Long way down
Why predicting the impact of a no-deal Brexit is so hard
路還長(zhǎng)
為什么難以預(yù)測(cè)無(wú)協(xié)議脫歐的后果？
Estimates of the economic effects of no-deal on GDP are varied
無(wú)協(xié)議脫歐如何影響GDP 尚無(wú)一致結(jié)論
Print edition | Britain
Jul 25th 2019
Apart from Economists for Free Trade (eft), a pro-Brexit group, almost no wonks believe that leaving the EU without a deal would be good for the economy. The majority flinch when Boris Johnson, the new prime minister, promises that Britain will push off by October 31st “come what may”. Yet the question of just how bad a no-deal Brexit would be has many answers.
除了支持脫歐的自由貿(mào)易經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家（EFT）以外，幾乎沒有一個(gè)專家相信，如果不達(dá)成協(xié)議就離開歐盟對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)有利。當(dāng)新首相鮑里斯·約翰遜（Boris Johnson）承諾無(wú)論如何，英國(guó)將在10月31日前離開時(shí)，大多數(shù)人開始畏縮不前。然而，無(wú)協(xié)議脫歐到底有多糟糕的問題有很多答案。
On July 18th the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), the fiscal watchdog, warned that a no-deal exit would “push the economy into recession”. The next day Oxford Economics argued that “no-deal Brexit might be bad, but not obr bad.” Capital Economics, another consultancy, wrote last year that in its central no-deal scenario “we don’t expect...a full-blown recession.” Estimates of the long-term effect on gdp are even more varied (see chart).
7月18日，財(cái)政監(jiān)督機(jī)構(gòu)預(yù)算責(zé)任辦公室（OBR）警告說(shuō)，不達(dá)成協(xié)議退出將“促使經(jīng)濟(jì)進(jìn)入衰退”。第二天，牛津經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院（Oxford Economics）辯稱，“不脫歐可能是糟糕的，但也不會(huì)像OBR 所說(shuō)的那樣?！绷硪患易稍児綜apital Economics去年寫道，在其核心的“不脫歐方案”中，“我們預(yù)期不會(huì)出現(xiàn)全面衰退?！睂?duì)GDP長(zhǎng)期影響的估計(jì)甚至更加多樣化。（見圖表）。
If Britain leaves without a deal it will become a member of the World Trade Organisation on its own, not as part of the EU . Britain would generally have to charge the same tariffs on eu imports as on non-eu ones. Regulations governing everything from medicines to electricity connections to financial services could lapse.
如果英國(guó)沒有達(dá)成協(xié)議就離開，它將獨(dú)自成為世界貿(mào)易組織的一員，而不是作為歐盟的一部分。英國(guó)必須對(duì)歐盟進(jìn)口商品征收與非歐盟進(jìn)口商品相同的關(guān)稅。從藥品到通過(guò)電力連接的金融服務(wù)的所有管理法規(guī)都可能失效。
Three big judgments shape economists’ views of the eventual impact of this. The first is precisely what happens to tariffs. The EFT assumes that Britain unilaterally cuts all of them to zero, boosting trade and thus economic growth. Most economists think that too optimistic.
經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家對(duì)最終影響的預(yù)期主要受到三個(gè)判斷的影響。第一個(gè)就是關(guān)稅問題。歐洲自由貿(mào)易聯(lián)盟認(rèn)為英國(guó)會(huì)單方面將它們?nèi)肯鳒p到零，從而促進(jìn)貿(mào)易，促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。但大多數(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家認(rèn)為這過(guò)于樂觀。
The second issue is what happens to non-tariff barriers, such as regulations, between Britain and its trading partners. Plenty of academic work looks at the economic impact of entering a big trading bloc, but there is much less on countries leaving, since this rarely happens. Will the non-tariff barriers that were lowered during Britain’s membership of the EU rise again when it pushes off? The government estimate shown in the chart assumes that the majority will be. Others, including from Rabobank, use estimates of non-tariff barriers between the eu and America as a guide to what Britain could face.
第二個(gè)問題是英國(guó)與其貿(mào)易伙伴之間的非關(guān)稅壁壘，如貿(mào)易管制。許多學(xué)術(shù)研究著眼于進(jìn)入一個(gè)大型貿(mào)易集團(tuán)對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的影響，但對(duì)離開的影響研究極少，因?yàn)檫@種情況很少發(fā)生，。在英國(guó)加入歐盟期間降低的非關(guān)稅壁壘會(huì)在其推動(dòng)下再次上升嗎？圖表中所示的政府估計(jì)數(shù)假設(shè)大多數(shù)壁壘將會(huì)上升。其他國(guó)家，包括來(lái)自荷蘭合作銀行的國(guó)家，使用歐盟和美國(guó)之間的非關(guān)稅壁壘估計(jì)值作為英國(guó)可能面臨的問題的指南。
The third judgment concerns so-called “dynamic effects”. Economists often assume that a reduction in openness to trade will crimp long-term productivity growth, in part because specialisation is more difficult and in part because inward investment from abroad would be lower. One paper from the London School of Economics, which looks at the impact of Britain moving to WTO rules, finds that including these dynamic effects triples the estimate of lost GDP per person.
第三種判斷關(guān)注“動(dòng)態(tài)效應(yīng)”。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家通常認(rèn)為，貿(mào)易開放度的降低會(huì)抑制長(zhǎng)期生產(chǎn)力的增長(zhǎng)，因?yàn)閷I(yè)化更加困難，而且來(lái)自國(guó)外的投資將減少。倫敦經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院（LSE）的一篇研究英國(guó)加入世貿(mào)組織的影響的論文發(fā)現(xiàn)，包括這些動(dòng)態(tài)效應(yīng)在內(nèi)，人均GDP損失估計(jì)值將達(dá)到三倍于靜態(tài)估計(jì)的水平。
Brexiteers argue that most economists are too negative—just as they were about the impact of the vote to leave the EU in 2016. Following a chaotic exit, the Bank of England could radically loosen monetary policy, and the government could ramp up spending or slash taxes. Perhaps. But even the gloomiest economic forecasts only paint a partial picture of what could happen following a chaotic exit. Shortages of medicines, violence at the Irish border, shuttered farms and panicky immigrants might not affect the economy much. But there is more to life than GDP.
英國(guó)脫歐主義者認(rèn)為，大多數(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家都過(guò)于消極，正如他們對(duì)2016年退出歐盟投票的影響所持的態(tài)度一樣。在混亂的退出之后，英格蘭銀行可以從根本上放松貨幣政策，政府可以增加支出或削減稅收。也許會(huì)有不糟糕的事情發(fā)生。但即便是最悲觀的經(jīng)濟(jì)預(yù)測(cè)也只能部分描繪出混亂退出后可能發(fā)生的情況。藥品短缺、愛爾蘭邊境的暴力、關(guān)閉的農(nóng)場(chǎng)和驚慌失措的移民可能對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)影響不大。但對(duì)生活的影響要大于GDP。
This article appeared in the Britain section of the print edition under the headline "How bad, exactly?"
