Two Early Ideals
第二章 早期理想
THE ROMANTIC LEGACY
浪漫主義的遺產(chǎn)
To introduce Hegel it is not su?cient to consider the problems he faced; it is also necessary to know the ideals he wanted to achieve.? What were Hegel’s basic values? How did he think philosophy should help us to achieve them? These questions are the most important that we can ask about any philosopher, especially Hegel.? We cannot understand his philosophy if we interpret it simply in technical terms, as if it were only a set of arguments, a series of deductions, or a systematic structure; for we still need to ask the more basic question: What were all these arguments, these deductions, and this system for? Although Hegel sometimes writes as if philosophy were an end in itself, serving no higher goal than contemplation, a consideration of his intellectual development shows that he became a philosopher to serve moral, political and religious ends.
對介紹黑格爾而言，僅僅考慮他所面對的那些問題是不夠的；還必須了解他想要去達(dá)成的那些理想。黑格爾的基本價值有哪些？他是如何設(shè)想哲學(xué)能夠幫助我們實現(xiàn)這些價值的？這些是我們可以詢問任何哲學(xué)家的最重要的問題，尤其是黑格爾。如果我們僅僅從術(shù)語的角度去解釋黑格爾哲學(xué)，是不能理解它的，好像它僅僅是一套論證，一系列推論，或者一個體系性的結(jié)構(gòu)；我們還需要問一些更基本的問題：所有這些論證、推論和體系究竟是為了什么？盡管黑格爾有時候?qū)懙溃路鹫軐W(xué)就是目的本身，不再服務(wù)于比沉思更高的目標(biāo)，但細(xì)想一下他的思想發(fā)展歷程就可以顯示，他之成為一個哲學(xué)家，是服務(wù)于道德、政治和宗教目的的。
Hegel’s early ideals grew out of early German romanticism, the period sometimes called Frühromantik.1 This intellectual movement ?ourished from 1797 to 1802 in Jena and Berlin. Among its leading lights were Friedrich Schlegel, Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis), Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Friedrich Daniel Schleiermacher, Ludwig Tieck and, though somewhat on its fringes, H?lderlin. The romantic circle would hold meetings at the literary salons of Rahel Levin and Henriette Herz in Berlin, and at the household of A.W. Schlegel in Jena. Though Hegel never attended these meetings, and though he came to Jena only after its ‘literary frenzy’ had faded, he was still greatly in?uenced by the romantics.? The crucial channels of in?uence were his close friends, Schelling and H?lderlin. Some of Hegel’s Frankfurt writings, especially the 1797/8 Sketches on Religion and Love and the 1797–9 Spirit of Christianity, are typical of the romantic spirit.
黑格爾的早期理想產(chǎn)生于早期德國浪漫主義，這個階段有時候被稱作Frühromantik（早期浪漫派）。1這場思想運動自1797年到1802年在耶拿與柏林蓬勃發(fā)展。它的中流砥柱（leading lights）有弗里德里?！な┤R格爾、弗里德里?！ゑT·哈登貝格（諾瓦利斯）、弗里德里?！ねぜs瑟夫·謝林、弗里德里?！さつ釥枴な┤R爾馬赫、路德維?！さ倏?，以及雖然有些邊緣的荷爾德林。浪漫派的圈子會在柏林拉赫爾·萊溫（Rahel Levin）和亨列特·赫茨（Henriette Herz）的文學(xué)沙龍，以及在耶拿A. W.施萊格爾家里舉行集會。盡管黑格爾從未出席此類集會，并且盡管他只是在其“文學(xué)狂飆突進(jìn)運動”消退之后才去的耶拿，但他還是受到了浪漫主義者的極大影響。影響他的至關(guān)重要的通道，是他最親近的朋友——謝林和荷爾德林。黑格爾法蘭克福時期的部分著作，尤其是1797~1798年的《論宗教與愛的殘篇》和1797~1799年的《基督教精神》，都充滿了典型的浪漫主義精神。
Although the importance of the romantic legacy seems obvious, it has lately become unpopular even to associate Hegel with romanticism. Walter Kaufmann, Shlomo Avineri and Georg Lukács, to name a few, have argued strenuously against any con?ation of Hegel with the romantics, even in his early years.2 There is an important element of truth to this. Hegel came into his own only in his later Jena years (1804–7) when he reacted against some of the central ideas of the romantic circle. The preface to the Phenomenology is his Abschiedsbrief, his settling of accounts with the romantics. We can see some of these critical tendencies even in the early fragments, so it would be a mistake to see Hegel as a romantic pure and simple even in his Frankfurt years.
盡管浪漫主義遺產(chǎn)的重要性看起來是顯而易見的，但是，甚至是將黑格爾和浪漫主義聯(lián)系起來不久前也變得不流行了。舉例來說，瓦爾特·考夫曼、所羅門·阿維內(nèi)里和喬治·盧卡奇，已經(jīng)強烈反對任何把黑格爾和浪漫主義者糅合在一起的做法，即便是黑格爾早期也是如此。2就這一點而言，有一些重要的真理要素。黑格爾僅僅是在他的耶拿晚期（1804-1807），反叛了浪漫派圈子的某些核心理念之后，才成為他自己的?！毒瘳F(xiàn)象學(xué)》序言就是他的分手信（Abschiedsbrief），是他和浪漫派之間的清理賬戶。甚至是在早期殘篇中，我們也能看到這些批判的某些傾向，因此，即便把法蘭克福時期的黑格爾視為純正的浪漫派，也會是一個錯誤。
Nevertheless, it is also a mistake to treat Hegel as a ?gure apart, as if we can understand him without the romantics, or as if he were fundamentally opposed to them. This would be anachronistic for the early Hegel; but it would also be inaccurate about the later Hegel, who never entirely freed himself from romantic in?uence.? His distinguishing features are still within a common genus. What seems to be a di?erence in quality is very often only one of quantity or emphasis. It is indeed a very common mistake of Hegel scholarship to regard ideas as distinctly Hegelian that are in fact common to the whole romantic generation. Hegel’s absolute idealism, his organic conception of nature, his critique of liberalism, his communitarian ideals, his vitalized Spinozism, his concept of dialectic, his attempt to synthesize communitarianism and liberalism – all these ideas are sometimes seen as uniquely Hegelian; but they were part of the common romantic legacy.
然而，把黑格爾當(dāng)作一個孤立的人物，好像我們可以離開浪漫派來理解他，或者仿佛他和浪漫派在根本是相互對立的，這也是一個錯誤。這對早期黑格爾來說將是一個時代錯誤；它對于后期黑格爾來說也是不準(zhǔn)確的，他從未完全擺脫浪漫主義的影響。他的獨特特征也還是在一個共同的種屬之內(nèi)的。看起來是質(zhì)上的差異，經(jīng)常不過是一種量的差異或側(cè)重點上的不同。把那些事實上是整個浪漫主義的一代人共同具有的理想認(rèn)作黑格爾獨有的，這的確是黑格爾的研究者一個非常常見的錯誤。黑格爾的絕對唯心主義、他的有機自然概念、他對自由主義的批判、他提倡社群主義的理想、他對斯賓諾莎主義的重新激活、他的辯證法概念、他綜合社群主義和自由主義的努力——所有這些理念有時被視為黑格爾獨具的；但它們其實是浪漫主義共同遺產(chǎn)的一部分。
Hegel scholars have often been led astray by Hegel’s own polemics. They accept these polemics as infallible, as if what Hegel says about his di?erences with the romantics had to be true simply because Hegel knew himself best. But sometimes the polemics distance Hegel from the romantics only at the cost of obscuring or disguising his own a?nity with them. When, for example, in the preface to the Phenomenology Hegel states that his own view is that the absolute is not only substance but also subject, Hegel scholars take this as a distinguishing feature of Hegel’s philosophy over Schelling’s and the romantics. But what Hegel claimed as his own project – the attempt to combine substance and subject, Spinoza and Fichte – was a common enterprise of the romantic generation.3
黑格爾的研究者經(jīng)常被黑格爾自己的論戰(zhàn)所誤導(dǎo)。他們接受這些論戰(zhàn)，認(rèn)為它們是絕對可靠的，仿佛黑格爾就他和浪漫主義者的區(qū)別所言必定是真的——很簡單，因為黑格爾最了解他自己。但有時候，論戰(zhàn)使黑格爾與浪漫主義者拉開的距離，不過是以模糊或掩飾他自己與他們的親緣性為代價的。比如，當(dāng)黑格爾在《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》序言中陳述他自己的觀點“絕對不僅是實體而且是主體”時，黑格爾的研究者把這當(dāng)作是黑格爾哲學(xué)超越了謝林哲學(xué)和浪漫主義者的一個顯著特征。但是，黑格爾宣稱的他自己的規(guī)劃——嘗試著把實體與主體、斯賓諾莎與費希特連接在一起——也是浪漫主義那代人共同的事業(yè)。3
The reason many scholars have separated Hegel from the romantic generation is that they have a very anachronistic conception of Frühromantik that virtually equates it with the later more reactionary tendencies of Sp?tromantik. Their conception of Hegel’s intellectual context rests upon a neglect of the early philosophical works of the romantics, the unpublished fragments of Schleiermacher, Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel and H?lderlin, most of which have been accessible in critical editions only in the last ?fty years. A careful study of these fragments is a fundamental desideratum of Hegel studies; it alone will allow us to locate him historically and to determine his individuality.
許多學(xué)者將黑格爾和浪漫主義那代人分開來的原因，是他們對早期浪漫派（Frühromantik）抱有一種時代錯誤的觀念，實際上將它同后來更具保守傾向的晚期浪漫派（Sp?tromantik）等同起來了。他們關(guān)于黑格爾思想背景的觀念，是建立在對于早期浪漫主義的哲學(xué)著作的忽略的基礎(chǔ)之上的，施萊爾馬赫、諾瓦利斯、弗里德里?！な┤R格爾和荷爾德林等人的未出版的殘篇，大多數(shù)只是在近五十年間才因為收入了歷史考證版而可以利用。對這些殘篇進(jìn)行細(xì)致的分析，是黑格爾研究中一項根本性的迫切需要；唯有這樣，我們才能在歷史上給黑格爾定位并確定他的個體性。
THE HIGHEST GOOD
至善
To know Hegel’s fundamental values, it is necessary to go back to a classical but neglected question of ethics: What is the highest good?? This question concerns the ultimate values in life, and indeed the purpose of life itself. Aristotle had explicitly de?ned the concept in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics.4 He argued that the highest good has two fundamental components: ?nality and completeness. The highest good is final in the sense that it is always an end and never a means; and it is complete in the sense that it cannot be made better by the addition of any other good. Although Aristotle’s question had been central to ancient and medieval ethics, it had lost much of its importance in the early modern era. Locke and Hobbes had belittled it, claiming that what is good is simply relative to the desires of the agent.5 But the question never disappeared in German philosophy.? It was always implicit in the Protestant tradition as the question ‘What is the vocation of man [die Bestimmung des Menschen]?’ With the revival of classical learning in mid-eighteenth-century Germany, the question took on a whole new lease of life. It was an important issue for the early romantic generation, especially for Friedrich Schlegel, Schleiermacher and Hegel himself.6
為了了解黑格爾有哪些基礎(chǔ)性的價值，有必要回到倫理學(xué)的一個經(jīng)典但為人忽略的問題：什么是至善？這個問題關(guān)注的是生命的終極價值，實際上關(guān)注的是生活本身的目的。亞里士多德在《尼各馬可倫理學(xué)》第一卷中對這個概念下過明確的定義。4他認(rèn)為至善有兩個基本成份：終極和完滿。就其總是目的而從不是手段的意義而言，至善是終極的；就其不能經(jīng)由任何其它善的添加而得到改進(jìn)的意義而言，至善是完滿的。盡管亞里士多德的問題在古代和中世紀(jì)的倫理學(xué)里居于中心地位，但在現(xiàn)代早期，它的重要性已經(jīng)極大喪失了。洛克和霍布斯輕視它，聲稱“什么是善”僅僅與行為者的欲望（the desires of the agent）相關(guān)。5但這一問題從未在德國哲學(xué)中消失。它一直以“何為人的規(guī)定[die Bestimmung des Menschen]”這一問題形式暗含在新教傳統(tǒng)當(dāng)中。隨著古典學(xué)術(shù)在十八世紀(jì)德國的復(fù)興，這一問題完全重獲新生。對于早期浪漫派，尤其是對于弗里德里?！な┤R格爾、施萊爾馬赫和黑格爾本人來說，這是一個重要的問題。6
We can formulate the highest good of Hegel and the young romantic generation in a single phrase, one they would often use and constantly imply: unity of life (Einheit des Lebens). The highest good, the end of life, consists in achieving unity, wholeness or harmony in all aspects of our being. This unity holds on three levels: with oneself, with others, and with nature. The main threat to such unity consists in division (Entzweiung) or alienation (Entfremdung). Though the self should live in unity with itself, others and nature, it ?nds itself divided from itself and from them. Its goal is to overcome these divisions and achieve unity, so that it is again ‘a(chǎn)t home in the world’ (in die Welt zu Hause).
我們可以用一個短語，一個他們經(jīng)常使用或不斷暗示的短語，來明確概括黑格爾和青年浪漫派的至善觀點：生活的統(tǒng)一性（Einheit des Lebens）。至善、生活的目的，在于統(tǒng)一性、整體性，或者我們存在的所有方面的和諧一致。這種統(tǒng)一性一以貫之地體現(xiàn)在三個層面：與自己、與他人，以及與自然。對這種統(tǒng)一性的主要威脅在于二元分裂（Entzweiung）和異化（Entfremdung）。盡管自我應(yīng)當(dāng)生活在與自我、他人和自然的統(tǒng)一中，但它又常常發(fā)現(xiàn)自己被迫同自己、他人和自然分裂開來。它的目標(biāo)就是克服這些分裂以達(dá)成統(tǒng)一，由此重新獲得“在世界中就是在家”（in die Welt zu Hause）的狀態(tài)。
The ultimate source for this ideal of the unity of life was classical antiquity, and more speci?cally the works of Plato and Aristotle.7 One crucial fact about Hegel, H?lderlin, Schelling, Friedrich Schlegel, and Schleiermacher is that, from an early age, they were enthusiastic students of the Greek classics, all of which they read in the original. In the Tübinger Stift Hegel, H?lderlin and Schelling formed a reading club that often read Plato. Rosenkranz informs us of how Hegel had mastered Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics by the age of 18.8
這種有關(guān)生活統(tǒng)一性的理想，其最終淵源是古典時代，尤其是柏拉圖和亞里士多德的著作。7有關(guān)黑格爾、荷爾德林、謝林、弗里德里?！な┤R格爾和施萊爾馬赫的一個至關(guān)重要的事實是，從很早的時候開始，他們就是熱衷于古希臘經(jīng)典的學(xué)生，所有這些著作他們都是用原文閱讀的。在圖賓根神學(xué)院，黑格爾、荷爾德林和謝林組織了一個讀書會，經(jīng)常閱讀柏拉圖。羅森克蘭茨告訴我們，黑格爾18歲的時候?qū)喞锸慷嗟碌摹赌岣黢R可倫理學(xué)》已經(jīng)精熟到何種程度。8
The ideal of unity is present in Plato and Aristotle in many ways.? First, Plato’s and Aristotle’s ideal of human excellence requires that the self be a whole, a harmony of reason and passion. Second, Plato and Aristotle insisted that the polis be an organism, where the whole cares for each part and each part lives for the whole. While they notoriously di?ered over how much diversity there should be in the state, both held that the ideal state should be an organic unity, having a single religion, art, morality, education and language for all citizens. Third, Plato and Aristotle understood nature in organic terms, as ‘a(chǎn) single visible living being’.9 In all these respects Plato and Aristotle presented the sharpest contrast with the modern worldview, whose self is divided into soul and body, whose state is a contract between self-interested parties, and whose concept of nature is mechanical. It was the great achievement of Hegel and the romantic generation to have rea?rmed the classical ideal of unity against the modern worldview.
統(tǒng)一性的理想，在柏拉圖和亞里士多德的著作中有多種呈現(xiàn)方式。首先，柏拉圖和亞里士多德關(guān)于卓越人性的理想，要求自我是一個整體，是理性與激情的和諧一致。其次，柏拉圖和亞里士多德主張，城邦（polis）是一個有機體。在城邦中，整體關(guān)心每一個部分，而每一部分為整體而活著。盡管關(guān)于國家中應(yīng)當(dāng)在多大程度上保留多樣性的問題，他們發(fā)生了眾所周知的分歧，但是他們都認(rèn)為，理想的國家應(yīng)當(dāng)是一個有機整體，所有公民有著唯一的宗教、藝術(shù)、道德、教育和語言。再次，柏拉圖和亞里士多德以有機的方式，把自然理解為“一個單一的、可見的活物”9。在所有這些方面，柏拉圖和亞里士多德與現(xiàn)代世界觀之間形成鮮明的對照：現(xiàn)代世界觀的自我被劃分為靈魂和肉體，其國家是各個自私自利的政黨之間的契約關(guān)系，而其自然的概念是機械論的。重新肯定古典的統(tǒng)一性理想以反對現(xiàn)代的世界觀，是黑格爾和浪漫一代的偉大成就。
The young Hegel and the romantics had a very idealistic conception of ancient Greek life. Their paradigm for unity of life was that of ?fth-century Athens. They had their own theory about the ancient Greek: that he lived in harmony with himself, with others and with nature. We scarcely need to bother about the historical accuracy of such a fanciful theory: it is a myth whose value entirely lies in what it tells us about the Germans rather than the ancient Greeks. The romantic conception of Greek life came from several sources: from Rousseau, Wieland, Herder and Schiller. But its ultimate source was that Homer of German myth, ‘the divine’ J.J. Winckelmann. It was Winckelmann who taught the Germans that Greek culture was an aesthetic whole. Winckelmann’s constant refrain that Greek life was ‘natural’ stemmed from his political conviction that the Greeks were a free people who could express their humanity. The political message behind Winckelmann’s classicism was never lost on a public weary of absolutism: we could all become Greeks if we were only free.
青年黑格爾和浪漫主義者，對古代希臘的生活持有一種十分理想主義的觀念。他們關(guān)于生活統(tǒng)一性的范型，是公元前五世紀(jì)的雅典。關(guān)于古代希臘人，他們有著自己的一套理論，認(rèn)為他生活在與自己、與他人，以及與自然的和諧一致中。我們幾乎用不著去操心這種想象出來的理論的歷史準(zhǔn)確性：它是一種神話——這種神話的價值，全在于他們向我們講述的有關(guān)德國人而非古希臘人的那些東西。關(guān)于希臘生活的浪漫主義概念，有幾個來源：盧梭、維蘭德（Wieland）、赫爾德和席勒。但它的最終根源是講述德國神話的“荷馬”——“圣”溫克爾曼（J. J. Winckelmann）。正是溫克爾曼教導(dǎo)德國人說，希臘文化是一個審美的整體。溫克爾曼反復(fù)吟誦的是，希臘人的生活是從其政治確信中“自然”產(chǎn)生的：他們確信希臘人是一個能夠表達(dá)他們?nèi)诵缘淖杂擅褡?。溫克爾曼古典主義背后的政治信息是，決不要迷失在一種對專制主義的社會厭倦中：只要我們是自由的，我們都能成為希臘人。
We can have a more de?nite idea of Hegel’s early ideals only if we consider each aspect of his highest good: unity with oneself, others and nature. This requires having a basic idea of romantic ethics, politics and religion.
只有當(dāng)我們考慮到黑格爾至善觀念的各個方面時——與自己、他人和自然的統(tǒng)一，我們才能對黑格爾的早期理想有一種更加確定的觀念。這需要我們對浪漫主義的倫理、政治和宗教觀念有基本的了解。
ETHICAL IDEALS
倫理理想
Romantic ethics has its source in the classical ideal of selfrealization or excellence. The romantic ideal was articulated by Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis, Schleiermacher and H?lderlin. But the ideal had a long history before them, and was part of the legacy of German humanism. It is also found in Schiller, Herder, Wieland, Goethe, and Wilhelm von Humboldt.
浪漫派的倫理學(xué)，在自我實現(xiàn)或卓越這一古典理想中有其淵源。浪漫主義的理想是由弗里德里?！な┤R格爾、諾瓦利斯、施萊爾馬赫和荷爾德林等人系統(tǒng)闡述出來的。但在他們之前，這一理想有一段很長的歷史，是德國人文主義遺產(chǎn)的一部分。在席勒、赫爾德、維蘭德、歌德和威廉·馮·洪堡那里，我們也可以發(fā)現(xiàn)它。
The romantic ideal of excellence, of unity with oneself, consists of three basic components: (1) totality, that a person should develop all his or her characteristic human powers, (2) unity, that these powers be formed into a whole or unity, and (3) individuality, that this whole or unity should be individual or unique, characteristic of the person alone.
浪漫主義關(guān)于卓越、關(guān)于與自我相統(tǒng)一的理想，包含三個基本的方面：（1）總體性（totality），也就是說，一個人應(yīng)當(dāng)發(fā)展他所有的獨具特色的人類能力；（2）統(tǒng)一性（unity），也就是說，這些能力組成一個整體或統(tǒng)一體；（3）個體性（individuality），也就是說，能力的整體或統(tǒng)一體，應(yīng)當(dāng)是個體性的或獨一無二的，是這個人所單獨特有的。
The demand for totality means that we should overcome all onesidedness, that we should not neglect any side of our being, because we are as human in our sensibility as in our reason. The demand for unity means that we should form all these powers into a single organic whole. The romantics would sometimes formulate the demand for unity in aesthetic terms. They insisted that we should make our lives into novels. Like all works of art, they should show unity in multiplicity, where the unity must be spontaneous, deriving from within rather than being imposed from without. The demand for individuality means that each person should develop not only those powers characteristic of humanity in general, but also those distinctive of her or his individuality; each work of art should be unique, expressive of the individual alone.
總體性的要求意味著，我們應(yīng)當(dāng)克服所有的片面性，我們應(yīng)當(dāng)不忽視我們存在的任何方面，因為我們既是憑借感性也是憑借理性而作為人存在的。統(tǒng)一性的要求意味著，我們應(yīng)當(dāng)將所有這些能力塑造成一個有機的整體。浪漫主義者有時以美學(xué)的方式來明確表達(dá)這種統(tǒng)一性的要求。他們堅稱，我們應(yīng)當(dāng)把我們自己的生活變成小說。像所有的藝術(shù)作品一樣，生活應(yīng)當(dāng)展示出一種多樣性的統(tǒng)一，此處的統(tǒng)一性必須是自發(fā)的，源生于內(nèi)而非從外部強加于其上的。個體性的要求意味著，每一個人不僅應(yīng)當(dāng)發(fā)展人性一般所特有的那些能力，而且應(yīng)當(dāng)發(fā)展那些使他的個體性得以彰顯的那些能力；每一件藝術(shù)品都應(yīng)當(dāng)是獨一無二的，是獨特個體的表達(dá)。
The romantic ethic of self-realization has to be conceived in contrast against its two main alternatives: the utilitarianism of Bentham and Helvetius, which de?ned the highest good as happiness and happiness in terms of pleasure; and the ethics of duty of Kant and Fichte, which made the highest end in life the performance of moral duties. The romantics rejected utilitarianism because it sees human beings as passive consumers of pleasure and neglects the active development of characteristic human powers. They objected to the Kantian–Fichtean ethic because it divides human beings into reason and sensibility and develops rationality at the expense of sensibility.
浪漫主義自我實現(xiàn)的倫理，應(yīng)當(dāng)放到與它的兩個主要替代選項的對照中來加以理解：一個是邊沁（Bentham）和愛爾維修（Helvetius）的功利主義，他們以幸福定義至善，又根據(jù)快樂來理解幸福；另一個是康德和費希特的義務(wù)倫理學(xué)，他們把履行道德義務(wù)作為人生的最高目的。浪漫主義者拒絕功利主義，因為它把人類視為快樂的被動消費者，而忽略人所獨具的能力之積極發(fā)展。他們反對康德—費希特主義的倫理學(xué)，因為它將人的存在區(qū)分為理性和感性，并以犧牲感性為代價來發(fā)展理性。
To achieve unity with oneself, the romantics, true to name, laid the greatest importance on the experience of love. They were greatly inspired by Plato’s Phaedrus and Symposium where love unites the two sides of the soul, reason and need. They saw an ethics of love as indeed superior to an ethics of duty. Love supersedes duty because in acting from love we do our duty from rather than contrary to inclination. Although we act from self-interest in love, the self no longer separates its essential interests from others; rather, the self ?nds itself in others; it becomes what it is only through others, which it perceives as equal to and independent of itself.
為了實現(xiàn)與自我的統(tǒng)一，浪漫主義者名副其實地賦予了愛的經(jīng)驗以最大的重要性。他們受到柏拉圖《斐德若篇》（Phaedrus）和《會飲篇》（Symposium）的極大啟發(fā)，在這些篇章中，愛把靈魂的兩個方面——理性與需要——結(jié)合在一起。他們認(rèn)為愛的倫理學(xué)比義務(wù)倫理學(xué)的確要稍勝一籌。愛取代了責(zé)任，因為在以愛為取向的行為中，我們在履行我們的義務(wù)之時，是順從而不是違逆我們的天性。盡管在愛中，我們是按照一己的利益而行動，但這個自我不再把它的根本利益與其他人區(qū)分開來；相反，這個自我在其他人中發(fā)現(xiàn)他自己；唯有通過那些他視為平等和獨立于自己的那些他者，他才能成為它自己。
This ethic of love appears in Friedrich Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Novalis and H?lderlin. Its father was Schiller, who had suggested it in his Philosophical Letters and Grace and Dignity.10 Perhaps its most enthusiastic exponent was Hegel himself. In his Spirit of Christianity he argued that love should be the fundamental principle of ethics, and that only love could overcome the dualisms of Kant’s ethics. In some early Frankfurt fragments he had developed a whole metaphysics of love, maintaining that the unity of subject and object, the identity of the self with the universe, is attained only through the experience of love.
這種愛的倫理，在弗里德里希·施萊格爾、施萊爾馬赫、諾瓦利斯和荷爾德林那里都出現(xiàn)過。它的父親是席勒，席勒在他的《哲學(xué)書簡》（Philosophical Letters）與《秀美與尊嚴(yán)》（Grace and Dignity）中都提及過。10或許，這一倫理最激情滿懷的闡釋者是黑格爾本人。在《基督教精神》中，黑格爾論證了，愛應(yīng)當(dāng)是倫理學(xué)的基礎(chǔ)性原則，并且唯有愛才可能克服康德倫理學(xué)的二元論。在某些早期的法蘭克福殘篇中，黑格爾發(fā)展了一整套愛的形而上學(xué)，斷言唯有通過愛的經(jīng)驗，才能達(dá)到主客之間的統(tǒng)一，達(dá)到自我與宇宙的同一。
Although Hegel had great debts to the romantic ethic, he would later distance himself from it in two respects. First, Hegel did not lay the same high value on individuality. For Hegel, to be an individual means to have a speci?c place or role within society and the state.11 Hegel would later criticize Friedrich Schlegel’s concept of ‘divine egoism’ for its perverse and presumptuous separation of the individual from the social world. Second, despite his initial enthusiasm, Hegel abandoned the ethic of love. He began to realize that the feelings and inclinations of love are insu?ciently universal to serve as the basis of moral and political life. I love my parents, my siblings, and my friends, perhaps, but not my compatriots, still less humanity in general. Hegel already knew this in the Frankfurt years; but he drew the full consequences from it only in his Jena years; by the time of the Philosophy of Right he had con?ned love to the ethical life of the family.12
盡管黑格爾極大地受惠于浪漫派倫理學(xué)，但他本人后來在兩個方面與它保持了距離。首先，黑格爾不再賦予個體性以同樣高的價值。對黑格爾來說，成為一個個體，就意味著在社會和國家中占據(jù)一個特殊的位置或扮演一個特殊的角色。11黑格爾后來對弗里德里希·施萊格爾的“神圣利己主義”（divine egoism）提出了批評，因為它剛愎自用，自以為是，將個體與社會世界分離開來。其次，盡管他早先滿腔熱情，黑格爾后來放棄了愛的倫理。他開始意識到，愛的情感和天性，不足以充當(dāng)?shù)赖潞驼紊畹钠毡榛A(chǔ)。我愛我父母、我的兄弟姐妹，以及我的朋友，但是我愛的不是我的同胞（同國人），更不用說一般意義上的人了。在法蘭克福時期，黑格爾已經(jīng)認(rèn)識到這一點；但只是到耶拿時期，他才從中推斷出整個的后果；到了寫作《法哲學(xué)》的時候，他已經(jīng)把愛限定在家庭倫理生活的范圍之中了。12
POLITICAL IDEAL
政治理想
The romantic ideal of unity with others is their concept of the organic state. The model for their organic state was the ancient republics of Greece and Rome. The romantic republic consists in (1) the right to participate in public a?airs, to elect rulers and to determine public policy, (2) the freedom of its individual members, i.e. rights for equal protection of their property, freedom of speech and press, and (3) care of the state for the education and development of its citizens.
體現(xiàn)浪漫主義與他者合一的理想的，是他們的有機國家概念。他們的有機國家的模型，是希臘和羅馬的古代共和國。浪漫主義的共和國有這樣一些內(nèi)涵：（1）參與公共事務(wù)、選舉統(tǒng)治者和決定公共政策的權(quán)利；（2）共和國個體成員的自由，亦即平等保護(hù)他們財產(chǎn)的權(quán)利、言論和出版的自由；（3）關(guān)心國家對公民的教育與培養(yǎng)。
The romantic republic was, in part, a reaction against ‘the machine state’ of enlightened absolutism, where the command of the prince would set all wheels in motion If everything in enlightened absolutism was done for the people, it was never done by the people. Contrary to the machine state, the organic state would develop from the participation of its citizens. The romantic republic was also a reaction against the atomistic state of liberalism, which was held together by a contract between self-interested individuals.? The romantics rejected this state as an attempt to square the circle: if agents act always on their self-interest, they will disobey the laws whenever they can avoid punishment, so that the only remedy would be total tyranny.
在某種程度上，浪漫主義的共和國是對啟蒙專制主義“機械國家”的一種反撥；在“機械國家”中，君主的命令讓所有的車輪轉(zhuǎn)動起來。如果說在啟蒙專制主義中所有的事情都是“為”人民而做的，那么，它從來都不是“由”人民來做的。與機械國家相反，有機國家將通過它的公民們的參與而得到發(fā)展。浪漫主義的共和國，也是對自由主義原子主義國家的一種反撥；這種原子主義國家，是通過自私自利的個人彼此之間訂立契約而聯(lián)結(jié)起來的。浪漫主義者拒絕這種國家，因為它是一種圓鑿方枘的嘗試：如果行為主體總是依照他們自己的利益行事，那么只要能夠避開懲罰他們就會不遵從法律。因此，作為唯一的補救之道，就將是全面的暴政。
In the late 1790s and early 1800s the romantic ideal of the organic state underwent some transformation as a result of the course of the French Revolution. In response to the anarchism and chronic instability in France, Hegel and the romantics began to qualify their original classical ideals. They stressed the importance of historical continuity, the role of independent groups within the state, the value of a mixed constitution, and the importance of a central ruler (the monarch). The organic state became more historical, more pluralistic and more centralized. In all these respects it lost its classical inspiration. It is not surprising that in the early 1800s we ?nd Hegel, Schlegel and Novalis looking back to the Middle Ages rather than classical antiquity. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the organic state never lost its democratic element, its constitutionalism and its belief in fundamental rights. This is true of Novalis, Schlegel, Schleiermacher until at least 1801; it remained true of Hegel throughout his life.
18世紀(jì)90年代末和19世紀(jì)初作為法國大革命進(jìn)程的后果，浪漫主義的有機國家理想經(jīng)歷了一些變形。為了回應(yīng)法國的無政府主義和長期的不穩(wěn)定，黑格爾和浪漫主義者著手對他們初始的古典理想進(jìn)行限制。他們強調(diào)歷史連續(xù)性的重要性，強調(diào)國家內(nèi)部獨立團體的作用，強調(diào)混合憲政的價值，強調(diào)核心統(tǒng)治者（君主）的重要性。有機國家，變得更為歷史化、更為多元化和更為中央集權(quán)化。在所有這些方面，它都喪失了其古典的靈感。因此，如果我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，19世紀(jì)初黑格爾、施萊格爾和諾瓦利斯把眼光投向了中世紀(jì)而不是古典古代，這是毫不足怪的。然而，如果說有機國家從未喪失它的民主因素、它的立憲主義，及其對基本權(quán)利的信念，這倒是公正的。對諾瓦利斯、施萊格爾、施萊爾馬赫來說，至少到1801年，這一點是真實的；而對黑格爾來說，終其一生都是如此。
Although the romantics’ ideal state was inspired by classical Greece and Rome, there is one respect in which it was, from the very beginning, modern. This was the romantics’ insistence on freedom of the individual. The romantics wanted to have not only the classical freedom of democratic participation, but also the modern freedom of the rights of man. They knew all too well that the ancient republics did not value tolerance and individual freedom. They also realized that it was impossible to go back in history and to revive the ancient republics or the medieval constitution.? Their ideal was to achieve a synthesis of the ancient ideal of community with the modern ideal of freedom. This was not a unique Hegelian ambition but the common goal of all romantic political thought.
盡管浪漫主義者的理想國家受到古典希臘羅馬的啟發(fā)，但這個理想自始就包含一個現(xiàn)代的方面。這便是浪漫主義者自始至終主張個體自由。浪漫主義者不僅想要民主參與意義上的古典自由，還想要人權(quán)意義上的現(xiàn)代自由。古典共和國并不認(rèn)可寬容和個體自由的價值，對此他們實在太了解了。他們也意識到，開歷史倒車，復(fù)興古代的共和國或者中世紀(jì)的憲法，是絕無可能的。他們的理想，是實現(xiàn)古代共同體理想和現(xiàn)代自由之間的一種綜合。這一點，不是黑格爾主義獨有的雄心，而是所有浪漫主義政治思想的共同目標(biāo)。
RELIGIOUS IDEAL
宗教理想
If we place the romantic ideal of the highest good in general historical perspective, it immediately becomes apparent that it is entirely immanent or this-worldly. The romantics held that the highest good is to be attained in this life, not in a world beyond it. If we achieve unity with ourselves, others and nature in this life, we have achieved the purpose of life, which serves no end beyond itself. The romantic conception of the highest good is therefore the negation of the classical Christian conception, according to which the highest good consists in eternal salvation. In Book XIX of the City of God Augustine had argued that the classical Aristotelian ideal of the highest good could not be realized in this life, which is only a vale of death, disease and distress. Famously, Augustine saw life on earth as a pilgrimage, a rite of passage, to an eternal destination. Selfconsciously, ?rmly, and passionately, Hegel and the romantics broke with the Augustinian tradition. It is indeed noteworthy that Hegel, along with H?lderlin and Schleiermacher, explicitly denied personal immortality and excoriated the entire ethic of salvation based on it. From his early Berne manuscripts to his 1831 lectures on the philosophy of religion Hegel attacked the ethic of salvation for its self-centered concern for the fate of the soul.13
如果我們把浪漫主義的至善理想放到普遍歷史的視野之下，那么下面這一點立即變得顯而易見：它是完全內(nèi)在的或此世的。浪漫主義者認(rèn)為，應(yīng)當(dāng)在此生而非彼岸來達(dá)成至善。如果我們在此生實現(xiàn)了與我們自己、他人以及自然之間的統(tǒng)一，那么我們就實現(xiàn)了人生目的，而這種人生目的并不為一個超越此生的目標(biāo)服務(wù)。因此，浪漫主義的至善概念是對古典基督教至善概念的一種否定，按照后者，至善在于永恒的救贖。奧古斯丁在《上帝之城》第十九卷中提出，亞里士多德主義的古典至善理想并不能在此生實現(xiàn)，此生不過是一條由死亡、疾病和不幸匯成的溪流。奧古斯丁有一個著名的見解，把地上的生活看作一場通向永恒終點的朝圣之旅和死亡之旅。黑格爾和浪漫主義者自覺地、堅定地和滿懷激情地與奧古斯丁的傳統(tǒng)決裂。十分值得注意的是，黑格爾沿著荷爾德林和施萊爾馬赫的路子，明確否認(rèn)了個人的不朽，嚴(yán)厲斥責(zé)了建基于這種不朽之上的一整套救贖倫理。從其早期的伯爾尼手稿到1831年的宗教哲學(xué)講演，黑格爾都對救贖倫理進(jìn)行了抨擊，抨擊它以自我為中心對靈魂命運的關(guān)切。13
True to his immanent ideal of the highest good, Hegel believed that the meaning of life could and should be achieved in the community alone. We ?nd satisfaction and purpose in our lives, he argued, when, like the ancient Roman and Greek, we contribute to the common good and help to create its laws. The ancient Greeks found immortality and meaning in their lives by living for the polis, which was a whole greater than themselves, and which they knew would survive them; they had no concern for their individual salvation, for the fate of their soul after death. In Hegel’s view, the Christian ethic of personal salvation was only a cry of desperation, a feeble Ersatz, after the loss of community. This ethic arose in the ?rst place only because of the decline of the ancient republics. When people lost their freedom to govern themselves, they could no longer ?nd meaning by participating in communal life; and so, out of despair, they sought the source of meaning in a world beyond the earth.
忠實于其內(nèi)在的至善理想，黑格爾相信，生活的意義能夠并且應(yīng)當(dāng)只是在共同體中才能實現(xiàn)。他論證說，當(dāng)我們像古代羅馬和希臘人那樣，為“共同善”作出貢獻(xiàn)和創(chuàng)立其法則的時候，我們就在我們的生活中獲得滿足和發(fā)現(xiàn)了目的。古希臘人通過為城邦而活，建立他們的不朽和人生意義。城邦是比他們自己更偉大的整體，并且他們知道城邦比他們能存活得更長久；他們不關(guān)心他們自己的個體救贖，不關(guān)心他們死后靈魂的命運。在黑格爾看來，基督教個人救贖的倫理，不過是失去共同體之后的一種絕望的哭喊，一種微不足道的補償（Ersatz）。這種倫理的興起，首先僅只是因為古代共和國的沒落。當(dāng)人們失去了支配自己的自由時，他們就不再能夠通過參與公共生活來發(fā)現(xiàn)意義；因此，出于絕望，他們在超世間中尋找意義的源泉。
Hegel and the romantics were stalwart opponents not only of the Christian ideal of the highest good but also of the traditional forms of Christian theology. They abhorred both theism and deism.? The source of their animus against theism was essentially political: theism had been part of the ideology of the ancien régime, a pillar of the old alliance of throne and altar. Because of the legacy of enlightened criticism, they also had little faith in the Bible, the mainstay of theism. The source of their antipathy to deism was more cultural: it had been a powerful force in alienating the self from nature.? Because the deist still clung to the old dogma of a supernatural soul, he placed the self outside nature, which he saw as nothing more than a gloomy machine. Since God existed in a supernatural realm and had abandoned nature after its creation, the natural realm lost its divine signi?cance.
黑格爾和浪漫主義者堅持不懈地反對的，不僅是基督教的至善理想，而且還有基督教神學(xué)的傳統(tǒng)形式。他們既痛恨一神論，也痛恨自然神論。他們對一神論產(chǎn)生敵意的根源本質(zhì)上是政治的：一神論曾經(jīng)是“舊制度”（ancien régime）意識形態(tài)的一部分，是王座和祭壇之間古老聯(lián)盟的支柱。由于啟蒙運動批判的遺產(chǎn)，他們也幾乎不信仰《圣經(jīng)》這根一神論的中流砥柱。他們反感自然神論的根源更多地是文化的：自然神論曾經(jīng)是造就自我與自然相異化的強大力量。因為自然神論者緊抱著“超自然的靈魂”這一古老教條不放，他把自我置于自然之外，而自然在他看來不過是一架黯淡無光的機械。既然上帝存在于超自然的王國，并且由于上帝創(chuàng)造自然之后就拋棄了它，自然王國也就因此失去了它神圣的意義。
Although their ideal of the highest good was entirely immanent, and although they were opposed to traditional forms of theology, Hegel and the romantics were still religious. Their conception of the divine, like their conception of the highest good, was entirely immanent. They held on to the traditional concepts of the in?nite – the ens realissimum, that of which nothing greater can be conceived – but they interpreted them in immanent terms to be the universe as a whole. Only such an immanent conception of the divine, they believed, would overcome the self’s alienation from nature. The self would identify itself with nature only if it were a mode of the single in?nite substance, a part of the universal whole.
盡管他們的至善理想是完全內(nèi)在的，盡管他們反對神學(xué)的傳統(tǒng)形式，但黑格爾和浪漫主義者的思想仍然是宗教性的。他們關(guān)于神圣的概念，如同他們關(guān)于至善的概念一樣，是完全內(nèi)在的。他們堅持傳統(tǒng)的無限概念——最實在的存在者（ens realissimum），不能設(shè)想任何比它更偉大的事物——但他們按照內(nèi)在的方式將它們解釋成為一個整體的宇宙。他們相信，唯有這一內(nèi)在的神圣概念，才能克服自我與自然之間的異化。唯有當(dāng)自我是宇宙整體的一個部分，是那個唯一無限的實體的一種樣式的時候，才能將自己與自然等同起來。
The most important forebear and model for this immanent conception of the in?nite was, of course, Spinoza, whose doctrines underwent a dramatic renaissance in Germany as a result of the pantheism controversy. Growing up in the 1790s, the young romantics were inevitably drawn into the vortex of this dispute.? Their notebooks give more than ample evidence of their study of, and sympathy for, Spinozism. For them, Spinoza was ‘der Gott betrunkene Mensch’ (the man drunk with God).14 To write ‘Hen kai pan’ – ‘Eins und Alles’ (one and all) – in Stammbücher became something of a fashion. Famously, in his Speeches on Religion Schleiermacher asks us to make an o?ering to ‘the holy rejected Spinoza’.15
當(dāng)然，這種內(nèi)在的無限的思想最重要的先驅(qū)和典型是斯賓諾莎。作為泛神論論辯的結(jié)果，斯賓諾莎的學(xué)說在德國遭遇了一種戲劇性的復(fù)興。18世紀(jì)90年代成長起來的青年浪漫派，不可避免地卷入了這場爭論的漩渦當(dāng)中。他們的筆記充分表明，他們不僅研究斯賓諾莎，而且同情斯賓諾莎。對他們來說，斯賓諾莎是“der Gott betrunkene Mensch”（沉醉于上帝之中的人）。14在留言冊（Stammbücher）中寫上“Hen kai pan”——“Eins und Alles”（一與一切）——成為了某種時尚。施萊爾馬赫在他的《宗教演講錄》中，發(fā)出一個著名的號召，要求我們獻(xiàn)祭于“一位圣潔的、被拒絕的斯賓諾莎”。15
What did Hegel and the young romantics get from Spinoza?? What they saw in him was ?rst and foremost his attempt to rationalize religion. Spinoza’s famous dictum deus sive natura, his identi?cation of God with the in?nitude of nature, seemed to resolve the con?ict between reason and faith that had preoccupied philosophers and theologians throughout the Enlightenment. Spinoza’s dictum divinized nature as much as it naturalized the divine, and so it seemed to make a religion out of science, a science out of religion. If God were the same as ‘the one and all’ – if the divine were the creative force of nature, the dynamic unity behind all its laws – then there would be no reason to oppose reason and faith.? Instead, the objects of religion and science would be one and the same. The case for Spinozism seemed only strengthened by the weakness of its traditional rivals, theism and deism, which, by the end of the eighteenth century, were on their last legs. Theism not only rested its case on miracles, which were hard to square with science, but it also su?ered greatly from the new biblical criticism.? For its part, deism had simply collapsed under the relentless barrage of Hume’s and Kant’s criticism of the traditional proofs of God’s existence. Only Spinoza’s pantheism did not seem in danger of such obsolescence. The reality of Spinoza’s God was as palpable as that of nature itself. Rather than being a mysterious spirit, like the God of traditional theism, or an irrelevant abstraction, like the God of deism, Spinoza’s God is the whole of nature, and so equally present within everyone alike. Since we are all modes of the single in?nite substance, we only have to re?ect upon ourselves to ?nd the divine within us.
黑格爾和青年浪漫派從斯賓諾莎那里獲得了什么呢？他們在他身上看到的，首先和主要是他將宗教理性化的意圖。斯賓諾莎的著名格言deus sive natura（神即自然），將上帝等同于自然之無限性，似乎解決了那曾經(jīng)傾注了整個啟蒙運動時期所有哲學(xué)家和神學(xué)家心力的理性與信仰之間的矛盾。斯賓諾莎的格言，在將自然神圣化的同時也將神圣自然化，因而它似乎創(chuàng)造了一種出自科學(xué)的宗教和一種出自宗教的科學(xué)。如果上帝無異于“一與一切”——如果神圣者就是自然的創(chuàng)造性力量，就是它所有法則背后的動力——那么，就沒有理由去把理性與信仰對立起來。取而代之的是，宗教和科學(xué)的對象將是同一回事。對于斯賓諾莎主義的支持仿佛僅僅是由于其傳統(tǒng)對手（一神論與自然神論）的弱點而得到增強，而到了十八世紀(jì)末，一神論和自然神論已經(jīng)到了崩潰的邊緣。一神論不僅不能把它的基礎(chǔ)建立在神跡之上，因為神跡已經(jīng)很難與科學(xué)調(diào)和，并且它也遭到了新圣經(jīng)批判的極大挑戰(zhàn)。另一方面，在休謨和康德對上帝存在的傳統(tǒng)證明毫不留情的密集炮轟的抨擊之下，自然神論也徹底土崩瓦解。唯有斯賓諾莎的泛神論似乎可以免于這種陳舊過時的危險。斯賓諾莎的上帝的實在性，就像自然本身一樣可感知。不是像傳統(tǒng)一神論的上帝那樣作為神秘的精神，也不是像自然神論的上帝那樣作為一種不相干的抽象，斯賓諾莎的上帝是自然之整體，并且同樣如此平等地呈現(xiàn)在每一個人之中。既然我們都是唯一無限實體的不同樣式，那么我們只需反思我們自身就可以發(fā)現(xiàn)在我們之中的神圣者。
It is important to see that the romantic attraction to Spinoza was not only religious but also political. To understand these political factors, it is worthwhile to keep in mind a famous remark of Heinrich Heine: that pantheism had always been the secret religion of Germany, the faith of its cultural underground.16 Heine knew whereof he spoke. Since the end of the seventeenth century in Germany, Spinoza had become the patron saint of radical Protestants, of all those discontented reformers who accused Luther of selling out to the princes and betraying his two grand ideals: religious liberty and the priesthood of all believers. These radicals embraced Spinoza for a variety of reasons, all of them perfectly Protestant. They saw Spinoza’s separation of church and state as a guarantee of religious liberty; they embraced his critique of the Bible because it freed Lutheranism from its biblicism, its deadening emphasis upon the letter as a rule of faith; and they loved his pantheism because it seemed to justify the equality and priesthood of all believers. After all, if God is in?nitely present within everyone alike, we are all equal; and then there is no need for a priest or spiritual authority to mediate our relationship with God. Of course, Spinoza was a Jew, at least by background; but for these radical Protestants, who were ecumenical to the bone, that was all the more reason to embrace him. What could better show their universalist credentials? And, in any case, did Spinoza not live with the brethren at Rijnsberg? Was the a?nity in doctrine that accidental after all?
重要的是，我們要看到，斯賓諾莎對浪漫主義的吸引不僅限于宗教方面，也包括政治方面。為了理解這些政治的因素，我們有必要花一點時間來回顧一下亨利?！ずＤ欢沃脑u論：泛神論一直以來就是德國的秘密宗教，是德國文化背景中的信仰。16海涅知道自己說的是怎么回事。在德國，自從17世紀(jì)末以來，斯賓諾莎就已經(jīng)變成激進(jìn)新教徒，以及那些心懷不滿的改革者的保護(hù)神。他們控訴路德投靠了君主，背棄了他自己的兩個偉大理想：宗教自由和所有信仰者都是神職人員。這些激進(jìn)者出于各種原因擁抱斯賓諾莎，所有這些人全都是新教徒。他們視斯賓諾莎把教會和國家相分離為宗教自由的保障；他們擁抱他對圣經(jīng)的批判，因為這一批判將路德主義從它的圣經(jīng)主義、從麻木地強調(diào)福音書是信仰的規(guī)則中解放出來；他們喜歡斯賓諾莎的泛神論，還因為它似乎為平等和每一位信仰者的祭司身份提供了辯護(hù)。畢竟，如果上帝是同樣無限地呈現(xiàn)在每一個人之中的，那么我們所有人就是平等的；因此，也就不需要一位牧師或者一個精神的權(quán)威來充當(dāng)我們與上帝關(guān)聯(lián)的中介。當(dāng)然，斯賓諾莎是一位猶太人，至少從出身背景來說是如此；但是這些激進(jìn)的新教徒是徹底普世化的，這就是擁抱他的最好的理由。還有什么東西（比斯賓諾莎的學(xué)說）能夠更好地為他們的普救說提供憑證呢？并且，不管怎樣，斯賓諾莎不是和里津斯堡（Rijnsberg）的同胞們生活在一起嗎？難道教義上的親緣關(guān)系只是一個意外？
Despite constant persecution, the ?ames of religious radicalism in Germany never died out; and clandestine editions of the Ethica and Tractatus never ceased to circulate. The radical ideals lived on well into the eighteenth century, when they found their foremost exponents in writers like Gottfried Arnold, Conrad Dippel, Johann Edelmann, and ?nally Lessing and Herder. When the romantics embraced Spinozism in the late 1790s they were – somewhat unwittingly – carrying on the tradition of the radical reformers.? The Spinoza revival of the 1790s was nothing less than the last great manifestation of the radical reformation. Its ?nest literary and philosophical expression was Schleiermacher’s Speeches.
盡管迫害不斷，但德國宗教激進(jìn)主義的火苗從未熄滅；《倫理學(xué)》（Ethica）和《神學(xué)政治論》（Tractatus）的秘密版本也從未停止過流通。這些激進(jìn)理想鮮活地進(jìn)入了18世紀(jì)，并在諸如戈特弗里德·阿諾德（Gottfried Arnold）、康拉德·迪佩爾（Conrad Dippel）、約翰·埃德爾曼（Johann Edelmann），以及最后在萊辛（Lessing）和赫爾德（Herder）等作家中間找到它們最重要的倡導(dǎo)者。當(dāng)浪漫主義者在18世紀(jì)90年代末擁抱斯賓諾莎主義的時候，他們在某種意義上是不知不覺地繼承了激進(jìn)改革者的傳統(tǒng)。斯賓諾莎在18世紀(jì)90年代的復(fù)活完全是激進(jìn)改革的最后一場偉大的示威。它最出色的文學(xué)和哲學(xué)表達(dá)，就是施萊爾馬赫的《講演錄》。
Eventually, Hegel too was taken up by the wave of enthusiasm for Spinoza. In his writings during the Berne period (1793–6) he seems almost immune to it. He endorses Kant’s idea of moral faith, according to which belief in a supernatural God is justi?ed on moral grounds. But he abandoned this doctrine in his Frankfurt years and developed instead an immanent conception of God. In his 1801 Differenzschrift Hegel defended Schelling’s Spinozism (see pp. 58–9). Although Hegel rightly resisted any con?ation of his absolute idealism with Spinozism, he never ceased to regard Spinoza’s philosophy as the foundation for modern philosophy and religion. In his History of Philosophy he wrote of Spinoza’s substance: ‘When one begins to philosophize one must be ?rst a Spinozist.? The soul must bathe itself in the aether of this single substance, in which everything one has held dear is submerged.’17
最后，黑格爾也被這股對斯賓諾莎的熱情浪潮所感染。在伯爾尼時期（1793-1796）的作品中，黑格爾看起來對此還幾乎完全免疫。他崇尚的是康德道德信仰的理念，按照這一理念，對超自然的上帝的信仰，可以在道德的地基上被證成。但在法蘭克福時期，黑格爾放棄了這一學(xué)說，并發(fā)展了一種內(nèi)在的上帝的思想。在1801年撰寫的《費希特與謝林哲學(xué)體系的差別》中，黑格爾為謝林的斯賓諾莎主義做了辯護(hù)（參看第58-59頁）。盡管黑格爾恰當(dāng)?shù)氐种屏巳魏螌⑺慕^對唯心主義和斯賓諾莎主義歸并起來的做法，但他從未停止認(rèn)為斯賓諾莎哲學(xué)是現(xiàn)代哲學(xué)與宗教的基礎(chǔ)。在《哲學(xué)史講演錄》中，黑格爾這樣來描寫斯賓諾莎的實體：“誰要開始研究哲學(xué)，誰就必須首先做一個斯賓諾莎主義者。靈魂必須在唯一實體的以太中洗個澡，人們所珍視的一切都浸沒在這唯一的實體之中?！?7
THE CHALLENGE OF DIVISION
分裂的挑戰(zhàn)
Although the romantic ideal of unity of life is beautiful, it also seems unattainable. It seems romantic in the popular sense of that term: an unrealistic dream. The classical ideals of Hegel and the romantic generation came into sharp con?ict with modern reality.? While the classical ideals demanded unity, modern society seemed to create division, and on every level: division within oneself, with others and with nature. For Hegel and the young romantics, the fundamental challenge was how to legitimate their ideal of unity of life in face of the growing divisions of modern life. The need for philosophy arose, as Hegel famously put it, from division (Entzweiung) (D II 20/89).
盡管生活統(tǒng)一性這一浪漫派的理想是美好的，它似乎也是難以企及的?！袄寺伞币辉~就其通俗意義而言，似乎是一種不切實際的夢想。黑格爾和浪漫主義那一代人的古典理想與現(xiàn)代的實在之間形成了一種尖銳的沖突。在古典理想需求統(tǒng)一性的地方，現(xiàn)代社會似乎則在所有的層面上都創(chuàng)造分裂：自我之內(nèi)的分裂、與他人的分裂和與自然的分裂。對黑格爾和青年浪漫派來說，基礎(chǔ)性的挑戰(zhàn)是，面對現(xiàn)代生活不斷增長的分裂，如何使他們有關(guān)生活統(tǒng)一性的理想具有正當(dāng)性。正如黑格爾的一句名言所指出的那樣：對哲學(xué)的需求起源于分裂（Entzweiung）（D II 20/89）。
Each ideal of unity seemed to be undermined by some aspect of modern life. The ideal of unity with oneself was threatened by the growing division of labor, the need for each individual to specialize and devote himself to a narrow task. The more production became rationalized or e?cient, the more he would have to cultivate speci?c skills and talents. Rather than realizing all their powers, people could develop only one narrow side of themselves. Acutely aware of this problem, the romantics agreed with Schiller’s famous lament:
每一種統(tǒng)一性的理想，似乎都遭到了現(xiàn)代生活某些方面的暗中破壞。不斷增長的勞動分工，每個個體將自身專門化以便獻(xiàn)身于一個狹隘任務(wù)的需要，威脅著人與自身統(tǒng)一的理想。生產(chǎn)越是變得理性化和高效，人們也就越是不得不去培養(yǎng)專門的技藝和才能。并非人們的所有能力都得到實現(xiàn)，而是他們只能發(fā)展其中某些狹隘的方面。由于清醒地意識到這個問題，浪漫主義者贊同謝林著名的悲嘆：
Always chained to a single little fragment of the whole, man himself develops into only a fragment; always in his ear the monotonous sound of the wheel that he turns, he never develops the harmony of his being; and instead of putting the stamp of humanity upon his nature he becomes nothing more than the imprint of his business or science.18 (NA XX, 323)
人由于總是被束縛在整體的一個小小片段上，于是也將他自己僅僅發(fā)展成為碎片；由于耳朵里總是他所轉(zhuǎn)動的齒輪的單調(diào)聲音，所以他從未發(fā)展出他的和諧的生命；他沒有給他的自然蓋上人性的圖章，而是僅僅變成所從事的商業(yè)和科學(xué)的印記。18（NA XX, 323）
Of course, in classical culture the division of labor had not been such a danger. This was not only because of the lack of technology, but also because of the entrenched institution of slavery. Free from the realm of economic necessity, the citizens of the Greek and Roman republics had more time and energy to spend on civic a?airs. But slavery was not acceptable to the modern world; and so the claims of the economic world became inescapable. The problem for Hegel and the young romantics was how to achieve the classical ideal of excellence without the classical institution of slavery. This seemed all but unattainable when modern forms of production and exchange seemed only to enslave everyone.
當(dāng)然，在古典文化中，勞動分工并不構(gòu)成這種威脅。這不僅是因為技術(shù)的匱乏，而且是因為奴隸制的根深蒂固。由于從經(jīng)濟必然性的王國解放出來了，希臘羅馬共和國的公民可以把更多的時間和精力放在公共事務(wù)上。但現(xiàn)代世界是不接受奴隸制的；因此，經(jīng)濟世界的各種要求就變得無法逃避了。黑格爾和青年浪漫派要面對的問題是，在沒有古典奴隸制的情況下，如何達(dá)成“（人性）卓越”這一古典理想。當(dāng)現(xiàn)代生產(chǎn)和交換的形式似乎不過是使每一個人都奴隸化時，這一理想看起來的確是高不可攀了。
The ideal of unity with others also faced grave dangers in the modern world. The fundamental trends of modern civil society seemed to be toward atomism and anomie, the decomposition of society and the state into a multitude of separate individuals who sought only their self-interest. Rather than joining together for the common good, individuals were forced to compete in the market place. There was no hope for participation in the community of a republic because of the sheer size and scale of the modern state, its increasing centralization and bureaucratization. The modern individual saw the state as a hostile and alien being, whose purpose was to dominate and control him. These atomistic trends of civil society were clearly perceived in Germany toward the close of the eighteenth century. Writers complained about the decline of the village community and parish from growing urbanization, and they deplored unemployment among urban masses.19
與他人之間的統(tǒng)一性理想，在現(xiàn)代世界同樣面臨著重大危險?，F(xiàn)代市民社會的根本趨勢似乎朝向原子論和無序狀態(tài)發(fā)展，社會與國家的分裂造就了大量只追求私利的分離的個體。這些個體被迫在市場中相互競爭，而不是為了共同善聯(lián)合在一起。由于現(xiàn)代國家的絕對大小和規(guī)模，它的不斷增長的集中化和科層化，共和國層面的共同體參與是無法指望的。現(xiàn)代個體視國家為敵對的和異化的存在，國家的目的是控制和支配他。在十八世紀(jì)末的德國，可以清楚地察覺到市民社會的原子化趨勢。作家們抱怨農(nóng)村公社和教區(qū)在不斷增長的城市化進(jìn)程中的衰落，他們?yōu)槌鞘兄械氖I(yè)大眾發(fā)出哀嘆。19
Finally, the ideal of unity with nature also seemed unattainable.? The ancients would identify themselves with nature, because they saw it as a living whole of which they were a part. But the whole realm of nature had become disenchanted through the growth of modern science and technology. Rather than seeing nature as an object of contemplation, as a realm of beauty, mystery and magic, the technologist gave it only an instrumental value. He was engaged in a struggle against nature, which he wanted to dominate and control by a machine. Since nature is only a machine, it can be controlled to serve us.
然而，如果現(xiàn)代社會創(chuàng)造的只是這些分裂，那么又如何可能獲取生活的統(tǒng)一性呢？對黑格爾和青年浪漫派來說，這是至關(guān)重要的時代議題。仿佛浪漫主義的宏偉理想一經(jīng)制定就被廢棄了，而這些理想看起來不過是對不可避免的“進(jìn)步力量”的一種抗議性的哭喊。盡管現(xiàn)代生活存在種種分裂，但是，顯示這些理想的正當(dāng)性，建立整全的可能性、實際上是必要性，這就是哲學(xué)的任務(wù)。首先必須向反思哲學(xué)（Reflexionsphilosophie）開戰(zhàn)，這種哲學(xué)似乎賦予了所有現(xiàn)代生活的分裂以正當(dāng)性。與笛卡爾、康德和費希特相反，必須表明世界不能分裂為主體與客體、心靈與肉體、自我與他人。青年黑格爾相信，向二元論開戰(zhàn)和展現(xiàn)整全的可能性，是哲學(xué)的一個特殊門類亦即形而上學(xué)的任務(wù)。20我們即將要談到的就是這種形而上學(xué)。
How, then, was it possible to achieve unity in life if modern society only creates divisions? For Hegel, and the young romantic generation, that was the crucial issue of the age. It seemed as if the grand romantic ideals were obsolete as soon as they were formulated, that they were only a cry of protest against the inevitable ‘forces of progress’. It was the task of philosophy to show the legitimacy of their ideals, to establish the possibility, indeed the necessity, of wholeness despite the divisions of modern life. It was necessary ?rst of all to do battle against Reflexionsphilosophie, which seemed to legitimate all the divisions of modern life. It was necessary to show – against Descartes, Kant and Fichte – that the world is not divided into subject and object, mind and body, self and other.? The young Hegel believed that doing battle against dualism and showing the possibility of wholeness was the task of one special ?eld of philosophy: metaphysics.20 It is to that metaphysics that we must now turn.
然而，如果現(xiàn)代社會創(chuàng)造的只是這些分裂，那么又如何可能獲取生活的統(tǒng)一性呢？對黑格爾和青年浪漫派來說，這是至關(guān)重要的時代議題。仿佛浪漫主義的宏偉理想一經(jīng)制定就被廢棄了，而這些理想看起來不過是對不可避免的“進(jìn)步力量”的一種抗議性的哭喊。盡管現(xiàn)代生活存在種種分裂，但是，顯示這些理想的正當(dāng)性，建立整全的可能性、實際上是必要性，這就是哲學(xué)的任務(wù)。首先必須向反思哲學(xué)（Reflexionsphilosophie）開戰(zhàn)，這種哲學(xué)似乎賦予了所有現(xiàn)代生活的分裂以正當(dāng)性。與笛卡爾、康德和費希特相反，必須表明世界不能分裂為主體與客體、心靈與肉體、自我與他人。青年黑格爾相信，向二元論開戰(zhàn)和展現(xiàn)整全的可能性，是哲學(xué)的一個特殊門類亦即形而上學(xué)的任務(wù)。20我們即將要談到的就是這種形而上學(xué)。
