)想的去發(fā)現(xiàn)基督教中一種實踐，通過這種實踐，判斷的“相互調(diào)整”可能以現(xiàn)代和解方式得以實現(xiàn)。
1802-1804; The Embryonic Hegelian System
Recognition and Social Life: The Break with Hdlderlin’s Conception
1802至1804年：醞釀中的黑格爾哲學(xué)體系
認識和社會生活：與荷爾德林構(gòu)想的決裂
Hegel’s viewpoint was rapidly evolving, and more hints of its direction can be gleaned from several works written between 1802 and 1804. One was a long essay published in parts in the Critical Journal of Philosophy in 1802 and 1803; “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, Its Place in Practical Philosophy, and Its Relation to the Positive Sciences of Law.”'^^ Around the same time, Hegel worked on two manuscripts, neither of which were published in his lifetime: a set of lecture notes (including what is now known as the “First Philosophy of Spirit”) and a lengthy sketch of part of his whole system, which has become known under the title the editors gave it, the System of Ethical Life {System der Sittlichkeit), a topic on which Hegel was lecturing at the time.'^^ In those works, Hegel was still attempting to bring his Frankfurt position into line with his newly adopted Schellingian views, combining those two influences in developing his own views vis-a-vis his longstanding interest in the developing political situations in France and Germany, Hegel ended up extending Schelling’s ideas in ways that find little parallel in Schelling’s own thought.Most importantly, he was led to take one of the most crucial and decisive steps toward formulating his own distinctive view.
? ? 黑格爾的觀點在迅速形成，他觀點發(fā)展方向的很多啟示在他寫于1802至1804年間若干篇著作中俯拾皆是。其中一篇是寫于1802至1803年間的部分刊發(fā)在《哲學(xué)評論雜志》上的長篇論文：“論對待自然法的科學(xué)方法、自然法在實踐哲學(xué)中的地位和自然法跟實定法律科學(xué)的關(guān)系。”大約在這同一時期，黑格爾致力于撰寫兩部手稿，這兩部手稿在他生前都沒有發(fā)表過：一套講稿（內(nèi)含現(xiàn)已聞名于世的“第一精神哲學(xué)”）和他整個體系的部分很長的綱要，這個綱要以編者給它加的標題《倫理體系》（System der Sittlichkeit）而聞名于世。在這批著作中，黑格爾仍然在嘗試使他法蘭克福時期立場與他新采用的對謝林的看法相一致，仍然在使這兩種具有影響的觀點融為一體用以發(fā)展他自己關(guān)于他長期以來感興趣的法國和德國發(fā)展著的政治形勢的看法。黑格爾終于不再在某些方面去延伸謝林的思想，因為這些方面幾乎和謝林自己的思想對不上號。最重要的是，他向系統(tǒng)闡述他自己別具一格的見解邁出了至關(guān)重要的決定性一步。
In the essay on “Natural Right,” Hegel took on what he saw as the two modern false starts in understanding natural rights: the empiricist, psychologistic theories of natural right typified by Hobbes and Locke, and the transcendental theories of natural right, typified by Kant and Fichte. The essay developed at some length what he took to be their myriad failures to acknowledge their hidden presuppositions, and he diagnosed the basic reason for such failure to be the way in which both types of theories attempted to develop a conception of a social “whole” out of the idea of a social contract among individuals already vested with normative authority outside of that social whole. Both of them failed, in Hegel’s eyes, because they could not understand how individuals are only “potencies” of a larger social whole and ultimately of the “absolute,” that is, ultimately “potencies” of “spirit.
? ? 在“自然法”這篇論文中，黑格爾把他看到的東西理解為現(xiàn)代人理解自然法的兩個錯誤的出發(fā)點：以霍布斯和洛克為代表的經(jīng)驗主義的心理學(xué)自然法理論與以康德和費希特為代表的先驗的自然法理論。這篇論文詳細闡述的是他所看作的他們根本未能承認他們隱含的假定，他進而分析這種失敗的基本原因在于一種方法，以這種方法，上述兩類理論嘗試闡述一種出之于社會契約幻想的社會“整體”概念，“整體”中的個體已經(jīng)被賦予社會整體之外的規(guī)范權(quán)力。上述兩種理論都無濟于事，在黑格爾眼里，因為它們不可能理解個體怎么只是一個更大的社會整體的“乘方”和最終只是“絕對”的“乘方”，也即最終只是“精神”的“乘方”。
To explain this, Hegel also brought into play a Fichtean idea of mutual “recognition” that gave him the key for which he had been looking in his attempts to work out his own views vis-a-vis Schelling’s and Holderlin’s.'-’'^ Hblderlin had convinced Hegel in Frankfurt that Fichte’s own procedure was too “subjective”; one simply could not begin with the “subject’s” certainty of itself and then ask how the “subject” manages to posit a world of “objects”; instead, one must begin with a commitment to an unarticulated unity of subject and object, which Hblderlin considered to be implicitly, nondiscursively in play in all the activities of our conscious lives. Hegel’s great insight in 1802 had been to develop Hblderlin’s point that one cannot begin with an isolated, individual subject experiencing the world and then ask how a world of objective experience gets built up out of the “inner” world of purely subjective experience; one must begin with an already shared world of subjects in a world making judgments in light of the “possible judgments” of others (the theme developed out of Kant’s third Critique in “Faith and Knowledge”). In 1803, Hegel developed that idea further: The “original unity” was not to be articulated in terms of Holderlin’s conception of a nondiscursive grasp of “Being”; it was to be understood as an inter subjective unity, a unity of mutually recognizing agents in the natural world. In the System of Ethical Life, his term for this unity was “absolute ethical life.”
? ? 為闡明上述問題，黑格爾也利用了費希特的相互“認識”的概念以便為他提供一把鑰匙，一把始終被他在嘗試提出他自己見解以跟謝林和荷爾德林見解相抗衡過程中尋找的鑰匙。荷爾德林早在法蘭克福時期就使黑格爾確信費希特自己的程序過于“主觀”；一個人完全不可能從“主體”關(guān)于它自身的確然性開始，完全不可能繼而追問“主體”怎樣設(shè)法設(shè)定“對象”世界；恰恰相反，一個人必須從相信存在著未經(jīng)闡述的主體與客體的統(tǒng)一開始，這種做法被荷爾德林認作是含蓄地、推論式地利用我們自覺生活中的一切活動。黑格爾在1803年時的大徹大悟在于推進了荷爾德林的下列觀點：一個人不可能從孤立的、個別的主體開始來體驗世界，不可能繼而追問客觀經(jīng)驗世界怎樣被依據(jù)純粹地主觀的經(jīng)驗的“精神”世界逐步建立起來；一個人必須從在世界中主體已經(jīng)分有的世界開始，必須從根據(jù)他人“可能的判斷”作出判斷開始（《信仰與知識》中闡述的這一主題發(fā)源于康德的第三《批判》）。在1803年，黑格爾進一步闡述了下列觀點：“原初的統(tǒng)一”不可能被根據(jù)荷爾德林對“存在的非推論式把握”的構(gòu)想加以系統(tǒng)闡述；它應(yīng)該被解讀為主體際的統(tǒng)一，即自然世界中相互認可的行動者的統(tǒng)一。在《倫理體系》中，他就這種統(tǒng)一所使用的術(shù)語是“絕對倫理”。
This concept of “recognition” gave Hegel a nondualistic, yet also nonreductionist account of the relation between spirit and nature. Hegel argued that the “ethical life” {Sittlichkeit) of any particular “people” must be construed entirely in terms of the patterns of entitlements and commitments that those individuals confer and sustain by acts of mutual recognition; it must not be construed as any kind of separate realm requiring its own special causal powers, nor as simply the result of a natural process. The difference between spirit and nature is thus not that between two different types of substance; it lies in the way in which humans are led to self-consciously regard themselves, to establish points of view on the world in addition to being natural entities in that world.? “Spirit,” as Hegel put it, “is the absolute intuition of itself as itself (or absolute knowing).”'^’
? ? “認識”這一概念為黑格爾提供了精神與自然關(guān)系的一種非二元論而又非還原論的說明。黑格爾論證道，任何特定“人們”的“倫理”（Sittlichkeit）必須被完全根據(jù)那些個人依靠相互認可行為從而賦予和支撐的權(quán)力與承諾的模式來加以理解；它未必將被理解成是任何種類需要它自己的特殊因果力量的獨立王國，它也未必將僅僅被理解成是自然過程的結(jié)果。精神與自然之間的差異因此不是兩種不同類型實體之間的差異；精神與自然的差異在于以某種方法人們被使得自覺地看待他們自己，被使得去確立關(guān)于世界和在世界中自然實有的觀點?！熬瘛?，像黑格爾說的，“是它純自身的絕對直觀（或絕對知識）”。
Moreover, we articulate this intersubjective unity in different ways depending on the purposive contexts in which we find ourselves. At any given moment, either “concepts” or “intuitions” can be playing the preponderant role in our conscious life. When our consciousness of things is preponderantly intuitive - when we are primarily aware of particular items and things - the conceptual element in experience is muted and blurred (but not absent); Hegel calls this the “subsumption of the concept under intuition.” It is that aspect of conscious life in which the appearance of things as simply being “given” to us is strongest. For example, our “practical feelings” (called the “practical potency”) of the need for something as elemental as food appears to us as an “intuitive” awareness of a singular and seemingly just “given” need for a particular object, and the element of conceptual (normative) activity at work in such needs is submerged within our consciousness. Nonetheless, even in those cases of the “concept’s being subsumed under intuition,” we still see things as such and such, for example, our seeing an apple as the kind of thing that would satisfy hunger, so that our “taking up” of the manifold of sense incorporates the elemental conceptual mediating activity at work in it.? On the other hand, when the element of conceptual mediation is more obviously in view, as when we perceive something as a tool, we have a case of “intuition’s being subsumed under the concept.” Seeing something as a tool is seeing it more self-consciously in terms of certain “concepts” it instantiates, in terms of the ways in which it fits into our practical projects. The intuition of apples thus seems like a “given,” but the intuition of tools seems much less “given.” Both ways of “seeming” are the result of the interplay of “concept” and “intuition” and of the relative weight each plays in their different purposive contexts.
? ? 尚不止于此，我們以不同的方式系統(tǒng)闡述主體際的統(tǒng)一，不同的方式仰賴于在其中我們找尋我們自己的有目的的語境。在任何特定的環(huán)節(jié)，要么“概念”要么“直觀”能夠在我們自覺的生活中扮演重要的角色。當(dāng)我們關(guān)于事物的意識主要是直觀的時候——當(dāng)我們主要意識到具體項和事物的時候——經(jīng)驗中概念元素緘默不語、模糊不清（而非不在場）；黑格爾稱這種情況為“在直觀支配下概念的歸入”。這就意味著，自覺的生活方面是最強烈的，在自覺的生活中，事物的現(xiàn)象只不過是“被給予”我們而已。舉例來說，在我們看來，我們需要某種像食物一樣須臾不可離開的東西的“實際感受”（被稱作“實際潛能”）顯露我們“直觀地”意識到唯一且似乎只是“給予式地”需要具體的對象，在這些需要中發(fā)揮作用的概念（規(guī)范）活動元素淹沒在我們的意識領(lǐng)域。然而，即使在“概念被以直觀加以歸納”的這些情況下，我們?nèi)匀话涯澄铩缥覀儼烟O果看作一種應(yīng)該消除饑餓的東西——所以，我們對感性雜多的“接納”包含在感性雜多中起作用的元素式的概念中介活動。另一方面，當(dāng)概念中介元素被更明顯地看到的時候，像當(dāng)我們把事物作為工具的時候一樣，我們具有“直觀被依照概念歸納”的問題。把某物看作工具，就是更為自覺地根據(jù)某物用具體例子說明的那些“概念”來看待某物，就是自覺地按照被標物借以符合于我們的實際計劃的方式來看待某物。蘋果的直觀因此看起來像“給予物”，而工具的直觀看起來不大像“給予物”。這兩種“看起來”的方式都是“概念”與“直觀”相互作用的結(jié)果，都是這兩種方式中每種方式在它們不同的有目的語境中發(fā)揮作用的相對重要的結(jié)果。
We progress from being natural creatures with relatively straightforward organic needs to being complex laboring creatures who work in order to satisfy those needs; labor and its concomitant use of tools in turn raises us to being social creatures, mutually shaping each other through an even more complex process of “formative culture,” Bildung, and this progression is articulated in the language of the “potencies.”'^* The law-governed regularities of nature (the first “potency”) are thus necessary for the normativity of social life (the second “potency”), but these normative features of human agency are not thereby reducible to these natural regularities. The great difference between the two kinds of life - organic and social — is that just as “the single individual was dominant in the first potency, the universal is dominant” at the potency of the social level.Thus, in Hegel’s preferred Schellingian way of putting the matter: “Man is potency, is universality for the other, but the other is just as much the same for him; and so he makes his reality, his unique being, his effecting this into himself into an incorporation into indifference, and he is now the universal in contrast to the first potency.
? ? 我們從具有相對地簡單的有機需要的自然動物進化到復(fù)雜的進行工作以滿足需要的會勞動動物；勞動及其伴隨工具的使用又依次把我們提升為社會動物，二者通過“教養(yǎng)”（Bildung）這一更為復(fù)雜的進化過程而相輔相成，這一進化過程被以“潛能”這類術(shù)語加以系統(tǒng)闡述。受到規(guī)律支配的自然（第一“潛能”）規(guī)則性因而是社會生活的規(guī)范（第二“潛能”）必需的東西，但行動者的這些規(guī)范特征沒有因此淪落為這些自然規(guī)則性。這兩種生活——有機生活與社會生活——之間的巨大差異在于，正像“單一個體過去支配第一潛能一樣，具體的普遍現(xiàn)在支配‘社會層面的潛能’”。所以，由于黑格爾更喜愛謝林提出問題的方式：“人是潛能，是他人的普適性，但他人恰恰等同于他；所以他使他的現(xiàn)實、他的唯一的存在，他對這的影響、變成他自已，變成結(jié)合，變成中立，而他現(xiàn)在與第一潛能形成對比的具體的普遍?！?br>
Hegel returned to these themes a year later in 1803 and developed them even further. With Schelling’s departure for Wurzburg in the summer of 1803 the personal and professional demands of fitting his rapidly developing thought into Schellingian form began to ease, and in his lectures during this period Hegel took the opportunity to sharpen his own thoughts with the aim of producing his own system in the form of a book (which he desperately needed to secure a salaried position).? What remains of the lecture notes written between 1803 and 1806 has become known to us as the Jena System Drafts {Jenaer Systementipurfe).''*'
? ? 黑格爾在1803年晚些時候回到了上述這些論題并且對它們加以進一步闡述。隨著謝林1803年夏去維爾茨堡，適合使他思想迅速發(fā)展為謝林形式的個人要求和職業(yè)要求已經(jīng)不復(fù)存在，在他這個時期講課中，黑格爾用這個機會來磨礪他自己的思想，目的在于將以書的形式創(chuàng)立他自己的哲學(xué)體系（這就使他極需弄到個帶薪的職位）。依然是那批寫于1803年和1806年的講稿現(xiàn)已成了眾所周知的《耶拿體系草案》（Jenaer Systementwürfe）。
In the 1803-04 manuscripts, there is much more emphasis on the notion of “consciousness” than there is in, for example, the System of Ethical Life, but the lines of thought are fairly continuous. Hegel uses the perception of color to illustrate how the “potencies” work in ex- plaining sensuous “consciousness.” There is first of all the sheer givenness of the sensation of color, but “spirit as sensing is itself animal, submerged in nature.”*-*^ This first “potency” does not give us the consciousness of color but merely the animal-like discrimination of color. To have consciousness of a color, one must be able to report on the experience, and one’s report on the experience (as a sensing of blue, for example) is a correct report only if it is sanctioned as reasonable according to the norms of one’s linguistic community. For the agent to be able to make such a normatively correct report, a particular sensation of color must be taken up by him and inferentially linked to other color concepts, and he must, moreover, be able to understand a “particular” sensing of blue as an instance of the “general” color blue. Thus, there are three such “potencies”: in Hegel’s own words, “[i] in sensation as determinateness of blue, for example, and [2] then as concept, formally and ideally related to others as names, as opposed to them and at the same time as identical with them in that they are colors, and [3] in this, simply, universally as color.(These three “potencies” for Hegel correspond to the functions in consciousness of sensation, imagination, and memory.)
? ? 在1803年至1804年的手稿中，更多的是強調(diào)“意識”概念而不是例如《倫理體系》中的內(nèi)容，但手稿中的思路與黑格爾之前作品中的思路一脈相承。黑格爾用顏色感來具體說明“潛能”怎樣被用來“解釋感性”意識。首先存在著純粹的給予性的顏色感，但“精神”作為鑒賞力本身是動物般的，被淹沒在自然中。這第一“潛能”沒有賦予我們顏色意識而只賦予我們對顏色的動物似的區(qū)分。為具有顏色意識，一個人必須能夠?qū)?jīng)驗作出描述，一個人對經(jīng)驗的描述（例如把經(jīng)驗描述成藍色感）是一個正確的描述，唯一的條件是它被認可是按照一個人的語言共同體中規(guī)范作出的合理描述。就某個行動者能夠作出這樣一種合乎規(guī)范的正確描述而言，具體的顏色感必須被他接納且被推論式地與其他顏色概念相聯(lián)系，而且他必須能夠把“具體的”藍色感理解成是“一般”藍色的例子。所以，存在著三種這樣的“潛能”：用黑格爾自己的話說，例如，[1] 確定藍色感的“潛能”，[2] 再者作為概念的“潛能”，概念形式上合乎理想地與作為名詞的他者相關(guān)聯(lián)，是跟他者相對立的，同時概念是與他者相統(tǒng)一的，因為他者是顏色，[3] 只不過普遍地作為顏色感的“潛能”。（上述這三種“潛能”對于黑格爾來說具有相應(yīng)的感覺意識功能、想象力意識功能和記憶意識功能。）“意識”在作為個體的行動者與“精神”之間起著中介的作用。
“Consciousness” mediates between the individual agent and “spirit.” The individual organic agent comes to be conscious of the natural world insofar as he manages to respond judgmentally, normatively, and not merely habitually to nature: not merely to have sensations of blue or to be able to discriminate blue things from non-blue things but to be able to report that he is experiencing blue and to evaluate that report in terms of whether it meets the standards of correctness held by his linguistic community. (That is, to be able to say both things like, “That looks blue to me,” and, “Oh, it’s not really blue, it only looked blue.”) The norms for being able to respond appropriately to episodes of sensing blue by saying things like, “That’s blue” or “That’s funny; it looked blue in that light,” are relative to the relevant linguistic community; or, as Hegel puts it, “the preceding potencies, in general, are ideal, they exist for the first time in a people: Language only is as the language of a people, and understanding and reason likewise.”''^
? ? 作為個體的有機行動者逐漸意識到物質(zhì)世界，就他想方設(shè)法對自然作出判斷式地、規(guī)范式地而不僅僅習(xí)慣式地反映而言：不僅具有藍色感或能夠區(qū)分藍色的東西和非藍色的東西，而且能夠描述他在體驗藍色的東西，并能夠根據(jù)這種描述是不是符合為他語言共同體所擁有的正確標準來評估這種描述。就是說，他能夠作出像“那在我看起來是藍色的”和“哦，它確實不是藍色的，它只是看起來是藍色的”一樣的兩種表述。這些規(guī)范，就它們能夠依靠作出像“那是藍色的”或“那是滑稽的；它被光線照著看起來是藍色的”一樣的表述來對藍色感的經(jīng)驗作出恰當(dāng)?shù)姆磻?yīng)而言，涉及有關(guān)的語言共同體；或者說，像黑格爾論述的，“那些先在的潛能通常是理想化的，它們最初存在于國民中：語言僅僅作為國民的語言而存在，知性和理性也同樣如此?！?br>
In the 1803-04 manuscripts, the notion of “recognition” received some substantial reworking. The Kantian idea of “mutual adjustment of judgments” in “Faith and Knowledge” became transmuted into an original struggle for recognition that possessed its own logic. Agents, as occupying a particular physical part of the world and having a subjective, personal point of view on that world necessarily appear to each other as particular points of view, as “excluding” each other: As Hegel puts it, “each appears in the consciousness of the other as that which excludes him from the whole extension of his individuality,” and this leads to a struggle to determine whose point of view is to be normatively dominant.'"*^ Since there is no given objective point of view to which the agents can turn to resolve such epistemic disputes between themselves, they must struggle to the death. The reasoning in the rather condensed lecture notes of 1803-04 seems to be that each agent must orient and situate himself with some conception of a “whole” of such judgments, and thus each at first claims to be that “whole,” an “absolute consciousness,” not as a matter of fulfilling some Hobbesian desire for power or security, but in order to be recognized simply “as rational, as totality in truth.He who capitulates, who would rather live than risk his life to preserve his claims to being an “absolute consciousness,” becomes “for the other immediately a non-totality, he is not absolutely for himself, he becomes the slave of the other.
? ? 在1803年至1804年的手稿里，“認識”這一概念得到了某些實實在在的修正。康德關(guān)于“判斷相互調(diào)整”的想法在《信仰與知識》中變成了擁有它自己的邏輯認識的原初斗爭。行動者，作為占有世界的具體物質(zhì)部分和具有關(guān)于世界的主觀個人觀點的行動者，必然相互看來好像是具體的觀點，是彼此“排斥的”：像黑格爾論述的，“每個人在他者的意識中都表現(xiàn)為排除了他個性的全部延展的東西”，這就導(dǎo)致了一場斗爭以確定誰的觀點必將規(guī)范上是占支配地位的觀點?！耙驗楦揪筒淮嬖谥袆诱邆兡軌蛸囈越鉀Q他們自己之間的這些認識上爭論的給定的客觀觀點，所以他們必須進行殊死搏斗。”1803年至1804年頗為濃密的講稿中的推論看來好像意味著每個行動者都必須使他自己適應(yīng)和置于這些判斷的“整體”的某種概念，因此每個行動者起初都聲稱屬于這個“整體”，屬于“絕對意識”，不是作為滿足霍布斯式的某種權(quán)力欲或安全欲的問題，而僅僅為了被認作是“合理的問題，真理的總體?！闭乔鼜牡乃菍幙善降疃辉馐芪ｋU以保全他關(guān)于“絕對意識”的主張的他，“為了他者而立刻”變成了“非總體，他絕對不是為了他自己，他成為他者的奴隸?！?br>
This lopsidedness of recognition - its going one way and not the other - is, he says, an “absolute contradiction,” something that cannot be sustained.He who becomes the slave is posited in the relationship as someone whose claims to knowledge and truth can only be interpreted as being subordinate to somebody else’s point of view, and the slave thus becomes the type of being who is incapable of bestowing the recognition that is necessary upon those for whom he is the slave. In his lecture notes, Hegel concluded that the mutual failure at securing such recognition compels both agents to acknowledge and develop that “absolutely universal consciousness” within themselves that makes it possible to conciliate their respective positions.(In the surviving lecture fragments, this is as far as the argument goes; the rest of the surviving notes after the section on recognition are short, but they indicate that Hegel intended to carry out his argument in a similar vein to that found in the System of Ethical Life; the problems of economic dependence treated in the earlier manuscript are also articulated through examples taken directly from Adam Smith - at one point Hegel invokes Smith’s notion of the division of labor in a “pin factory” only to argue that it is only “machinelike” and therefore ultimately degrading to people.)
? ? 認識的這一失衡——認識傾向于一方而不傾向于另一方——是，他說道，“絕對矛盾”，是某種不可能被支撐的東西。“正是變成奴隸的他通常被置于他人的關(guān)系中，他人關(guān)于知識和真理的主張只能被解釋成是隸屬于其他他人的觀點，奴隸因此成了典型的不可能被賦予認識的人，認識是他為其做奴隸的人們所必需的。在他的講稿里，黑格爾得出的結(jié)論是，為保衛(wèi)這樣的認識而導(dǎo)致的兩敗俱傷，迫使兩個行動者承認和發(fā)展他們自身的“絕對地普世的意識”，這就使他們有可能調(diào)和他們各自的立場?！埃ㄔ跉埓娴闹v稿中，論證就到這里；在認識部分之后的其余現(xiàn)存的講稿篇幅上非常簡短，但它們標志著黑格爾打算以類似的語氣來論證見于《倫理體系》中的東西；他早期手稿中論述的經(jīng)濟依賴問題也通過直接從亞當(dāng)·斯密那里選出的一些例子得到系統(tǒng)闡述——在每個方面，黑格爾只不過求助于斯密“發(fā)夾廠”中分工這一概念來論證分工只是“像機器似的”東西，因此分工最終削弱人的力量。）
In the unpublished System of Ethical Li fe Hegel showed that he was struggling to put this new conception of “spirit” and “freedom” into play as a conception of how freedom is both a necessary feature of agency and something that is to be socially achieved. For us to understand the ways in which we deny or affirm that we or others are entitled to certain claims to knowledge or rights to action, we must understand the more fundamental unity in which such recognitional activities and statuses operate as an “Idea” of reason: As he put it, since the “Idea” is the “identity of concept and intuition,” we must always be operating with a notion, however obscure, of what it would mean to “get it right” in our judgmental activities.’^?
? ? 在他生前未發(fā)表的《倫理體系》中，黑格爾表明他在竭力把對“精神”與“自由”的新構(gòu)想，用來設(shè)想自由怎樣既必須是代理的特征也是某種將得到社會實現(xiàn)的東西。就我們理解借助這些方式我們否定或證實我們或他人可以作出關(guān)于知識或行動權(quán)的某些主張而言，我們必須理解一種更為基本的統(tǒng)一體，在這種統(tǒng)一體中，這些認識活動與地位發(fā)揮著理性的“觀念”的作用：像他指出的一樣，因為理性的“觀念”是“概念與直觀的統(tǒng)一”，所以我們必須始終在與理性的“觀念”通常意味著的在我們判斷活動中“搞清它”這一見解打交道，不管這一見解是多么晦澀難懂。
But it w'as also clear that we did not always “get it right” and that we have not always been in a position of freedom. That has to do, so Hegel argued, wfith the stance we assume toward nature. Nature does not determine our stance toward it; we spontaneously determine that, and it is our “distance” from natural determination that determines how adequate our realization of freedom is. Thus, he noted that natural “l(fā)ife” always has an element of “inequality” to it, that some have more “power” than others, and that when encounters between agents occur without the right kind of social mediation, the result cannot be complete mutuality of recognition but instead must be relations of domination, of “l(fā)ordship and bondage.”’^’
? ? 然而，同樣十分清楚的是，我們并不總是“搞清它”，我們沒有總是處在自由的位置。這涉及，黑格爾也堅稱，我們對自然所采取的態(tài)度。自然不決定我們對它的態(tài)度；我們自發(fā)地決定我們對自然的態(tài)度，正是我們與自然確定的“距離”決定我們對自由的認識是多么適當(dāng)。因而，他注意到，自然“生活”總是具有與自然“不相等”的元素，一些人具有比他人更多的“力量”，當(dāng)行動者在沒有通過一種正確的社會中介的情況下相遇的時候，結(jié)果不可能產(chǎn)生完整的相互認識關(guān)系而反倒必然產(chǎn)生支配關(guān)系和“統(tǒng)治與奴役”關(guān)系。
Hegel took the transition point between nature and sociality to be the family as a social unit founded on natural relations (those between the sexes) but incorporating within itself normative commitments and ethical ideals. The family is the “supreme totality” - that is, the most complex normative unity - “of which nature is capable.Other modes of sociality would then be founded on increasing departures from nature toward the ideal of “absolute ethical life,” which would be completely “indwelling within individuals and is their essence,”’” in which “the ethical life of the individual is one pulse beat of the whole system and is itself the whole system,” and in which the stances individuals jointly assume toward each other are free from natural determination.’” These increasing departures from nature toward sociality correspondingly mark increasingly adequate realizations of freedom (that is, of conditions under which the self-determination of norms rather than behavior according to natural regularities is possible). Following the family is therefore the economy, which arises out of the system of natural needs, of work with tools, of the organization of labor and the like; the economy eventually produces and gives way to what Hegel calls an “absolute ethical totality,” a people, a Volk, which is defined not along ethnic or racial lines (that is, not in terms of nature) but in terms of what ultimately collectively matters for it.'” The “universality” of a people “in which they are one is absolute indifference ... in which all natural difference is nullified,”'” which implies (in the Schellingian framework Hegel is using) that a “people” is not an unstable unity that pushes itself on toward any higher set of “potencies.”
? ? 黑格爾把自然與社會的轉(zhuǎn)變點看成是作為社會單位的家庭，家庭奠基于自然關(guān)系（不同性別之間的關(guān)系）而家庭自身中包含規(guī)范性承諾和倫理理想。家庭是“最高總體”——也即最復(fù)雜的規(guī)范統(tǒng)一體——“自然所能夠形成的統(tǒng)一體”。其他的社會模式于是應(yīng)該建立在逐漸離開自然而走向“絕對倫理”理想基礎(chǔ)上，“絕對倫理”總是完全“存在于個體中和構(gòu)成個體的本質(zhì)”。因此，“個體倫理是整體系統(tǒng)的一種顯露，它自身就是整體系統(tǒng)”，因此個體彼此共同采取的態(tài)度不受自然確定性的影響。這些逐漸從自然到社會性的偏移相應(yīng)地標志著越發(fā)適合自由的實現(xiàn)（也就是，這些條件的實現(xiàn)，在這些條件下，規(guī)范的自決而不是行為的自決按照自然規(guī)則性是可能存在的）。此后家庭從而成了經(jīng)濟單位，這種經(jīng)濟單位出之于自然需要系統(tǒng)，出之于使用工具進行勞動系統(tǒng)，出之于勞動的組織化系統(tǒng)以及出之于諸如此類的方面；家庭這種經(jīng)濟單位最終產(chǎn)生且讓位于黑格爾稱作的“絕對倫理總體”，民族（ **Volk** ），民族的界定不是按照種族的思路（也即不是根據(jù)自然的思路）而根據(jù)最終共同對民族至關(guān)重要的東西來界定民族?！白鳛橐粋€整體的民族的‘普世性’”是絕對中立的……在民族中一切自然差異都消除干凈?！斑@就意味著（在黑格爾所使用的謝林構(gòu)架中）‘民族’不是一個能夠把它自己推向任何一套更高‘潛能’的不穩(wěn)定的統(tǒng)一體。
Nonetheless, a particular “people” is not the “absolute indifference,” the point at which the tensions and oppositions in lower-order “potencies” no longer exist to drive the system on toward higher and higher unities.'” Behind all the different peoples is an unchanging spirit of “humanity.” Hegel noted that “the world-spirit, in every one of its shapes, has enjoyed its self-awareness, weaker or more developed but always absolute; it has enjoyed itself and its own essence in every nation under every system of laws and customs” - an indication, if nothing else, of just how strong was the hold that Holderlin’s ideas still exercised on Hegel.'” Rather than bring into play Schelling’s notion of history as the progressive revelation of God, Hegel stayed with the notion oi fate that he had worked out in the “Spirit of Christianity” and that had been inspired by Holderlin: Each people is destined to a “tragic fate,” and the rise and fall of peoples is “the performance within the realm of the ethical of the tragedy which the absolute eternally plays on itself.? . . . Tragedy consists in this, that ethical nature segregates its inorganic nature (in order not to become embroiled in it) as a fate (Schicksal), and places it outside itself; but by the recognition of this fate in its struggle against it, ethical nature is reconciled with the divine essence as the unity of both.”'” This conception of the way in which “spirit” appears in different historical forms, the particular conception of fate and divinity, is virtually the same as that found in Holderlin’s own notes on history and tragedy, an idea that informed much of Holderlin’s poetry in his short, brilliantly creative period after 1800."’" Thus, like Holderlin, Hegel asserted that such “divinity” appears in forms relative to the “people” for whom it is a divinity - “In this way the ideality as such must be given a pure absolute shape, and so must be regarded and worshipped as the nation’s God.”"’' In the System of Ethical Life, Hegel makes it clear that he thinks that there is an “absolute” conception of divinity but that it appears in particular forms for different peoples “This universality which has directly united the particular with itself is the divinity of the people, and this universal, intuited in the ideal form of particularity, is the God of the people.Nonetheless, Hegel seems to think that history must have an overall unity, noting rather darkly that “over the single stages [of each shape of spirit] there floats the idea of totality which, however, is mirrored back by its whole scattered image, and sees and recognizes itself therein” - another, rather oblique reference to the views of his former Frankfurt companion.
? ? 然而，一個“具體的”民族不是“絕對的中立”，不是一個中立點，在該中立點，較低秩序“潛能”中的張力與對立不復(fù)存在，不復(fù)迫使系統(tǒng)走向越來越高的統(tǒng)一體?！霸谒胁煌娜藗儽澈笫遣蛔兊摹祟悺??！焙诟駹栕⒁獾?，“世界精神，以它的每一種形式，享有它的自我意識，‘世界精神’時而較貧弱時而更加發(fā)達而總是非絕對莫屬；它享有它自身及其自己的本質(zhì)，存在于受法律和習(xí)慣的每一系統(tǒng)支配的每一民族中”——這就表明，如果說沒有什么其他區(qū)別的話，荷爾德林的觀念這種約束仍然對黑格爾的影響恰恰是多么強大。黑格爾不是不利用謝林關(guān)于歷史作為上帝的漸次啟示的見解，而是繼續(xù)采用那早就被他在《基督教精神及其命運》中制定出的且作為受到荷爾德林啟發(fā)產(chǎn)物的命運這一概念：每個民族都注定具有“悲劇的命運”，民族的興衰“表現(xiàn)在悲劇倫理領(lǐng)域，悲劇自身永遠受到絕對的影響?！北瘎≡谟诘氖?，倫理的自然分開它的作為命運（ **Schicksal** ）的無機自然（以便不被卷入無機自然，并把無機自然置于它自身之外；但借助在它與命運的抗?fàn)幹姓J識命運，倫理的自然跟作為倫理自然與無機自然統(tǒng)一的神的本質(zhì)相和解）。關(guān)于“精神”因之以不同形式顯露的方面構(gòu)想，關(guān)于命運與神性的具體構(gòu)想，實質(zhì)上等同于見于荷爾德林自己關(guān)于歷史與悲劇札記中的東西，實質(zhì)上等同于一種貫穿在荷爾德林1800年后短暫而光輝的創(chuàng)作時期很多詩篇中的想法?！耙虼?，像荷爾德林一樣，黑格爾斷言這種‘神性’以某些與‘民族’相關(guān)的形式顯現(xiàn)，就‘民族’而言這意味著神性——‘以這種方式，理想性本身必須被賦予一種純粹絕對的形式，因此理性本身必須被看作且散奉為特定民族的上帝?！凇秱惱眢w系》中，黑格爾明確地表示他認為存在著‘絕對’神性概念，但他同時認為‘絕對’神性概念以具體的形式向各種不同的民族顯露——‘這已直接把它自身和具體東西相結(jié)合的普世性就是特定民族的神性，這普世性，被以特殊的理想形式直觀的普世性，就是特定民族的上帝?！墒牵诟駹柨磥砗孟裾J為歷史必須具有總的統(tǒng)一體，看來好像頗為模糊地注意到‘在[精神每一形式]的單一階段上漂浮著總體觀念，總體觀念卻得到它整個消散的鏡像的反射，看到和認識到它自己在那里’——又一次頗為婉轉(zhuǎn)地提到他以前在法蘭克福時期同伴的見解。
Cameralism, the Estates, and Modernity in Germany
官房學(xué)、等級和德國現(xiàn)代性
These kinds of fundamental considerations permitted Hegel to return to the theme of Germanic freedom he had earlier discussed in the “German Constitution.” The crucial issue was, again, that of the “fate” of “Germanic freedom” and its correlated notion of “representation.” As he had done in “The German Constitution,” Hegel argued that a legal organization of society into estates was necessary for a free people, and he knew that in arguing in this way he was going against the trend.? The estates were already an outmoded institution in Hegel’s own day, and, by 1802, they seemed clearly to be destined to vanish. An estate was a social grouping according to legally recognized social rank (which tended to correlate with economic status but was not equivalent to it) in which members had certain rights and privileges peculiar to that estate. The classical medieval distinction of the estates had sorted them into nobility, ecclesiastics, and commoners according to the formula of one estate doing the work, one estate being in charge of spiritual activities, and one estate doing the fighting necessary for the common defense (at least according to Philip de Vitry’s virtually canonical 1335 description).'*’*' But as many had already recognized for quite some time, the category of those who did the “work” inadequately grouped together two very different economic groups: prosperous merchants and all the others who worked, including peasants. Even in the medieval world in which the tripartite division of the estates was most at home, the “townspeople” and the rural populations were still very different in wealth and power. By 1800, it seemed not only that the continued existence of the traditional estates was incompatible with the emerging sense of personal freedom in European life, but also that it was also putting a stranglehold on economic progress.
? ? 上述種種基本思考使黑格爾可以回過頭來論述他早先在《論德意志憲法》中探討的日耳曼人的自由這一主題。至關(guān)重要的再度是“日耳曼人自由”的“命運”問題及其相關(guān)的“代表”這一概念問題。像他早在《論德意志憲法》中就已論述的，黑格爾堅稱一個合法的具有等級的社會機構(gòu)是一個自由的民族所必需的，他同樣知道在以這種方法論證時他可能招惹眾怒。社會等級已經(jīng)成了黑格爾自己時代過時的制度，截至1802年的時候，社會等級看來顯然注定要走向滅亡。等級是按照得到合法認可的社會地位而形成的社會群體（社會地位往往涉及經(jīng)濟地位但不等于經(jīng)濟地位），在社會群體中，成員具有某些權(quán)利和這一等級特有的特權(quán)。中世紀對社會等級作出了經(jīng)典區(qū)分，把社會等級分成貴族、傳教士和平民，這種區(qū)分依照的慣例是某個等級做的工作，某個等級負責(zé)的精神活動，和某個等級做的為共同防御所必需的作戰(zhàn)（至少根據(jù)菲利普·德維特里實際教規(guī)第1335條的描述是這樣區(qū)分的）。但是像許多人早在很久以前就已認識到的，這類做特定“工作”的人們不適合組成兩個截然不同的經(jīng)濟群體：財源興旺的商人與所有做工的其他人，包括農(nóng)民。甚至在中世紀世界里，社會等級的三重劃分像家常便飯一樣，“城里人”與鄉(xiāng)下人在擁有財富和享有權(quán)力方面仍然有著天壤之別。到1800年，看來好像不僅傳統(tǒng)社會等級的繼續(xù)存在是與正在產(chǎn)生的歐洲生活中個人自由感不相一致的，而且傳統(tǒng)社會等級的繼續(xù)存在也正在壓制著經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展。
Hegel’s argument for their continued existence rested on his radical reinterpretation of them as ethical unities instead of natural or primarily economic social formations. Each estate, he argued, was constituted by the type of shared stance that its members took toward themselves, each other, and members of other estates. Thus, even though between 1802 and 1803 Hegel divided the three estates in a way that more or less mirrored the conventional distinctions at work in German law at the time - nobility. Burger (townsman), and peasant - he quite distinctively reinterpreted each of them: The estate of Burger (townsmen) was about the principle of “uprightness” (Rechtsschaffenheit); the aristocracy was about courage; and the peasantry about the virtue of “simple trust” in the nobility.'*’^
? ? 黑格爾對社會等級繼續(xù)存在的論證，仰賴于他激進地把社會等級重新解釋成是倫理統(tǒng)一體而非自然的社會組織或主要地經(jīng)濟的社會組織。每一等級，他論證道，都由這類具有共同立場的群體及該群體成員們對他們自己、對他們彼此之間、對其他等級成員所采取的態(tài)度組成。因此，盡管1801年至1803年黑格爾以一種或多或少反映在當(dāng)時德意志法律中所用的常規(guī)區(qū)分的方式來劃分三種等級——貴族、 **Bürger** （市民）和農(nóng)民——但他卻重新對它們中每個等級作了十分獨特的解釋： **Bürger** （市民）等級關(guān)心“誠實”（ **Rechtschaffenheit** ）原則；貴族關(guān)心勇敢；農(nóng)民關(guān)心“單純信仰”這一美德。
Hegel’s ideas on the necessity of the estates were clearly colored by his reactions to German cameralism, a doctrine developed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by and for German civil servants in the employment of various monarchs; the doctrine concerned itself with the proper methods for rationally administering a state with the goal of increasing its wealth. Cameralism assumed that society (specifically, German society) was in essence a harmonious whole and that the state should rationally administer the whole only so as to increase wealth for the state and should intervene in the workings of the social whole only in order to remedy distortions in it (for example, when individuals or groups were demanding more than their naturally just share or were engaged in activities that did not follow from their historical privileges).Cameralism was a theory of fiscal administration, holding that fiscal tasks should be both administratively centralized and made more uniform; it was thus very much tied into the leading ideas of the German Enlightenment and its related concepts of “enlightened absolutism” and the state as a “machine.” It did not hold that society itself should become more uniform, only that the rational, enlightened administration of society should become more uniform. According to cameralist theory, the fiscal administration of the “state” helped to coordinate the various corporate bodies of society; it did not reform them.'*’’
? ? 黑格爾的社會等級的必然性這一想法顯然受到他反對德國官房學(xué)的影響，德國官房學(xué)是17和18世紀期間由受雇于各種不同君主的德國文官們發(fā)展出且為他們服務(wù)的一種學(xué)說；這種學(xué)說涉及合理地管理國家目的在于增加國家財富的一些恰當(dāng)?shù)姆椒?。官房學(xué)假定社會（特別是德國社會）本質(zhì)上是一個和諧的整體，國家應(yīng)該合理地掌管這個整體而僅僅在于為國家增加財富，應(yīng)該干預(yù)社會整體的工作而僅僅為了消除社會整體中的扭曲（例如當(dāng)個體或團體過量要求他們的自然公正份額或從事一些不在他們歷史特權(quán)范圍內(nèi)活動的時候）?！肮俜繉W(xué)是一門財政管理理論，認為財政任務(wù)既應(yīng)該加以集中管理也應(yīng)該被使得更加統(tǒng)一；它因此與德國啟蒙運動一流思想和它相關(guān)的‘開明專制主義’概念及作為‘機器’的國家概念有著極為密切的聯(lián)系。官房學(xué)不認為社會本身應(yīng)該變得更加統(tǒng)一，只認為合理的、開明的社會管理應(yīng)該變得更加統(tǒng)一。”
Cameralism’s highly flawed foundations came into clear view around 1803-06 as the Holy Roman Empire was starting to exhale its last breaths. Its most basic problem was that, given the complex, particularistic existence of the hometowns, the intrinsic harmony that it postulated in German society simply did not exist. After the first wave of reaction to revolutionary French incursions into Germany, cameralist theory necessarily, although only gradually, began to shift toward notions of centralized social reform. At that point, it seemed that the state could only pursue the goal of increasing its aggregate wealth by claiming sovereignty over all elements of society, that is, by claiming that all the local, particularized corporate bodies with their unwritten, centuries-old sets of norms and practices had to submit to the rationalizing dictates of the centralized administration.
? ? 官房學(xué)漏洞百出的基本原理大約在1803年至1806年已經(jīng)清晰可見，其時神圣羅馬帝國已經(jīng)奄奄一息。它的最基本問題是，考慮到復(fù)雜的特殊恩寵論家鄉(xiāng)的存在，它所假定存在的德國社會固有的和諧是根本不存在的。在第一波反對法國大革命對德國的入侵后，財政學(xué)理論必需，盡管只是逐漸地，開始轉(zhuǎn)向以社會改革為中心的概念。在這方面，它看來好像認為國家只會借助下列的做法來達到加快聚集財富的目標：主張所有社會元素，也即主張一切地方的、特殊的法人團體因它們多少世紀以來沒有古老的不成文的一套套規(guī)范和習(xí)俗從而都必須聽任集中化管理的合理支配。
