2025年，多個(gè)加拿大原住民組織發(fā)布了關(guān)于北極主權(quán)與安全的最新戰(zhàn)略報(bào)告，它們傳達(dá)了一個(gè)共同的核心信息：若不尊重原住民權(quán)利持有者及其在議程設(shè)定與決策中的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位，加拿大在北極的主權(quán)便無(wú)從談起。
November 2025
2025年11月
Recent Canadian Northern Indigenous Peoples’ Sovereignty, Security, and Defence Strategies
加拿大北方原住民主權(quán)、安全與防務(wù)戰(zhàn)略近期動(dòng)向
P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Zachary Zimmermann, and Samuel Pallaq Huyer
P. 惠特尼·拉肯鮑爾、扎卡里·齊默爾曼、塞繆爾·帕拉克·休耶
Several Canadian Indigenous organizations have released recent strategies and reports on Arctic sovereignty and security, all of which share a common theme: there can be no Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic without respect for Indigenous rightsholders and leadership in agenda setting and decision making.
多個(gè)加拿大原住民組織近期發(fā)布了關(guān)于北極主權(quán)與安全的戰(zhàn)略和報(bào)告，這些文件都共享一個(gè)共同主題：若不尊重原住民權(quán)利持有者及其在議程設(shè)定和決策中的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位，加拿大在北極的主權(quán)便無(wú)從談起。
In June 2025, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK) released An Inuit Vision for Arctic Sovereignty, Security and Defence, which highlights the need for Inuit perspectives to be central to Canada's national security efforts and calls on the Government of Canada to prioritize human security in its defence planning.
2025年6月，因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟發(fā)布了《因紐特人對(duì)北極主權(quán)、安全與防務(wù)的愿景》，該文件強(qiáng)調(diào)因紐特人視角必須成為加拿大國(guó)家安全努力的核心，并呼吁加拿大政府在其防務(wù)規(guī)劃中優(yōu)先考慮人的安全。
In September 2025, Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. (NTI) and the Government of Nunavut (GN) released the Nunavut Arctic Sovereignty and Security Strategy, which outlines five pillars for a secure and sovereign Nunavut that also emphasize human security; the importance of nation-building infrastructure projects to reduce supply chain vulnerabilities, support national security, and unlock economic opportunities; and the need for sustained investment in community-based security.
2025年9月，努納武特土著土地索賠組織與努納武特政府發(fā)布了《努納武特北極主權(quán)與安全戰(zhàn)略》，該戰(zhàn)略概述了建設(shè)一個(gè)安全且擁有主權(quán)的努納武特的五大支柱，這些支柱同樣強(qiáng)調(diào)人的安全；國(guó)家建設(shè)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目對(duì)于減少供應(yīng)鏈脆弱性、支持國(guó)家安全和釋放經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)會(huì)的重要性；以及對(duì)社區(qū)安全持續(xù)投資的必要性。
The Assembly of First Nations (AFN) Yukon Region report on Yukon First Nations Defence and Security, released in August 2025, reiterates that Indigenous Peoples must be acknowledged and treated as essential decision-making partners in Arctic defence and security, offering specific recommendations to the federal government on how to improve information sharing, co-planning, and funding for defence and security initiatives.
原住民議會(huì)育空地區(qū)關(guān)于育空第一民族防務(wù)與安全的報(bào)告于2025年8月發(fā)布，重申必須承認(rèn)原住民并將其視為北極防務(wù)與安全中至關(guān)重要的決策伙伴，并就如何改善信息共享、共同規(guī)劃以及為防務(wù)與安全倡議提供資金向聯(lián)邦政府提出了具體建議。
These documents advocate for a holistic view of security that includes community well-being, economic prosperity, and the environment, in addition to traditional military defence.
這些文件倡導(dǎo)一種整體性的安全觀，除了傳統(tǒng)的軍事防御外，還包括社區(qū)福祉、經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮和環(huán)境。
As the Government of Canada has updated its defence and foreign policies related to the Arctic in the last two years,1 Indigenous rightsholders in that country have responded.
在過(guò)去兩年中，隨著加拿大政府更新了其與北極相關(guān)的國(guó)防和外交政策，該國(guó)的原住民權(quán)利持有者做出了回應(yīng)。
Recent position papers or strategies released in 2025 by Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK), Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. (NTI) in collaboration with the Government of Nunavut, and the Assembly of First Nations (AFN) Yukon Region share a core message: Canada's Arctic sovereignty is inseparable from the sovereignty, security, and well-being of the Indigenous peoples who inhabit the region.
因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟、努納武特土著土地索賠組織與努納武特政府合作，以及原住民議會(huì)育空地區(qū)于2025年發(fā)布的近期立場(chǎng)文件或戰(zhàn)略共享一個(gè)核心信息：加拿大的北極主權(quán)與居住在該地區(qū)的原住民的主權(quán)、安全和福祉密不可分。
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Generally compatible with state messaging, these documents challenge the Government of Canada to move beyond traditional national defence to embrace a more holistic, collaborative or Indigenous-led approach that respects and enables their roles as active partners in, and not passive subjects of, security.
這些文件雖然與政府的總體信息一致，但挑戰(zhàn)加拿大政府超越傳統(tǒng)的國(guó)防思維，采納一種更全面、協(xié)作或由原住民主導(dǎo)的方法，該方法尊重并使他們能夠成為安全事務(wù)中的積極伙伴，而非被動(dòng)的對(duì)象。
The visions articulated in all three documents are grounded in Indigenous rights to traditional territories and activities therein.
這三份文件所闡述的愿景都基于原住民對(duì)其傳統(tǒng)領(lǐng)土及其中活動(dòng)的權(quán)利。
As the national Inuit advocacy organization based in Ottawa, ITK claims a voice on behalf of Inuit as the original peoples of Inuit Nunangat—the Inuit homeland in Canada.2
作為總部設(shè)在渥太華的全國(guó)性因紐特人倡導(dǎo)組織，因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟代表作為因紐特人努南加特——因紐特人在加拿大家園——原始民族的因紐特人發(fā)聲。
Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporation (NTI), representing the Inuit beneficiaries of the Nunavut Agreement, coordinates and manages Inuit responsibilities set out in that Crown-Inuit treaty and ensures that the federal and territorial governments fulfill their obligations.3
努納武特土著土地索賠組織代表《努納武特協(xié)議》的因紐特人受益人，協(xié)調(diào)并管理該王室-因紐特人條約中規(guī)定的因紐特人責(zé)任，并確保聯(lián)邦和地區(qū)政府履行其義務(wù)。
The Assembly of First Nations (AFN) Yukon Region works with all fourteen Yukon First Nations (YFNs) to support advancing their priorities and interest on a national level.4
原住民議會(huì)育空地區(qū)與所有十四個(gè)育空第一民族合作，支持在國(guó)家層面推進(jìn)他們的優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)和利益。
ITK: An Inuit Vision for Arctic Sovereignty, Security and Defence
因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟：《因紐特人對(duì)北極主權(quán)、安全與防務(wù)的愿景》
Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami released its position paper An Inuit Vision for Arctic Sovereignty, Security and Defence in June 2025.
因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟于2025年6月發(fā)布了其立場(chǎng)文件《因紐特人對(duì)北極主權(quán)、安全與防務(wù)的愿景》。
Declaring that “Inuit are proud Canadians” (p. 3), the document chastizes the Government of Canada for what it characterizes as costly mistakes of the past, extols the strengths and knowledge that Inuit bring to this nation-building discussion, and highlights the need to recognize the “importance of human security to national security” (p. 3).
該文件宣稱(chēng)“因紐特人是自豪的加拿大人”（第3頁(yè)），批評(píng)加拿大政府過(guò)去犯下了它所稱(chēng)的代價(jià)高昂的錯(cuò)誤，贊揚(yáng)因紐特人為這場(chǎng)國(guó)家建設(shè)討論帶來(lái)的優(yōu)勢(shì)和知識(shí)，并強(qiáng)調(diào)需要認(rèn)識(shí)到“人的安全對(duì)國(guó)家安全感的重要性”（第3頁(yè)）。
This call to action is rooted in the core thesis that “Inuit sovereignty is Canada’s sovereignty,” and that a secure and prosperous Arctic is impossible without a direct partnership with Inuit and significant investment in Inuit Nunangat (p. 3).
這一行動(dòng)呼吁植根于核心論點(diǎn)：“因紐特人的主權(quán)就是加拿大的主權(quán)”，并且沒(méi)有與因紐特人的直接伙伴關(guān)系以及對(duì)因紐特人努南加特的重大投資，就不可能有一個(gè)安全與繁榮的北極（第3頁(yè)）。
The report states unreservedly that “Canada trails all other Arctic States in developing its Arctic territory, exposing our country to security threats, sovereignty violations, and foreign interference” (p. 3).
該報(bào)告毫無(wú)保留地指出，“加拿大在開(kāi)發(fā)其北極領(lǐng)土方面落后于所有其他北極國(guó)家，使我國(guó)面臨安全威脅、主權(quán)侵犯和外國(guó)干涉”（第3頁(yè)）。
This paper reiterates a longstanding position articulated by ITK presidents, including now-Governor General Mary May Simon,5 that Canada must adopt a broader and deeper vision of Arctic security than a narrow, militaristic or military-centric view.
這份文件重申了因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟歷任主席（包括現(xiàn)任總督瑪麗·梅·西蒙）長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)的立場(chǎng)，即加拿大必須對(duì)北極安全采取比狹隘的、軍事主義或以軍事為中心的觀點(diǎn)更廣泛、更深刻的愿景。
Instead, it posits that national security in the Arctic is inextricably linked to human security: the welfare and prosperity of the Inuit people and their communities (p. 3).
相反，它假定北極的國(guó)家安全與人的安全密不可分：即因紐特人及其社區(qū)的福祉與繁榮（第3頁(yè)）。
By investing in essential infrastructure and services, and by empowering Inuit through direct partnerships and self-determination, ITK articulates a vision whereby Canada improve Arctic security by placing Inuit welfare first and enacting “a more ambitious vision” (p. 9).
通過(guò)對(duì)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和服務(wù)進(jìn)行投資，并通過(guò)直接伙伴關(guān)系和自決權(quán)賦能因紐特人，因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟闡明了一個(gè)愿景：加拿大通過(guò)將因紐特人的福祉放在首位并制定“一個(gè)更具雄心的愿景”來(lái)改善北極安全（第9頁(yè)）。
ITK’s human security focus is rooted in its view that Inuit play a unique and vital role in the Canadian Arctic.
因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟對(duì)人的安全的關(guān)注植根于其觀點(diǎn)，即因紐特人在加拿大北極地區(qū)發(fā)揮著獨(dú)特而至關(guān)重要的作用。
Inuit Nunangat, which constitutes 40% of Canada’s land area and 72% of its coastline, is home to 51 Inuit communities that serve as hubs for monitoring vast terrestrial and marine areas, including the Northwest Passage (pp. 3, 5).
因紐特人努南加特占加拿大陸地面積的40%和海岸線(xiàn)的72%，是51個(gè)因紐特人社區(qū)的所在地，這些社區(qū)是監(jiān)測(cè)包括西北航道在內(nèi)的廣闊陸地和海洋區(qū)域的樞紐（第3、5頁(yè)）。
Inuit hunters, harvesters, and researchers are described as the "eyes and ears" on the ground, providing invaluable, in-kind support to the “thin ranks of Canadian Coast Guard and Canadian Armed Forces personnel in the region (p. 3).
因紐特獵人、采集者和研究人員被描述為當(dāng)?shù)氐摹岸俊保瑸椤霸摰貐^(qū)規(guī)模單薄的加拿大海岸警衛(wèi)隊(duì)和加拿大武裝部隊(duì)人員”提供寶貴的實(shí)物支持（第3頁(yè)）。
Ironically, ITK fails to even acknowledge the Canadian Rangers, a component of the Canadian Armed Forces Reserves that has a patrol in practically every Inuit community as is predominantly comprised of Inuit in Inuit Nunangat.
具有諷刺意味的是，因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟甚至沒(méi)有承認(rèn)加拿大游騎兵，這是加拿大武裝部隊(duì)預(yù)備役的一個(gè)組成部分，在幾乎每個(gè)因紐特人社區(qū)都有一個(gè)巡邏隊(duì)，并且在因紐特人努南加特主要由因紐特人組成。
This is a remarkable omission given that they are mentioned in greater detail in ITK’s report on marine policy:
這是一個(gè)顯著的遺漏，因?yàn)樵谝蚣~特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟關(guān)于海洋政策的報(bào)告中更詳細(xì)地提到了他們：
Inuit have a long-standing relationship with the Canadian Armed Forces through the Canadian Rangers, in place since the late 1940s.
因紐特人通過(guò)加拿大游騎兵與加拿大武裝部隊(duì)有著長(zhǎng)期的關(guān)系，這一關(guān)系自1940年代末就已存在。
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Inuit members of the Canadian Rangers routinely participate in the Operation NANOOK annual exercises of the Canadian Armed Forces, which recognize that with increasing vessel traffic comes the need to bolster Canada’s capacity to respond to Inuit Nunangat’s increasing marine safety and security needs.
作為加拿大游騎兵的因紐特成員定期參加加拿大武裝部隊(duì)的“納努克行動(dòng)”年度演習(xí)，這些演習(xí)認(rèn)識(shí)到，隨著船舶交通量的增加，需要加強(qiáng)加拿大應(yīng)對(duì)因紐特人努南加特日益增長(zhǎng)的海洋安全需求的能力。
The expanding role of the CCGA [Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary] in the Arctic should complement the maritime role of the Canadian Rangers, as well as local hunters and trappers organizations and associations—or local ground [search and rescue (SAR)] teams in Inuit Nunangat—along with Inuit communities whose pivotal role in local SAR and maritime domain awareness operations too often goes unrecognized.
加拿大海岸警衛(wèi)隊(duì)輔助隊(duì)在北極的擴(kuò)大作用應(yīng)補(bǔ)充加拿大游騎兵的海上作用，以及當(dāng)?shù)孬C人和捕獵者組織與協(xié)會(huì)——或因紐特人努南加特的當(dāng)?shù)氐孛妫ㄋ丫龋╆?duì)——以及因紐特人社區(qū)，它們?cè)诋?dāng)?shù)厮丫群秃Ｉ蠎B(tài)勢(shì)感知行動(dòng)中的關(guān)鍵作用常常得不到承認(rèn)。
Given the long-standing contributions of the Canadian Rangers to Inuit Nunangat’s maritime domain awareness and the increasing role of the CCGA in Inuit communities, there is an increasing need to coordinate and improve their interoperability so that they can work together during emergencies.
鑒于加拿大游騎兵對(duì)因紐特人努南加特海上態(tài)勢(shì)感知的長(zhǎng)期貢獻(xiàn)以及加拿大海岸警衛(wèi)隊(duì)輔助隊(duì)在因紐特人社區(qū)中日益重要的作用，越來(lái)越需要協(xié)調(diào)和提高它們的互操作性，以便它們能夠在緊急情況下協(xié)同工作。
Why ITK would choose to avoid any comparable discussion in a report specifically about security and defence is peculiar, marginalizing the proud service of more than a thousand Inuit in the Canadian Rangers, which means that Inuit living in small communities serve in the Canadian Armed Forces at a far higher average per capita than Canadians as a whole.6
為什么因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟會(huì)選擇在一份專(zhuān)門(mén)關(guān)于安全和防務(wù)的報(bào)告中避免任何類(lèi)似的討論是很奇怪的，這邊緣化了超過(guò)一千名因紐特人在加拿大游騎兵中的自豪服務(wù)，這意味著居住在小社區(qū)的因紐特人加入加拿大武裝部隊(duì)的人均比例遠(yuǎn)高于全體加拿大人。
Furthermore, the Rangers’ role in community resilience seems an ideal example of the comprehensive approach and human security-centric narrative promoted in An Inuit Vision for Arctic Sovereignty, Security and Defence.
此外，游騎兵在社區(qū)韌性方面的作用似乎是在《因紐特人對(duì)北極主權(quán)、安全與防務(wù)的愿景》中所倡導(dǎo)的綜合方法和以人的安全為中心的敘事的理想范例。
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The ITK report stresses that, despite their essential role, Inuit communities face significant social and economic inequities caused by a historic lack of infrastructure (p. 3).
因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟的報(bào)告強(qiáng)調(diào)，盡管因紐特人社區(qū)發(fā)揮著重要作用，但它們面臨著因歷史上缺乏基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施而造成的嚴(yán)重社會(huì)和經(jīng)濟(jì)不平等（第3頁(yè)）。
The report cites limited telecommunications and “ageing or non-existent transportation infrastructure, such as ports, harbors [sic], and paved runways” as prime examples of this chronic deficit (p. 3).
該報(bào)告列舉了電信受限和“老化或不存在的交通基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，如港口、港灣和鋪設(shè)的跑道”，作為這種長(zhǎng)期赤字的主要例證（第3頁(yè)）。
This underdevelopment makes the region difficult and expensive to access and monitor, while also forcing communities to rely on foreign satellite technology for basic connectivity (pp. 3, 10).
這種不發(fā)達(dá)狀況使得該地區(qū)難以進(jìn)入和監(jiān)測(cè)且成本高昂，同時(shí)也迫使社區(qū)依賴(lài)外國(guó)衛(wèi)星技術(shù)來(lái)滿(mǎn)足基本的連接需求（第3、10頁(yè)）。
The document also expresses alarm at Canada’s "muted response" to increasing shipping traffic and a growing presence of foreign actors seeking to assert influence in the Inuit homeland (p. 3).
該文件還對(duì)加拿大“反應(yīng)平淡”表示震驚，面對(duì)的是日益增長(zhǎng)的航運(yùn)交通以及越來(lái)越多的外國(guó)行為體試圖在因紐特人家園施加影響（第3頁(yè)）。
The report warns against repeating the mistakes of the past, specifically citing the militarization of the Arctic during the Second World War and its negative consequences for Inuit (p. 4).
該報(bào)告警告不要重蹈覆轍，特別引用了第二次世界大戰(zhàn)期間北極的軍事化及其對(duì)因紐特人的負(fù)面影響（第4頁(yè)）。
Peculiarly, the major infrastructure projects that it references – the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line – was constructed in the 1950s, not the 1940s.
奇怪的是，它提到的主要基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目——遠(yuǎn)程預(yù)警線(xiàn)——是在1950年代建造的，而不是1940年代。
Instead, the position paper might have pointed to the disruptive influence of the arrival of US Army Air Forces in the area around Frobisher Bay (now Iqaluit) during and immediately after the Second World War that Mélanie Gagnon described based on oral histories with thirty-three Inuit Elders.8
相反，這份立場(chǎng)文件本可以指出梅蘭妮·加尼翁根據(jù)與33位因紐特長(zhǎng)者的口述歷史所描述的、在二戰(zhàn)期間及結(jié)束后不久，美國(guó)陸軍航空隊(duì)抵達(dá)弗羅比舍灣（今伊卡盧伊特）地區(qū)所造成的破壞性影響。
In any case, the narrative that ITK constructs stitches the Canadian military into a broader teleology of oppression, suggesting that it preceded destructive colonial policies such as forced relocations of Inuit families and the slaughter of sled dogs, which it alleges were both intended to bolster Canada’s sovereignty claims at the expense of its people (p. 4).
無(wú)論如何，因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟構(gòu)建的敘事將加拿大軍方縫合進(jìn)一個(gè)更廣泛的壓迫目的論中，暗示它先于破壞性的殖民政策，如強(qiáng)制搬遷因紐特人家庭和屠殺雪橇犬，該文件聲稱(chēng)這兩者都旨在以犧牲其人民為代價(jià)來(lái)支持加拿大的主權(quán)主張（第4頁(yè)）。
While these narratives are now political mainstream, a recent systematic study suggests that the notion that the Government of Canada used Inuit as “human flagpoles” for sovereignty is not grounded in verifiable evidence from the time of actual High Arctic relocations but instead became an instrumental political narrative much later.9
雖然這些敘述現(xiàn)在已成為政治主流，但最近的一項(xiàng)系統(tǒng)研究表明，加拿大政府利用因紐特人作為主權(quán)“人肉旗桿”的概念并非基于實(shí)際高北極搬遷時(shí)期可驗(yàn)證的證據(jù)，而是在很久之后才成為一種工具性的政治敘述。
The fact that this “human flagpole” idea factors so heavily into both the ITK and NTI/GN strategies speaks to its sedimentation in Canadian political discourse.
“人肉旗桿”這一想法在因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟和努納武特土著土地索賠組織/努納武特政府戰(zhàn)略中都如此重要，這一事實(shí)說(shuō)明了它在加拿大政治話(huà)語(yǔ)中的沉淀。
The document also points to specific geopolitical vulnerabilities that are exposed by Canada's underinvestment in the Arctic.
該文件還指出了加拿大在北極投資不足所暴露出的具體地緣政治脆弱性。
First, it emphasizes how Russia has invested heavily in its Arctic territory and is partnering with China to increase shipping along its Northern Sea Route (NSR) at a level that already dwarfs the number of transits through the Canadian Northwest Passage (p. 7).
首先，它強(qiáng)調(diào)俄羅斯如何對(duì)其北極領(lǐng)土進(jìn)行了大量投資，并正在與中國(guó)合作，增加沿其北方海航道的航運(yùn)，其水平已經(jīng)使穿越加拿大西北航道的過(guò)境次數(shù)相形見(jiàn)絀（第7頁(yè)）。
It is doubtful, however, that Inuit leadership really wants Canada to emulate the Russians in their approach to building transportation arteries or in their treatment of their Indigenous Peoples.10
然而，令人懷疑的是，因紐特人領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人是否真的希望加拿大在建設(shè)交通干線(xiàn)或?qū)Υ湓∶竦姆绞缴闲Х露砹_斯人。
By holding up transit traffic in the NSR to suggest that Russia is ahead of Canada, ITK intimates that Inuit desire more international shipping in their waters – as long as Inuit stewardship is the foundation of adaptive and integrated marine management.11
通過(guò)舉出北方海航道的過(guò)境交通量來(lái)暗示俄羅斯領(lǐng)先于加拿大，因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟暗示因紐特人希望在其水域有更多的國(guó)際航運(yùn)——只要因紐特人的管理是適應(yīng)性和綜合海洋管理的基礎(chǔ)。
This is a clearer position than Inuit leadership often presents, given deep-seated concerns about the impacts of shipping on ecosystems and communities.
考慮到人們對(duì)航運(yùn)對(duì)生態(tài)系統(tǒng)和社區(qū)影響的深切擔(dān)憂(yōu)，這比因紐特人領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人通常表達(dá)的立場(chǎng)更為清晰。
ITK also calls out China’s exploitation of infrastructure deficits in the Arctic as “strategic footholds to exert influence” (p. 7).
因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟還指出，中國(guó)利用北極的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施赤字作為“施加影響力的戰(zhàn)略立足點(diǎn)”（第7頁(yè)）。
The report provides examples of Chinese state-owned companies attempting to acquire critical infrastructure in Greenland and an important gold mine complex in Nunavut, demonstrating a pattern of foreign interests seeking to exploit Canadian vulnerabilities (p. 7).
該報(bào)告舉例說(shuō)明中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)試圖收購(gòu)格陵蘭的關(guān)鍵基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和努納武特的一個(gè)重要金礦綜合體，展示了外國(guó)利益集團(tuán)試圖利用加拿大弱點(diǎn)的模式（第7頁(yè)）。
The document, however, does not specifically reference the active Chinese-owned mine in Nunavik or the majority Chinese state-owned company MMG Resources’ possession of Nunavut’s Izok and High Lake zinc, lead and copper deposits.12
然而，該文件并未具體提及努納維克正在運(yùn)營(yíng)的中資擁有的礦山，或由中國(guó)政府控股的五礦資源有限公司擁有努納武特的伊佐克湖和海湖鋅、鉛和銅礦床。
Instead, it prioritizes mentioning by name the failed bid by the Chinese state-owned Shandong Gold Group to purchase the Hope Bay mine in 2020.
相反，它優(yōu)先點(diǎn)名提及中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)山東黃金集團(tuán)在2020年收購(gòu)霍普灣礦失敗的嘗試。
ITK also downplays the effectiveness of Canada and the other like-minded Arctic states in blocking pernicious Chinese acquisitions over the last decade, including the invocation of national security provisions to do so.13
因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟還淡化了加拿大和其他志同道合的北極國(guó)家在過(guò)去十年中阻止有害的中國(guó)收購(gòu)的有效性，包括為此援引國(guó)家安全條款。
Nevertheless, this position paper offers the clearest affirmation to date that Inuit in Canada are attentive to risks and threats posed by Chinese investment and research activities in Inuit Nunangat.
盡管如此，這份立場(chǎng)文件提供了迄今為止最明確的肯定，即加拿大的因紐特人關(guān)注中國(guó)投資和研究活動(dòng)在因紐特人努南加特構(gòu)成的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和威脅。
Given the timing of the position paper, the inclusion of the United States in the context of rising geopolitical uncertainty and risk should come as no surprise.
考慮到這份立場(chǎng)文件的發(fā)布時(shí)機(jī)，在地緣政治不確定性和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)上升的背景下將美國(guó)納入其中應(yīng)該不足為奇。
The document highlights the longstanding sovereignty dispute between Canada and the US over the Northwest Passage, which the US does not recognize as Canada's historic internal waters (p. 7).
該文件強(qiáng)調(diào)了加拿大和美國(guó)之間長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)在西北航道問(wèn)題上的主權(quán)爭(zhēng)端，美國(guó)不承認(rèn)其為加拿大的歷史性?xún)?nèi)水（第7頁(yè)）。
“The Northwest Passage is part of Inuit Nunangat, our Arctic homeland,” Monica Ell-Kanayuk, the President of Inuit Circumpolar Canada, affirmed in 2019.
“西北航道是因紐特人努南加特的一部分，是我們的北極家園，”加拿大因紐特人北極圈理事會(huì)主席莫妮卡·埃爾-卡納尤克在2019年確認(rèn)。
“Canada’s sovereignty is based on treaties and constructive agreements which recognize both Inuit sovereignty and Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage.”14
“加拿大的主權(quán)基于條約和建設(shè)性協(xié)議，這些協(xié)議承認(rèn)因紐特人主權(quán)和加拿大對(duì)北極（包括西北航道）的主權(quán)?！?br>ITK and other Inuit organizations’ position on the issue aligns with Canada's legal stance, which is grounded in the continuous Inuit use and occupation of the waters and sea ice for thousands of years.
因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟和其他因紐特人組織在這個(gè)問(wèn)題上的立場(chǎng)與加拿大的法律立場(chǎng)一致，該立場(chǎng)基于因紐特人數(shù)千年來(lái)對(duì)水域和海冰的持續(xù)使用和占據(jù)。
An Inuit Vision for Arctic Sovereignty, Security and Defence also notes the US Government Accountability Office’s inquiry into how much it would cost to take over Greenland, citing the Kingdom of Denmark's “underinvestment in its economic and military security” as an example of “how vulnerable Inuit Nunangat and Canada may be to foreign interference and coercion if the federal government does not invest more in Inuit and bring the region into the rest of the country” (p. 6).
《因紐特人對(duì)北極主權(quán)、安全與防務(wù)的愿景》還提到美國(guó)政府問(wèn)責(zé)局對(duì)接管格陵蘭需要多少成本的調(diào)查，引述丹麥王國(guó)“對(duì)其經(jīng)濟(jì)和軍事安全投資不足”作為例子，說(shuō)明“如果聯(lián)邦政府不對(duì)因紐特人進(jìn)行更多投資并將該地區(qū)與全國(guó)其他地區(qū)連接起來(lái)，因紐特人努南加特和加拿大在外國(guó)干涉和脅迫面前可能多么脆弱”（第6頁(yè)）。
By not disavowing the Trump Administration’s narrative, this could be read as an unexpected foray by a Canadian Inuit organization into commenting on Greenlandic affairs – without highlighting Greenlanders’ insistence that they reject Trump’s overtures and threats and do not want to become part of the US.
由于沒(méi)有否認(rèn)特朗普政府的說(shuō)法，這可以被解讀為加拿大因紐特人組織對(duì)格陵蘭事務(wù)的意外涉足評(píng)論——而沒(méi)有強(qiáng)調(diào)格陵蘭人堅(jiān)持拒絕特朗普的示好和威脅，并且不想成為美國(guó)的一部分。
Nevertheless, ITK seeks to illustrate that Canada's historic neglect of Inuit Nunangat has created an environment where foreign actors can exploit inequities to assert their own interests, such as by prohibiting further development of the Arctic or using cyber-attacks to exploit vulnerabilities in the region’s technology infrastructure (p. 7).
盡管如此，因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟試圖說(shuō)明，加拿大歷史上對(duì)因紐特人努南加特的忽視造成了一種環(huán)境，外國(guó)行為體可以利用不平等來(lái)維護(hù)自身利益，例如通過(guò)禁止北極的進(jìn)一步發(fā)展或利用網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊來(lái)利用該地區(qū)技術(shù)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的脆弱性（第7頁(yè)）。
To counter these threats and build a secure, prosperous Arctic, the document outlines six key priorities that must form the foundation of Canada’s national security policy in the Arctic:
為了應(yīng)對(duì)這些威脅并建設(shè)一個(gè)安全、繁榮的北極，該文件概述了六個(gè)關(guān)鍵優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)，這些事項(xiàng)必須成為加拿大在北極的國(guó)家安全政策的基礎(chǔ)：
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Secure the region through Inuit-Crown Partnership:
通過(guò)因紐特人-王室伙伴關(guān)系確保區(qū)域安全：
The position paper emphasizes that Canada's greatest asset is its unique, direct working relationship with an Arctic Indigenous people (p. 8).
這份立場(chǎng)文件強(qiáng)調(diào)，加拿大最大的資產(chǎn)是其與北極原住民獨(dú)特、直接的工作關(guān)系（第8頁(yè)）。
The Inuit-Crown Partnership Committee (ICPC), established in 2017, is identified as a pivotal mechanism for information sharing and developing effective policies based on Inuit expertise (p. 8).
成立于2017年的因紐特人-王室伙伴關(guān)系委員會(huì)被確定為基于因紐特人專(zhuān)業(yè)知識(shí)共享信息和制定有效政策的關(guān)鍵機(jī)制（第8頁(yè)）。
The document urges continued federal engagement in the ICPC to advance shared priorities and strengthen Canada's position as a powerful Arctic state (p. 8).
該文件敦促聯(lián)邦政府繼續(xù)參與因紐特人-王室伙伴關(guān)系委員會(huì)，以推進(jìn)共同優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)，并加強(qiáng)加拿大作為一個(gè)強(qiáng)大北極國(guó)家的地位（第8頁(yè)）。
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Invest in Inuit prosperity to improve Arctic security:
投資于因紐特人的繁榮以改善北極安全：
The report challenges a security approach that is narrowly focused on increasing military presence.
該報(bào)告質(zhì)疑了一種狹隘地專(zhuān)注于增加軍事存在的安全方法。
It argues that the most tangible threats to Arctic security are foreign influence and interference, economic sabotage, and the growing inequities between Inuit Nunangat and the rest of Canada.
它認(rèn)為，對(duì)北極安全最切實(shí)的威脅是外國(guó)影響和干涉、經(jīng)濟(jì)破壞以及因紐特人努南加特與加拿大其他地區(qū)之間日益嚴(yán)重的不平等。
Therefore, Arctic security measures must prioritize closing gaps in health, education, and social services that compel many families to leave the region, alongside more effective policies to reduce hunger and the high cost of living (p. 9).
因此，北極安全措施必須優(yōu)先考慮縮小迫使許多家庭離開(kāi)該地區(qū)的健康、教育和社會(huì)服務(wù)方面的差距，同時(shí)采取更有效的政策來(lái)減少饑餓和高昂的生活成本（第9頁(yè)）。
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Bring Inuit Nunangat into Canada:
將因紐特人努南加特融入加拿大：
The document advocates for a more ambitious vision for developing the region and integrating its infrastructure and economy into the rest of the country.
該文件倡導(dǎo)一個(gè)更具雄心的愿景，以發(fā)展該地區(qū)并將其基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和經(jīng)濟(jì)與全國(guó)其他地區(qū)整合。
It calls for an aggressive fiscal policy focused on regional development, rather than “one-off,” project-based development.
它呼吁采取積極的財(cái)政政策，聚焦于區(qū)域發(fā)展，而不是“一次性的”、基于項(xiàng)目的發(fā)展。
This includes “preparing now for the new Arctic future, including by developing sea lanes and other supporting infrastructure throughout the Northwest Passage that will be needed to meet increasing shipping demands” (p. 9).
這包括“為新的北極未來(lái)做好準(zhǔn)備，包括在整個(gè)西北航道開(kāi)發(fā)海上通道和其他配套基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，以滿(mǎn)足日益增長(zhǎng)的航運(yùn)需求”（第9頁(yè)）。
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Invest directly in Inuit:
直接向因紐特人投資：
ITK insists that the federal government's long-standing practice of deferring to provincial and territorial jurisdictions, rather than investing more boldly in a distinctions-based approach with Inuit, has caused Canada to “fall behind all other Arctic States” (p. 9).
因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟堅(jiān)稱(chēng)，聯(lián)邦政府長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)的做法是遵從省和地區(qū)管轄權(quán)，而不是以更有區(qū)別的方式與因紐特人進(jìn)行更大膽的投資，這已導(dǎo)致加拿大“落后于所有其他北極國(guó)家”（第9頁(yè)）。
To accelerate change and improve prosperity, the report proposes direct federal investments in Inuit Treaty Organizations and new legislative and policy approaches that support greater Inuit self-determination over areas like education, healthcare, and housing (p. 9) – longstanding priorities raised by ITK at the Inuit Crown Partnership Committee.
為了加速變革和改善繁榮，該報(bào)告提議聯(lián)邦政府直接向因紐特人條約組織投資，并采取新的立法和政策方法，支持因紐特人在教育、醫(yī)療和住房等領(lǐng)域獲得更大的自決權(quán)（第9頁(yè)）——這是因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟在因紐特人-王室伙伴關(guān)系委員會(huì)上提出的長(zhǎng)期優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)。
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Ensure defence infrastructure investments benefit Inuit:
確保國(guó)防基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資惠及因紐特人：
This directly connects to the Government of Canada’s national defence and security agenda, referencing Canada’s April 2024 Defence Policy Update, Our North Strong and Free, which commits to modernizing NORAD and investing in dual-use infrastructure (p. 10).
這直接關(guān)聯(lián)到加拿大政府的國(guó)防和安全議程，提及加拿大2024年4月的國(guó)防政策更新《我們的北方，強(qiáng)大而自由》，該政策承諾現(xiàn)代化北美防空防天司令部并投資于兩用基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施（第10頁(yè)）。
While welcoming this focus, the ITK report stresses that the concept of dual-use infrastructure must be expanded to genuinely benefit Inuit communities.
在歡迎這一重點(diǎn)的同時(shí)，因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟的報(bào)告強(qiáng)調(diào)，必須擴(kuò)大兩用基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的概念，以真正惠及因紐特人社區(qū)。
Accordingly, ITK insists that defence spending priorities should be on closing the infrastructure gap in Inuit Nunangat by supporting projects that include housing, new ports, harbours, and docks, fibre connectivity, and climate change-resistant runways and sea lanes (p. 10).
因此，因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為，國(guó)防開(kāi)支的優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)應(yīng)該是通過(guò)支持包括住房、新港口、港灣和碼頭、光纖連接以及抗氣候變化跑道和海上通道在內(nèi)的項(xiàng)目，來(lái)縮小因紐特人努南加特的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施差距（第10頁(yè)）。
This vision resonates with the NATO Defence Investment Pledge in June 2025, in which Prime Minister Mark Carney agreed to dedicate an addition 1.5% of Canada’s GDP to investments in critical defence and security-related expenditure, such as new airports, ports, telecommunication, emergency preparedness systems, and other dual-use investments which serve defence as well as civilian readiness.15
這一愿景與2025年6月的北約國(guó)防投資承諾產(chǎn)生共鳴，總理馬克·卡尼同意將加拿大GDP的額外1.5%用于關(guān)鍵國(guó)防和安全相關(guān)開(kāi)支的投資，例如新機(jī)場(chǎng)、港口、電信、應(yīng)急準(zhǔn)備系統(tǒng)，以及其他服務(wù)于國(guó)防和民用準(zhǔn)備的兩用投資。
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Address vulnerabilities in foreign interference:
應(yīng)對(duì)外國(guó)干涉中的脆弱性：
The report concludes by highlighting the "vulnerable and awkward position" of Inuit leaders, who have been warned by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) about foreign adversaries offering to fill the infrastructure gaps, yet have not been provided a clear alternative or sufficient investment from Canada itself (p. 10).
報(bào)告最后強(qiáng)調(diào)了因紐特人領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人“脆弱而尷尬的處境”，他們已被加拿大安全情報(bào)局警告有外國(guó)對(duì)手主動(dòng)提出填補(bǔ)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施缺口，但尚未從加拿大本身獲得明確的替代方案或足夠的投資（第10頁(yè)）。
This leaves Inuit reliant on foreign technology, such as Space X’s Starlink, because Canada has failed to improve connectivity through domestic providers (p. 10).
這使得因紐特人依賴(lài)外國(guó)技術(shù)，例如太空探索技術(shù)公司的“星鏈”，因?yàn)榧幽么笪茨芡ㄟ^(guò)國(guó)內(nèi)供應(yīng)商改善連接（第10頁(yè)）。
ITK ends with a poignant call on the federal government to work with Inuit to ensure, in the interests of national security, that they are not forced to shoulder the burden of having to decline partnerships with foreign actors that could otherwise support diversified economic development in Inuit Nunangat (p. 10).
因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟最后向聯(lián)邦政府發(fā)出迫切呼吁，要求其與因紐特人合作，以確保出于國(guó)家安全利益，他們不會(huì)被迫承擔(dān)拒絕與外國(guó)行為體建立伙伴關(guān)系的負(fù)擔(dān)，而這些伙伴關(guān)系本可以支持因紐特人努南加特的多元化經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展（第10頁(yè)）。
While ITK’s short position paper is light on details about conventional security and defence issues, and offers less detail than its report on Inuit Nunangat marine policy priorities and recommendation, the national Inuit advocacy organization provides a framework to rationalize its participation in Arctic sovereignty, security, and defence agenda setting, and to promote its human security focus and the need for infrastructure.
雖然因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟簡(jiǎn)短的立場(chǎng)文件在傳統(tǒng)安全和防務(wù)問(wèn)題的細(xì)節(jié)上著墨不多，提供的細(xì)節(jié)也比其關(guān)于因紐特人努南加特海洋政策優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)和建議的報(bào)告要少，但這個(gè)全國(guó)性的因紐特人倡導(dǎo)組織提供了一個(gè)框架，以合理化其參與北極主權(quán)、安全和防務(wù)議程設(shè)置，并推廣其人的安全重點(diǎn)和對(duì)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的需求。
“We don’t have the essential infrastructure to interact with Canada in the way that just about every other Canadian community can interact with one another,” ITK President Natan Obed explained in an interview on CBC News in April 2025.
“我們沒(méi)有必要的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，無(wú)法像幾乎所有其他加拿大社區(qū)之間互動(dòng)那樣與加拿大互動(dòng)，”因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟主席納坦·奧貝德在2025年4月接受加拿大廣播公司新聞采訪(fǎng)時(shí)解釋道。
“So, there’s this great opportunity to bolster Arctic sovereignty to show Canada’s commitment to the world for the Arctic by improving the lives and the infrastructure for Canadian Inuit.”16
“因此，這是一個(gè)巨大的機(jī)會(huì)，通過(guò)改善加拿大因紐特人的生活條件和基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施來(lái)加強(qiáng)北極主權(quán)，向世界展示加拿大對(duì)北極的承諾。”
This agenda is clear in An Inuit Vision for Arctic Sovereignty, Security and Defence, as well as a subsequent report released by Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. and the Government of Nunavut.
這一議程在《因紐特人對(duì)北極主權(quán)、安全與防務(wù)的愿景》以及隨后由努納武特土著土地索賠組織和努納武特政府發(fā)布的報(bào)告中都很明確。
Nunavut Arctic Sovereignty and Security Strategy
《努納武特北極主權(quán)與安全戰(zhàn)略》
In May 2025, the Nunavut Partnership Committee (NPC) – which consists of the Executive Council of the Government of Nunavut (GN) and the Board of Directors of Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. (NTI) – endorsed two new workplans with a strategic focus on Infrastructure and Arctic Sovereignty and Security pursuant to the two organizations’ 2022 Nunavut Partnership Declaration.
2025年5月，努納武特伙伴關(guān)系委員會(huì)——由努納武特政府執(zhí)行委員會(huì)和努納武特土著土地索賠組織董事會(huì)組成——根據(jù)兩個(gè)組織2022年的《努納武特伙伴關(guān)系宣言》，批準(zhǔn)了兩項(xiàng)新的工作計(jì)劃，戰(zhàn)略重點(diǎn)分別是基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和北極主權(quán)與安全。
“Our shared goal must remain the full and fair implementation of the Nunavut Agreement, which not only safeguards Inuit rights but also serves as a foundation for reconciliation, Arctic sovereignty, and security which is based on Inuit historical and continuous use and occupancy,” NTI President Jeremy Tunraluk explained.
“我們的共同目標(biāo)必須是全面、公平地執(zhí)行《努納武特協(xié)議》，該協(xié)議不僅保護(hù)因紐特人的權(quán)利，而且也是和解、北極主權(quán)和安全的基礎(chǔ)，而這些都是基于因紐特人歷史上的持續(xù)使用和占據(jù)，”努納武特土著土地索賠組織主席杰里米·通拉魯克解釋說(shuō)。
“These two new workplans are designed to enhance Arctic infrastructure that will improve Inuit livelihoods and also significantly advance Canada’s national interests by reinforcing Arctic sovereignty and unlocking economic potential in Nunavut.”17
“這兩項(xiàng)新的工作計(jì)劃旨在加強(qiáng)北極基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，這將改善因紐特人的生計(jì)，并通過(guò)加強(qiáng)北極主權(quán)和釋放努納武特的經(jīng)濟(jì)潛力，顯著推進(jìn)加拿大的國(guó)家利益?！?br>Guided by the principle of Piliriqatigiinniq – working together for the common good – the GN and NTI convened the Nunavut Arctic Sovereignty and Security Summit in Iqaluit in June 2025, which brought together a diverse group of leaders, experts, community members, and youth to explore and define a “unified vision for Nunavut’s Arctic sovereignty rooted in the values, priorities, and lived realities of Nunavummiut.”18
在“Piliriqatigiinniq”——為共同利益而共同努力——原則的指導(dǎo)下，努納武特政府和努納武特土著土地索賠組織于2025年6月在伊卡盧伊特召開(kāi)了努納武特北極主權(quán)與安全峰會(huì)，該峰會(huì)匯集了不同的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人、專(zhuān)家、社區(qū)成員和青年群體，以探索和定義“植根于努納武特人的價(jià)值觀、優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)和生活現(xiàn)實(shí)的、統(tǒng)一的努納武特北極主權(quán)愿景?！?br>The ensuing Nunavut Arctic Sovereignty and Security Strategy,19 released two months later, offers the central message that “there can be no Arctic sovereignty without Inuit security” (p. 2).
隨后于兩個(gè)月后發(fā)布的《努納武特北極主權(quán)與安全戰(zhàn)略》提出了核心信息：“沒(méi)有因紐特人的安全，就沒(méi)有北極主權(quán)”（第2頁(yè)）。
It defines sovereignty not as an abstract military or state interest, but as the lived reality of Inuit, encompassing their well-being, culture, and self-determination (p. 10).
它將主權(quán)定義的不是抽象的國(guó)家利益，而是因紐特人的生活現(xiàn)實(shí)，包括他們的福祉、文化和自決權(quán)（第10頁(yè)）。
“Inuit have always been the foundation of Canada’s presence in the Arctic.
“因紐特人一直是加拿大在北極存在的基礎(chǔ)。
There is no Canadian sovereignty without Inuit security,” NTI President Jeremy Tunraluk emphasized.
沒(méi)有因紐特人的安全，就沒(méi)有加拿大的主權(quán)，”努納武特土著土地索賠組織主席杰里米·通拉魯克強(qiáng)調(diào)。
“This strategy is clear that sovereignty in the Arctic must be guided by Inuit-led priorities.”20
“這項(xiàng)戰(zhàn)略明確指出，北極的主權(quán)必須以因紐特人主導(dǎo)的優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)為指導(dǎo)。”
The strategy is presented as a "living" document, grounded in the principle of self-determination and Inuit-led governance (pp. 7, 20).
該戰(zhàn)略被呈現(xiàn)為一份“活”的文件，基于自決權(quán)和因紐特人主導(dǎo)的治理原則（第7、20頁(yè)）。
A set of core principles guide the Nunavummiut approach to sovereignty and security.
一套核心原則指導(dǎo)著努納武特人對(duì)主權(quán)和安全的方法。
The first is Inuit self-determination.
首先是因紐特人的自決權(quán)。
Sovereignty is defined by the ability of Inuit to make decisions for their communities, in their homeland, and on their own terms.
主權(quán)被定義為因紐特人能夠在自己的家園、按自己的方式為社區(qū)做決定的能力。
This is a right affirmed by international instruments like the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and protected under Canadian law (pp. 11, 26).
這是得到《聯(lián)合國(guó)土著人民權(quán)利宣言》等國(guó)際文書(shū)確認(rèn)并受加拿大法律保護(hù)的權(quán)利（第11、26頁(yè)）。
Second is human security.
第二是人的安全。
For Nunavummiut, security is a lived reality tied to essential needs: safe homes, food security, clean water, healthcare, and economic opportunity (p. 10).
對(duì)努納武特人而言，安全是與基本需求相關(guān)的生活現(xiàn)實(shí)：安全的家園、糧食安全、清潔水、醫(yī)療保健和經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)會(huì)（第10頁(yè)）。
It also includes the protection of the environment, cultural integrity, and language (pp. 3, 16).
它還包括保護(hù)環(huán)境、文化完整性和語(yǔ)言（第3、16頁(yè)）。
The third element is that Inuit represent presence with purpose.
第三個(gè)要素是因紐特人代表著有目的的在場(chǎng)。
The GN/NTI strategy rejects a narrow definition of sovereignty that uses Inuit as “human flagpoles” to assert Canada's claims, as it alleges was the case with forced relocations of Inuit families in the 1940s and 1950s.
努納武特政府/努納武特土著土地索賠組織的戰(zhàn)略拒絕使用因紐特人作為“人肉旗桿”來(lái)主張加拿大主權(quán)主張的狹隘主權(quán)定義，正如它聲稱(chēng)在1940年代和1950年代強(qiáng)制搬遷因紐特人家庭的情況那樣。
Instead, it advocates for a sovereignty that is rooted in the lived experiences, knowledge, and leadership of Inuit who have lived in their Arctic homeland for millennia (p. 9).
相反，它倡導(dǎo)一種植根于在北極家園生活了數(shù)千年的因紐特人的生活經(jīng)驗(yàn)、知識(shí)和領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力的主權(quán)（第9頁(yè)）。
Last, but not least, the strategy emphasizes that the Nunavut Agreement is the only treaty between the Government of Canada and an Indigenous People that explicitly references sovereignty, recognizing Inuit as “essential” to establishing it (p. 10).
最后但同樣重要的是，該戰(zhàn)略強(qiáng)調(diào)《努納武特協(xié)議》是加拿大政府與一個(gè)原住民之間唯一明確提及主權(quán)的條約，承認(rèn)因紐特人對(duì)建立主權(quán)“至關(guān)重要”（第10頁(yè)）。
Accordingly, Inuit are rightsholders, not passive participants or mere stakeholders, in the making of Arctic policy (pp. 20, 35).
因此，在北極政策的制定中，因紐特人是權(quán)利持有者，而不是被動(dòng)的參與者或僅僅的利益相關(guān)者（第20、35頁(yè)）。
The Nunavut Arctic Sovereignty and Security Strategy is organized around five interconnected pillars that form the basis for its understanding of Arctic sovereignty and security (pp. 6, 12):
《努納武特北極主權(quán)與安全戰(zhàn)略》圍繞五個(gè)相互關(guān)聯(lián)的支柱組織，這些支柱構(gòu)成了其對(duì)北極主權(quán)與安全理解的基礎(chǔ)（第6、12頁(yè)）：
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Strong and Resilient Communities:
強(qiáng)大且有韌性的社區(qū)：
This pillar calls for sustained investment to address chronic housing shortages, inadequate healthcare access, and food insecurity (pp. 15-17) in Nunavut.
這一支柱呼吁持續(xù)投資，以解決努納武特長(zhǎng)期存在的住房短缺、醫(yī)療保健不足和糧食不安全問(wèn)題（第15-17頁(yè)）。
It also identifies reliable, Canadian-owned connectivity as a critical component of modern nation-building that enhances community well-being and security and reduces reliance on foreign technologies (p. 17).
它還確定可靠的、加拿大擁有的連接是現(xiàn)代社會(huì)建設(shè)的關(guān)鍵組成部分，它能增強(qiáng)社區(qū)福祉和安全，并減少對(duì)外國(guó)技術(shù)的依賴(lài)（第17頁(yè)）。
The strategy also calls for expanding community-based programs that contribute to domain awareness, defence, and security, particularly the Inuit Guardians and Canadian Rangers, and for more investments in emergency preparedness (p. 18).
該戰(zhàn)略還呼吁擴(kuò)大有助于態(tài)勢(shì)感知、防務(wù)和安全的社區(qū)項(xiàng)目，特別是因紐特人守護(hù)者和加拿大游騎兵，并增加對(duì)應(yīng)急準(zhǔn)備的投資（第18頁(yè)）。
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Nunavut Perspectives on Arctic Sovereignty and Security:
努納武特對(duì)北極主權(quán)與安全的視角：
This pillar focuses on Inuit-led governance and self-determination as the foundation of sovereignty, and stresses that a lack of infrastructure is the "single greatest barrier to achieving true local, territorial, and national security” (p. 20).
這一支柱聚焦于因紐特人主導(dǎo)的治理和自決權(quán)作為主權(quán)的基礎(chǔ)，并強(qiáng)調(diào)缺乏基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施是“實(shí)現(xiàn)真正的地方、地區(qū)和國(guó)家安全的唯一最大障礙”（第20頁(yè)）。
The strategy calls for the Government of Canada to support Inuit self-determination as the "cornerstone of Arctic governance, ensuring that Inuit make decisions rather than simply agreeing to decisions made elsewhere," and for infrastructure development to be Inuit-led and Inuit-driven (p. 21).
該戰(zhàn)略呼吁加拿大政府支持因紐特人的自決權(quán)，作為“北極治理的基石，確保因紐特人做決策，而不僅僅是同意別處做出的決定，”并要求基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施開(kāi)發(fā)由因紐特人領(lǐng)導(dǎo)和驅(qū)動(dòng)（第21頁(yè)）。
It also recommends expanding and strengthening the Canadian Rangers and other programs that “maintain operational readiness and integrate Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit and practices into training, operations, and local emergency preparedness efforts” (p. 21)
它還建議擴(kuò)大和加強(qiáng)加拿大游騎兵以及其他“保持行動(dòng)準(zhǔn)備狀態(tài)并將因紐特人傳統(tǒng)知識(shí)與實(shí)踐融入培訓(xùn)、行動(dòng)和當(dāng)?shù)貞?yīng)急準(zhǔn)備工作”的項(xiàng)目（第21頁(yè)）
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Nunavut in the Circumpolar World:
環(huán)極世界中的努納武特：
The strategy highlights Nunavut's central role in the circumpolar world due to shared cultural, linguistic, and familial ties with Inuit in other countries, and positions Inuit as a "bridge between Canada and other Arctic nations," fostering cooperation and collaboration in international fora (p. 23).
該戰(zhàn)略強(qiáng)調(diào)了由于與其他國(guó)家的因紐特人共享文化、語(yǔ)言和家庭聯(lián)系，努納武特在環(huán)極世界中的核心作用，并將因紐特人定位為“加拿大與其他北極國(guó)家之間的橋梁”，在國(guó)際論壇中促進(jìn)合作與協(xié)作（第23頁(yè)）。
The document also emphasizes the need for defence infrastructure (such as airstrips, ports, harbours, roads, and communication and electrical networks) that is multi-use and designed to serve both military and community needs (p. 24).
該文件還強(qiáng)調(diào)需要多用途的國(guó)防基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施（如簡(jiǎn)易機(jī)場(chǎng)、港口、港灣、道路以及通信和電力網(wǎng)絡(luò)），并設(shè)計(jì)用于滿(mǎn)足軍事和社區(qū)需求（第24頁(yè)）。
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Unlocking Nunavut's Economic Potential:
釋放努納武特的經(jīng)濟(jì)潛力：
This pillar states that economic inequality weakens communities, and that Arctic sovereignty cannot be achieved without sustainable economic self-determination for Inuit (p. 26).
這一支柱指出，經(jīng)濟(jì)不平等削弱了社區(qū)，沒(méi)有因紐特人可持續(xù)的經(jīng)濟(jì)自決權(quán)，就無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)北極主權(quán)（第26頁(yè)）。
It advocates for a shift from a reliance on southern workforces and resource extraction to Inuit-led development that creates meaningful employment, local capacity, and ownership stakes in major projects (pp. 26-27).
它倡導(dǎo)從依賴(lài)南方勞動(dòng)力和資源開(kāi)采轉(zhuǎn)向因紐特人主導(dǎo)的開(kāi)發(fā)，從而在重大項(xiàng)目中創(chuàng)造有意義的就業(yè)、地方能力和所有權(quán)股份（第26-27頁(yè)）。
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Climate Change Adaptation and Environmental Impacts:
氣候變化適應(yīng)與環(huán)境影響：
This pillar addresses the profound implications of climate change for Inuit security and Canadian sovereignty, highlighting how melting ice is increasing geopolitical interest and foreign activities in the region (p. 29).
這一支柱討論了氣候變化對(duì)因紐特人安全和加拿大主權(quán)的深遠(yuǎn)影響，強(qiáng)調(diào)了冰層融化如何增加了該地區(qū)的地緣政治利益和外國(guó)活動(dòng)（第29頁(yè)）。
The strategy calls for adaptation and resiliency rooted in Inuit self-determination, combining traditional knowledge (Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit) with modern approaches (p. 29).
該戰(zhàn)略呼吁植根于因紐特人自決權(quán)的適應(yīng)性和韌性，將傳統(tǒng)知識(shí)（因紐特人傳統(tǒng)知識(shí)）與現(xiàn)代方法相結(jié)合（第29頁(yè)）。
Once again, it advocates for greater investment in the Inuit Guardians and Canadian Rangers, who are described as “a potent force, and a model of how Inuit knowledge, skills and Inuit stewardship build true resilience in communities, strengthening Canada's sovereignty” (p. 29).
它再次主張對(duì)因紐特人守護(hù)者和加拿大游騎兵進(jìn)行更多投資，他們被描述為“一支強(qiáng)大的力量，以及因紐特人的知識(shí)、技能和管理如何建立社區(qū)真正的韌性、加強(qiáng)加拿大主權(quán)的典范”（第29頁(yè)）。
It also pushes for a transition away from diesel dependency to clean, locally-produced alternative energy solutions (p. 30).
它還推動(dòng)從依賴(lài)柴油轉(zhuǎn)向清潔、本地生產(chǎn)的替代能源解決方案（第30頁(yè)）。
Like the ITK position paper, the Nunavut Arctic Sovereignty and Security Strategy intends to serve as a clarion call to action for Nunavummiut and their partners to take decisive steps to safeguard their well-being, strengthen Canada's claim to jurisdiction, and ensure that Inuit voices lead in the national and circumpolar dialogue (p. 34).
與因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟的立場(chǎng)文件一樣，《努納武特北極主權(quán)與安全戰(zhàn)略》旨在作為對(duì)努納武特人及其合作伙伴采取果斷行動(dòng)的號(hào)角，以保障他們的福祉，加強(qiáng)加拿大的管轄權(quán)主張，并確保因紐特人的聲音在國(guó)家和環(huán)極對(duì)話(huà)中起主導(dǎo)作用（第34頁(yè)）。
Offering more specific detail than the ITK document, it articulates a human-centric (and Inuit-centric) approach to sovereignty and security.
比因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟的文件提供了更具體的細(xì)節(jié)，它闡明了一種以人為中心（和以因紐特人為中心）的主權(quán)與安全方法。
Although the lines between “security” and “well-being” are not always clear, the spirit of partnership, co-development, and resilience is readily apparent.
盡管“安全”和“福祉”之間的界限并不總是明確的，但伙伴關(guān)系、共同發(fā)展和韌性的精神顯而易見(jiàn)。
Yukon First Nations Defence and Security: Prioritizing Sovereignty, Preparedness, and Partnership
育空第一民族防務(wù)與安全：優(yōu)先考慮主權(quán)、準(zhǔn)備和伙伴關(guān)系
In February 2023, a high-altitude object (which later turned out to be a hobbyist balloon originating from the northern continental United States) was shot down by the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) over the Yukon.
2023年2月，一個(gè)高空氣球（后來(lái)被證實(shí)是來(lái)自美國(guó)本土北部的一個(gè)業(yè)余愛(ài)好者氣球）在育空上空被北美防空防天司令部擊落。
This action represented the first kinetic action that NORAD had taken in defence of North America, yet it also highlighted lapses in communication and engagement with the Yukon First Nations (YFN) upon whose traditional territories the kinetic action and the ensuing ground search were conducted.21
這一行動(dòng)代表了北美防空防天司令部為保衛(wèi)北美采取的首次動(dòng)能行動(dòng)，然而它也突顯了與育空第一民族的溝通和接觸方面的失誤，而動(dòng)能行動(dòng)和隨后的地面搜索正是在育空第一民族的傳統(tǒng)領(lǐng)土上進(jìn)行的。
This incident also served as the impetus for YFN leadership to task the AFN regional office with conducting an in-depth study on defence and security in the Yukon.22
這一事件也促使育空第一民族領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人責(zé)成原住民議會(huì)地區(qū)辦公室對(duì)育空的防務(wù)與安全進(jìn)行深入研究。
In partnership with the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN), AFN Yukon Region hosted six “open house” sessions with YFN leaders, Elders, community members, and external subject matter experts on specific themes relating to the defence and security space in late 2024 and early 2025.
原住民議會(huì)育空地區(qū)與北美和北極防務(wù)與安全網(wǎng)絡(luò)合作，于2024年底和2025年初舉辦了六場(chǎng)“開(kāi)放日”會(huì)議，與育空第一民族領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人、長(zhǎng)者、社區(qū)成員和外部主題專(zhuān)家就防務(wù)與安全領(lǐng)域相關(guān)的特定主題進(jìn)行交流。
Subsequently, AFN Yukon Region, in partnership with the Yukon First Nation Chamber of Commerce, hosted the Yukon First Nations Defence and Security Industries Conference in April 2025.23
隨后，原住民議會(huì)育空地區(qū)與育空第一民族商會(huì)合作，于2025年4月舉辦了育空第一民族防務(wù)與安全產(chǎn)業(yè)會(huì)議。
These activities directly informed the Yukon First Nations Defence and Security report released in August 2025.24
這些活動(dòng)直接為2025年8月發(fā)布的《育空第一民族防務(wù)與安全》報(bào)告提供了信息。
Recognizing “the systemic exclusion of First Nations governments from decisions that directly affect their lands, people, and safety,” it resonates with the Inuit strategies in emphasizing that “Yukon First Nations are not passive stakeholders, but essential decision-making partners with the knowledge, jurisdiction, and the lived experience needed to guide security planning in their territories” (p. 8).
該報(bào)告認(rèn)識(shí)到“第一民族政府被系統(tǒng)性地排除在直接影響其土地、人民和安全的決策之外”，它與因紐特人的戰(zhàn)略產(chǎn)生共鳴，強(qiáng)調(diào)“育空第一民族不是被動(dòng)的利益相關(guān)者，而是擁有指導(dǎo)其領(lǐng)土安全規(guī)劃所需的知識(shí)、管轄權(quán)和實(shí)際經(jīng)驗(yàn)的關(guān)鍵決策伙伴”（第8頁(yè)）。
The 72-page report is strategic in its presentation, emphasizing existing legal frameworks for meaningful collaboration in defence and security, identifying the primary gaps in military coordination in the Yukon, and offering twelve practical recommendations for federal partners and YFNs to move forward.
這份72頁(yè)的報(bào)告在表述上具有戰(zhàn)略性，強(qiáng)調(diào)了在防務(wù)與安全領(lǐng)域進(jìn)行有意義合作的現(xiàn)有法律框架，指出了育空地區(qū)軍事協(xié)調(diào)的主要差距，并為聯(lián)邦合作伙伴和育空第一民族提出了十二項(xiàng)切實(shí)可行的向前推進(jìn)建議。
The report begins by emphasizing the history of defence in the Yukon and its effects on YFNs, namely the impacts of constructing the Alaska Highway, which displaced communities and damaged traditional livelihoods.
報(bào)告首先強(qiáng)調(diào)了育空地區(qū)的防務(wù)歷史及其對(duì)育空第一民族的影響，即建設(shè)阿拉斯加高速公路的影響，該公路導(dǎo)致社區(qū)搬遷并破壞了傳統(tǒng)生計(jì)。
“Mainstream histories often portray the Alaska Highway as an engineering triumph: an emblem of progress, northern development, and military cooperation between the U.S. and Canada,” it highlights.
“主流歷史往往將阿拉斯加高速公路描繪成工程上的勝利：進(jìn)步、北方發(fā)展以及美加軍事合作的象征，”它強(qiáng)調(diào)說(shuō)。
“But these accounts too often overlook or erase the experiences of Yukon First Nations, whose lands, families, and ways of life were profoundly impacted by the highway’s construction.
“但這些敘述常常忽視或抹去育空第一民族的經(jīng)歷，他們的土地、家庭和生活方式受到了高速公路建設(shè)的深刻影響。
While the public narrative celebrates speed, scale, and nation-building, many Yukon First Nations remember this moment as one of destruction, dispossession, and deep loss.”
雖然公眾的敘述頌揚(yáng)速度、規(guī)模和國(guó)家建設(shè)，但許多育空第一民族將此銘記為破壞、剝奪和深深失落的時(shí)刻?！?br>The report states that “to move forward together in genuine partnership, acknowledging this history and the enduring legacies of defence projects in the Yukon is vital” (p. 9).
報(bào)告指出，“為了以真正的伙伴關(guān)系共同前進(jìn)，承認(rèn)這段歷史以及育空地區(qū)國(guó)防項(xiàng)目持久的遺留影響至關(guān)重要”（第9頁(yè)）。
Yukon First Nations Defence and Security highlights that legal frameworks for meaningful collaboration exist but are underutilized.
《育空第一民族防務(wù)與安全》強(qiáng)調(diào)，存在有意義的合作的法律框架，但未被充分利用。
Specifically, section 6.5 of the YFN Umbrella Final Agreement – a constitutionally-protected modern treaty – governs military access to YFN settlement land, stating that consent must be given by the affected First Nation (p. 10).
具體而言，《育空第一民族總括最終協(xié)議》第6.5條——一項(xiàng)受憲法保護(hù)的現(xiàn)代條約——規(guī)定了軍方進(jìn)入育空第一民族聚居地的條件，指出必須得到受影響第一民族的同意（第10頁(yè)）。
Nonetheless, YFNs insist that “notification alone is no longer sufficient” and that “the next step must involve respectful Nation-to-Nation collaboration in planning and decision-making” (p. 11).
盡管如此，育空第一民族堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為“僅通知已不再足夠”，并且“下一步必須在規(guī)劃和決策中涉及尊重民族間的合作”（第11頁(yè)）。
The report proposes that, through these existing legal frameworks, the roles of YFNs could be expanded and formalized to include approving military exercises occurring on their territories and creating joint planning tables (p. 11).
報(bào)告提議，通過(guò)這些現(xiàn)有的法律框架，可以擴(kuò)大和正式確定育空第一民族的角色，包括批準(zhǔn)在其領(lǐng)土上進(jìn)行的軍事演習(xí)和建立聯(lián)合規(guī)劃?rùn)C(jī)制（第11頁(yè)）。
AFN Yukon highlights two main gaps in military coordination with YFNs in the Yukon: disaster and emergency management (DEM) and search and rescue (SAR).
原住民議會(huì)育空地區(qū)強(qiáng)調(diào)了與育空第一民族在育空地區(qū)軍事協(xié)調(diào)方面的兩個(gè)主要差距：災(zāi)害與應(yīng)急管理和搜救。
While funding and coordination mechanisms exist, they remain “fragmented, reactive, and insufficient to reflect the leadership roles Yukon First Nations already play and…h(huán)ave the authority to exercise.”
雖然存在資金和協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制，但它們?nèi)匀弧爸щx破碎、反應(yīng)遲緩，且不足以反映育空第一民族已經(jīng)發(fā)揮且有權(quán)行使的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)作用?！?br>YFN governments have the legal responsibility to declare emergencies and coordinate responses on their settlement lands, but “the DEM roles and responsibilities of Yukon First Nations outside the UFA framework remain relatively unclear” (p. 13).
育空第一民族政府在法律上有責(zé)任在其聚居地宣布緊急狀態(tài)并協(xié)調(diào)應(yīng)對(duì)措施，但“在《總括最終協(xié)議》框架之外，育空第一民族在災(zāi)害與應(yīng)急管理中的角色和責(zé)任仍然相對(duì)不明確”（第13頁(yè)）。
By extension, YFN governments are not being recognized as equal and essential partners, are excluded from key policies and funding programs, and still await reimbursement for past disaster responses that they have undertaken (p. 14).
推而言之，育空第一民族政府未被承認(rèn)為平等的、必不可少的伙伴，被排除在關(guān)鍵政策和資助項(xiàng)目之外，并且仍在等待對(duì)其過(guò)去承擔(dān)的災(zāi)害應(yīng)對(duì)行動(dòng)的報(bào)銷(xiāo)（第14頁(yè)）。
Similar patterns are raised in terms of SAR, with YFNs being “too often treated as informal participants in a system they regularly lead” (p. 15).
在搜救方面也出現(xiàn)了類(lèi)似的模式，育空第一民族“在他們經(jīng)常領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的系統(tǒng)中，常常被當(dāng)作非正式的參與者對(duì)待”（第15頁(yè)）。
The report states that YFN actions in SAR operations are often “unrecognized, uncompensated, and informal, despite being essential.”10 and that formalizing YFNs’ role in SAR will recognize pre-existing jurisdiction, honour experience, and display sovereignty in action.
報(bào)告指出，育空第一民族在搜救行動(dòng)中的行動(dòng)往往“盡管必不可少，但未被承認(rèn)、未獲補(bǔ)償且是非正式的”，并指出，將育空第一民族在搜救中的角色正式化將承認(rèn)預(yù)先存在的管轄權(quán)、尊重經(jīng)驗(yàn)并展示行動(dòng)中的主權(quán)。
Finally, the report presents twelve recommendations that address the priorities of YFNs in the defence and security space.
最后，報(bào)告提出了十二項(xiàng)建議，旨在解決育空第一民族在防務(wù)與安全領(lǐng)域的優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)。
Recommendation 1 relates to acknowledging the history of defence in the Yukon, recommending a “formal recognition of the history of defence in the Yukon and a joint commitment to move forward together, including support for community-led historical and environmental reclamation.”
建議1涉及承認(rèn)育空地區(qū)的防務(wù)歷史，建議“正式承認(rèn)育空地區(qū)的防務(wù)歷史并共同承諾共同前進(jìn)，包括支持社區(qū)主導(dǎo)的歷史和環(huán)境修復(fù)?！?br>Recommendations 2-8 are targeted toward the federal and territorial governments and present specific policy proposals to address the gaps identified in the report, namely to “Establish Formal Information-Sharing and Co-Planning Protocols with Yukon First Nations” (Recommendation 2), “Establish a Yukon First Nation Emergency Management Function through Fiscal Transfer Agreements” (Recommendation 6), and “Formalize Yukon First Nations’ Role in Search and Rescue” (Recommendation 7).
建議2-8針對(duì)聯(lián)邦和地區(qū)政府，提出了具體的政策建議，以解決報(bào)告中確定的差距，即“與育空第一民族建立正式的信息共享和共同規(guī)劃協(xié)議”（建議2），“通過(guò)財(cái)政轉(zhuǎn)移協(xié)議建立育空第一民族應(yīng)急管理職能”（建議6），以及“將育空第一民族在搜救中的角色正式化”（建議7）。
Recommendations 9-12 encourage YFN governments to deepen participation in the defence and security space, namely to “Close Knowledge Gaps to Help Yukon First Nation Businesses Compete in Defence Procurement” (Recommendation 10), “Deepen Yukon First Nation Engagement with Intelligence and Security Agencies” (Recommendation 11), and “Support Yukon First Nation-Led Forums on Defence, Security, and Safety” (Recommendation 12) (pp. 33-43).
建議9-12鼓勵(lì)育空第一民族政府深化在防務(wù)與安全領(lǐng)域的參與，即“縮小知識(shí)差距以幫助育空第一民族企業(yè)參與國(guó)防采購(gòu)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”（建議10），“深化育空第一民族與情報(bào)和安全機(jī)構(gòu)的接觸”（建議11），以及“支持育空第一民族主導(dǎo)的防務(wù)、安全與保障論壇”（建議12）（第33-43頁(yè)）。
While this report recognizes that security in the North must be viewed through a comprehensive and human-centred lens, it differs from the Inuit reports analyzed earlier in that it speaks primarily to matters within the mandates of “hard” security-oriented partners such as the Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces, including where these intersect with SAR and disaster response and emergency management.
雖然這份報(bào)告承認(rèn)北方的安全必須通過(guò)全面和以人為本的視角來(lái)看待，但它與之前分析的因紐特人報(bào)告不同，主要涉及國(guó)防部/加拿大武裝部隊(duì)等以“硬”安全為導(dǎo)向的伙伴職責(zé)范圍內(nèi)的事務(wù)，包括這些事務(wù)與搜救、災(zāi)害應(yīng)對(duì)和應(yīng)急管理交叉的領(lǐng)域。
Attentive to “soft security” and socio-economic considerations, Yukon First Nations Defence and Security does not fixate on the threat of foreign invasion and instead focuses on current challenges associated with climate change impacts, infrastructure vulnerabilities, and the need for preparedness and resilience (pp. 16, 27).
關(guān)注“軟安全”和社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)因素，《育空第一民族防務(wù)與安全》并不固執(zhí)于外國(guó)入侵的威脅，而是聚焦于與氣候變化影響、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施脆弱性以及準(zhǔn)備和韌性需求相關(guān)的當(dāng)前挑戰(zhàn)（第16、27頁(yè)）。
“Yukon First Nations are already leading in emergency management, infrastructure development, and economic innovation,” AFN Yukon Regional Chief Kluane Adamek noted.
“育空第一民族已經(jīng)在應(yīng)急管理、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)和經(jīng)濟(jì)創(chuàng)新方面處于領(lǐng)先地位，”原住民議會(huì)育空地區(qū)酋長(zhǎng)克盧安·阿達(dá)梅克指出。
“The report calls on all partners to recognize, support, and resource that leadership,” offering “a roadmap for how Canada can strengthen its northern security by working with, rather than around, Yukon First Nations.”25
“該報(bào)告呼吁所有合作伙伴承認(rèn)、支持并為這一領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力提供資源，”提供了“加拿大如何通過(guò)與育空第一民族合作而不是繞開(kāi)他們來(lái)加強(qiáng)其北方安全的路線(xiàn)圖。”
Conclusions
結(jié)論
The three reports that we have summarized offer important examples of how Indigenous Peoples in Northern Canada intend to position themselves at the forefront of security discussions in the Arctic.
我們總結(jié)的三份報(bào)告提供了重要的例子，說(shuō)明加拿大北方的原住民如何打算將自己置于北極安全討論的前沿。
First and foremost, all of the strategies define security broadly.
首先，所有這些戰(zhàn)略都廣義地定義了安全。
It is more than traditional military threats and must include human security issues such as reliable and climate-resilient infrastructure, strong economies, food security, and cultural continuity.
它不僅限于傳統(tǒng)的軍事威脅，還必須包括人的安全問(wèn)題，如可靠且適應(yīng)氣候變化的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施、強(qiáng)大的經(jīng)濟(jì)、糧食安全和文化延續(xù)性。
Climate change is highlighted as the most significant and immediate security threat, both as a driver of increased regional activity and as a cause of direct environmental insecurity for Northern Peoples.
氣候變化被強(qiáng)調(diào)為最重大、最直接的安全威脅，它既是區(qū)域活動(dòng)增加的一個(gè)驅(qū)動(dòng)因素，也是導(dǎo)致北方民族直接環(huán)境不安全感的一個(gè)原因。
In terms of state-based threats, Russia and China are specifically identified as key competitors or adversaries who “are ramping up their activities in the Arctic as they compete for authority, influence and critical mineral wealth” (NTI/GN, p. 29), with the ITK report lumps in the United States as another actor “aggressively asserting their influence now” (ITK, p. 6).
在國(guó)家威脅方面，俄羅斯和中國(guó)被特別指明為關(guān)鍵的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者或?qū)κ?，他們“在?zhēng)奪權(quán)威、影響力和關(guān)鍵礦產(chǎn)財(cái)富的過(guò)程中，正在增加其在北極的活動(dòng)”（努納武特土著土地索賠組織/努納武特政府，第29頁(yè)），而因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟的報(bào)告將美國(guó)歸為另一個(gè)“現(xiàn)在積極施加其影響力”的行為體（因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟，第6頁(yè)）。
These dynamics demand stronger partnership between Inuit, First Nations, and the Government of Canada to protect Indigenous Peoples and advance shared priorities.
這些動(dòng)態(tài)要求因紐特人、第一民族與加拿大政府之間建立更強(qiáng)大的伙伴關(guān)系，以保護(hù)原住民并推進(jìn)共同的優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)。
The documents reject any notion that Indigenous Peoples are passive stakeholders in defence and security deliberations, insisting that they are rightsholders whose government-to-government relationships with the Government of Canada necessitate a spirit of partnership to set priorities and co-develop solutions.
這些文件駁斥了任何關(guān)于原住民是防務(wù)與安全審議中被動(dòng)利益相關(guān)者的觀點(diǎn)，堅(jiān)稱(chēng)他們是權(quán)利持有者，他們與加拿大政府之間的政府間關(guān)系需要一種伙伴關(guān)系精神來(lái)設(shè)定優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)并共同制定解決方案。
The arguments by ITK, NTI, and AFN Yukon Region are rooted in the legal authority of Indigenous Peoples in modern treaties that stipulate a Nation-to-Nation approach.
因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟、努納武特土著土地索賠組織和原住民議會(huì)育空地區(qū)的論點(diǎn)植根于原住民在現(xiàn)代條約中的法律權(quán)威，這些條約規(guī)定了民族間的方法。
All three reports note that, to be effective partners, Indigenous organizations need dedicated, long-term funding to build internal capacity so that they can engage more fully on defence issues that affect them, lead emergency management efforts, and pursue economic opportunities.
所有三份報(bào)告都指出，要成為有效的伙伴，原住民組織需要專(zhuān)門(mén)的、長(zhǎng)期的資金來(lái)建設(shè)內(nèi)部能力，以便他們能夠更充分地參與影響他們的防務(wù)問(wèn)題，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)應(yīng)急管理工作，并尋求經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)會(huì)。
Along these lines, AFN Yukon Region called specifically for Canada “to begin considering formal, enduring roles for Indigenous experts in Arctic and defence planning and strategy, beyond the important contributions of the Canadian Rangers at the local, regional, and national levels” (p. 36).
沿著這些思路，原住民議會(huì)育空地區(qū)特別呼吁加拿大“開(kāi)始考慮在原住民專(zhuān)家參與北極和防務(wù)規(guī)劃與戰(zhàn)略方面，確立正式、持久的角色，使其超越加拿大游騎兵在地方、區(qū)域和國(guó)家層面做出的重要貢獻(xiàn)”（第36頁(yè)）。
Canadian Indigenous perspectives on sovereignty, security, and defence also highlight the centrality of Indigenous Knowledge and ways of knowing, being, and seeing.
加拿大原住民對(duì)主權(quán)、安全和防務(wù)的視角也強(qiáng)調(diào)了原住民知識(shí)以及認(rèn)知、存在和看待方式的核心地位。
Each strategy emphasizes the tangible benefits of traditional knowledge and on-the-land expertise for effective security planning, emergency response, and environmental monitoring.
每項(xiàng)戰(zhàn)略都強(qiáng)調(diào)了傳統(tǒng)知識(shí)和實(shí)地專(zhuān)業(yè)知識(shí)對(duì)于有效的安全規(guī)劃、應(yīng)急響應(yīng)和環(huán)境監(jiān)測(cè)的切實(shí)益處。
The Nunavut and Yukon reports both place explicit emphasis on the Canadian Rangers, Indigenous Guardian programs, and other local community-based groups as valuable first responders in remote areas who deserve more support, resources, and recognition.
努納武特和育空的報(bào)告都明確強(qiáng)調(diào)加拿大游騎兵、原住民守護(hù)者項(xiàng)目以及其他本地社區(qū)團(tuán)體是偏遠(yuǎn)地區(qū)寶貴的第一響應(yīng)者，他們值得更多的支持、資源和認(rèn)可。
All three strategies see defence and security investments as opportunities for economic development, particularly through procurement and infrastructure projects.
所有三項(xiàng)戰(zhàn)略都將國(guó)防和安全投資視為經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的機(jī)會(huì)，特別是通過(guò)采購(gòu)和基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目。
While historical examples that they reference serve as a reminder of how defence and security initiatives can cause dislocation and ongoing trauma, the Indigenous organizations all project optimism that new investments in Canadian Arctic security represent a way to address civilian infrastructure deficits and foster economic development.
雖然它們引用的歷史例證提醒人們國(guó)防和安全倡議可能造成混亂和持續(xù)的創(chuàng)傷，但原住民組織都表達(dá)了樂(lè)觀態(tài)度，認(rèn)為對(duì)加拿大北極安全的新投資是解決民用基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施赤字和促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的一種方式。
In advocating for Indigenous procurement targets and for local businesses and development corporations to be at the forefront of defence-related infrastructure and service contracts, they also see material ways for Indigenous companies to benefit.
通過(guò)倡導(dǎo)原住民采購(gòu)目標(biāo)以及讓本地企業(yè)和發(fā)展公司站在國(guó)防相關(guān)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和服務(wù)合同的最前沿，他們也看到了原住民公司獲益的具體途徑。
“Inuit have a vision of Inuit Nunangat as the primary driver of growth in the Canadian economy over the coming decades,” the ITK report describes.
“因紐特人有一個(gè)愿景，即因紐特人努南加特成為未來(lái)幾十年加拿大經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的主要驅(qū)動(dòng)力，”因紐特人團(tuán)結(jié)聯(lián)盟的報(bào)告描述道。
The Inuit-Crown partnership “is necessary for the ascendancy of Inuit Nunangat within Canada and the ascendancy of Canada as a powerful Arctic State within the international community” (p. 8).
因紐特人-王室伙伴關(guān)系“對(duì)于因紐特人努南加特在加拿大國(guó)內(nèi)的崛起以及加拿大作為國(guó)際社會(huì)中強(qiáng)大北極國(guó)家的崛起是必要的”（第8頁(yè)）。
In this sense, Indigenous sovereignty and Canadian sovereignty, and Indigenous security and Canadian security, and inextricably intertwined.
從這個(gè)意義上說(shuō)，原住民主權(quán)與加拿大主權(quán)、原住民安全與加拿大安全，是密不可分、交織在一起的。