Introduction
引?
My dad was also my hero, just like the case with you. Dick clearly was a terrific guy and a sound thinker. You were lucky to have him as a father, teacher, and inspiration.
? ? ? ? ? —WARREN E. BUFFETT
(written on the back of a Pecaut & Company newsletter)
? ? 我的?親也是我??中的英雄，就像你的?親是你的英雄?樣。迪克顯然是個了不起的家伙，他還善于思考。你?常幸運，能夠成為他的??和學?，能夠從他那?獲得靈感。
? ? ? ? ? ——沃倫·巴菲特 （寫在佩科公司企業(yè)資訊的背?）
After my dad, Dick Pecaut, passed away in 2009, I wrote a loving tribute to him in my investment firm’s monthly newsletter. Days later, I received one of the newsletters back. Handwritten, on the back of that newsletter, was a note from the Oracle of Omaha, Warren Buffett. The man whose mindset, strategies, and investing insights my business partner, Corey, and I have studied for three decades. The man whose wisdom we are honored to share with you in the coming pages.
? ? 2009年，我的?親迪克·佩科去世后，我在??的投資公司的每?企業(yè)資訊中悼念了他。?天后，我收到?份回復(fù)，有?在企業(yè)資訊背?寫了??字，竟然是“奧?哈的先知”沃倫·巴菲特的?筆。我和我的商業(yè)伙伴科?花了30年的時間研究巴菲特的思想、策略和投資洞察?，我們很榮幸能在這本書接下來的內(nèi)容中和你分享他的智慧。
? Buffett’s short note served as a heartwarming footnote to my father’s life work as an investment advisor. It also served as validation of both the newsletters that make up this book and our work as investment advisors.
? ? 我?親做了?輩?的投資顧問，巴菲特寫下的??字總結(jié)了他的??，令?動容。這??字是對我們投資顧問?作的肯定，也是我們撰寫這本書的初衷。
? We have been longtime Berkshire Hathaway commentators. Our analyses of its chairman, Warren Buffett, and vice chairman, Charlie Munger, have been featured in the New York Times, Money Magazine, Schiff’s Insurance Observer, and a host of other leading investment publications. One of our newsletters was referenced in James O’Loughlin’s book, The Real Warren Buffett: Managing Capital, Leading People.1
? ? 作為伯克希爾·哈撒?公司的資深評論員，我們對公司主席沃倫·巴菲特以及副主席查理·芒格的研究，曾是《紐約時報》《?錢》《希夫保險觀察家》以及其他?些主要的投資雜志的頭條?章。詹姆斯·奧洛克林撰寫的《沃倫·巴菲特傳：管理資?，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)?眾》[1] 中還曾引?過我們的?份企業(yè)資訊。
? For years, we sent our newsletter, unsolicited, to Berkshire Hathaway’s headquarters. But until this thoughtful reply, we never knew if anyone actually opened the envelopes.2
? ? ?年來，我們主動將企業(yè)資訊發(fā)送到伯克希爾·哈撒?公司總部。直到收到了這份暖?的回復(fù)，我們才知道的確有?看過它們。[2]
? Corey and I were electrified. Buffett read our newsletter! It was an acknowledgment that our writings and insights on value investing are of interest to the master himself. On a personal level, mourning my father, it was one of the warmest and most affirming notes I have ever received. For that, I am eternally grateful.
? ? 我和科?激動不已。巴菲特讀了我們的企業(yè)資訊！這?以說明?師對我們在價值投資??的?解感興趣。就個???，這?句話是我收到的最溫暖的悼詞，它肯定了我?親的成就。為此，我會永遠感激他。
? But it wasn’t always like this. We didn’t always receive personal notes from the world’s greatest investor.
How Did We Get Here?
我們是如何開始的
I graduated from Harvard in 1979 with a philosophy degree. While there, I took only one economics course. I found it too theoretical, not anything like the investing I saw happening in my family’s business.
? ? 1979年，我從哈佛?學畢業(yè)，獲得哲學學位。在哈佛，我只選修過?門經(jīng)濟學課程。我發(fā)現(xiàn)那門經(jīng)濟學課程過于理論化，和我家的公司所做的投資完全是兩回事。
? My grandfather, father, and uncle had founded Pecaut & Company, a stockbrokerage firm, in 1960. My grandfather, Russell, often marveled that they made money from day one and never looked back.? My involvement in the family business began in the late 1970s, when I was working summers in the back office. I did the grunt work, including updating the S&P 500 tear sheets.
? ? 我的祖?、?親和叔叔在1960年創(chuàng)辦了?家證券經(jīng)紀公司——佩科公司。我的祖?羅素總是感嘆，他們從公司成?那天起就穩(wěn)賺不賠，從未出過岔?。 我是20世紀70年代到公司幫忙的。我每年夏天都在交易清算室?忙活，?作很煩瑣，其中就包括從標準普爾500指數(shù)中撕下舊單，換上新單。
? Back then, the S&P sent its clients color-coded binders that were alphabetized like a set of encyclopedias. Every month, a packet would arrive in the mail with colored sheets that matched the binders. Green sheets were large-company stocks. Yellow sheets were small-company stocks. Blue sheets were for bonds. Someone needed to manually update the binders by replacing old sheets with the new. That was my job. I learned a lot by reading those sheets.
? ? 那時，標準普爾500指數(shù)發(fā)給客?的彩?編碼活?夾是按字?順序排列的，看上去就像套百科全書。每個?，我們的郵件?都夾著?沓與活?夾相配的彩紙。綠紙是?公司的股票，?紙是?公司的股票，藍紙是購買股票需要填寫的單?。這時便需要有?將活?夾中的單?換成新的，這便是我的?作。讀了這些單?，我學到了不少知識。
? After graduating, I entered the firm as a full-time employee. I felt inadequate and clueless. Our small, family-run operation had no formal training program or structure. My dad rarely sat me down to discuss how things were going. I tortured myself with my own self-judgment about how poorly I thought I was doing. I learned by trial and error.
? ? 畢業(yè)后，我正式進?公司，成為?名全職員?。我覺得??能?不?，?從下?。我家公司的規(guī)模不?，沒有什么正規(guī)的培訓(xùn)，也談不上組織架構(gòu)。?親很少有時間坐下來和我討論討論事情的進展。我以為????是處，痛苦不已。我不斷嘗試，不斷犯錯，倒也學會了不少東?。
? One error was option trading. It was quick and exciting. You could theoretically triple your money in a short time. Do that a few times, and you’d have a good year. I spent a year trying to develop a successful option trading strategy. And at the end of the year? I had made about a hundred bucks. Calculating that into the amount of time spent, I had made about 10 cents an hour.? Clearly, that wasn’t worth it. Trading in the short-term may work for some people, but it wasn’t for me. I needed a better approach.
? ? 我犯的錯誤之?便是期權(quán)交易。期權(quán)交易速度快，?分刺激。理論上講，你可以在短時間內(nèi)將??的資?翻上3倍，多交易?次，你?年都會???憂。我花了?年的時間來研究期權(quán)交易的成功策略。到了年底，我?概賺了100美元?？紤]到時間成本，我每個?時只賺了?約10美分。 這么做顯然沒有任何意義。短期交易也許對別?有?，在我這?卻?不通，我需要找到更好的?法。
? Then, in 1982, I read the book The Money Masters by John Train, in which he profiles nine brilliant investors, including John Templeton and Warren Buffett. A light bulb came on when I finished the book. I said, “I’m going back to school. These investors are my professors. My curriculum is everything they say and write.” I was excited. I would study the most brilliant investors in the world like they were my professors at Harvard. I was on fire to learn everything I could about them and to figure out how to invest like them.
? ? 1982年，我讀了約翰·特雷恩撰寫的《?錢的主?》，書中介紹了包括約翰·坦普爾頓和沃倫·巴菲特等在內(nèi)的9位杰出的投資?。讀完這本書，我突然有了主意，說道：“我打算回學校深造。這些投資?就是我的教授，我要學的知識就是他們所說、所寫的?切?！蔽壹硬灰?。我把世界上最杰出的投資?當作我在哈佛的教授，渴望了解他們的?切，希望能夠像他們?樣成為投資??的?家。
? From that point forward, I saw my role in the firm primarily as a learning organism. My thought was that the more I learned, the better my decisionmaking would be, and the better I would serve our clients.? Over time, my favorite professors would include Sir John Templeton (of the Templeton Growth Fund),3 George Michaelis of Source Capital (a topperforming closed-end fund), Jean-Marie Eveillard (who ran what is now the First Eagle Global Fund), Bob Rodriguez (of First Pacific Advisors), and Marty Whitman (of Third Avenue Value Investors). These experts would all offer tremendous insight and direction.
? ? 從那時起，我在公司的主要任務(wù)就是學習。我想著只要多學習，就能做出更加英明的投資決策，就能更好地為客?服務(wù)。 久?久之，我喜歡的教授囊括了約翰·坦普爾頓爵?（坦普爾頓成?基?）、喬治·?凱利斯（最佳封閉式基?原始資本公司）、讓-??·埃?亞爾（第??鷹全球基?）、鮑勃·羅德?格斯（第?太平洋顧問公司），以及?丁·惠特曼（第三?道價值基?）。這些專家為我們獻計獻策，為我們指引?向。[1]
? But of all the brilliant “professors,” none of them has been more instructive than Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger of Berkshire Hathaway.
? ? 然?在所有杰出的教授當中，沒有誰的建議能?伯克希爾·哈撒?公司的沃倫·巴菲特和查理·芒格給出的建議更中肯了。
? After realizing that Buffett was one of the guys to learn from, I devoured all his annual letters to shareholders from Berkshire. When I met a friend who had Buffett’s letters from his partnership prior to taking over Berkshire, I devoured those, too. I loved reading them.
? ? 當意識到該向巴菲特學習后，我便津津有味地讀遍了巴菲特每年寫給伯克希爾股東的信。巴菲特在接?伯克希爾前，曾給他的合伙?寫過不少信，我遇到的?個朋友剛好有這些信，我便興致勃勃地讀完了。我喜歡讀這些信。
? From where I lived, it was only a 90-minute drive to Omaha and Berkshire’s annual meetings. But to attend, you had to be a shareholder.
? ? 從我住的地?出發(fā)，只要開?90分鐘就能趕到奧?哈參加伯克希爾的年會?？梢?yún)⒓幽陼捅仨毘蔀椴讼柕墓蓶|。
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University of Berkshire Hathaway”
伯克希爾·哈撒??學
I distinctly remember that first meeting in 1984. It was an electric yet cozy affair at Omaha’s Joslyn Art Museum.
? ? 我清楚地記得1984年我第?次參加的年會。年會在奧?哈喬斯林藝術(shù)博物館舉?，令?既興奮?愜意。
? A local CPA I knew, Corey Wrenn, was taking tickets at the door.4 He was a relatively new employee, hired by Berkshire’s audit department in 1983.
? ? 科?·雷恩和我是?相識，他這個注冊會計師正在門?驗票。[1] 他1983年才被伯克希爾審計部門錄?，算起來還是公司的新員?。
? After graduating college and working two years in public accounting in Sioux City, Iowa, Corey decided that wasn’t what he wanted to do his whole life. While looking for another job, he received a call from a headhunter in Omaha who told him that Berkshire Hathaway was looking for an internal auditor. Corey asked, “Berkshire what?” The headhunter said, “It’s run by Warren Buffett.” And Corey responded, “Warren who?” He had no idea who or what they were. Nonetheless, he took the job and began working alongside the six or seven other employees in the audit department, auditing Berkshire’s subsidiary companies and preparing schedules used for quarterly financial statements and for Buffett’s use.
? ? ?學畢業(yè)后，科?在艾奧?的蘇城做了兩年的公共會計?作，但他覺得那并不是??想奮??輩?的事業(yè)。找?作時，他接到奧?哈?個獵頭打來的電話，獵頭告訴他伯克希爾·哈撒?公司正在招聘?名內(nèi)部審計員?？?問道：“伯克希爾什么？”獵頭答道：“是沃倫·巴菲特的公司?！笨?答道：“沃倫什么？”他丈?和尚摸不著頭腦。盡管如此，他還是做了那份?作，和其他六七個??起在審計部門審計伯克希爾?公司的賬?，為巴菲特準備季度財務(wù)報表。
? I had felt a pang of jealousy when I found out he had been hired there. I envied how he would be learning firsthand from Buffett.5
? ? 當發(fā)現(xiàn)科?居然在伯克希爾?作時，我羨慕不已。我多么羨慕他能從巴菲特那?學到第??的知識呀。[2]
? But I wasn’t focused on Corey at the time. My eyes were on the stage.
? ? 但那時我并沒有把注意?放在科??上，我的眼睛?直盯著主席臺不放。
? Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger sat on the auditorium’s stage in front of an audience of 300 shareholders (which at the time I felt was large).
? ? 沃倫·巴菲特和查理·芒格?對著300名股東，坐在禮堂的主席臺上（我當時覺得那個主席臺可真夠?的）。
? I realized that if I were going to learn, I would have to get up and ask what I was wondering about. I wrote pages and pages of detailed questions with the goal of getting to the microphone.
? ? 我知道，要是想學知識，就必須站起來提出??的疑問。所以，我詳詳細細地寫下?????的問題，就等著拿到?克?了。
? I nervously asked my one question. Their clarity of mind and high intellect was clear from their answer. I thought, Wow. That was a fantastic answer.? They took my dumb question and turned it into a masterpiece.
? ? 我緊張地提出了第?個問題。從他們的回答中就能看出他們清晰的頭腦和?凡的才智。我?想：“哇，回答得太棒了！他們把我愚蠢的問題變成了杰作。”
? I kept thinking, What took me so long to get here? Why haven’t I been here before?
? ? 我接著想：“我怎么現(xiàn)在才來，以前怎么就沒想到要過來呢？”
? At that meeting, I learned that Berkshire owned 80% of Wesco Financial, where Charlie Munger served as the chairman. So I flew out to Pasadena to attend the Wesco meeting. It was a much smaller affair.
? ? 那次年會上，我得知伯克希爾持有?斯科?融公司80%的股份，?查理·芒格正是?斯科?融公司的主席。所以，我??往帕薩迪納參加了?斯科的年會。?斯科年會的規(guī)模可要?得多。
? The first Wesco meeting I attended had only 15 people, and half worked for the company. Once again, I had prepared questions. After asking three questions, it was clear I would be asking a lot more.
? ? 我第?次參加?斯科年會時，只有15?出席會議，其中半數(shù)都是公司的員?。我?準備了許多問題。
? I felt nervous. Munger has an imposing presence behind his thick Cokebottle lenses. He seemed like an old professor who doesn’t tolerate fools. I got up and stammered, “I’m sorry, I’ve got a lot of questions. It looks like I’m asking all the questions. I didn’t mean to take over the meeting.”
? ? 我很緊張。芒格戴著厚厚的眼鏡，?分威嚴。他就像位受不了傻?的?教授。我站起來，結(jié)結(jié)巴巴地說：“不好意思，我有??堆的問題，好像就我在問問題，我不是有意霸占整場會議的。”
? He was gracious, saying, “That’s what we’re here for. I’ll answer your questions as long as you’ve got them. If people want to leave, they can leave.? But I’ll be here.”6
? ? 他和藹地說：“我們就是為了問題才聚集在這?的。只要你有問題，我就會??作答。誰要是想?，可以隨時離開，不過我不會?的。”
? I thought, Wow. All right, then. Here we go. I don’t know how long it went, but I was in heaven. There’s no doubt that having that level of expertise delivered directly to me accelerated my learning.
? ? 我?想：“哇，太好了，那就開始吧！”我不知道我們?問?答了多久，但我?興壞了。毫?疑問，頂級專家?把?的教導(dǎo)讓我前進了??步。
? The “University of Berkshire Hathaway” is what I nicknamed the accumulated wisdom dispensed by Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger.
? ? “伯克希爾·哈撒??學”就是我給沃倫·巴菲特和查理·芒格所積累的智慧起的昵稱。
? Each year’s curriculum consists of Berkshire Hathaway’s annual reports and the lectures at its annual meetings. That course of study, now accessible in these pages, has taught Corey and me far more about investing than any other source.
? ? 每?年，我們都研讀伯克希爾·哈撒?公司的年度報告，聆聽年會上的講座。如今，所有的智慧都匯集在了這本書?，我和科?也從中學到了從其他任何地?都學不到的投資學知識。
? Pouring over Berkshire’s reports, reading Buffett’s annual letter, and listening to Buffett and Munger at the annual meeting have all been central to our growth as value investors. It is the core curriculum of our business education—one that easily rivals most MBA programs.7 It is the cornerstone of our continuing education.
? ? 閱讀伯克希爾的報告及巴菲特每年寫給股東的信，聆聽巴菲特和芒格在年會上的發(fā)?，對我們這些價值投資?來說?關(guān)重要。這些才是商業(yè)教育的核?，它輕松碾壓?商管理學碩?（MBA）課程，是我們接受繼續(xù)教育的基?。
? It is, without a shadow of doubt, the best investment either of us has ever made.
? ? 毫?疑問，這是我們兩個做過的最好的投資項?。
? Once a year, you have arguably the greatest investment team of all time on hand to answer your questions. It is a fantastic annual tutorial on the world of business. Buffett admitted in the beginning that he was terrified of public speaking. (He used to get physically ill at just the thought of it.)
? ? 每?年，有史以來最杰出的投資團隊都會為你答疑解惑，編撰優(yōu)秀的商業(yè)世界年度教程。巴菲特坦?，他?開始害怕當眾講話（他曾經(jīng)只要?想到要當著這么多?說話，就會感到?體不適）。
? Thankfully, over the years, Buffett and Munger have grown ever-more comfortable as educators. Today, they are excellent teachers. Their wisdom and willingness to share make each annual meeting an invaluable installment in a sublime lecture series.
? ? 謝天謝地，這些年來，巴菲特和芒格越來越習慣于當眾講話了。如今，他們成了優(yōu)秀的教師。他們的智慧以及樂于分享的精神，使得每場年會都成了寶貴的系列講座。
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A Short History
公司簡史
Buffett was educated at the University of Nebraska. Afterward, he enrolled at Columbia Business School. He went there to learn from the father of value investing, Benjamin Graham. Buffett became Graham’s star student.? Afterward, Graham took him on at his investment partnership, Graham Newman.
? ? 巴菲特曾就讀于內(nèi)布拉斯加州??學，之后在哥倫?亞?學商學院深造。在那?，他師從于價值投資之?——本杰明·格雷厄姆。巴菲特成了格雷厄姆最得意的門?。那之后，格雷厄姆讓巴菲特去了他合伙投資的公司——格雷厄姆·紐曼公司上班。
? Buffett used what he learned from that experience to start his own partnership back in Omaha. He did phenomenally well from the very beginning. A $10,000 investment in his partnership in 1956 grew to $200,000 by 1969. That’s a 25.9% compounded annualized return. Incredibly, the partnership never had a down year, even though the market had six down years during that period.
? ? 巴菲特利?那段經(jīng)歷在奧?哈啟動了??的合伙??涯，他從?開始就表現(xiàn)得出類拔萃。1956年合伙?投資的10000美元到了1969年已經(jīng)漲到了200000美元，年復(fù)合收益率達到25.9%。不可思議的是，盡管這期間曾遭遇過六年的市場低迷，但合伙?的收益卻從未下降過。
? In 1959, Buffett met Charlie Munger, who was also from Omaha, at a dinner party. Each man instantly recognized the intelligence of the other.? Munger had worked in law, but Buffett convinced him that he should be in the investment business if he wanted to make real money.8 Munger started his own investment partnership, Wheeler, Munger & Co., in 1962. From then on, he and Buffett worked on a number of investment ideas together, both formally and informally.
? ? 1959年，巴菲特在晚宴上遇到了同樣來?奧?哈的查理·芒格，他們?刻覺察到了對?的睿智。芒格當時從事法律?作。巴菲特規(guī)勸他，如果想賺?錢，就得改?做投資。[1] 芒格于1962年成?了??的投資合伙?公司——惠勒·芒格公司。從那時起，他就和巴菲特以正式或?正式的形式經(jīng)常交換投資意?。
? Berkshire Hathaway was originally a New England textile company. It was a deeply discounted stock, with a book value of $19. Its net working capital was over $11 a share. Buffett bought shares at around $7–$8 per share.? Buffett was buying shares at a discount to net cash and near-cash items.
? ? 伯克希爾·哈撒?公司起初是?家新英格蘭紡織公司，它的股價當時打了很?折扣，賬?價值為每股19美元，?凈營運資本每股超過11美元。巴菲特以每股7—8美元的價格收購伯克希爾的股票，享受到低于凈現(xiàn)?及類似現(xiàn)?的價格折扣。
? The decline of the textile industry was underway. Berkshire Hathaway was consolidating and selling assets. Then, with the cash, it was buying in its stock—which was intelligent because the stock was so cheap. In 1963, Berkshire did a massive buy-in of almost a third of its shares. The owners of Berkshire Hathaway saw Buffett’s position and didn’t want him in their little fiefdom. They called Buffett, offering to pay him $11.50 a share. He agreed.? He’d make about a 40% profit in a short period.
? ? 紡織?業(yè)漸漸衰落，伯克希爾公司忙著整合售賣資產(chǎn)。當時，巴菲特的合伙?公司使?現(xiàn)?也購買了伯克希爾的股票——此舉?分明智，因為那時股票相當便宜。 1964年，伯克希爾公司?規(guī)?；刭弻⒔?/3的公司股票——公司的?板們不想讓巴菲特“坐享其成”，想把他趕出公司。他們給巴菲特打電話，承諾?付給他每股11.5美元。他同意了，這意味著他能在短時間內(nèi)獲得?約50%的利潤。
? When the letter came for the offer, however, it was less than the agreed-on amount—but only by pennies. Nevertheless, their dishonesty upset Buffett.? They were trying to chisel him out of 12.5 cents per share. So Buffett went the other way and started buying increasingly more shares of Berkshire until he took control. He then booted out the guy who had tried to chisel him out.? In 1964, Warren Buffett took control of that small New England textile firm, and it became his new base for making investments.
? ? 然?合同送到時，價格卻?商定的少了?些。他們想從巴菲特的每股股票?騙上12.5美分。如此奸詐的?徑惹惱了巴菲特。于是巴菲特反其道??之，開始?量購進伯克希爾的股票，并最終收購了這家公司。他接著解雇了試圖誆騙他的家伙。1965年，沃倫·巴菲特接管了這家?型新英格蘭紡織公司，把它變成了??新的投資基地。
? At the time, the move made no sense. Buffett had bought a business in decline that he didn’t know how to run. He later joked that he should have taken the money. That would have been the smarter thing to do.
? ? 當時，巴菲特此舉毫?意義。他收購了?家?意蕭條的公司，況且還不懂經(jīng)營。巴菲特后來開玩笑說，他本該拿錢??才對，那樣做才更明智。
? As it turned out, this textile company was an ideal vehicle for making investments. With Berkshire Hathaway’s stock, Buffett had a publicly traded corporation with captive capital. The benefits of this corporate structure for managing money are significant.
? ? 事實證明，這家紡織公司成了理想的投資媒介。這得益于伯克希爾·哈撒?的股票，巴菲特得到了?家擁有受限資?的上市公司，這種企業(yè)架構(gòu)在資?管理??優(yōu)勢明顯。
? In his previous partnership, if shareholders redeemed their shares, the money would come right out of the till. Now, when shareholders sell their shares in Berkshire Hathaway, that doesn’t affect its available capital. Capital doesn’t leave the corporate shell unless Buffett pays a dividend. He could use this captive permanent capital to invest long-term by buying businesses, in part or in whole. Berkshire’s structure also allows for making opportunistic investments in special situations.
? ? 在曾經(jīng)的合伙?公司中，?旦股東贖回股票，公司就必須兌現(xiàn)，進?遭受損失。如今，即便股東出售伯克希爾·哈撒?的股票，也不會影響公司的可?資本。只要巴菲特不?付股息，資本就依然歸公司所有。他可以利?這些穩(wěn)定的受限資?來進??期投資：全資收購或部分收購企業(yè)的股份。伯克希爾的企業(yè)架構(gòu)使得特殊情況下的機會主義投資成為可能。
? Over time, Buffett phased out the textile portion of the business. He sold off assets to create more cash. With the cash, he began to build his wealthcompounding machine.
? ? 巴菲特逐步取消了公司的紡織業(yè)務(wù)。他變賣資產(chǎn)，獲得了更多現(xiàn)?。正是借助這些現(xiàn)?，他開始打造起??的財富機器。
? In 1967, Buffett bought an insurance company, National Indemnity.? Insurance has been a core operation at Berkshire Hathaway ever since. He loves the insurance business. With its float characteristics, it creates a powerful platform for compounding wealth.
? ? 1967年，巴菲特收購了?家保險公司——國?保險公司。?那以后，保險就成了伯克希爾·哈撒?公司的核?業(yè)務(wù)。巴菲特熱愛保險。保險浮存?的特征為公司創(chuàng)造巨額財富提供了強有?的平臺。
? Insurance companies collect premiums, of which a significant portion goes into reserves to pay future claims. This reserve (the “float”) earns money for Berkshire, leveraging the company’s return on capital. If you can operate in a way where that float is generated at a low cost and you can grow it over time, you have built a wealth-compounding machine. As Munger once put it, “Basically, we’re a hedgehog that knows one big thing. If you generate float at 3% per annum and buy businesses that earn 13% per annum with the proceeds of that float, we have figured out that’s a pretty good position to be in.” Few investors understand that float is one of the secrets to Berkshire’s success.
? ? 保險公司收取的保費?都成為?以?付索賠?的準備?。這些準備?（浮存?）為伯克希爾賺到了錢，提?了公司的資本回報率。你要是能依靠低成本浮存?慢慢“斂財”，就能打造出?臺財富機器。正如芒格曾經(jīng)所說的那樣：“其實，我們就是只知道?件?事的刺猬。[2] 如果每年能獲得3%的浮存?，并靠著這些浮存?收購年利潤?達13%的公司，我們的形勢就?常好?！蓖顿Y??都還不知道，浮存?就是伯克希爾成功的秘密之?。
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“Woodstock for Capitalists”
“資本家的伍德斯托克?樂節(jié)”
As Buffett’s and Munger’s fame and wealth have grown, so has the frenzy around Berkshire’s once humble annual meetings.
? ? 隨著巴菲特和芒格名聲?噪，以及他們的財富越聚越多，伯克希爾曾經(jīng)??問津的年會也變得異常熱鬧。
? As noted, my first meeting in 1984 was a cozy, 300-attendee affair. Since then, the meeting has changed many times. First it was an event, then a spectacle, and now it is a full-fledged, three-day party. But in 1984, 300 attendees was considered large, since only 13 people attended just six years before. Fast-forward to 2015, when 45,000 people were in attendance.11
? ? 正如之前提到的那樣，我1984年第?次參加的年會是?場只有300?出席的會議。從那時起，年會接?連三地有了變化。?開始，年會只是公司的?事，之后成了浩蕩的聚會，到現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)演變成了為期3天的?型派對。但在1984年，300?來參加年會就被認為規(guī)模不?了——要知道在此6年前的年會可只有13?出席?已。快進到2015年看看，?共有40000?參加了年會。[1]
? In a short period, Berkshire’s annual meetings morphed from a small private lecture series into a chamber of commerce’s dream event. It may be a sign of the times that so many people now flock to Omaha to hear Buffett and Munger speak. It’s often called “Woodstock for capitalists.” This testifies to the world’s rising interest in the realm of investment.
? ? 沒?多?時間，伯克希爾的年會就從?型私?系列講座演變成了商會夢寐以求的?事件，成群結(jié)隊的?聚集在奧?哈聆聽巴菲特和芒格的講話似乎成了時代的象征。年會常常被戲稱為“資本家的伍德斯托克?樂節(jié)”。這?不證明了世界對投資領(lǐng)域愈發(fā)濃厚的興趣。
? Buffett and Munger are happy to accommodate the hordes of fans, friends, students, and shoppers who flock to Omaha each year. In fact, they have managed to stretch out the whole affair for an action-packed, three-day weekend.
? ? 巴菲特和芒格很?興每年能有這么多粉絲、朋友、學?和商家趕來奧?哈。事實上，正是他們兩個?讓年會成了為期3天的激動??的假期。
? It’s a weekend vacation package where shareholder discounts abound.? Stores such as Borsheim’s (jewelry) and Nebraska Furniture Mart have exclusive openings and parties for shareholders. Around town, Omaha routinely features events, such as an Omaha Storm Chasers baseball game, where Buffett has signed autographs and thrown out the first pitch.
? ? 伯克希爾的“度假套餐”是為股東提供的各式各樣的折扣商品。波仙珠寶店、內(nèi)布拉斯加家具賣場為股東獨家開放，派對隨處可?。在?鎮(zhèn)周圍，奧?哈定期舉辦活動，巴菲特就為奧?追?者棒球賽簽過名，并投出了第?球。
? Over the weekend, shareholders are encouraged to patronize everything in which Berkshire has an economic interest—which brings us to “The Berkshire Mall,” a target-marketing retail bonanza for Berkshire subsidiaries.
? ? 整個周末，公司?勵股東光顧“伯克希爾購物中?”，為伯克希爾創(chuàng)收。這?可是伯克希爾?公司的零售天堂。
? The ground floor of the CenturyLink Center turns into a mini-mall for Berkshire’s shareholders. Dozens of subsidiaries form a midway of booths hawking their wares.12
? ? 世紀電信中?的?樓成了伯克希爾股東的?型購物中?，??家?公司擺出攤位兜售他們的商品。[2]
? And then there’s the meeting itself, which kicks off with an original short film. Over the years, these films feature skits that have featured every kind of celebrity, including soap opera legend Susan Lucci, boxer Floyd Mayweather, and actor Bryan Cranston (appearing in his role as Walter White from Breaking Bad).
? ? 年會以原創(chuàng)短?開場。多年來，這些搞笑短?由各?各業(yè)的名?出演，包括肥皂劇傳奇?物蘇珊·盧琪、拳擊?弗洛伊德·梅威瑟以及演員布賴恩·克蘭斯頓（扮演過《絕命毒師》中的沃爾特·懷特）。
The Meeting Itself
年會
With all the furor around the Q&A, you might be forgiven for thinking it was of lesser importance. But you couldn’t be farther from the truth. These two men are always the main attraction.
? ? 盡管年會上問答環(huán)節(jié)熱?朝天，但你要是覺得它并不重要也?可厚?，雖然事實遠?如此。巴菲特和芒格永遠是?家關(guān)注的焦點。
? People care deeply about what they have to say and will wait for hours just to ask a single question. In 1984, the Q&A session went on for 2.5 hours.? Now, it’s considered short if it wraps up in under six hours. Such is the value attendees place on the combined wisdom of these two modern-day sages.
? ? ?家特別關(guān)?他們會說些什么，寧愿等上?個?時也要問上?個問題。1984年，問答環(huán)節(jié)持續(xù)了兩個半?時。如今，這個環(huán)節(jié)要是到不了6個?時都顯得意猶未盡。?們趕來參加年會就是為了吸取兩位“現(xiàn)代圣賢”的共同智慧。
? Admittedly, adjusting to the larger numbers of attendees has been, well, an adjustment. With so many people vying to get a question in, the quality of the questions appeared—to Corey and me—to drop off. But perhaps we are being unfair. Having been longtime attendees,13 we miss the quieter, more intimate meetings of the past. Fortunately, in 2013, the quality of questions significantly improved by adding a panel of three journalists and three analysts, who now ask a majority of the questions.
? ? 誠然，出席?數(shù)越來越多，年會也需要做出調(diào)整。爭相提問的?變多了，但我和科?卻發(fā)現(xiàn)所提問題的質(zhì)量有所下降。也許是我們有失公允。參加了這么多次年會，我們開始懷念曾經(jīng)那些安靜親切的年會了。[1]幸運的是，3名記者和3名分析師代替?家在年會上發(fā)問，這?幅提升了2013年年會上問題的質(zhì)量。
? Regardless of size, though, the meetings are always informative and full of Buffett and Munger’s wit and insight.
? ? 然??論規(guī)模??，年會都充滿了巴菲特和芒格的智慧與遠?，總能讓我們學到很多東?。
A Conversation Across Time
穿越時間的對話
Corey and/or I have taken copious notes during every single Berkshire meeting since that first one in 1984. In 1986, I decided I shouldn’t keep them to myself and started sending them out as a newsletter to clients and friends.
? ? ?1984年起，我和科?每?次參加伯克希爾的年會都會做?量的筆記。1986年，我覺得不該把它們據(jù)為?有，便將它們撰寫成資訊發(fā)送給客?和朋友們。
? While working for Berkshire, Corey was still on my newsletter’s mailing list. He remembers reading and enjoying my newsletters while there. He found them to be informative and down-to-earth and thought they captured the essence of the meetings. We talked on the phone from time to time, and I would ask him questions. He said I understood Berkshire’s business, from the outside looking in, as well as anyone.
? ? 盡管科?當時還在伯克希爾?作，但我還是會給他發(fā)?份資訊。他還記得在伯克希爾讀到我發(fā)來的資訊時喜悅的?情。他發(fā)現(xiàn)資訊信息量?、務(wù)實，還提煉出了會議的精華。我們不時在電話中交談，我還會問他?些問題。他說我和其他??樣，以旁觀者的?度審視伯克希爾的業(yè)務(wù)。
? While at Berkshire, Corey had often thought about chronicling what he learned there in a diary, but part of him thought that would be disloyal to the corporation, so he opted against it.
? ? 在伯克希爾的時候，科?總是琢磨著怎樣才能把學到的知識寫在?記?。但他轉(zhuǎn)念?想，這么做也許會泄露公司機密，便就此作罷。
? While he didn’t formally sit down to take notes, Corey still picked up gems of wisdom as he talked to his coworkers and the executives of the subsidiaries and watched how these exceptional people thought. As a necessity of his job, Corey was always focused on learning. The subsidiaries he worked with varied greatly in their business models. Nebraska Furniture Mart’s business, after all, is a lot different from National Indemnity, See’s Candies, and Buffalo News.
? ? 盡管沒有坐下來好好記筆記，但科?在和同事交流的過程中，在和?公司?管的談話中，在觀察這些成功??的思維?式的過程中，學到了很多智慧?？?的?作?時?刻不需要學習，因為他審計的?公司的經(jīng)營模式存在很?差異——內(nèi)布拉斯加家具賣場的經(jīng)營模式?然和國?保險公司、時思糖果以及《??城新聞報》?相徑庭。
? While working there, Corey also went to graduate school for his MBA and studied organizational theory as part of that. So during his workdays, he observed how effectively Berkshire’s decentralized organization functioned through the lens of what he was studying.
? ? 在伯克希爾?作時，科?攻讀了?商管理學碩?學位并學習了管理組織理論。因此，在?作中，他將所學知識應(yīng)?于伯克希爾分散式管理組織的研究上，搞清了伯克希爾?效的經(jīng)營?式。
? Corey became my business partner in 1992. While not disclosing any of the proprietary information he had been privy to, Corey and I discussed Berkshire all the time. He brought a deep understanding of the culture, the values, and of the players involved.
? ? 1992年，科?成了我的商業(yè)伙伴。盡管科?沒有向我透露伯克希爾任何的機密信息，我們還是會經(jīng)常聊起這家公司。他?常了解伯克希爾的?化、企業(yè)價值以及曾經(jīng)的同事。
? At that time, he personally knew a lot of the people involved and intimately understood the businesses that Berkshire owned. He had spent a lot of time traveling to meet with the subsidiaries.14 Ajit Jain, who is often talked about as being Buffett’s replacement now, invited Corey for dinner after he spent the day working at his office in New York. Corey even had brief interactions with Buffett, talking to him briefly two or three times.15
? ? 當時，科?認識伯克希爾公司?的很多?，也?常了解伯克希爾的各項業(yè)務(wù)，并經(jīng)常和?公司的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)們??。[1]如今阿吉特·賈殷常被看作巴菲特的接班?，科?曾在他紐約的辦公室忙活了?天，他還請科?吃了晚飯。科?甚?還和巴菲特簡單地說過兩三次話。
? Corey had seen firsthand Berkshire’s high ethical standards. Corey saw how Buffett, from the top, set the tone that Berkshire employees would monitor and respect all laws and rules. When Corey started in internal audit, computers could be purchased online without paying sales tax. But, at Berkshire, if anything like that was purchased, it had to be reported to corporate, so they could file the use tax returns. Buffett wanted to make sure that Nebraska got their sales tax. He was adamant about making sure that Berkshire paid—not more taxes than it had to, but the taxes that it was responsible for.
? ? 科?親眼?證了伯克希爾的“?道德標準”。他看到巴菲特從公司?層開始，如何定下員?們相互監(jiān)督，并遵守國家所有法律法規(guī)的基調(diào)?？?做內(nèi)部審計時，可以直接從?上訂購電腦，不需要繳納任何銷售稅。然?在伯克希爾，?論購買什么東?，都需要向公司匯報，這樣?來，他們就能提交納稅申請表。巴菲特要確保公司正確繳納了各項稅費。
? Taking everything he understood from that experience, Corey has contributed to the notes every year since he came to work at Pecaut & Company in 1992. In the years he attended alone, I based the newsletter on his notes and insights. While I wrote each newsletter, Corey rigorously edited each one.16
? ? 科?吸取了過往的所有經(jīng)驗，?1992年來到佩科公司?作，他每年都會參加伯克希爾的年會，并做好筆記。有時他?個?參加年會，我便根據(jù)他的筆記和?解來撰寫資訊。我負責撰寫資訊，科?則認認真真地校對。[2]
? Writing feverishly at each meeting, Corey and I jot down what we feel are the most significant of Buffett and Munger’s comments and insights. Our rigorous note-taking enables us to highlight, reflect on, and pass along the golden nuggets of what we learned.
? ? 每次參加年會，我和科?都奮筆疾書，記錄下我們認為巴菲特和芒格的最有價值的評論與?解。我們的筆記?分嚴謹，只有這樣我們才能夠找出會議的重點，反思會議的精華，并將學到的寶貴知識傳遞出去。
? Once home, we do a condensed but detailed write-up of each meeting’s notes for our clients. Those write-ups are what make up this book.
? ? ?到家，我們就為客?撰寫出詳細的會議紀要。那些會議紀要便是本書內(nèi)容的基礎(chǔ)。
? In addition to their words, we often address what was unsaid, inferred, or implied. Our own expertise as value investors adds a depth of insight that goes beyond a dry, static, verbatim reporting of events.
? ? 除了他們直?的內(nèi)容，我們還常常需要處理那些雖然并未明說，卻能夠推斷和感知的東?。我們兩個價值投資?的專業(yè)知識能夠提升本書的洞察?，避免枯燥乏味的照本宣科。
? Much of the mainstream news reporting on Buffett is done without deep insight into the working world of investing.17 In these pages, you will benefit from our own critical assessment of the meetings.
? ? 不少主流媒體在報道巴菲特時，并沒有深?了解投資的學問。[3]?在這本書中，我們對年會進?了專業(yè)的、批判性的評價，你可以從中學到不少知識。
? We have taken hundreds of hours of lectures and distilled them to their most concentrated form. You’ve been saved the painstaking task of digging through the archives to bring the gold to the surface.
? ? 我們選取了?百個?時的演講內(nèi)容中最精華的部分，你?不著費?挖掘，就能看到滿地的??。
? You’ll quickly be swept up by the highlight reel of what has been a fascinating, informative, and often hilarious ride through 30 years of the
? ? 巴菲特和芒格30年來精彩幽默的“表演”蘊藏了豐富的知識，你很快就會被其中的?段深深吸引。
Warren and Charlie show.
This isn’t a book about dusty old “investment theory.” This is a curated collection of the best advice and insights Buffett and Munger have shared over the last three decades. Shocking revelations. Funny moments. Devilishly insightful strategies.
? ? 這不是?本塵封已久的“投資理論”，這是巴菲特和芒格在過去30年間分享的最精彩的意?與?解的精選集，??有令?警醒的啟?，有歡樂的時光，有巧妙的策略。
? These newsletters form a conversation with Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger spanning three decades. We have no doubt that any serious investor will be fascinated and informed, in equal measure, by these letters. (And we challenge you not to laugh out loud at Munger and Buffett’s sibling-like haranguing.)
? ? 這不是?本塵封已久的“投資理論”，這是巴菲特和芒格在過去30年間分享的最精彩的意?與?解的精選集，??有令?警醒的啟?，有歡樂的時光，有巧妙的策略。
? We believe these notes (excluding the annual reports) are the best substitute for attending Berkshire’s annual meetings in person over the last 30 years. Of course, if you were at the meetings, then this book is the perfect refresher. The pages to follow will add color and definition to your own memories of events.
? ? 這些內(nèi)容能夠彌補你30年來沒能參加伯克希爾年會的遺憾。當然，如果你參加過年會，這本書就能幫你好好回憶會議的內(nèi)容。接下來的內(nèi)容將為你的記憶增光添彩。
? The layout of the book is simple. It’s designed to put you in the room with Buffett and Munger, every year for the past 30 years (1986–2015).18 You will see how Buffett and Munger responded to their own mistakes and faced challenges as the world changed around them. The book unfolds as a journey.
? ? 這本書結(jié)構(gòu)簡單，它能夠帶你進?過去30年（1986—2015年）的伯克希爾年會，讓你同巴菲特和芒格待在?起。你將看到巴菲特和芒格如何糾正??的錯誤，如何在世界的動蕩中應(yīng)對挑戰(zhàn)?？傊?，這本書將帶你進??段旅程。
? If you decide to jump on board, you will see the remarkable rise of Berkshire Hathaway as it happens. You’ll come to understand the genius behind it. You have in your hands fly-on-the-wall analyses of 30 years of annual meetings.
? ? 如果你決定加?我們，[4]你將看到伯克希爾·哈撒?公司的崛起，你將了解它背后的天才，還將拿到伯克希爾30年間每場年會真實的分析結(jié)果。
? Admittedly, for most companies, that would be like watching paint dry.? But Berkshire Hathaway is a different kind of beast.19 The company’s unique success, and the strategies that made it possible, are legendary.
? ? 誠然，對?多數(shù)公司來說，陳年的會議紀要就像慢慢變?的油漆，但伯克希爾·哈撒?公司卻是另?番情景。[5]它?可?擬的成功及其背后切實可?的戰(zhàn)略都堪稱傳奇。
How To Use These Letters
如何使?本書
This book isn’t for the first-time investor. It’s for the informed investor who sees the value of being able to get deep into the mindsets of Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger. If you want to walk around in their shoes for the past three decades, absorb what works, and then apply it to your own investments, then this book is for you.
? ? 這本書不適合初次投資的?。它是為?多識?的投資?準備的，他們看到了深?了解沃倫·巴菲特和查理·芒格思維模式的價值。如果你希望能像他們?樣投資得游刃有余，想找到有效的投資?法，并將其運?到??的投資項?當中，那么這本書就是你的不?之選。
? Also, one significant personal benefit of value investing is peace of mind.? Many investors tough it out in the markets for years, living a life filled with anxiety and stress. They constantly fear that their investments will disappear overnight. On the other hand, great value investors, like Buffett and Munger, sleep like a baby—provided they follow simple timeless principles.
? ? 價值投資還能讓你獲得內(nèi)?的平靜。不少投資?在市場上苦苦掙扎，過著焦慮不安的?活。他們總是擔???的投資項?會在?夜之間化為烏有。?像巴菲特和芒格這樣優(yōu)秀的價值投資?，卻能如孩?般安然?睡——他們不過是遵循了?些亙古不變的簡單的投資原則罷了。
? We hope that by the time you’ve finished this book, these principles will be engrained in your consciousness. We hope that your investment decisions will take on a quality and depth that give you a serious competitive edge.
? ? 希望你看完這本書后，有些原則能夠在你的意識中?根發(fā)芽。希望你能夠做出?質(zhì)量的、有深度的投資決策，為??贏得強有?的競爭優(yōu)勢。
? This is not a “how-to” book. This book wrestles with the question, “Why do two of the world’s greatest investors do what they do?” The answer is contained in these pages. If you understand it, you will become a better investor. If you can think and behave like they do, particularly under pressure, you will become a great and wealthy investor.
? ? 這不是?本告訴你“該如何去做”的書。這本書?直在思考?個問題：兩位最偉?的投資?為什么要這么做？答案就在接下來的內(nèi)容當中。你如果能夠把握其中的真諦，就能成為更好的投資?。如果你能像他們?樣思考和投資，特別是能夠頂著壓?做事，你就能成為偉??富有的投資?。
? This book will provide you with a deeper insight into how two of the world’s greatest investors deal with investment problems as they arise. You’ll witness, in real time, their reactions to events like the sovereign debt crisis, the subprime crisis, and nuclear terrorism. Through it all, you get an honest and frank account of mistakes made and obstacles overcome. You’ll see firsthand Buffett’s rock-solid reasoning for investing in Coke and See’s Candy.
? ? 這本書將使你擁有更加深刻的洞察?，了解兩位偉?的投資?是如何應(yīng)對投資難題的。你將實時?證他們處理主權(quán)債務(wù)危機、次貸危機以及核恐怖主義事件的能?。這樣?來，你就能坦然?對??犯下的錯誤和眼下的難題。你將親?體會巴菲特投資可?可樂公司與時思糖果時的可靠推斷。
? You’ll also take a long look into the morbidly funny yet jaw-droppingly astute mind of Munger on a range of issues. From the futility of growing corn for fuel to the annual whipping of the modern portfolio theory, Munger never misses a beat.
? 你還能在?系列問題上仔細觀察芒格既滑稽?令?錯愕的思想——從挖苦種??做燃料的徒勞?益到對現(xiàn)代投資組合?年?度的抨擊，芒格?個都沒落下過。
? Had this been just a collection of anecdotes drawn from the last 5–10 years, it would have been too short of a time period to be meaningful.? Instead, this is a three-decade, year-by-year analysis of history unfolding.? You will be able to view Buffett and Munger’s decision-making process from a unique vantage point. You have a collection of insights about what went on beneath the surface of those decisions over time. You see how the same timeless principles are applied to vastly changing landscapes and circumstances (i.e., the internet, the demise of newspapers, booms and busts, and so on).
? ? 如果只搜集了過去5到10年的資料，則時間太短，分析起來沒有太?意義。?這本書呈現(xiàn)了30年間伯克希爾每?年的年會分析，你將能夠從獨有的優(yōu)勢視?來審視巴菲特和芒格的決策過程。隨著時間的推移，你還能洞悉這些決策背后的故事。你將看到同樣的亙古不變的原則如何在千差萬別的?業(yè)中?顯??（如互聯(lián)?的興起，報業(yè)的衰落，以及經(jīng)濟的繁榮與蕭條，等等）。
? While reading, you may wonder, If Berkshire got out of the market, shouldn’t I do the same? or If Berkshire bought it, should I buy it too? Buffett and Munger are clear in their advice—people should learn from them and model their advice rather than copy their behavior. The main reason is this: Unless you find yourself in the enviable position that Berkshire operates in, you would do well not to copy its moves.
? ? 讀書時，你可能在想，如果伯克希爾從股市抽?，我難道也要退出來？或者說，要是伯克希爾收購了哪家公司，我也要跟著買進？巴菲特和芒格的建議?常清晰：?家應(yīng)該向他們學習，接受他們的忠告，?不是完全照搬他們的做法。主要原因是，除?你的處境和伯克希爾?樣令?羨慕，否則最好不要跟??動。
? Berkshire Hathaway now represents half a trillion dollars of assets. It makes direct purchases and deals of its own design. Berkshire sometimes buys whole companies. Buffett and Munger play the game at a scale that most investors cannot match. So instead of copying, understand why they made the decisions they did. Then apply those insights to your own decisions and your own position.
? ? 伯克希爾·哈撒?公司?前擁有1萬億美元的資產(chǎn)，它可以“隨?所欲”地購?股票、達成交易，有時甚?全資收購某公司。巴菲特和芒格投資的規(guī)模是我們多數(shù)投資??法?擬的。所以與其照搬，倒不如想想他們?yōu)槭裁磿龀鲞@些決策，然后把這些?解應(yīng)?到??的決策和處境當中去。
? In more than one annual meeting, Buffett suggests that the best investment you can make is in yourself. After a lifetime of following his teachings and seeing the success in our own business, we wholeheartedly agree with him.
? ? 巴菲特不??次地在年會上表?，最好的投資項?是??。我花了?輩?的時間向他學習，也?證了??公司的成功，我真?認同他的觀點。
? These letters are a valuable resource of learning and analysis that you can model for your own investing decisions.? But before you dive in, understand that you are about to reap the rewards of the best investment we ever made, as a student at the University of Berkshire Hathaway.
? ? 本書中的會議紀要是?于學習和研究的寶貴資源，你可以將此作為??投資決策的參考。開始閱讀前，切記你即將收獲我們在“伯克希爾·哈撒??學”學到的最寶貴的投資知識。
? So we invite you to turn the page and step into the fascinating world of the world’s greatest investment team . . .
? ? 所以，我們邀請你翻開這本書，踏?世界頂級投資團隊的迷?世界……
All the best,
Daniel S. Pecaut
Pecaut & Company
April 2016
祝好！
丹尼爾·佩科
佩科公司
2016年4?
