Text 1
Few creations of big technology capture the imagination like giant dams. Perhaps it is humankind's long suffering at the mercy of flood and drought that makes the idea of forcing the waters to do our bidding so fascinating. But to be fascinated is also, sometimes, to be blind. Several giant dam projects threaten to do more harm than good.
幾乎沒有什么技術(shù)可以像大壩一樣激起人們的想象力?；蛟S長(zhǎng)久以來(lái)任洪災(zāi)和旱災(zāi)的侵襲，所以人類特別癡迷于建大壩來(lái)控制水流。但是有時(shí)候太過興奮就容易變得盲目。許多大壩已經(jīng)有弊大于利的危險(xiǎn)。
重大技術(shù)所創(chuàng)造的事物中，很少能有像大型水壩這樣能激起人們想象力的?？赡苷且?yàn)槿祟愰L(zhǎng)期以來(lái)遭受旱澇災(zāi)害的擺布才使得治理江河，供我驅(qū)策的理想如此讓人著迷。但讓人著迷有時(shí)也使人盲目。數(shù)個(gè)巨型大壩將可能引起弊大于利的后果。
The lesson from dams is that big is not always beautiful. It doesn't help that building a big, powerful dam has become a symbol of achievement for nations and people striving to assert themselves. Egypt's leadership in the Arab world was cemented by Aswan High Dam.Turkey's bid for First World status includes the giant Ataturk Dam.
巨型水壩帶來(lái)的教訓(xùn)就是大的事物并不總是美的事物。這不能阻止各國(guó)和人民將建造巨型的，宏偉的水壩視為成功的標(biāo)志，他們極力用這種方式宣告自己的地位。A水壩鞏固了埃及在阿拉伯世界的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位。在土耳其躋身第一世界的地位的努力中，At大壩功不可沒。
建造大壩的教訓(xùn)是：大的未必總是美好的。但這個(gè)教訓(xùn)也無(wú)法阻礙修建宏大雄偉、功能強(qiáng)大的水壩成為那些竭力顯示自己威力的國(guó)家和人民的一種成功的標(biāo)志。埃及由于建造了阿斯旺大壩而鞏固了其在阿拉伯世界的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位。土耳其力圖躋身世界一流地位的努力中也包括修建阿塔圖爾克大壩。
But big dams tend not to work as intended. The Aswan Dam, for example, stopped the Nile flooding but deprived Egypt of the fertile silt that floods left- all in return for a giant reservoir of disease which is now so full of silt that it barely generates electricity.
但大壩的運(yùn)作往往不會(huì)如期進(jìn)行。比如，阿斯旺大壩雖然阻止了尼羅河的泛濫，但也使埃及失去了洪水過后留下的肥沃的淤泥——這些淤泥反而堆積在水庫(kù)里，泥滿為患，使得水庫(kù)幾乎不能發(fā)電。
但是大壩往往不會(huì)按照預(yù)期來(lái)運(yùn)行。以阿斯旺大壩為例，它阻止了尼羅河洪水泛濫，但也使埃及失去了洪水沖擊過后留下的肥沃淤泥——這一切換回來(lái)的是一座巨大的“疾病庫(kù)”（水庫(kù)），現(xiàn)在它已積滿淤泥，以至于幾乎無(wú)法發(fā)電。
And yet, the myth of controlling the waters persists. This week, in the heart of civilized Europe, Slovaks and Hungarians stopped just short of sending in the troops in their contention over a dam on the Danube. The huge complex will probably have all the usual problems of big dams. But Slovakia is bidding for independence from the Czechs, and now needs a dam to prove itself.
但至今，控制水域的誤區(qū)仍然存在。本周，在文明的歐洲中心，因?yàn)樗畨萎a(chǎn)生了分歧，S和匈牙利差點(diǎn)兒就在D兵戎相見。這個(gè)大型的建筑工程會(huì)帶來(lái)水壩的通病。但是S正努力從C獨(dú)立出來(lái)，并且它需要建造一個(gè)水壩來(lái)證明自己。
然而，控制水域的錯(cuò)誤觀念還在繼續(xù)。本周，在歐洲文明的腹地，斯洛伐克人和匈牙利人因多瑙河上一處水壩發(fā)生爭(zhēng)端而差點(diǎn)動(dòng)用了軍隊(duì)。這個(gè)大型工程很可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)大壩的所有常見問題。但斯洛伐克正在尋求脫離捷克而獨(dú)立，現(xiàn)在他們需要建一個(gè)大壩來(lái)證明自己的實(shí)力。
Meanwhile, in India, the World Bank has given the go-ahead to the even more wrong-headed Narmada Dam. And the bank has done this even though its adviser say the dam will cause hardship for?the powerless and environmental destruction. The benefits are for the powerful, but they are far from guaranteed.
與此同時(shí)，世界銀行更是資助印度建造大錯(cuò)特錯(cuò)的N水壩。盡管專家指出大壩將給普通百姓造成損失，使環(huán)境造到破壞，但它仍一意孤行。雖說(shuō)可能給有權(quán)力的人帶來(lái)好處，但是也并不能打保票。
與此同時(shí)，世界銀行已經(jīng)答應(yīng)貸款給印度，助其建造“更加執(zhí)迷不悟的納爾馬達(dá)大壩”。盡管世界銀行的顧問指出，該大壩將給平民帶來(lái)苦難，而且會(huì)破壞環(huán)境，但世界銀行依然一意孤行。大壩只會(huì)給當(dāng)權(quán)者帶來(lái)利益，但這種利益也遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)得不到保障。
Proper, scientific study of the impacts of dams and of the costs and benefits of controlling water can help to resolve these conflicts. Hydroelectric power and flood control and irritation are possible without building monster dams. But when you are dealing with myths, it is hard to be either proper, or scientific. It is time that the world learned the lessons of Aswan. You don't need a dam to be saved.
關(guān)于大壩產(chǎn)生的后果以及控制水域的利弊的合理的科學(xué)研究可以解決這些矛盾?？梢钥紤]水力發(fā)電，控制洪水，合理灌溉，而不用建造那些可怕的大壩。但是一旦涉及到錯(cuò)誤的觀念，很難得出合理的或科學(xué)的結(jié)論。是時(shí)候吸取阿斯旺大壩的教訓(xùn)了。你根本不需要一座大壩來(lái)拯救。
對(duì)大壩的影響以及控水成本和收益進(jìn)行恰當(dāng)科學(xué)的研究有助于解決這些沖突。即使不建“怪獸大壩”，水力發(fā)電、洪水治理以及引水灌溉也是可能的。可是，在與錯(cuò)誤觀念打交道時(shí)，很難做到合理或科學(xué)?，F(xiàn)在是全世界吸取阿斯旺大壩教訓(xùn)的時(shí)候了。人們未必非要通過修建大壩來(lái)拯救自己。
Text 2
Well, no gain without pain, they say. But what about pain without gain? Everywhere you go in America, you hear tales of corporate revival. What is harder to establish is whether the productivity revolution that businessmen assume they are presiding over is for real.
人們常說(shuō)不勞無(wú)獲。但如果是勞而無(wú)獲呢？在美國(guó)，無(wú)論你走到哪都會(huì)聽說(shuō)企業(yè)復(fù)興的軼事。難的卻是商人們自認(rèn)為引領(lǐng)的生產(chǎn)力革命是否真是有效。
好吧，不勞無(wú)獲，人們都這么說(shuō)?？梢?b>勞而無(wú)獲呢？在美國(guó)，無(wú)論你走到哪里都會(huì)聽到企業(yè)復(fù)蘇的傳聞。商界人士自認(rèn)為由其主導(dǎo)的生產(chǎn)力革命是否確有其事，這一點(diǎn)則更加難以確定。
The official statistics are mildly discouraging. They show that, if you lump manufacturing and services together, productivity has grown on average by 1.2% since 1987. That is somewhat faster than the average during the previous decade. And since 1991, productivity has increased by about 2% a year, which is more than twice the 1978-87 average. The trouble is that part of the recent acceleration is due to the usual rebound that occurs at this point in a business cycle, and so is not conclusive evidence of a revival in the underlying trend. There is, as Robert Rubin, the treasury secretary, says, a "disjunction" between the mass of business anecdote that points to a leap in productivity and the picture reflected by the statistics.?
官方數(shù)據(jù)有點(diǎn)讓人灰心。數(shù)據(jù)顯示，如果把制造業(yè)和服務(wù)業(yè)加在一起來(lái)看，自1987年以來(lái)生產(chǎn)力平均增長(zhǎng)1.2%。比過去十年的平均值稍稍快一點(diǎn)。并且從1991年以來(lái)，每年生產(chǎn)力增長(zhǎng)約2%，是1978至1987年間平均值的兩倍多。問題是這種增長(zhǎng)很大程度上是由于商業(yè)循環(huán)此時(shí)出現(xiàn)的普通的反彈，所以這不能作為復(fù)蘇的潛在趨勢(shì)的有力證據(jù)。正如財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)羅伯特說(shuō)的，在大量的企業(yè)生產(chǎn)力大飛躍的傳聞和數(shù)據(jù)所反映的現(xiàn)實(shí)情況之間存在差距。
官方統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)有些讓人沮喪。這些數(shù)據(jù)表明，即使把制造業(yè)和服務(wù)業(yè)合起來(lái)算，1987年以來(lái)生產(chǎn)力也只是平均增長(zhǎng)1.2%。這比上一個(gè)十年的平均增長(zhǎng)速度略快。自1991年來(lái)，生產(chǎn)力每年增長(zhǎng)約2%，這是1978至1987年平均增長(zhǎng)速度的兩倍多。問題在于，近年出現(xiàn)的生產(chǎn)力快速增長(zhǎng)現(xiàn)象部分是由于商業(yè)周期到這個(gè)時(shí)間點(diǎn)通常會(huì)出現(xiàn)反彈造成的，因而它不是經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇已經(jīng)是潛在趨勢(shì)的確鑿證據(jù)。正如財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)羅伯特所說(shuō)的，大量表明生產(chǎn)力飛躍增長(zhǎng)的商業(yè)傳聞與統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)所反映的情況之間存在著”脫節(jié)“。
Some of this can be easily explained. New ways of organizing the workplace-- all that re-engineering and downsizing-- are only one contribution to the overall productivity of an economy, which is driven by many other factors such as joint investment in equipment and machinery, new technology, and investment in education and training. Moreover, most of the changes that companies make are intended to keep them profitable, and this need not always mean increasing productivity: switching to new markets or improving quality can matter just as much.
其中一些原因很容易解釋。企業(yè)組織的新方法-- 重新規(guī)劃和縮小規(guī)模-- 僅僅是一個(gè)國(guó)家總的生產(chǎn)力提高的一個(gè)因素，其被許多其他因素所推動(dòng)，像對(duì)機(jī)器設(shè)備的聯(lián)合投資，新技術(shù)和對(duì)教育培訓(xùn)的投資。此外，企業(yè)做這些改變大多是為了盈利，這也就意味著并不一定會(huì)提高生產(chǎn)力：對(duì)企業(yè)來(lái)說(shuō)，轉(zhuǎn)向新的市場(chǎng)或者提高質(zhì)量也同樣重要。
這其中有一部分情況很容易解釋。企業(yè)組織新方法-- 所有那些諸如重新規(guī)劃和精簡(jiǎn)規(guī)模的做法-- 只是推動(dòng)某一經(jīng)濟(jì)整體生產(chǎn)力發(fā)展的因素之一，而生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展還受到許多其它因素的驅(qū)動(dòng)，如設(shè)備與機(jī)械和技術(shù)上的聯(lián)合投資，以及教育和培訓(xùn)上的投資等。另外，公司大部分改革是為了贏利，而贏利并不一定意味著提高生產(chǎn)力：轉(zhuǎn)向新的市場(chǎng)或提高產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量也會(huì)有同樣的效果。
Two other explanations are more speculative. First, some of the business restructuring of recent years may have been ineptly done. Second, even if it was well done, it may have spread much less widely than people suppose.
其他的兩個(gè)解釋更大程度上是猜測(cè)的。首先，近些年的企業(yè)重組做的不好。其次，即使做得好的，這種做法也沒能像人們預(yù)想的那樣廣泛推廣。
其他兩種解釋帶有更大的猜測(cè)性。其一認(rèn)為，近年來(lái)的一些企業(yè)在重組工作上表現(xiàn)無(wú)能。其二則認(rèn)為，即使重組工作執(zhí)行得好，該行動(dòng)也沒能像人們設(shè)想的那樣廣泛推廣。
Leonard, a Harvard academic and former chief executive of Au Bong Pain, a rapidly growing chain of bakery cafes, says that much "re-engineering" has been crude. In many cases, he believes, the loss of revenue has been greater than the reductions of cost. His colleague, Michael, says that far too many companies have applied re-engineering in a mechanistic fashion, chopping out costs without giving sufficient thought to long-term profitability. BBDO's Al is blunter. He dismisses a lot of the work of re-engineering consultants as mere rubbish-- "the worst sort of ambulance chasing."
哈佛大學(xué)學(xué)者同時(shí)也是一家發(fā)展迅速的烘焙咖啡連鎖店的前任總裁雷昂那多說(shuō)大多數(shù)的重組工作粗鄙不堪。他堅(jiān)信，在許多情況下，營(yíng)業(yè)額的下滑比成本的削減要大得多。他的同時(shí)米歇爾說(shuō)太多公司機(jī)械地采用重組的方式削減成本，卻不充分考慮長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)利益。BBDO的艾爾更是直言不諱。他對(duì)那些企業(yè)重組顧問的工作不屑一顧，認(rèn)為簡(jiǎn)直就是垃圾--”最糟糕的趁火打劫”。
哈佛學(xué)者，快速發(fā)展的面包咖啡連鎖店前任總裁說(shuō)，“重組”大多是粗糙的。他認(rèn)為在很多情況下，企業(yè)收益的損失超出了成本的降低。他的同事邁克說(shuō)，太多的公司采用了機(jī)械的方式進(jìn)行重組，沒有充分考慮長(zhǎng)期盈利能力就削減成本。BBDO 的艾爾更是直言不諱。他對(duì)重組顧問所做的許多工作不屑一顧，將其視為純粹的垃圾-- “典型的趁火打劫”。
Text 3
Science has long had an uneasy relationship with other aspects of culture. Think of Gallileo's 17th-century trial for his rebelling belief before the Catholic Church or poet William Blake's harsh remarks against the mechanistic worldview of Isaac Newton. The schism between science and the humanities has, if anything, deepened in this century.
科學(xué)與文化的其他方面長(zhǎng)時(shí)間以來(lái)關(guān)系都很緊張。想想17世紀(jì)G因背叛天主教的信仰而遭到審判，或者詩(shī)人W對(duì)牛頓的機(jī)械主義世界觀的尖銳抨擊。如果說(shuō)科學(xué)和人文之間還存在分歧的話，那么本世紀(jì)有增無(wú)減。
科學(xué)與文化的其他方面歷來(lái)關(guān)系緊張。想想17世紀(jì)伽利略因其叛逆信仰所受到的天主教會(huì)審判，還有詩(shī)人威廉布萊克對(duì)艾薩克牛頓機(jī)械主義世界觀的尖銳批判?？茖W(xué)與人文之間這一分歧在本世紀(jì)甚至進(jìn)一步加深。
Until recently, the scientific community was so powerful that it could afford to ignore its critics-- but no longer. As funding for science has declined, scientists have attacked "anti-science" in several books, notably Higher Superstition, by Paul R. Gross, a biologist at the University of Virginia, and Norman Levitt, a mathematician at Rutgers University; and The Demon- Haunted World, by Carl Sagan of Cornell University.
直到前不久，科學(xué)界還非常強(qiáng)大，以致能對(duì)批評(píng)者置之不理-- 但現(xiàn)在不行了。隨著科研基金的減少，科學(xué)家們?cè)跀?shù)本著作中開始抨擊“反科學(xué)”，特別是佛吉尼亞大學(xué)生物學(xué)家保羅和拉特格斯大學(xué)數(shù)學(xué)家諾曼合著的《高級(jí)迷信》，以及康奈爾大學(xué)卡爾所著的《鬼出沒的世界》。
Defenders of science have also voiced their concerns at meetings such as "The Flight from Science and Reason," held in New York City in 1995, and "Science in the Age of (Mis) Information," which assembled last June near Buffalo.
科學(xué)的捍衛(wèi)者們也在會(huì)議上表達(dá)了他們的擔(dān)憂。比如1995年在紐約舉行的“逃離科學(xué)與理性”會(huì)議，以及去年6月在布法羅附近召開的“（偽）信息時(shí)代的科學(xué)”會(huì)議。
Anti-science clearly means different things to different people. Gross and Levitt find fault primarily with sociologist, philosophers and other academics who have questioned science's objectivity. Sagan is more concerned with those who believe in ghosts, creationism and other phenomena that contradict the scientific worldview.
顯然，反科學(xué)對(duì)不同的人有不同的含義。他們主要挑那些質(zhì)疑科學(xué)的客觀性的社會(huì)學(xué)家、哲學(xué)家和其他學(xué)者的毛病。而薩根則更關(guān)注那些相信鬼神，上帝造物論和其他違背科學(xué)世界觀的現(xiàn)象的人。
A survey of news stories in 1996 reveals that the anti-science tag has been attached to many other groups as well, from authorities who advocated the elimination of the last remaining stocks of smallpox virus to Republicans who advocated decreased funding for basic research.
1996年對(duì)新聞報(bào)道的調(diào)查表明，反科學(xué)的標(biāo)簽也貼在了許多其他群體身上，如從提倡消滅最后殘存的天花病毒庫(kù)的官方人士到提倡削減基礎(chǔ)研究基金的共和黨人。
Few would dispute that the term applies to the Unabomber, whose manifesto, published in 1995, scorns science and longs for return to a pre-technological utopia. But surely that does not mean environmentalists concerned about?uncontrolled industrial growth are anti-science, as an essay in US News & World Report last May seemed to suggest.
如果把這個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ)用在“隱形炸彈人”身上，幾乎不會(huì)有什么人反對(duì)。這個(gè)人在1995年公開發(fā)表聲明，蔑視科學(xué)、渴望回到前技術(shù)時(shí)代的理想社會(huì)。當(dāng)然，這并不能說(shuō)明，對(duì)不加控制的工業(yè)增長(zhǎng)表示擔(dān)憂的環(huán)境主義者也是反科學(xué)的，而去年5月份刊登在《美國(guó)新聞和世界報(bào)道》上的一篇文章似乎暗示是這么回事。
The environmentalists, inevitably, respond to such critics. The true enemies of science, argues Paul, a pioneer of environmental studies, are those who question the evidence supporting global warming, the depletion of the ozone layer and other consequences of industrial growth.
環(huán)保主義者必會(huì)對(duì)這些批評(píng)作出回應(yīng)。作為環(huán)境研究的先驅(qū)，保羅認(rèn)為，科學(xué)的真正敵人是那些對(duì)證明全球變暖、臭氧層耗竭和其他工業(yè)增長(zhǎng)后果的證據(jù)提出質(zhì)疑的人。
Indeed, some observers fear that the anti-science epithet is in danger of becoming meaningless. "The term anti-science can lump together too many, quite different things," notes Harvard University philosopher Gerald in his 1993 work Science and Anti-Science. "They have in common only one thing that they tend to annoy or threaten those who regard themselves as more enlightened."
一些評(píng)論員甚至擔(dān)心反科學(xué)這個(gè)稱號(hào)面臨著失去意義的危險(xiǎn)。哈佛大學(xué)的哲學(xué)家在其1993年所著的《科學(xué)與反科學(xué)》中寫道：“反科學(xué)”一詞可以涵蓋很多截然不同的內(nèi)容。它們唯一的共同之處就是會(huì)激怒或威脅那些自持更文明進(jìn)步的人“
Text 4
Emerging from the 1980 census is the picture of a nation developing more and more regional competition, as population growth in the Northeast and Midwest reaches a near standstill.
1980年人口普查呈現(xiàn)出這樣一副圖景：隨著東北部和中西部人口增長(zhǎng)近乎停滯，地區(qū)間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)變得越來(lái)越激烈了。
This development-- and its strong implications for US politics and economy in years ahead-- has enthroned the South as America's most densely populated region for the first time in the history of the nation's head counting.
這一新態(tài)勢(shì)--以及它對(duì)今后美國(guó)政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)的強(qiáng)大影響--已使南部地區(qū)在美國(guó)人口普查史上首次成為人口最密集區(qū)。
Altogether, the US population rose in the 1970s by 23.2 million people-- numerically the third-largest growth ever recorded in a single decade. Even so, that gain adds up to only 11.4 percent, lowest in American annual records except for the Depression years.
20世紀(jì)70年代，美國(guó)人口總共增長(zhǎng)了2320萬(wàn)--從數(shù)字上來(lái)看，這是有歷史記載以來(lái)10年內(nèi)人口增長(zhǎng)的第三高。即便如此，人口總數(shù)也只增加了11.4%，除了大蕭條時(shí)期，這是美國(guó)年度記錄中最低的增長(zhǎng)率。
Americans have been migrating south and west in larger numbers since World War 2, and the pattern still prevails
第二次世界大戰(zhàn)以來(lái)，更多的美國(guó)人在向南部和西部地區(qū)遷移，而且這種模式如今仍然盛行。
Three sun-belt states-- Florida, Texas and California-- together had nearly 10 million more people in 1980 than a decade earlier. Among large cities, San Diego moved from 14th to 18th and San Antonion from 15th to 10th-- with Cleveland and Washington. D. C., dropping out of the top 10.
佛羅里達(dá)州、德克薩斯州和加利福尼亞州這三個(gè)陽(yáng)光地帶，1980年的人口比10年前增加了近1000萬(wàn)。其中的一些大城市，圣地亞哥（加州）從第14位上升到了第8位，圣安東尼奧（德州）從第15位升到第10位，而克利夫蘭（俄亥俄州）和華盛頓地區(qū)則被擠出了前十。
Not all that shift can be attributed to the movement out of the snow belt, census officials say. Nonstop waves of immigrants played a role, too-- and so did bigger crops of babies as yesterday's baby boom generation reached its child-bearing years.
人口普查官員說(shuō)，這種變化并非全都因?yàn)橐与x冷凍地帶。不斷的移民潮也起到了很大的作用，當(dāng)然還有大批的新生兒的出現(xiàn)-- 曾經(jīng)的“嬰兒潮”那一代人到了生育的年齡。
Moreover, demographers see the continuing shift south and west as joined by a related but newer phenomenon: More and more, Americans apparently are looking not just for places with more jobs but with fewer people, too. Some instances--?
而且，人口學(xué)家發(fā)現(xiàn)，向南部和西部地區(qū)的不斷遷移還伴隨著一種相關(guān)卻又較新的現(xiàn)象：顯然，美國(guó)人日益傾向于尋找不只是擁有更多工作機(jī)會(huì)的地方，而且還朝著人口較少 的地方移動(dòng)。例證如下：
* Regionally, the Rocky Mountain states reported the most rapid growth rate-- 37.1 percent since 1970 in a vast area with only 5 percent of the US population.
從區(qū)域上看，落基山脈各州公布的人口增長(zhǎng)率最高-- 1970年以來(lái)這片廣闊的土地上的人口增長(zhǎng)率為37.1%, 而其人口總量原本僅占美國(guó)總?cè)丝诘?%。
Among states, Nevada and Arizona grew fastest of all: 63.5 and 53.1 percent respectively. Except for Florida and Texas, the top 10 in rate of growth is composed of Western states with 7.5 million people-- about 9 per square mile.
從各州情況來(lái)看，內(nèi)華達(dá)州和亞利桑那州是增長(zhǎng)最快的：其增長(zhǎng)率分別為63.5% 和53.1%。除了佛羅里達(dá)州和德克薩斯州外，處于人口增長(zhǎng)率前十的都是西部各州，共有750萬(wàn)人--每平方英里約9個(gè)人。
The flight from overcrowdedness affects the migration from snow belt to more bearable climates.
從人口過度稠密地區(qū)的逃離，影響了以前那種從寒冷地帶到氣候宜人地區(qū)的遷移趨勢(shì)。
Nowhere do 1980 census statistics dramatize more the American search for spacious living than in the Far West. There, California added 3.7 million to its population in the 1970s, more than any other state.
1980年的人口普查統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)顯示，沒有任何地方比遠(yuǎn)西地區(qū)更能證明這種為了尋找廣闊的生活空間而遷移的取向了。在那，加州1970年代人口增加了370萬(wàn)，比其他任何州都多。
In that decade, however, large numbers also migrated from California, mostly to other parts of the West. Often they chose-- and still are choosing-- somewhat colder climates such as Oregon, Idaho and Alaska in order to escape smog, crime and other plagues of urbanization in the Golden State.
不過，70年代也有大批人從加州遷出，大多數(shù)人去了西部其他地方。他們常常選擇--現(xiàn)在依然選擇--氣候較冷的地方，為的是躲開“黃金州”（加州）的霧霾，犯罪和城市化帶來(lái)的其他困擾。
As a result, California's growth rate dropped during the 1970s, to 18.5 percent-- little more than two thirds the 1960s' growth figure and considerably below that of other Western states.
結(jié)果，加州的人口增長(zhǎng)率在1970年代降到了18.5%--只有60年代增長(zhǎng)率的2/3，大大低于西部其他各州。
