A Trump White House 特朗普白宮
The 45th president 第45任美國(guó)總統(tǒng)
What is Donald Trump likely to achieve in power?
特朗普?qǐng)?zhí)政將有何作為？
MUCH of the time, argues David Runciman, a British academic, politics matters little to most people. Then, suddenly, it matters all too much. Donald Trump’s term as America’s 45th president, which is due to begin with the inauguration on January 20th, stands to be one of those moments.
英國(guó)學(xué)者大衛(wèi)·朗西曼（David Runciman）曾經(jīng)說(shuō)過(guò)，在大多數(shù)時(shí)候，對(duì)于大多數(shù)人而言，政治無(wú)關(guān)緊要?？赊D(zhuǎn)眼間，它又與每個(gè)人息息相關(guān)。作為美國(guó)第45任總統(tǒng)，唐納德·特朗普將于1月20日正式就任。他走馬上任之日，必是天翻地覆之時(shí)。
It is extraordinary how little American voters and the world at large feel they know about what Mr Trump intends. Those who back him are awaiting the biggest shake-up in Washington, DC, in half a century—though their optimism is an act of faith. Those who oppose him are convinced there will be chaos and ruin on an epoch-changing scale—though their despair is guesswork. All that just about everyone can agree on is that Mr Trump promises to be an entirely new sort of American president. The question is, what sort?
不論是美國(guó)選民，還是整個(gè)世界，誰(shuí)都不清楚特朗普接下來(lái)打算做什么，這可真是絕無(wú)僅有了。那些支持特朗普的人們，正翹首企盼華盛頓半個(gè)世紀(jì)以來(lái)的最大變動(dòng)——然而他們的樂(lè)觀不過(guò)是信仰使然。而反對(duì)他的人們則堅(jiān)信，將來(lái)天下大亂、覆巢毀卵之程度定為今世罕見(jiàn)——然而他們的絕望不過(guò)是臆測(cè)假想。不過(guò)，人人都同意一點(diǎn)，特朗普必定是一位與眾不同的美國(guó)總統(tǒng)。而問(wèn)題是，他的不同屬于哪一種？
Inside the West Wig
白宮風(fēng)云
You may be tempted to conclude that it is simply too soon to tell. But there is enough information—from the campaign, the months since his victory and his life as a property developer and entertainer—to take a view of what kind of person Mr Trump is and how he means to fill the office first occupied by George Washington. There is also evidence from the team he has picked, which includes a mix of wealthy businessmen, generals and Republican activists (seeBriefing).
也許你會(huì)說(shuō)，現(xiàn)在談這些為時(shí)尚早。但是，從特朗普參加競(jìng)選，到勝選后的數(shù)月，乃至他作為房地產(chǎn)開(kāi)發(fā)商和娛樂(lè)大亨的人生，已經(jīng)充分說(shuō)明了他是一個(gè)怎樣的人，以及他打算在當(dāng)年喬治·華盛頓工作過(guò)的辦公室里做些什么。他欽點(diǎn)的白宮團(tuán)隊(duì)清一色由商業(yè)富豪、軍事將領(lǐng)及共和黨骨干組成，管中窺豹，可見(jiàn)一斑。
For sure, Mr Trump is changeable. He will tell theNew York Timesthat climate change is man-made in one breath and promise coal country that he will reopen its mines in the next. But that does not mean, as some suggest, that you must always shut out what the president says and wait to see what he does.
誠(chéng)然，特朗普是善變的。他上一秒剛對(duì)《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》表示氣候變化是人為造成的，下一秒就答應(yīng)煤炭大國(guó)，美國(guó)將重啟煤礦生產(chǎn)。然而，這并不代表你必須像某些人說(shuō)的那樣，對(duì)于這位新總統(tǒng)，莫要聽(tīng)其言，只能觀其行。
When a president speaks, no easy distinction is to be made between word and deed. When Mr Trump says that NATO is obsolete, as he did to two European journalists last week, he makes its obsolescence more likely, even if he takes no action. Moreover, Mr Trump has long held certain beliefs and attitudes that sketch out the lines of a possible presidency. They suggest that the almost boundless Trumpian optimism on display among American businesspeople deserves to be tempered by fears about trade protection and geopolitics, as well as questions about how Mr Trump will run his administration.
身為總統(tǒng)，講話時(shí)，是不該在言行一致問(wèn)題上輕易留人口實(shí)的。上周，當(dāng)特朗普對(duì)兩名歐洲記者說(shuō)“北約已然過(guò)時(shí)”的時(shí)候，他未采取任何行動(dòng)，就已讓其“過(guò)時(shí)”的可能性變得更大。此外，特朗普一直堅(jiān)持的某些看法和態(tài)度，已經(jīng)勾勒出其就職總統(tǒng)后的大致線路了。也就是說(shuō)，美國(guó)商人們漫無(wú)邊際的特朗普式樂(lè)觀主義不能太過(guò)了，對(duì)貿(mào)易保護(hù)和地緣政治的擔(dān)憂、以及對(duì)特朗普政府執(zhí)政方式的質(zhì)疑，都理應(yīng)讓這種樂(lè)觀降降溫。
Start with the optimism. Since November’s election the S&P500 index is up by 6%, to reach record highs. Surveys show that business confidence has soared. Both reflect hopes that Mr Trump will cut corporate taxes, leading companies to bring foreign profits back home. A boom in domestic spending should follow which, combined with investment in infrastructure and a programme of deregulation, will lift the economy and boost wages.
先說(shuō)樂(lè)觀情緒。自從11月特朗普勝選以來(lái)，美國(guó)股市標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)上漲了6%，達(dá)到歷史高點(diǎn)。研究顯示，公司信心顯著回升。兩種跡象均表明，人們對(duì)特朗普寄予了厚望，期待他通過(guò)減稅政策，引領(lǐng)公司將國(guó)外利潤(rùn)帶回到國(guó)內(nèi)來(lái)。緊隨其后的是加大國(guó)內(nèi)財(cái)政支出，基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資與減政計(jì)劃并舉，從而提振經(jīng)濟(jì)并推動(dòng)工資上漲。
Done well, tax reform would confer lasting benefits (seeFree exchange), as would a thoughtful and carefully designed programme of infrastructure investment and deregulation. But if such programmes are poorly executed, there is the risk of a sugar-rush as capital chases opportunities that do little to enhance the productive potential of the economy.
干得好的話，稅務(wù)改革將帶來(lái)持久好處，思慮周全、精心設(shè)計(jì)的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資方案和減政計(jì)劃亦是如此。但是，一旦這些項(xiàng)目執(zhí)行不力，則有“三分鐘熱度”的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，因?yàn)橘Y本所追逐的機(jī)會(huì)，是無(wú)助于鞏固經(jīng)濟(jì)生產(chǎn)潛力的。
That is not the only danger. If prices start to rise faster, pressure will mount on the Federal Reserve to increase interest rates. The dollar will soar and countries that have amassed large dollar debts, many of them emerging markets, may well buckle. One way or another, any resulting instability will blow back into America. If the Trump administration reacts to widening trade deficits with extra tariffs and non-tariff barriers, then the instability will only be exacerbated. Should Mr Trump right from the start set out to engage foreign exporters from countries such as China, Germany and Mexico in a conflict over trade, he would do grave harm to the global regime that America itself created after the second world war.
而這并非唯一風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。一旦物價(jià)開(kāi)始飛漲，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的加息壓力就會(huì)增大。于是乎，美元走強(qiáng)，那些持有巨額美債的國(guó)家會(huì)苦不堪言，而他們當(dāng)中，大部分都是新興市場(chǎng)國(guó)家。無(wú)論以何種方式，由此產(chǎn)生的不穩(wěn)定因素都會(huì)反過(guò)來(lái)影響美國(guó)。面對(duì)不斷擴(kuò)大的貿(mào)易赤字、高額關(guān)稅和非關(guān)稅壁壘，如果特朗普政府采取行動(dòng)，勢(shì)必會(huì)讓這些不穩(wěn)定因素愈發(fā)激化。倘若特朗普一開(kāi)始就將中國(guó)、德國(guó)、墨西哥等外國(guó)進(jìn)口商卷入貿(mào)易沖突當(dāng)中，那么二戰(zhàn)之后美國(guó)一手打造的全球體制將會(huì)遭受重創(chuàng)。
Just as Mr Trump underestimates the fragility of the global economic system, so too does he misread geopolitics. Even before taking office, Mr Trump has hacked away at the decades-old, largely bipartisan cloth of American foreign policy. He has casually disparaged the value of the European Union, which his predecessors always nurtured as a source of stability. He has compared Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor and the closest of allies, unfavourably to Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president and an old foe. He has savaged Mexico, whose prosperity and goodwill matter greatly to America’s southern states. And, most recklessly, he has begun to pull apart America’s carefully stitched dealings with the rising superpower, China—imperilling the most important bilateral relationship of all.
特朗普不僅低估了全球經(jīng)濟(jì)體制的脆弱性，還對(duì)地緣政治產(chǎn)生了誤讀。還沒(méi)上任，他就撕開(kāi)了民主黨和共和黨沿用了幾十年之久的外交政策的遮羞布。美國(guó)歷任總統(tǒng)將歐盟的價(jià)值視作穩(wěn)定的源泉，一直悉心呵護(hù)，而特朗普卻予以蔑視。德國(guó)總理默克爾是美國(guó)最親密的盟友，而特朗普卻將默克爾與美國(guó)的宿敵、俄羅斯總統(tǒng)普京相提并論。他對(duì)墨西哥猛烈抨擊，而墨西哥的繁榮和友好對(duì)于美國(guó)南部各州而言至關(guān)重要。而最不過(guò)腦子的，是他已經(jīng)對(duì)美國(guó)苦心經(jīng)營(yíng)的中美關(guān)系開(kāi)始了破壞，而中國(guó)是一個(gè)正在崛起的超級(jí)大國(guó)，中美關(guān)系是所有雙邊關(guān)系當(dāng)中的重中之重。
The idea running through Mr Trump’s diplomacy is that relations between states follow the art of the deal. Mr Trump acts as if he can get what he wants from sovereign states by picking fights that he is then willing to settle—at a price, naturally. His mistake is to think that countries are like businesses. In fact, America cannot walk away from China in search of another superpower to deal with over the South China Sea. Doubts that have been sown cannot be uprooted, as if the game had all along been a harmless exercise in price discovery. Alliances that take decades to build can be weakened in months.
特朗普的外交政策所貫徹的思想是：國(guó)與國(guó)的關(guān)系遵循的是交易的藝術(shù)。特朗普似乎認(rèn)為，通過(guò)挑起他樂(lè)于解決的那些爭(zhēng)端，他就可以從其他主權(quán)國(guó)家那里得到自己想要的東西，所以才有了那些所作所為。而他的錯(cuò)誤在于，把國(guó)家當(dāng)成了公司。實(shí)際上，要想尋找另一個(gè)大國(guó)來(lái)處理中國(guó)南海問(wèn)題，美國(guó)就不可能繞開(kāi)中國(guó)。懷疑的種子一旦播下，就無(wú)法根除，就像在價(jià)格發(fā)現(xiàn)過(guò)程中，博弈將會(huì)貫穿始終一樣，只不過(guò)懷疑會(huì)帶來(lái)危害，而博弈則不會(huì)。同盟關(guān)系的建立需要耗費(fèi)幾十年時(shí)間，而削弱只需短短幾個(gè)月。
Dealings between sovereign states tend towards anarchy—because, ultimately, there is no global government to impose order and no means of coercion but war. For as long as Mr Trump is unravelling the order that America created, and from which it gains so much, he is getting his country a terrible deal.
主權(quán)國(guó)家之間的交易極有可能導(dǎo)致混亂，因?yàn)?，最終不會(huì)有一個(gè)全球政府來(lái)維持公道，所以除了開(kāi)戰(zhàn)，別無(wú)他法。特朗普正在瓦解美國(guó)一手打造的世界秩序，而這個(gè)秩序?qū)γ绹?guó)有萬(wàn)般好處，而他給美國(guó)拉來(lái)的這單生意簡(jiǎn)直糟糕透頂。
Hair Force One
普軍一號(hào)
So troubling is this prospect that it raises one further question. How will Mr Trump’s White House work? On the one hand you have party stalwarts, including the vice-president, Mike Pence; the chief of staff, Reince Priebus; and congressional Republicans, led by Paul Ryan and Mitch McConnell. On the other are the agitators—particularly Steve Bannon, Peter Navarro and Michael Flynn. The titanic struggle between normal politics and insurgency, mediated by Mr Trump’s daughter, Ivanka, and son-in-law,Jared Kushner, will determine just how revolutionary this presidency is.
未來(lái)麻煩不斷，還將產(chǎn)生新的問(wèn)題。特朗普的白宮該怎么運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)？一方面，他有堅(jiān)定的共和黨擁護(hù)者，副總統(tǒng)彭斯、共和黨主席普利巴斯、還有Paul Ryan、Mitch McConnell等人為首的共和黨國(guó)會(huì)議員。而另一方面，也不乏煽風(fēng)點(diǎn)火之輩，尤其是Steve Bannon（譯者注：特朗普的首席策略師及高級(jí)顧問(wèn)）、Peter Navarro（譯者注：特朗普的白宮國(guó)家貿(mào)易委員會(huì)主席）和Michael Flynn（譯者注：特朗普的國(guó)家安全顧問(wèn)）。在循規(guī)蹈矩與標(biāo)新立異的政治路線之間，會(huì)有一場(chǎng)曠世較量，特朗普的女兒伊萬(wàn)卡和女婿庫(kù)斯納會(huì)從中調(diào)停，其結(jié)果將決定此屆總統(tǒng)任期究竟能帶來(lái)多大的顛覆。
As Mr Trump assumes power, the world is on edge. From the Oval Office, presidents can do a modest amount of good. Sadly, they can also do immense harm.
隨著特朗普的就任，世界變得不知所措了。身在白宮，總統(tǒng)既可以勵(lì)精圖治，亦能夠禍亂朝綱。
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