Europe faces an enduring crisis of energy and geopolitics
This will weaken it and threaten its global position
歐洲面臨著一場持久的能源和地緣政治危機
這將削弱它并威脅到它的全球地位
If you ask?Europe’s friends around the world what
they think of the old continent’s prospects they often respond with two
emotions. One is admiration. In the struggle to help Ukraine and resist Russian
aggression, Europe has displayed unity, grit and a principled willingness to bear
enormous costs. But the second is alarm. A brutal economic squeeze will pose a test
of Europe’s resilience in 2023 and
beyond. There is a growing fear that the recasting of the global energy system, American
economic populism and geopolitical rifts threaten thelong-run competitiveness of the European Union and non-members, includingBritain. It is not just the continent’s prosperity that is at risk, the healthof the transatlantic alliance is, too.
如果你問歐洲在世界各地的朋友，他們?nèi)绾慰创@個古老大陸的前景，他們的回答通常有兩種情緒。一個是欽佩。在幫助烏克蘭和抵抗俄羅斯侵略的斗爭中，歐洲表現(xiàn)出了團結(jié)、勇氣和承擔巨大代價的原則性意愿。但第二個是恐慌。殘酷的經(jīng)濟緊縮將在2023年及以后考驗歐洲的韌性。人們越來越擔心，全球能源體系的重塑、美國的經(jīng)濟民粹主義和地緣政治分歧會威脅到歐盟和包括英國在內(nèi)的非歐盟成員國的長期競爭力。不僅歐洲大陸的繁榮受到威脅，跨大西洋聯(lián)盟的健康也受到威脅。
Don’t be fooled by the rush of good news from Europe in the past few
weeks. Energy prices are down from the summer and a run of good weather means that gas storage is
nearly full. But the energy crisis still poses dangers. Gas prices are six
times higher than their long-run average. On November 22nd Russia threatened tothrottle the lastoperational pipeline to Europe, even as missile attacks caused emergency powercuts across Ukraine. Europe’s gas storage will need to be refilled once againin 2023, this time without any piped Russian gas whatsoever.
不要被過去幾周從歐洲傳來的一連串好消息所迷惑。能源價格從夏季開始下降，而連續(xù)的好天氣意味著天然氣儲備接近飽和。但能源危機仍然是個危險。天然氣價格是長期平均價格的六倍。11月22日，俄羅斯威脅要切斷通往歐洲的最后一條輸油管，盡管導彈襲擊導致烏克蘭全境緊急斷電。到2023年，歐洲的天然氣儲藏庫將需要再次補充，這一次沒有任何來自俄羅斯的管道天然氣。
Vladimir Putin’s energy weapon will exact a toll beyond Ukraine.
Our modelling suggests that, in a normal winter, a 10% rise in real energy
prices is associated with a 0.6% increase in deaths. Hence the energy crunch this yearcould cause over
100,000 extra deaths of elderly people across Europe. If so, MrPutin’s energy weapon could take more lives outside Ukraine than his artillery, missiles and drones do directly within it. That is one more reason why Ukraine’s resistance to Russia is Europe’s fight, too.
弗拉基米爾?普京的能源武器所造成的損失將超過烏克蘭。我們的模型表明，在一個正常的冬天，實際能源價格上漲10%，死亡人數(shù)就會增加0.6%。因此，今年的能源短缺可能會導致整個歐洲有超過10萬名老年人額外死亡。從這角度看，普京先生的能源武器在烏克蘭境外造成的死亡人數(shù)可能比他的大炮、導彈和無人機在烏克蘭境內(nèi)直接造成的死亡人數(shù)還要多。這就是為什么烏克蘭對俄羅斯的抵抗也是歐洲的戰(zhàn)斗的另一個原因。
The war is also creating financial vulnerabilities. Energy inflation
is spilling over into the rest
of Europe’s economy, creating an acute dilemma for the European Central Bank. It needs to raise
interest rates to control prices. But if it?goes too farit could
destabilise the euro zone’s weaker members, not least indebted Italy.
這場戰(zhàn)爭也在造成金融方面的脆弱性。能源通脹正在蔓延到歐洲其它經(jīng)濟領(lǐng)域，令歐洲中央銀行陷入嚴重的兩難局面。它需要提高利率以控制物價。但如果它用力過猛，可能會破壞歐元區(qū)較弱成員的穩(wěn)定，尤其是負債累累的意大利。
Even as the energy crisis rages, the war has exposed a vulnerability inEurope’s business model. Too many of Europe’s industrial firms, especiallyGerman ones, have relied on abundant energy inputs from Russia. Plenty ofcompanies have also become more dependent on another autocracy, China,as an end market.The prospect of severed relations with Russia, structurally higher costs and adecoupling of the West and China has meant areckoning in many boardrooms.
正在能源危機肆虐之際，這場戰(zhàn)爭也暴露出歐洲商業(yè)模式的一個弱點。太多的歐洲工業(yè)企業(yè)，尤其是德國企業(yè)，依賴俄羅斯豐富的能源輸入。許多公司也變得更加依賴另一個專制國家，秦國，作為終端市場。與俄羅斯斷絕關(guān)系的前景、結(jié)構(gòu)性的高成本以及西方與秦國的脫鉤，意味著許多公司的董事會要進行破產(chǎn)清算。
That fear has been amplified by America’s economic nationalism which
threatens to draw activity across the Atlantic in a whirlwind of subsidies and
protectionism. President Joe Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act involves $400bn of
handouts for energy, manufacturing and transport and includes make-in-America
provisions. In many ways the scheme resembles the industrial policies that China haspursued for decades. As the other two pillars of the world economy become moreinterventionist and protectionist, Europe, with its quaint insistence onupholding World Trade Organisation rules on free trade, looks like a sucker.
這種擔憂被美國的經(jīng)濟民族主義放大了，后者可能會在補貼和保護主義的旋風中吸引大西洋彼岸的蠢蠢欲動。美國總統(tǒng)喬?拜登的《通貨膨脹削減法案》涉及4000億美元的能源、制造業(yè)和運輸業(yè)補貼，其中包括“美國制造”條款。在許多方面，該計劃與中國幾十年來推行的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策相似。隨著世界經(jīng)濟的另兩大支柱傾向更加干涉主義和保護主義，堅持維護世界貿(mào)易組織自由貿(mào)易規(guī)則的歐洲看起來就像個傻瓜。
Already, companies are reacting to the subsidies.
Northvolt, a prized Swedish battery startup, has said that it
wants to expand production in America. Iberdrola, a Spanish energy company, is
investing twice as much in America as in the European Union. Many bosses warn
that the combination of expensive energy and American subsidies leaves Europe
at risk of mass deindustrialisation.?BASF, a German chemicals giant, recently unveiled plans toshrink its European operations “permanently”. It does not help that Europe isageing faster than America, too.
企業(yè)們已經(jīng)開始對補貼做出反應(yīng)。瑞典備受贊譽的電池初創(chuàng)企業(yè)諾伏(Northvolt)表示，希望擴大在美國的產(chǎn)能。西班牙能源公司Iberdrola在美國的投資是在歐盟的兩倍。許多企業(yè)老板警告說，昂貴的能源加上美國的補貼，使歐洲面臨大規(guī)模去工業(yè)化的風險。德國化工巨頭巴斯夫(BASF)最近公布了“永久性”縮減其歐洲業(yè)務(wù)的計劃。歐洲人口老齡化速度也比美國快，這也于事無補。
Losing investment makes Europe poorer and feeds into a sense
of declining
economic vigour. Compared with its pre-covid?GDP?trajectory, Europe has done
worse than any other economic bloc. Of the world’s 100 most valuable firms,
only 14 are European. Politicians will be tempted to chuck out the rule book and respond with
subsidies of their own in an escalating arms race of corporate goodies. Germany’s economy
minister has accused America of “hoovering up investments”. President Emmanuel Macron of France hascalled for “a European wake-up”.
失去投資使歐洲更加貧窮，加劇了經(jīng)濟活力下降的感覺。與新冠疫情前的gdp軌跡相比，歐洲的表現(xiàn)比任何其他經(jīng)濟集團都要糟糕。在全球100家最有價值的公司中，只有14家是歐洲公司。政客們很可能會拋棄規(guī)則，以各自的補貼作為回應(yīng)，展開一場不斷升級的企業(yè)利益軍備競賽。德國經(jīng)濟部長指責美國“豪搶投資”。法國總統(tǒng)埃馬紐埃爾·馬克龍呼吁“歐洲覺醒”。
Thus the subsidy row is also feeding tensions between America and Europe. America’s
financial and military support for Ukraine vastly exceeds Europe’s, and as it pivots to Asia to meet
the challenge from China, America resents the?EU’s failure to pay for its ownsecurity. Most members of?NATO have failed to meet the goal of spending 2%of?GDP on defence. The?EU was staggeringly naive about Russianaggression. Although the war caused America and Europe to unite after theruptures of the Trump years, the danger is that a long conflict and economictensions will gradually pull them apart again. Mr Putin and China, would lovethat.
因此，補貼之爭也加劇了美國和歐洲之間的緊張關(guān)系。美國對烏克蘭的財政和軍事支持遠遠超過了歐洲，隨著美國轉(zhuǎn)向亞洲應(yīng)對來自中國的挑戰(zhàn)，美國對歐盟未能為自己的安全買單感到不滿。大多數(shù)北約成員國都未能實現(xiàn)將GDP的2%用于國防的目標。對于俄羅斯的侵略，歐盟天真得驚人。盡管這場戰(zhàn)爭使美國和歐洲在特朗普時代的破裂之后團結(jié)起來，但危險在于，長期的沖突和經(jīng)濟緊張將逐漸使它們再次分裂。普京和秦國會樂見其成。
To avoid a dangerous rift, America must see the bigger picture. Mr
Biden’s protectionism threatens to drain Europe of vitality even as America props up Ukraine’s army,
and armadas of tankers cross the Atlantic to supply Europe’s energy. The chief
aim of Bidenomics is to stop China dominating key industries: America has no
strategic interest in siphoning European investment. It should make European firms eligible forits energysubsidies, and integrate transatlantic energy markets more deeply.
為了避免危險的裂痕，美國必須站在更高的格局。拜登先生的保護主義有可能耗盡歐洲的活力，即使是在美國支持烏克蘭軍隊、大批油輪穿越大西洋為歐洲供應(yīng)能源的時候。拜登經(jīng)濟學的主要目的是阻止中國主導關(guān)鍵行業(yè)：虹吸歐洲投資并不符合美國的戰(zhàn)略利益。它應(yīng)該讓歐洲公司有資格獲得其能源補貼，并更深入地整合跨大西洋能源市場。
Europe, meanwhile, needs to protect its economy againstthe energy squeeze. Schemes that rightly aim to subsidise consumers and firmsfor their basic energy needs should curb demand by charging higher prices atthe margin, as inGermany.To lower long-run energy prices Europe should accelerate the renewablesrevolution, while keeping energy markets open to competition. It also needs toadapt to a new security reality. That means spending more on defence so that itcan take up the burden as Americashifts its gaze towards Asia.
與此同時，歐洲需要保護其經(jīng)濟免受能源短缺的影響。那些旨在補貼消費者和企業(yè)基本能源需求的計劃，應(yīng)該像德國那樣，通過提高邊際價格來抑制需求。為了降低長期能源價格，歐洲應(yīng)該加速可再生能源革命，同時保持能源市場的開放競爭。它還需要適應(yīng)新的安全現(xiàn)實。這意味著在國防上投入更多，以便在美國將目光轉(zhuǎn)向亞洲時能夠承擔起負擔。
Besides admiration and alarm, the other emotion governing
transatlantic relations is frustration. America is irritated by Europe’s
economic torpor and its failure todefend itself; Europe is outraged by America’s economic populism. But just asEurope must not be divided by the war, so it is vital that the most powerfuldemocratic alliance in history adapts—and endures.
除了欽佩和驚恐，支配大西洋兩岸關(guān)系的另一種情緒是沮喪。美國對歐洲經(jīng)濟的疲軟和未能自衛(wèi)感到惱火；歐洲則被美國的經(jīng)濟民粹主義激怒。但正如歐洲不能因戰(zhàn)爭而分裂一樣，有史以來最強大的民主聯(lián)盟適應(yīng)并經(jīng)受住考驗。
