中國房價飆升的同時美國等各個國家的房價也在快速上漲，房市熱潮有地域區(qū)別，本質(zhì)卻都是一樣的，借鑒諾獎得主對美國房市的過去和未來，思考全球經(jīng)濟與我國房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)濟的未來。
The Housing Boom Is Already Gigantic. How Long Can It Last?
房市繁榮已經(jīng)無比龐大。它還能持續(xù)多久？
By Robert J. Shiller
作者 Rober J. Shiller
Dec.7, 2018
寫于2018年12月7日
翻譯者：恰恰
We are, once again, experiencing one of the greatest housing booms in United States history.
How long this will last and where it is heading next are impossible to know now.
But it is time to take notice: My data shows that this is the United States’ third biggest housing boom in the modern era.
在美國歷史上，我們曾一度經(jīng)歷過無比巨大的房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)濟繁榮。
這種繁榮能持續(xù)多久？它會走向何處？都不得而知。
但，是時候注意了：我的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，這是現(xiàn)代美國第三次房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)濟熱潮。
Since February 2012, when the price declines associated with the last financial crisis ended, prices for existing homes in the United States have been rising steadily and enormously. According to the S&P/CoreLogic/Case-Shiller National Home Price Index (which I helped to create) as of September, the prices were 53 percent higher than they were at the bottom of the market in 2012.
That means, on average, a house that sold for, say, $200,000 in 2012 would bring over $300,000 in September.
自從2012年2月，由上次金融危機引起的價格下跌結(jié)束以后，美國現(xiàn)有房屋的價格就開始穩(wěn)步且飛快地上漲。根據(jù)九月的標普/CoreLogic/Case-Shiller國家房屋價格指數(shù)（我?guī)椭谱鞯模?，價格已經(jīng)高出2012年底價的53% 。
這意味著，平均每所2012年售價20萬美金的房子在九月份售價超過30萬美金。
Even after factoring in Consumer Price Index inflation, real existing home prices were up almost 40 percent during that period. That is a substantial increase in less than seven years.
In fact, based on my data, it amounts to the third strongest national boom in real terms since the Consumer Price Index began in 1913, behind only the explosive run-up in prices that led to the great financial crisis of a decade ago, and one connected with World War II and the great postwar Baby Boom.
即使考慮到消費者價格指數(shù)的通貨膨脹，在這期間實際現(xiàn)有房屋的價格也上漲了幾乎40%。這是不到7年里的大幅上漲。事實上， 基于我的數(shù)據(jù)，自1913年消費者價格指數(shù)開始，這等同于全國第三次實體繁榮，僅次于十年前造成巨大金融危機的價格暴漲，和另一場關(guān)系到第二次世界大戰(zhàn)及戰(zhàn)后嬰兒潮的價格上漲。
The No. 1 boom occurred from February 1997 to October 2006, when real prices of existing United States homes rose 74 percent. This was a period of intense speculative enthusiasm — for houses and for financial instruments based on mortgages as investments — and it was also a time of great regulatory complacency. The term “flipping houses” became popular then. People exploited the boom by buying homes and selling them only months later at a huge profit.
排名第一的繁榮發(fā)生在1997年2月到2006年10月， 期間美國現(xiàn)房的價格上漲了74%。這是一個投機熱情高漲的時期，對于房子和基于抵押貸款做投資的金融工具，這也是嚴重的監(jiān)管自滿的時期。那時“房屋翻轉(zhuǎn)”這個詞變得流行。人們利用這輪繁榮購買房屋并在幾個月后以巨額利潤出售房屋。
That boom ended disastrously. Soaring valuations collapsed with a 35 percent drop in real prices for existing homes, ushering in the financial crisis that enveloped the world in 2008 and 2009.
The second greatest boom, from 1942 to 1947, had more benign consequences. Over this five-year interval, real prices of existing homes rose 60 percent.
這場繁榮以慘烈收尾。沖天的估值伴隨著現(xiàn)房價格下跌35%崩塌， 并迎來籠罩在2008年到2009年的金融危機。1942年到1947年的第二大繁榮帶來了更加良性的后果。在這五年間，現(xiàn)有房屋的實際價格上漲了60％。
Booms and busts are rooted in popular narratives with complex social-psychological roots. This boom centered on a war-induced housing shortage, an enormous increase in the number of new babies and families who would need housing after the war, and the 1944 G.I. Bill, which subsidized home-buying by veterans. Home prices did not fall significantly after this boom ended.
繁榮和蕭條根植于具有復(fù)雜社會心理根源的流行敘事中。這場繁榮集中在戰(zhàn)爭導(dǎo)致的住房短缺，戰(zhàn)后需要住房的新生嬰兒和家庭數(shù)量大幅增加，以及1944年的G.I.比爾資助退伍軍人購買房屋。
Today, signs of weakness in the housing market are being taken by some as a signal that the prices of single-family homes may fall soon, as they did sharply after 2006. The leading indicators, which include building permits and sales of both existing and new homes, have all been declining in recent months.
如今，一些人認為房屋市場疲軟的跡象表明單戶住宅價格可能很快下跌，因為他們在2006年之后大幅上漲。近幾月，主要指標包括建筑許可和現(xiàn)有房屋和新房銷售都在下降。
But with few examples of extreme booms, we cannot be sure what such indicators mean for the current market.
Low interest rates — imposed by the Federal Reserve and other central banks in reaction to the financial crisis — are the most popular culprit in the current boom. There is some apparent merit to this view, since these three biggest nationwide housing booms all included very low interest rates.
但由于幾乎沒有極端繁榮的例子，我們無法確定這些指標對當前市場意味著什么。
美聯(lián)儲和其他央行為應(yīng)對金融危機降低利率是這場繁榮中最流行的罪魁禍首。這個觀點有明顯的優(yōu)勢，因為三大房市熱潮都包含了非常低的利率。
But the market reaction to interest rates is hardly immediate or predictable. The housing market does not react as directly as you might expect to interest rate movements. Over the nearly seven years of the current boom, from February 2012 to the present, all major domestic interest rates have increased, not decreased. So, while interest rates have been low, they have moved the wrong way, yet the boom has continued.
但是市場對于利率的反應(yīng)是不是即刻的或者可預(yù)測的。房屋市場不會像你預(yù)期的那樣立刻對利率變動做出反應(yīng)。從2012年2月到現(xiàn)在，當前繁榮的近7年，所有主要的國內(nèi)利率都上漲了，而不是降低。 因此盡管利率是降低了，他們卻找錯了方向，因為這場繁榮還在繼續(xù)。
Another explanation is simple economic growth. But, as a matter of history, prices of existing homes — as opposed to the supply of newly built homes — have generally not responded to economic growth. There was only a 20 percent increase in real prices of existing homes in the 50 years from 1950 to 2000 despite a sixfold increase in real G.D.P.
另一個解釋是簡單的經(jīng)濟增長。 但是縱觀歷史， 和新建房屋相反，現(xiàn)有房屋的價格通常對經(jīng)濟增長沒有反應(yīng)。 1950年到2000年這50年間，現(xiàn)有房屋無視GDP六倍的增長僅僅上漲了20%。
The simplest narrative being given for the current boom is just that the 2008-2009 financial crisis and the so-called Great Recession are over and home prices are returning to normal.
對當前繁榮的最簡單的敘述是，2008-2009金融危機和所謂的大蕭條結(jié)束，房價正在恢復(fù)正常。
But that explanation does not cut it either. In September they were 11 percent higher than at the 2006 peak in nominal terms, and almost as high in real terms. This is not a return to normal, but a market that appears to be rising to a record.
It is difficult to assess the contribution of President Trump to the current boom.
但是這種解釋也無法立足。9月份掛出的房價比2006年的峰值高11%， 但是房屋的實際造價幾乎一樣。這不是恢復(fù)正常，市場明顯在上漲到一個新的記錄。
難以評估特朗普總統(tǒng)對這場熱潮的貢獻。
It is certainly less obvious than the role of President George W. Bush in the 1997-2006 boom. Mr. Bush extolled the benefits of “the ownership society” and in 2003 he signed the American Dream Downpayment Act, which subsidized home purchases. In his 2004 re-election bid he boldly asserted: “We want more people owning their own home.” This seems to have contributed to an atmosphere of high expectations for home price increases.
可以肯定的是沒有喬治 W. 布什總統(tǒng)在1997-2006年的繁榮里扮演的角色明顯。布什先生贊揚了“所有制社會”的好處，并在2003年簽署了美國夢預(yù)付款法案，該法案補貼購房。在他2004年的連任競選中，他大膽地宣稱：“我們希望更多的人擁有自己的房屋?！边@似乎促成了對房價上漲的高度期望。
The Trump administration’s attitude toward housing is less clear. President Trump’s slogan “Make America Great Again” has overtones of the “American dream.” But provisions of his Tax Reform and Jobs Act of 2017 were unfriendly to homeowners.
川普政府對于房市的態(tài)度并不明確。特朗普總統(tǒng)的口號“讓美國再次偉大”再次宣揚了“美國夢”。但2017年的“稅改和就業(yè)法”規(guī)定對房主并不友好。
Even without major further interest rate increases, there would seem to be a limit on how much the prices of existing homes can increase. After all, people must struggle to cover a range of living expenses, and builders are supplying fresh new offerings to compete with the existing houses on the market.
即使沒有重大的進一步加息，現(xiàn)有房屋的價格增長似乎也是有限的。畢竟，人們必須努力支付一系列生活費用，建筑商也正在提供新房，以與市場上的現(xiàn)有房屋競爭。
Perhaps the home price increases are now a self-fulfilling prophesy. As John Maynard Keynes argued in his 1936 “General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,” people seem to have a “simple faith in the conventional basis of valuation.”
也許如今的房價上漲是一種自我實現(xiàn)的預(yù)言。正如約翰·梅納德·凱恩斯（John Maynard Keynes）在其1936年的“就業(yè)，利息和貨幣通論”中提出的那樣，人們似乎對傳統(tǒng)的估值依據(jù)有著“簡單的信念”。
If the conventional basis is now that home prices are going up 5 percent a year, then sellers, who would otherwise have no idea what to ask for their houses, will just put a price based on this convention. And likewise buyers will not feel they are paying too much if they accept the convention. In the United States, we may believe that the process is all part of the “American dream.”
如果傳統(tǒng)依據(jù)是房價每年上漲5％，那么賣家將只根據(jù)這個慣例定價，否則他不知道要多少。同樣買家如果接受了這個定價也不會覺得太貴。在美國，我們可能認為這個過程就是“美國夢”的一部分。
It can’t go on forever, of course. But when it will end isn’t knowable. The data can’t tell us when prices will level off, or whether they will plunge catastrophically. All we do know is that prices have been roaring higher at a speed rarely seen in American history.
它不會永遠持續(xù)下去。但是什么時候結(jié)束是不可知的。數(shù)據(jù)不能告訴我們什么時候價格會穩(wěn)定，或者它是否會災(zāi)難式跳水。我們能知道的僅僅是房價已經(jīng)以美國歷史上罕見的速度一路高歌地上漲。
Robert J. Shiller is Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale.
Robert J. Shiller 是耶魯大學(xué)經(jīng)濟學(xué)斯特林教授。（斯特林教授是耶魯大學(xué)教授的最高級別, 授予在其領(lǐng)域內(nèi)頂尖水平的終身教授）
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