英文早讀第119篇，選自巴菲特年度信，友才翻譯。
Controls
控制類
There were three main sources of gain during 1966 in respect to controlled companies. These arose through:(1) retained business earnings applicable to our holdings in 1966; (2) open market purchases of additional stock below our controlling interest valuation and; (3) unrealized appreciation in marketable securities held by the controlled companies. The total of all positive items came to 2,600,838 in 1966.
在1966年在控制類公司有3個(gè)主要的獲利來(lái)源。這些來(lái)自于：（1）在1966年我們的持股可以獲得的商業(yè)利潤(rùn)；（2）低于我們的控制類股份估值購(gòu)買公開市場(chǎng)股份；（3）控制類公司持有的市場(chǎng)化股票未結(jié)算升職。在1966年所有積極的項(xiàng)目到260萬(wàn)0838美元。
However, due to factors mentioned in my November 1, 1966 letter, specific industry conditions, and other relevant valuation items, this gain was reduced by 1,034,780 in arriving at our fair valuation applicable to controlling interests as of December 31, 1966. Thus the overall gain in the control category was reduced to 1,566,058 for the year.
然而，考慮到在1966年11月1日信件中提到的因素，特殊行業(yè)條件，和其他相關(guān)估值項(xiàng)目，這個(gè)盈利被減少103萬(wàn)4780美元來(lái)滿足我們對(duì)在1966年12月31日控制類股份可獲得的公平估值。因此在控制類范疇整體盈利在這一年被減少到了156萬(wàn)6058美元。
We were undoubtedly fortunate that we had a relatively high percentage of net assets invested in businesses and not stocks during 1966. The same money in general market holdings would probably have produced a loss, perhaps substantial, during the year. This was not planned and if the stock market had advanced substantially during the year, this category would have been an important drag on overall performance. The same situation will prevail during 1967.
我們毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)很幸運(yùn)在1966年有相對(duì)高比例的凈資產(chǎn)投資在業(yè)務(wù)上而不是股票上。同樣的錢在股市持股將可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生損失，或許是大幅度的，在這一年。這不是事先計(jì)劃的，如果股市在這一年大幅增長(zhǎng)，這個(gè)范疇將會(huì)是我們整體表現(xiàn)的重要拖累。同樣的情況也會(huì)在1967年流行。
Generals - Private Owner
一般類——基于私有化
Our performance here falls in the "twenty-one dollars a day, once a month" category. In the middle of 1965 we started purchasing a very attractive widely held security which was selling far below its value to a private owner. Our hope was that over a two or three year period we could get 10 million or more invested at the favorable prices prevailing. The various businesses that the company operated were understandable and we could check out competitive strengths and weaknesses thoroughly with competitors, distributors, customers, suppliers, ex-employees, etc. Market conditions peculiar to the stock gave us hope that, with patience, we could buy substantial quantities of the stock without disturbing the price.
我們的表現(xiàn)這里陷入了“一天21美金，一個(gè)月一次”的范疇。在1965年中，我們開始購(gòu)買一個(gè)非常有吸引力的被廣泛持有的股票，以遠(yuǎn)低于他對(duì)私有化價(jià)值的價(jià)格在出售。我們希望經(jīng)過(guò)兩三年我們可以有1000萬(wàn)美金或者更多以我們喜歡的價(jià)格投資進(jìn)去。這家公司運(yùn)作的不同的業(yè)務(wù)是合理的并且我們可以徹底檢查競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)和劣勢(shì)通過(guò)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者、經(jīng)銷商、顧客、供應(yīng)商、前雇員等等。這只股票特有的市場(chǎng)條件給了我們希望，擁有耐心，我們可以購(gòu)買大量的股票而不擾動(dòng)價(jià)格。
At yearend 1965 we had invested 1,956,980 and the market value of our holdings was 2,358,412 so that 401,432 was contributed to performance during 1965. We would have preferred, of course, to have seen the market below cost since our interest was in additional buying, not in selling. This would have dampened Buffett Partnerships Ltd.'s 1965 performance and perhaps reduced the euphoria experienced by limited partners (psychially, the net result to all partners would have been a standoff since the general partner would have been floating) but would have enhanced long term performance. The fact that the stock had risen somewhat above our cost had already slowed down our buying program and thereby reduced ultimate profit.
在1965年年末我們已經(jīng)投資了195萬(wàn)6980美金，我們持股的市值是235萬(wàn)8412美金，因此40萬(wàn)1432美金在1965年貢獻(xiàn)給了表現(xiàn)。我們傾向于，當(dāng)然，看到市值低于成本因?yàn)槲覀兊呐d趣在更多購(gòu)買，而不是出售。這或許會(huì)減弱巴菲特合伙基金在1965年的表現(xiàn)并且或許減少有些合伙人的興奮體驗(yàn)（心理上，這個(gè)結(jié)果對(duì)所有合伙人都會(huì)失落因?yàn)槠胀ê匣锶耸找嬉彩歉?dòng)的）但是或許會(huì)增強(qiáng)長(zhǎng)期表現(xiàn)。事實(shí)上這只股票漲到了我們的成本之上便減緩了我們的購(gòu)買進(jìn)程并且由此減少了最后的盈利。
An even more dramatic example of the conflict between short term performance and the maximization of long term results occured in 1966. Another party, previously completely unkown to me, issued a tender offer which foreclosed opportunities for future advantageous buying. I made the decision that the wiset course (it may not have been) for us to follow was to dispose of our holdings and we thus realized a total profit of 1,269,181 in February, of which 867,749 was applicable to 1966.
一個(gè)更加戲劇性的沖突的例子在短期表現(xiàn)和長(zhǎng)期表現(xiàn)上發(fā)生在1966年。另一個(gè)團(tuán)第，先前我完全不知道，發(fā)布了一個(gè)許可排除了未來(lái)優(yōu)先購(gòu)買的機(jī)會(huì)。我做了個(gè)決定對(duì)我們最明智的方式（他或許還不是）去做的就是處置我們的股票，我們因此在2月份實(shí)現(xiàn)了126萬(wàn)9181美金的整體盈利，其中86萬(wàn)7749美金是在1966年獲得的。
While any gains looked particularly good in the market environment that intimately developed in 1966, you can be sure I don't delight in going round making molehills out of mountains. The molehill, of course, was reflected in 1966 results. However, we would have been much better off from a long range standpoint if 1966 results had been five percentage points worse and we were continuing to buy subtantial quantities of the stock at the depressed prices that might have been expected to prevail in this year's market environment.
盡管任何盈利看起來(lái)都很好在1966年緊接著發(fā)展的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境下，你可以肯定我不會(huì)高興于不在山上而圍繞鼴丘轉(zhuǎn)。鼴丘，當(dāng)然，反應(yīng)在了1966年結(jié)果上。然而，我們將會(huì)更好從長(zhǎng)期觀點(diǎn)來(lái)看如果1966年結(jié)果是更糟糕5個(gè)百分點(diǎn)，并且我們可以繼續(xù)購(gòu)買大量的股票以低的價(jià)格，這或許在這一年的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境下會(huì)流行。
42.prevail：盛行；流行；普遍存在
43.check out：查看；檢查；通過(guò)
44.thoroughly：徹底；完全；仔細(xì)；非常
45.distributor：經(jīng)銷商；分銷商
46.peculiar：特殊的；特別的；特有的
47.dampen：抑制；控制；減弱；弄濕
48.euphoria：興奮；極度興奮的情緒
49.psychically：精神的；心靈的
50.standoff：冷淡的；冷漠的；隔開一段距離的；對(duì)峙；冷漠
51.dramatic：戲劇性的；戲劇的；巨大的；引人注目的；令人吃驚的
52.tender：柔軟的；溫柔的；投標(biāo)；提議
53.foreclose：（因抵押人未如期還貸）取消贖回權(quán)；排除…的可能
54.dispose：處置；布置；排列；安排
55.intimately：密切地；緊密地；直接地
56.molehill：鼴丘（鼴鼠打洞拔出的泥土堆成）
57.dime：一角硬幣；十分錢
58.premature：早產(chǎn)兒；過(guò)早發(fā)生的事；過(guò)早的；早產(chǎn)的
59.prevail：盛行；流行
60.standpoint：立場(chǎng)；觀點(diǎn)
