題記：
去年《樊登讀書(shū)會(huì)》講過(guò)這本書(shū)，前幾天提交了《路西法效應(yīng)》的讀書(shū)筆記，王大編在點(diǎn)評(píng)中提到了這本書(shū)，所以我很自然地把這本書(shū)加進(jìn)書(shū)單。百度閱讀僅190頁(yè)的內(nèi)容讓我竊喜地以為可能兩天就能提交讀書(shū)筆記，可是沒(méi)想到竟然拖了六天，原因在于在看完中文版后，有兩處不太理解，只能找英文版讀起來(lái)，而又想了解很多英文表述方法，所以放棄了速讀，一字一字讀完。讀了兩遍，對(duì)本書(shū)的理解大大加深。
尼采的這兩句話可以概況為本書(shū)的核心觀點(diǎn)：
1）He who has a why to live can bear with almost any how.
2）That which does not kill me, makes me stronger.
作者簡(jiǎn)介：作者維克多·弗蘭克爾是奧地利著名猶太裔心理學(xué)家，二戰(zhàn)期間本已收到美國(guó)的綠卡的他為了照顧年邁的父母留在了奧地利，不久被關(guān)進(jìn)奧斯維辛集中營(yíng)，在這個(gè)生存幾率只有1/28的人間地獄里經(jīng)歷了難以想象的痛苦和折磨，為了“未完成的心理學(xué)著作”他活了下來(lái)，二戰(zhàn)勝利后，面對(duì)至親至愛(ài)都已離世的慘痛境遇，他仍尋找到了生活的意義，開(kāi)創(chuàng)了心理學(xué)界的意義療法，堪稱偉大。
1、任何情境下人都是有自由意志的
《路西法效應(yīng)》強(qiáng)調(diào)人在情境中會(huì)受到影響，會(huì)不自覺(jué)地服從權(quán)威，甚至做出違背道德和人性的事。但這本書(shū)告訴我們即使在集中營(yíng)那么惡劣的環(huán)境，人也是有自由?！霸诩袪I(yíng)生活的經(jīng)驗(yàn)表明，人還是有可能選擇自己的行為的。有足夠的例證（常常是英雄性質(zhì)的）說(shuō)明，人可以克服冷漠，克制暴躁。即使是在可怕的心理和生理?xiàng)l件下，人也能夠保持一定的精神自由和意識(shí)獨(dú)立。
我們這些在集中營(yíng)生活過(guò)的人，都記得那些走過(guò)一個(gè)個(gè)屋子安慰別人、把自己最后一塊面包給了別人的人。這樣的人在數(shù)量上可能不多，但足以說(shuō)明一點(diǎn)：有一樣?xùn)|西你是不能從人的手中奪去的，那就是最寶貴的自由，人們一直擁有在任何環(huán)境中選擇自己的態(tài)度和行為方式的自由?！?/p>
In spite of all the enforced physical and mental primitiveness of the life in a concentration camp, it was possible for spiritual life to deepen. The damage to their inner selves was less. They were able to retreat from their terrible surroundings to a life of inner riches and spiritual freedom. The experiences of camp life show that man does have a choice of action, it becomes clear that the sort of person the prisoner became was the result of an inner decision, and not the result of camp influences alone.
What alone remains is "the last of human freedoms"—the ability to "choose one's attitude in a given set of circumstances." It is this spiritual freedom—which cannot be taken away—that makes life meaningful and purposeful. The examples are sufficient proof that man's inner strength may raise him above his outward fate.
2、如果苦難不可避免，那么也要從中尋找到意義
如果你發(fā)現(xiàn)經(jīng)受磨難是命中注定的，那你就應(yīng)當(dāng)把經(jīng)受磨難作為自己獨(dú)特的任務(wù)。你必須承認(rèn)，即使在經(jīng)受磨難時(shí)，你也是獨(dú)特的、孤獨(dú)的一個(gè)人。沒(méi)有人能夠解除你的磨難，替代你的痛苦。你獨(dú)特的機(jī)會(huì)就依存于自己承受重負(fù)的方式之中。
作為犯人，我們這樣的想法絕非脫離實(shí)際的臆想，這也是唯一能幫助我們解脫的想法。它使我們免于絕望，哪怕是處于看似毫無(wú)希望之時(shí)。我們?cè)缇瓦^(guò)了質(zhì)問(wèn)生命意義的階段，已經(jīng)不是天真地想通過(guò)積極地創(chuàng)造某種有價(jià)值的東西實(shí)現(xiàn)某個(gè)目標(biāo)的年齡了。對(duì)我們來(lái)說(shuō)，生命的意義包含著從生到死受苦受難這一更廣闊的循環(huán)。
一旦我們明白了磨難的意義，我們就不再通過(guò)無(wú)視折磨或心存幻想、虛假樂(lè)觀等方式去減少或平復(fù)在集中營(yíng)遭受的苦難。經(jīng)受苦難成了一項(xiàng)我們不能逃避的任務(wù)。
Life holds a potential meaning under any conditions, even the most miserable ones. It is here that we encounter the central theme of existentialism: to live is to suffer, to survive is to find meaning in the suffering. Nietzsche said "He who has a why to live can bear with almost any how."
3、找到生命的意義，任何環(huán)境下人都不會(huì)放棄?
我們一定不能忘記，即使在看似毫無(wú)希望的境地，即使面對(duì)無(wú)可改變的厄運(yùn)，人們也能找到生命之意義。那時(shí)重要的是，能夠見(jiàn)證人類潛能之極致，即人能夠?qū)€(gè)人的災(zāi)難轉(zhuǎn)化為勝利，將個(gè)人的厄運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)化為人類之成就。
武志紅也說(shuō)過(guò)類似的話：不管多么可怕的體驗(yàn)，如果你能承受得住，讓它流動(dòng)，那么一般情況下會(huì)化身為美妙的體驗(yàn)。當(dāng)然，前提必須是“承受得住”。你會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)，原來(lái)痛苦就是不被我們所接受的體驗(yàn)。?
Thus, when we saw a comrade smoking his own cigarettes, we knew he had given up faith, in his strength to carry on, and, once lost, the will to live seldom returned. Any attempt at fighting the camp's psychopathological influence on the prisoner by psychotherapeutic or psychohygienic methods had to aim at giving him inner strength by pointing out to him a future goal to which he could look forward.
Whatever we had gone through could still be an asset to us in the future. And I quoted from Nietzsche: That which does not kill me, makes me stronger.
In spite of this terrible suffering experience, I had no intention of losing hope and giving up. For no man knew what the future would bring, muchless the next hour.?
4、找到生命意義的有效方法
一旦找到了意義 （比如犧牲的意義），痛苦就不再是痛苦了。我們可以用三種不同的方式來(lái)發(fā)現(xiàn)生命之意義：
（1）通過(guò)創(chuàng)立某項(xiàng)工作或從事某種事業(yè)；（2）通過(guò)體驗(yàn)?zāi)撤N事情或面對(duì)某個(gè)人；（3）在忍受不可避免的苦難時(shí)采取某種態(tài)度
5、人性的善存在于個(gè)人的內(nèi)心深處，因人而異，不要貼標(biāo)簽
沒(méi)有哪個(gè)團(tuán)體純粹由高尚的人或者齷齪的人組成，不存在純粹類型的團(tuán)體。因此，即使在集中營(yíng)看守當(dāng)中，你偶爾也能發(fā)現(xiàn)一個(gè)高尚的人。集中營(yíng)生活撕開(kāi)了人的靈魂，暴露出人性的深處。在人性的深處，如果你發(fā)現(xiàn)人類在本性上就善惡交織，你還會(huì)覺(jué)得奇怪嗎？所有人的心里都有一道劃分善惡的分水嶺，它一直延伸到人性深處，通過(guò)集中營(yíng)所展現(xiàn)出的人性深淵的最底部，此刻，你也能清楚地看出來(lái)。
Human kindness can be found in all groups, even those which as a whole it would be easy to condemn. The boundaries between groups overlapped and we must not try to simplify? matters by saying that these men were angels and those were devils.
6、遭受痛苦不是尋找意義的必要方式
無(wú)論如何，遭受痛苦不是尋找意義的必要方式。我的意思是說(shuō)，即使在遭遇痛苦時(shí)，人們也有可能找到意義——假如痛苦是不可避免的話。如果痛苦是可以避免的，那么有意義的事就是去消除痛苦的根源，不論這種原因是心理的、生理的或政治的。遭受不必要的痛苦與其說(shuō)是英雄行為，不如說(shuō)是自虐。
7、獲釋后的心理問(wèn)題：對(duì)攻擊者的認(rèn)同與道德扭曲
獲得釋放后，很多人不太容易擺脫集中營(yíng)生活中司空見(jiàn)慣的殘忍行為的影響。獲得自由以后，他們覺(jué)得自己可以隨意而輕率地運(yùn)用自己的自由了。這次他們由被壓迫者成了壓迫者。他們是暴力和不公的施予者，而不是接受者。他們痛苦的經(jīng)歷成了為所欲為的借口。
During this psychological phase one observed that people with natures of a more primitive kind could not escape the influences of? ?the brutality which had surrounded them in camp life. Now, being free, they thought they could use their freedom licentiously and ruthlessly. The only thing that had changed for them was that they were now the oppressors instead of the oppressed.They became instigators, not objects, of willful force and injustice. They justified their behavior by their own terrible experiences. This was often revealed in apparently insignificant events.
Only slowly could these men be guided back to the commonplace truth that no one has the right to do?wrong, not even if wrong has been done to them.
8、重新定義意源性神經(jīng)官能癥
在追求夢(mèng)想的路上，人的內(nèi)心會(huì)產(chǎn)生焦慮，往往目標(biāo)越高、期待越高的人會(huì)感受到更多的焦慮，但是近代的心理學(xué)常常把這種焦慮定義為精神問(wèn)題，凱文老師說(shuō)這樣的定義是有問(wèn)題的，因?yàn)槿绻凑者@樣的劃分標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，平庸無(wú)能的人才是健康的。北大的很多優(yōu)秀的小孩都會(huì)陷入一定程度的焦慮，其實(shí)這樣的焦慮是正常的，因特爾前總裁Andrew S·Grove也認(rèn)為“只有偏執(zhí)狂才能生存（Only the Paranoid Survive）”。
本文作者也持有同樣的觀點(diǎn)：并非所有沖突都是神經(jīng)官能癥性質(zhì)的，一定程度的沖突是正常的、健康的。同樣，苦難也不總是病理現(xiàn)象，苦難非但不是神經(jīng)官能癥的癥狀，反而可能是個(gè)人進(jìn)步的表現(xiàn)，如果苦難是由存在之挫折引致，就更是如此。我堅(jiān)決否認(rèn)人對(duì)其存在意義的追求 （或?qū)ζ浯嬖谝饬x的懷疑）是源于或者會(huì)導(dǎo)致任何疾病。存在之挫折本身既非病理性的也非病源性的。人對(duì)于生命價(jià)值的擔(dān)心乃至絕望是一種存在之焦慮，而絕非心理疾病。意源性神經(jīng)官能癥的發(fā)生不是由于欲望與本能的沖突，而是由于存在本身出現(xiàn)了問(wèn)題。其中，追求意義過(guò)程中遇到挫折是一個(gè)很重要的原因。顯而易見(jiàn)，治療意源性神經(jīng)官能癥最適當(dāng)、最有效的辦法不是一般意義上的心理療法，而是意義療法，只有意義療法能夠突出人特有的意識(shí)。
Noogenic neuroses do not emerge from conflicts between drives and instincts but rather from existential problems. Not every conflict is necessarily neurotic; some amount of conflict is normal and healthy. In a similar sense suffering is not always a pathological phenomenon; rather than being a symptom of neurosis, suffering may well be a human achievement, especially if the suffering grows out of existential frustration. A man's concern, even his despair, over the worthwhileness of life is an?existential distress?but by no means a mental?disease.
