當(dāng)這本書(shū)的第一版在1975年發(fā)行時(shí)，主要的論述還是聚焦在主觀性，感覺(jué)。這個(gè)焦點(diǎn)是60年代的遺產(chǎn)，最初是針對(duì)在之前的理性主義和行為主義的有必要的反應(yīng)。它宣稱:"人們不是機(jī)器。他們不僅僅是生理機(jī)能的組合。他們有希望，夢(mèng)想，激情。沒(méi)有哪兩個(gè)人是一樣的，每個(gè)人都都有特別的觀點(diǎn)，獨(dú)特的方法看待這個(gè)世界。人類任何一個(gè)忽視主觀性的關(guān)于人性的觀點(diǎn)都是荒謬的。"
雖然這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)是有價(jià)值的，但是聚焦在感覺(jué)上還是走的太遠(yuǎn)。就像其他的運(yùn)動(dòng)，一開(kāi)始針對(duì)一個(gè)極端觀點(diǎn)的看法本身也會(huì)變成一個(gè)極端觀點(diǎn)。這個(gè)極端主義的結(jié)果是忽視了思考。這本書(shū)的目的就是回應(yīng)這些疏忽。第一版的導(dǎo)論解釋了它的理由如下:
強(qiáng)調(diào)主觀性是為了糾正太過(guò)于簡(jiǎn)單化處理的危險(xiǎn)。但是這種回應(yīng)經(jīng)過(guò)長(zhǎng)時(shí)間，會(huì)導(dǎo)致更糟糕的結(jié)果-忽視了思考。更糟糕的理由有兩個(gè)。首先，因?yàn)槲覀兩钤谝粋€(gè)被操縱的年代。商品推銷者和蠱惑人心的政客們掌控了大量的心理學(xué)資源，影響我們的感情和潛意識(shí)，用于勸說(shuō)我們膚淺就是深刻，有害的就是有益的，罪惡就是道德。我們的感覺(jué)在這些操縱下面是非常的脆弱。
第二，由于實(shí)際上現(xiàn)代生活中每個(gè)重要的地方-法律，醫(yī)藥，政府，教育，科學(xué)，商業(yè)，還有社區(qū)事務(wù)-我們都被嚴(yán)重的問(wèn)題和復(fù)雜的情況所困擾，我們需要仔細(xì)的收集并平衡事實(shí)和收集的意見(jiàn)，對(duì)于不同結(jié)論和行動(dòng)的深思熟慮的思考，在最好的結(jié)論和最恰當(dāng)?shù)男袆?dòng)中做出正確的選擇。
［現(xiàn)在的大學(xué)生］已經(jīng)習(xí)慣于不是低估主觀性，而是高估。因此，他不需要放縱他的感覺(jué)，相反，他被教育如何辨別出感覺(jué)，判斷出外部事物造成了多大程度的影響，并且當(dāng)這些感覺(jué)之間或者和其他人的感覺(jué)發(fā)生沖突時(shí)，仔細(xì)做好評(píng)估。簡(jiǎn)而言之，他需要學(xué)會(huì)進(jìn)行批判性思維。
對(duì)于不少人，將感覺(jué)和思考看待為互為排斥的觀點(diǎn)是個(gè)不幸的趨勢(shì)，被迫做出選擇。如果我們關(guān)注其中一個(gè)，在他們看來(lái)，我們就必須拒絕另一個(gè)。這是錯(cuò)誤的。感覺(jué)和思考可以完美的互補(bǔ)。感覺(jué)，自然而然，是得到結(jié)論的非常好的開(kāi)始。而思考，更加深思熟慮，可以辨別出最好的，最恰當(dāng)?shù)母杏X(jué)。兩者都是自然的。
思考，當(dāng)然，不像感覺(jué)那樣自動(dòng)化。我們需要系統(tǒng)化方法和練習(xí)引導(dǎo)才能做好。
對(duì)待思考的普遍態(tài)度從70年代后開(kāi)始轉(zhuǎn)變了。批判性思維是重要的技能，教育應(yīng)該給予足夠的重視，這不再是少數(shù)人的觀點(diǎn)了。成百上千的人一起呼吁，要求在當(dāng)前的課程中增加批判性思維的內(nèi)容，甚至設(shè)置特別的關(guān)于思考的課程。對(duì)于新的千禧時(shí)代的挑戰(zhàn)是，人們需要能夠超越感覺(jué)的思維，清晰，公正，解決重要問(wèn)題和做出決定，這一點(diǎn)，大家沒(méi)有不同意見(jiàn)。
這個(gè)版本的特點(diǎn)
這個(gè)版本的《超越感覺(jué)》保留了和以前版本一樣的結(jié)構(gòu)。第一部分解釋了心理學(xué)的，哲學(xué)的和社會(huì)環(huán)境中批判性思維的產(chǎn)生，敘述了加強(qiáng)這些思考的習(xí)慣和態(tài)度。第二部分幫助學(xué)生識(shí)別并克服思考中常見(jiàn)的錯(cuò)誤。第三部分提供解決這些問(wèn)題的按部就班的方法。
從總體設(shè)計(jì)來(lái)說(shuō)，我還是做了不少改變，大部分是對(duì)于評(píng)論者有益的建議的反饋。
第一章，增加了一個(gè)新的部分"觀念的影響"
第三章，增加了一個(gè)新的部分"原因和效果的理解"
第15章，增加了個(gè)觀察的價(jià)值的新案例。
第17章，"評(píng)估你的信息來(lái)源"的部分有擴(kuò)展。
新增加了一些"意見(jiàn)分歧"的練習(xí)。
在過(guò)去，我嘗試按照喬治·奧威爾（George Orwell）明智的建議:"如果你能夠想到對(duì)應(yīng)的日常用語(yǔ)，千萬(wàn)不要使用外來(lái)語(yǔ)，科學(xué)術(shù)語(yǔ)，或者行話。"這不是一直容易做到。當(dāng)一個(gè)邏輯學(xué)家學(xué)會(huì)了“以人為據(jù)”，“不合邏輯推論”，和“肯定要件”（argumentum ad hominem, non sequitur, and “affirming the consequen）這樣的術(shù)語(yǔ)，他們自然就會(huì)使用。這些爭(zhēng)論促使他們強(qiáng)求我們：:比如，"它們是最精確的術(shù)語(yǔ)，不要加入那些需要照顧的行列或者剝奪學(xué)生們使用它們的機(jī)會(huì)。"在不重要的時(shí)候，我會(huì)屈服于這個(gè)要求。（直到前一個(gè)版本，比如，我使用了省略三段論法（enthymeme）這些術(shù)語(yǔ)。這是我的錯(cuò)（enthymeme）...你看，我又來(lái)了）但是這些術(shù)語(yǔ)的精確性真的是我使用他們的原因嗎？有沒(méi)有可能是我們這些教授喜歡炫耀我們的知識(shí)或者我們不愿意讓我們的學(xué)生免于我們被迫承受過(guò)度努力（"我們承受過(guò)痛苦，你們也應(yīng)該接受"），對(duì)我來(lái)說(shuō)，現(xiàn)代文化已經(jīng)給批判性思維足夠多的障礙了，沒(méi)有必要再增加了。
使用這些普通的語(yǔ)言會(huì)不會(huì)做的太過(guò)分？是的，有人認(rèn)為我避免使用推論（ inferences）這個(gè)詞，用結(jié)果（conclusions）這個(gè)單詞代替的時(shí)候，已經(jīng)這么做了。但是我誠(chéng)懇的表示不同意。詞典編纂者們指出這兩個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ)的區(qū)別非常細(xì)微。不在這上面花時(shí)間是更理智的做法。還有，任何時(shí)候因?yàn)槠渌鞣N原因，我避免使用價(jià)值（values ）這個(gè)詞匯。
價(jià)值（values ）這個(gè)單詞和相對(duì)主義關(guān)系密切，在這種語(yǔ)境下使用，會(huì)損害爭(zhēng)論在品質(zhì)（或者翻譯成概念）有差異這一重要觀念。對(duì)于很多學(xué)生來(lái)說(shuō)，單詞（value）會(huì)觸發(fā)他們的想法，"每個(gè)人都有權(quán)力認(rèn)可自己的價(jià)值，我的適合我，因此，它們可能需要不時(shí)的‘澄清’，這從來(lái)沒(méi)有被質(zhì)疑過(guò)。"這個(gè)想法會(huì)妨礙批判性思維。
致謝：
我要對(duì)那些對(duì)本書(shū)做出貢獻(xiàn)的人表示感謝，特別感謝審查過(guò)手稿的人:
Anna Villegas, San Joaquin Delta College.
Aimee Bissonette, Inver Hills Community College.
James Kruser, Alfred State College.
Sue Crowson, Del Mar College.
Erin Murphy, University of Kentucky.
Adrian Patten, University of Cincinnati.
Dedaimia Storrs Whitney, Franklin College.
Lisa Weisman-Davlantes, California State–Fullerton.
Geoffrey Phillip Bellah, Orange Coast College.
Karen Hoffman, Hood College.
xii Aimee Ross-Kilroy, Loyola Marymount University.
Deanna Davis, College of the Canyons
我還要感謝： John Augustine, Delta College; Lori Ebert, International Institute of the Americas; John Garcia, Cerro Coso Community College; Michael Small, Shasta College; Joel Brouwer, Montcalm Community College; Cynthia Gobatie, Riverside Community College; Anne Benvennti, Cerro Coso College; Fred Heifner Jr., Cumberland University; and Phyllis Toy, University of Southern Indiana.
原文：
Preface
When the first edition of this book appeared in 1975, the dominant intellectual focus was still subjectivity, feelings. That focus, the legacy of the 1960s, was originally a necessary reaction to the rationalism and behaviorism that preceded it. It declared, in effect: “People are not robots. They are more than the sum total of their physiology. They have hopes, dreams, emotions. No two humans are alike—each has a special perspective, a unique way of perceiving the world. And any view of humanity that ignores this subjective side is a distortion..
Yet, despite its value, the focus on feelings went too far. Like many other movements, what began as a reaction against an extreme view became an extreme view itself. The result of that extremism was the neglect of thinking. This book was designed to answer that neglect. The introduction to the first edition explained its rationale as follows.
The emphasis on subjectivity served to correct a dangerous oversimplification. But it is the kind of reaction that cannot be sustained for long without causing an even worse situation—the neglect of thinking. Worse for two reasons. First, because we live in an age of manipulation. Armies of hucksters and demagogues stand ready with the rich resources of psychology to play upon our emotions and subconscious needs to persuade us that superficial is profound, harmful is beneficial, evil is virtuous. And feelings are especially vulnerable to such manipulation.
Secondly, because in virtually every important area of modern life— law, medicine, government, education, science, business, and community affairs—we are beset with serious problems and complex issues that demand careful gathering and weighing of facts and informed opinions, thoughtful consideration of various conclusions or actions, and judicious selection of the best conclusion or most appropriate action. . . .
[Today’s college student] has been conditioned not to undervalue subjectivity, but to overvalue it. And so he does not need to have his feelings indulged. Rather, he needs to be taught how to sort out his feelings, decide to what extent they have been shaped by external influences, and x PRFACE evaluate them carefully when they conflict among themselves or with the feelings of others. In short, he needs to be taught to think critically.*
There is an unfortunate tendency among many to view feeling and thought as mutually exclusive, to force a choice between them. If we focus on one, then in their view we must reject the other. But this is mistaken. Feeling and thought are perfectly complementary. Feeling, being more spontaneous, is an excellent beginning to the development of conclusions. And thought, being more deliberate, provides a way to identify the best and most appropriate feeling. Both are natural.
Thinking, however, is less automatic than feeling. To do it well demands a systematic approach and guided practice.
The general attitude toward thinking has changed considerably since the mid-1970s. The view that critical thinking is an important skill to which education should give prominence is no longer a minority view. Hundreds of voices have joined the chorus calling for the addition of critical thinking objectives to existing courses and even the creation of special courses in thinking. There is little disagreement that the challenges of the new millennium demand minds that can move beyond feelings to clear, impartial, critical problem solving and decision making.
Features of This Edition
This edition of Beyond Feelings retains the basic organization of previous editions. The first section explains the psychological, philosophical, and social context in which critical thinking takes place and describes the habits and attitudes that enhance such thinking. The second section helps students recognize and overcome common errors in thinking. The third section provides a step-by-step strategy for dealing with issues.
Within the overall design, however, I have made a number of changes, most in response to the helpful suggestions of reviewers.
? In Chapter 1, a new section—“The Influence of Ideas”—has been added.
? In Chapter 3, a new section—“Understanding Cause and Effect”— has been added.
? In Chapter 15, new examples of the value of observation have been added.
? In Chapter 17, the subsection “Evaluate your information sources.
has been expanded.
? A number of new “Difference of Opinion” exercises have been added.
*In 1975, “he” was still accepted as a reference to both sexes.
PREFACE xi As in the past, I have attempted to follow George Orwell’s sage advice: “Never use a foreign phrase, a scientific word, or a jargon word if you can think of an everyday English equivalent.” This is not always easy. When logicians are taught terms such as argumentum ad hominem, non sequitur, and “affirming the consequent,” they naturally want to use them. Arguments for doing so urge themselves upon us: for example, “These are the most precise terms. Don’t join the ranks of the coddlers and deprive students of them.” In weak moments I succumb to this appeal. (Until the previous edition, for example, I included the term enthymeme. Mea culpa . . . there I go again.) But is the precision of such terms the real reason for my wanting to use them? Is it not possible that we professors enjoy parading our knowledge or that we are reluctant to spare our students the struggle we were forced to undergo (“We suffered, so they should too”)? It seems to me that modern culture already provides too many impediments to critical thinking for us to add more.
Is it possible to carry this plain language commitment too far? Yes, and some will think I have done so in avoiding the term inferences and speaking instead of conclusions. But I respectfully disagree. Lexicographers point out that the distinction between these terms is extremely subtle, so it seems more reasonable not to devote time to it. Also, I avoid using the term values whenever possible for a somewhat different reason.
The word value is so associated with relativism that its use in this context can undermine the crucial idea that arguments differ in quality. For many students, the word value triggers the thought, “Everyone has a right to his or her values; mine are right for me, and though they may need ‘clarification’ from time to time, they are never to be questioned.” This thought impedes critical thinking.
Acknowledgments
I wish to express my appreciation to all those who contributed to the preparation of this edition. Special thanks to those who reviewed the manuscript.
Anna Villegas, San Joaquin Delta College.
Aimee Bissonette, Inver Hills Community College.
James Kruser, Alfred State College.
Sue Crowson, Del Mar College.
Erin Murphy, University of Kentucky.
Adrian Patten, University of Cincinnati.
Dedaimia Storrs Whitney, Franklin College.
Lisa Weisman-Davlantes, California State–Fullerton.
Geoffrey Phillip Bellah, Orange Coast College.
Karen Hoffman, Hood College.
xii Aimee Ross-Kilroy, Loyola Marymount University.
Deanna Davis, College of the Canyons
I am also grateful to John Augustine, Delta College; Lori Ebert, International Institute of the Americas; John Garcia, Cerro Coso Community College; Michael Small, Shasta College; Joel Brouwer, Montcalm Community College; Cynthia Gobatie, Riverside Community College; Anne Benvennti, Cerro Coso College; Fred Heifner Jr., Cumberland University; and Phyllis Toy, University of Southern Indiana.
