This latter course, in effect, was the Prussian way, but Hegel had come to the conclusion in “The German Constitution” that Prussia was unsuitable for the restoration of the Holy Roman Empire because of its own decline and because its centralizing policies threatened the existence of the estates.*'’* In his 1802-03 writings, Hegel was trying to thread the needle, to support something like the Prussian idea of locating the authority of the estates in a larger social whole while at the same time avoiding the risks of eliminating the estates altogether, as he feared was actually happening in Prussia.
? ? 這后一過程實(shí)質(zhì)上是普魯士式的道路，但黑格爾早已在《論德意志憲法》中得出的結(jié)論是，普魯士之所以不適合恢復(fù)到羅馬帝國是因?yàn)槠蒸斒孔约旱乃ヂ?，是因?yàn)槠蒸斒考瘷?quán)化政策威脅到社會等級的存在。在他1802至1803年的著作中，黑格爾正試圖去完成一件困難的事情，正試圖支撐像普魯士人觀念一樣的東西，這就是把社會等級的權(quán)力置于更大的社會整體中，同時避免冒險(xiǎn)徹底消除社會等級，像他擔(dān)心的實(shí)際在普魯士發(fā)生的情況一樣。
Hegel thus found himself in the dilemma that was to occupy him for a good part of his life when he turned to thinking about political matters. On the one hand, he rejected J. J. Moser’s methods; to Hegel, Moser seemed to have contented himself with the useless task of simply compiling the various traditional claims of rights and privilege without making any attempt to impose any kind of rational unity on them. On the other hand, Hegel did not want to take the Prussian route of potentially eliminating the estates altogether. In 1802 and 1803, Schellingian theory combined with a concept of “recognition” seemed to give him the way out he needed, since it seemed to be able to offer an account of the estates as “potencies” of the whole society, as corporate bodies that on their own created a dynamic that led to the creation of a “state” that was their unity but still presupposed their existence; and it did this by virtue of a non-naturalistic but not reductionistic theory of “spirit” and agency.
? ? 黑格爾因此發(fā)覺他在轉(zhuǎn)而思考政治問題時陷入他一生絕大部分時間里無法擺脫的困境。一方面，他拒絕J.J.莫澤的方法；在黑格爾看來，莫澤好像提及他本人做了一些無用功，這就是只是編纂有著不同傳統(tǒng)的權(quán)利和特權(quán)的主張，而沒有嘗試把任何種類合理的統(tǒng)一強(qiáng)加于這樣的權(quán)利和主張。另一方面，黑格爾不想采用普魯士完全潛在地消除社會等級這一道路。在1802年和1803年，謝林的兼有“認(rèn)識”概念的理論看來好像給黑格爾指出了黑格爾所需要的路徑，因?yàn)橹x林的理論看來好像能夠說明社會等級是整個社會的“潛能”，正像法人團(tuán)體獨(dú)立地創(chuàng)造一種導(dǎo)致創(chuàng)造“國家”的動力，“國家”是法人團(tuán)體的統(tǒng)一體但仍然以法人團(tuán)體的存在為先決條件；謝林的上述理論憑借“精神”與中介的非自然主義理論而非還原論的理論給黑格爾指出了黑格爾所需要的路徑。
In reinterpreting the estates as embodying fundamental ethical stances toward social life, Hegel also thereby radically reinterpreted who could be included in membership in them. What he called at the time the “absolute estate” included the nobility as members; since the members of this estate live “general lives wholly belonging to the public,” only that estate was fit for life in politics. Hegel thus included in that estate not only the nobility but also philosophers - a conclusion that made sense only in light of Fichte’s redefinition of the university and of philosophy’s place in it.' (Hegel also drew on Plato’s authority for combining the tasks of the political nobility and the philosophers.)*^' From a biographical point of view, it is striking that Hegel thereby included himself but would have excluded his father from membership in the “absolute estate.”*
? ? 在重新把社會等級解釋成是體現(xiàn)對社會生活的基本倫理態(tài)度時，黑格爾同樣也因此重新從根本上解釋了究竟誰可能被包含在社會等級成員中。他在當(dāng)時所稱作的“絕對等級”包含貴族作為成員；因?yàn)檫@個等級中的成員過著“完全屬于公眾的一般生活”，所以只有這個等級適合政治生活。黑格爾因此不但把貴族而且把哲學(xué)家算入這個等級——一個僅僅根據(jù)費(fèi)希特對大學(xué)和對哲學(xué)在大學(xué)中地位的重新界定而說得通的結(jié)論。（黑格爾還利用了柏拉圖的權(quán)威把政治貴族的任務(wù)與哲學(xué)家的任務(wù)結(jié)合起來。）從傳記的觀點(diǎn)看，引人注目的是黑格爾因此把他本人列入“絕對等級”的成員，而大概會把他父親排除在“絕對等級”的成員之外。
A major point of Hegel’s argument was obviously to demonstrate that old-fashioned cameralist jurisprudence should be replaced by speculative Hegelian/Schellingian philosophy. A speculative theory of what would count as an adequate realization of freedom would, Hegel concluded, make “a good part and perhaps all of the sciences called positive jurisprudence . . . fall within a completely developed and elaborated philosophy,” and, by implication, not within the domains of the cameralistic faculties.* “Philosophy,” Hegel said, “stands in the Idea of the whole above the parts; thereby it keeps each part in its limits and also, by the majesty of the Idea itself, prevents the part from burgeoning by subdivision into endless minutiae.”*
? ? 黑格爾論證的一個重要觀點(diǎn)顯然在于證明老派官房學(xué)的法學(xué)應(yīng)該被思辨的黑格爾哲學(xué)或謝林哲學(xué)所取代。思辨理論應(yīng)該被算作自由的適當(dāng)實(shí)現(xiàn)，這樣的思辨理論應(yīng)該，黑格爾推斷，構(gòu)成被稱作實(shí)定法學(xué)的主要部分，或許構(gòu)成整個實(shí)定法學(xué)……應(yīng)該屬于一種得到全面發(fā)展和詳盡闡述的哲學(xué)，而不應(yīng)該屬于官房學(xué)專業(yè)領(lǐng)域，盡管黑格爾對這樣的見解含而不露?！罢軐W(xué)”，黑格爾說道，“位于部分之上的整體觀念中；因此它使每一部分在其界限內(nèi)，同樣也通過觀念自身的權(quán)威來使部分不致被迅速再分成無窮的細(xì)小部分。”
Philosophy speaks from the standpoint of the “absolute” - but from what point of view was the philosopher speaking when he said that? At this point, Hegel did not find even his own answers to that question very convincing; and he had to worry that his own doctrine of the “mores” of a “people” only threatened to be replace cameralism’s dogmatics with some more communitarian and equally dogmatic conception of law. The System of Ethical Life remained unpublished and unfinished.
? ? 哲學(xué)根據(jù)“絕對”的觀點(diǎn)言說——但哲學(xué)家在講哲學(xué)時根據(jù)何種觀點(diǎn)言說呢？在這個問題上，黑格爾甚至還沒有找到一個非常令他自己信服的答案；他不得不擔(dān)心他自己關(guān)于“人民”的“更多東西”理論僅僅威脅要用某種更帶有共產(chǎn)主義社會味道的、等同于教條的法律概念取代官房學(xué)的教條?！秱惱眢w系》此時仍然沒有出版，也沒有寫完。
1804-1805: Logic and Metaphysics
Hegel's First "Logic”
1804年至1805年：邏輯學(xué)與形而上學(xué)
黑格爾最早的“邏輯學(xué)”
Hegel’s only reputation at this time was that of being Schelling’s disciple, and since their journal had closed he had been publicly silent, publishing nothing. Moreover, the small inheritance on which he had been living was dwindling fast, and the small supplements from the nominal students’ fees and honoraria for his work in journals were nowhere near enough to compensate.
? ? 黑格爾在這時僅有的名氣是作為謝林的信徒，因?yàn)樗麄兒限k的雜志已經(jīng)?？?，所以他在公共場合沉默不語，連一個字也沒有發(fā)表。不僅如此，一小筆他長期賴以為生的遺產(chǎn)也快要花光了，一小筆來自微不足道的學(xué)生服務(wù)費(fèi)的補(bǔ)貼和他為雜志社工作的酬金幾乎難以滿足他的生活開銷。
Clearly, Hegel needed a salaried position, and, just as clearly, he needed a book to get one; but none seemed to be forthcoming. In 1802 he announced that “his” system would be forthcoming; this was repeated in 1803 when he told his students that his own “compendium” for the lectures would soon be forthcoming; when he wrote to Goethe on September 29, 1804, requesting an appointment as a professor in philosophy, he added that “the purpose of a work I hope to complete this winter for my lectures - a purely scientific elaboration of philosophy will permit me to present it to Your Excellency, should I be kindly permitted to do so.”'’'’ In 1805, he wrote a letter to Johann Heinrich Voss, seeking to enlist his help in attaining a position at Heidelberg, saying, “By fall, I will give an exposition of my work as a system of philosophy.””* In 1804-05, Hegel wrote out a clean copy of a long manuscript on “Logic, Metaphysics, and Philosophy of Nature,” which was almost certainly intended to be the basis for the book he had been promising since 1802. Yet again, despite his earnest promises of a book to all concerned and despite his desperate need for one, Hegel became completely dissatisfied with his efforts and as he had before, simply and abruptly stopped work on it and began work on another manuscript.
? ? 很顯然，黑格爾需要一個帶薪的職位；同樣十分清楚的是，他需要撰寫一本書以獲得帶薪的職位；但寫書的事看來似乎沒有任何眉目。在1802年，他宣稱“他的”體系即將問世；這樣的宣稱在1803年被他重復(fù)了一遍，當(dāng)時他告訴學(xué)生他自己的講課“綱要”將會很快編寫出來；當(dāng)他于1804年9月29日致信歌德，請求擔(dān)任哲學(xué)教授職位的時候，他補(bǔ)充說道：“我希望在這個冬季學(xué)期為我講課——對哲學(xué)作純粹科學(xué)的詳盡闡述——寫出一本著作，這本著作的目的在于將使我能夠把它獻(xiàn)給閣下，承蒙惠允。”在1805年，他致信約翰·海因里?！じＫ?，試圖謀取在他提攜下獲得海德堡大學(xué)教職，信中說道：“到秋季，我將把我的著作擴(kuò)充成哲學(xué)體系。”在1804年至1805年，黑格爾謄清了一部很長的“邏輯學(xué)、形而上學(xué)和自然哲學(xué)”手稿，這部手稿幾乎肯定意在奠定他自1802年以來一直在允諾的這本書的基礎(chǔ)。然而，盡管他對有關(guān)這本書的一切作了嚴(yán)肅認(rèn)真的承諾，盡管他極需一本書來證明自己的水平，黑格爾仍然對他自己的努力極為不滿，像他以前做的一樣，他只不過突然中止了這本書的寫作并著手另一部手稿的寫作。
The 1804-05 manuscript - The Jenaer Systementwiirfe II: Logik, Metaphysik, Natiirphilosophie {Jena System Draft II: Logic, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Nature) - presents a curious development in Hegel’s thought.'” It is almost certainly written during the period 1804-05, but it contains none of the social and political reflections of the earlier attempts at a system. It surely was a reworking of some older lecture notes (or an older manuscript for a book) that Hegel had developed for his courses on logic and metaphysics in 1802; most likely, his abandoning this manuscript had to do with how he came to see its incompatibility with the state of his thought as it was developing during the period 1805-06. Indeed, it seems that he quite suddenly stopped working on it altogether. The manuscript thus marked yet another stage in the growing crisis in Hegel’s career. The very obscurity of the surviving manuscript is evidence of just how distraught Hegel was becoming at this point in his life.
? ? 1804至1805年手稿——《耶拿體系草案：邏輯學(xué)、形而上學(xué)和自然哲學(xué)》——展現(xiàn)了黑格爾思想奇特的發(fā)展。這部手稿幾乎肯定寫于1804至1805年這個階段，但它不包含對體系早期嘗試的社會反思和政治反思。它想必是對被黑格爾在1802年為他邏輯學(xué)和形而上學(xué)課程撰寫的那些舊講稿（或一部較早書稿）的修訂；很可能，他放棄了這部手稿，這涉及他怎樣逐漸看出這部手稿與他將在1805至1806年這個時期闡述的思想狀況不相一致。實(shí)際上，情況似乎是他完全極其突然地終止了這部著作的寫作。這部手稿因此仍然標(biāo)志著黑格爾學(xué)術(shù)生涯中另一危機(jī)日益增加的階段?，F(xiàn)存手稿的極其晦澀恰好證明黑格爾在他平生那個階段變得多么心煩意亂。
Early on in his career at Jena, Hegel had come to the idea that his “system” would be divided among what he had taken to calling logic and metaphysics, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit, but it was not clear to him just how the three (or maybe four) parts of his system were to be related to each other. Uniting all these different sections would be a truly speculative philosophy conceived, as Hegel now put it, as the articulation of the absolute, that is, the articulation of the basic structure, the unity, underlying both the objective and the subjective points of view.
? ? 早在他耶拿學(xué)術(shù)生涯時期，黑格爾就已經(jīng)開始認(rèn)識到，他的“體系”應(yīng)被劃分成被他早就喜愛稱作的邏輯學(xué)與形而上學(xué)、自然哲學(xué)和精神哲學(xué)，但他恰恰尚不清楚他體系的三個（或許四個）部分是如何相互關(guān)聯(lián)的。把所有的這些不同部分結(jié)合起來的應(yīng)該是一種真正的思辨哲學(xué)，像黑格爾當(dāng)時論述的，思辨哲學(xué)應(yīng)該被設(shè)想成是對絕對的系統(tǒng)闡述，也就是說，應(yīng)該被設(shè)想成是對基本結(jié)構(gòu)或同一的系統(tǒng)闡述，基本結(jié)構(gòu)和統(tǒng)一既構(gòu)成客觀觀點(diǎn)的基礎(chǔ)，也構(gòu)成主觀觀點(diǎn)的基礎(chǔ)。
Hegel’s unpublished manuscript of 1804-05 was an attempt to accomplish this via a “l(fā)ogic” of relations. Hegel’s decision to call this a “l(fā)ogic” followed the trend of the times. If nothing else, other people at Jena (including Fichte) had been doing much the same thing, and Hegel’s own course in philosophy as a student at Tubingen in the winter semester of 1788-1789 had been called “Logic and Metaphysics” (taught by J. F. Flatt).
? ? 黑格爾生前未發(fā)表的1804年至1805年手稿是一次借助“關(guān)系邏輯學(xué)”來完成對絕對的系統(tǒng)闡述的嘗試。黑格爾順應(yīng)當(dāng)時學(xué)界潮流決定稱對絕對的系統(tǒng)闡述為“邏輯學(xué)”。甚至英雄所見略同，在耶拿的其他人（包括費(fèi)希特）同樣也一直在用心闡述他們各自的“邏輯學(xué)”，黑格爾自己在1788至1789年冬季學(xué)期在圖賓根學(xué)習(xí)的哲學(xué)課程也被稱作“邏輯學(xué)”和“形而上學(xué)”（由J.F.弗拉特講授）。
The key idea of Hegel’s 1804 “Logic” seems to have been that the system begins with something like Hblderlin’s conception of the unity of thought and being, some notion of a fundamental identity, and one then shows that the articulation of this identity itself presupposes an articulation of “difference,” following which one shows how the articulation of this relation of identity and difference must develop itself into a yet richer, more determinate relational system. Although the crucial introductory sections of the manuscript are missing, it seems most likely that Hegel began the manuscript with the concept of what he called “simple relation” - Holderlin’s notion of the deep unity of thought and being - from which the surviving portions show that he then proceeded to develop the relations of “reality” and “negation,” out of which the conceptions of qualitative difference and quantitative difference were then themselves developed. The articulation of the conception of “quantitative difference” was used to argue the point that traditional syllogistic logic was incapable of handling conceptions of the “infinite,” which had been otherwise quite capably handled in the mathematics of the differential and integral calculus.'^** The way in which the infinite is expressed as a “ratio” in the calculus shows that there is indeed a purely conceptual basis for articulating the infinite, and that mathematics has thereby shown that a new type of “l(fā)ogic” is required in order that the “infinite” not be conceived as some kind of “thing” - as an infinitesi- mally large or small quantity — but as having an “ideal” existence in its expressions in the formulas of the calculus.
? ? 黑格爾1804年“邏輯學(xué)”中的關(guān)鍵思想看來似乎在于他的體系開篇論述的類似荷爾德林思想與存在統(tǒng)一的概念或某種基本同一的觀念，這一關(guān)鍵思想于是表明對同一本身的系統(tǒng)闡述預(yù)先假定了對“差異”的系統(tǒng)闡述，緊接著這一關(guān)鍵思想表明對同一與差異關(guān)系的系統(tǒng)闡述怎么必然把它自身發(fā)展成了一個甚至更為豐富的、更加確定的關(guān)系體系。雖然這部手稿中至關(guān)重要的導(dǎo)論部分現(xiàn)已闕失，但看來似乎很可能黑格爾在手稿開頭部分論述了被他稱作的“簡單關(guān)系”這一概念——荷爾德林關(guān)于思想與存在的深度統(tǒng)一的見解——根據(jù)這樣的假定，手稿的現(xiàn)存部分表明他接著繼續(xù)闡述“現(xiàn)實(shí)”與“否定”的關(guān)系，依據(jù)這一關(guān)系，質(zhì)的差異與量的差異概念本身繼而得到闡述。系統(tǒng)闡述“量的差異”概念，習(xí)慣上的做法是去論證下列這樣的要點(diǎn)：傳統(tǒng)的三段論邏輯學(xué)不能夠處理“無限”概念，而數(shù)學(xué)中的微積分處理起“無限”概念已是得心應(yīng)手。“一種借以把無限表述為微積分比率的方法，揭示確實(shí)存在著一種系統(tǒng)闡述無限的純粹概念的基礎(chǔ)，揭示數(shù)學(xué)因此已經(jīng)證實(shí)人們需要一種新型‘邏輯學(xué)’，以便‘無限’不應(yīng)該被設(shè)想成是某種‘東西’——不應(yīng)該被設(shè)想成是無窮大或無窮小的量——而應(yīng)該被設(shè)想成是‘無限’‘理想地’存在于‘無限’用微積分公式表述中?！?br>
Indeed, the mathematical example shows, Hegel argued in the manuscript, that thinking in terms of simple “relations” (Beziehungen) requires us to articulate them in terms of a more basic conception of “ratios,” or “relationships” {Verhultnisse), “totalities” grasped in thought that are the conditions of our conceptual grasp of the “relations” between things (such as the individual elements in an infinite series). In the manuscript, two such “relationships” are singled out: the relationship of being and the relationship of thought. Under the heading “relationship of being,” Hegel includes what he calls the relationships of substantiality, of causality, and of reciprocal interaction, which together commit us to understanding the various individual substances of the world as only moments in the process of the world’s coming to be and passing away as a whole, “moments” at which that “infinite” process coalesces into individual “points.”
? ? 更確切地說，手稿中所使用的數(shù)學(xué)例子表明，黑格爾在手稿中辯稱，這種用簡單“關(guān)系”（Beziehungen）進(jìn)行的思維要求我們以思想把握的“比率”或“關(guān)系”（Verh?ltnisse）或“總體”這些更基本的概念從而對簡單“關(guān)系”作出系統(tǒng)的闡述，這些較為基本的概念構(gòu)成了我們概念式地把握事物（例如無限級數(shù)中個體元素）間“關(guān)系”的條件。在手稿中，這樣的兩種“關(guān)系”被挑出：存在的關(guān)系與思想的關(guān)系。在“存在的關(guān)系”這個標(biāo)題下，黑格爾列出被他稱作的實(shí)體關(guān)系、因果性關(guān)系和相互作用關(guān)系，它們共同使我們承諾把世界各種不同的個別實(shí)體僅僅大體上理解成是世界生成與消逝過程中的一些環(huán)節(jié)，一個個“無限”過程因之合并為個別“點(diǎn)”的“環(huán)節(jié)”。
If the “relationship of being” is the conceptual articulation of the way in which the particular items of the world are both absorbed into and produced by the universal process of nature itself, then the “relationship of thought” is the pure “l(fā)ogic” of the unity of and relations between the “universal” and the “particular” aspects of that process, the logic according to which the primordial divisions in the “judgment,” and later in the “syllogism,” are produced.'?’
? ? 如果“存在的關(guān)系”是對一種方式作概念式的系統(tǒng)闡述，而且以這種方式世界中具體事物既被并入自然本身的普遍過程，也生于自然本身的普遍過程的話，那么“思想的關(guān)系”就是上述過程的純粹統(tǒng)一的“邏輯”，就是上述過程的“普遍”方面與“具體”方面之間關(guān)系的純粹統(tǒng)一的“邏輯”，這樣的“邏輯”依據(jù)的是“判斷”和而后“推論式”中原始劃分的產(chǎn)生。
In the manuscripts, Hegel argues for the conclusion that any rigorous, “l(fā)ogical” typology of judgments must itself be derived from what is necessary to articulate the larger totality within which such judgments are made, in particular, to articulate the implicit relations between universals and particulars. The guiding thread in that discussion has to do with the notion that if there are only so many ways that universals and particulars can be related to each other, then there can be only that many types of correctly formed judgments. However, all attempts to establish this in any kind of rigorous fashion only demonstrate, so Hegel concluded, that a putatively purely formal classification of judgments itself already depends on a more substantial, material treatment of what it is correct to assert, and that the doctrine of judgment thus naturally gives way to a doctrine of what it is correct to assert, which itself comprises the classical theory of the syllogism, the theory of inference.
? ? 在這部手稿中，黑格爾為贊成下列的結(jié)論而展開論證：任何嚴(yán)格“邏輯”判斷的類型學(xué)自身都必須被追溯到系統(tǒng)闡述這些判斷被借以作出的更大總體所必需的東西，特別是，都必須被追溯到系統(tǒng)闡述普遍與特殊之間的暗含的關(guān)系所必需的東西。這種探討中的引導(dǎo)性思路關(guān)系到的見解是，如果只存在著這么多的方式以致普遍與特殊能夠彼此關(guān)聯(lián)的話，那么就只能夠存在著這么多的正確形成的判斷類型。然而，一切以任何種嚴(yán)格方式確立上述見解的嘗試都只不過證明，黑格爾也斷言，一種假定地純粹地形式的判斷分類自身已經(jīng)取決于對這種分類所正確地?cái)嘌缘臇|西作出一種更加實(shí)體的、更加物質(zhì)的論述，判斷的理論因此自然地讓位于關(guān)于判斷所正確地?cái)嘌詵|西的理論，這后一理論自身包含古典的推論理論或推理理論。
In the 1804 “Logic,” Hegel argued that the classical theory of the syllogism, however, required as a condition of its own possibility another nonsyllogistic totality. This was not, however, an entirely new conclusion; already in his 1802 essay on the “Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy” for the Critical Journal of Philosophy^ he had shown that he was quite familiar with the criticisms of formal syllogistic structure made by the third-century skeptic, Sextus Empiricus. On Sextus’ account, a familiar syllogism such as “Every man is an animal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is an animal” is inadequate; it itself rests on syllogisms that are either incomplete - how do we know that every man is an animal until we have investigated all men? - or are complete and therefore make the syllogism circular - since if we have investigated every man, then we have also investigated Socrates, so we already know Socrates is an animal, and we have already presupposed the conclusion, “Socrates is an animal,” in even stating the syllogism. Other similar criticisms had been voiced in Hegel’s own day about the sufficiency of syllogistic structure. To put it in the contemporary terms coined by Gilbert Ryle: What was at stake were the inference licenses at work in the syllogism; the argument was that we cannot understand the validity of syllogisms until we have shown the validity of the inference licenses themselves (since they cannot be included in the premises of the system). Hegel concluded not only that it was simply dogmatic to presuppose that all such inference licenses must be formal, but also that an investigation of both the way in which judgments must be classified and the proof the validity of syllogisms themselves shows that the whole of syllogistic logic cannot be explained in terms of a purely formal enterprise.
? ? 然而，在1804年的“邏輯學(xué)”里，黑格爾認(rèn)為古典的推論理論要求把另一非推論式的總體作為它自己可能性的條件。然而，這并不是一個全新的結(jié)論；早在他1802年發(fā)表在《哲學(xué)評論雜志》上的“懷疑論與哲學(xué)的關(guān)系”這篇論文里，他就已經(jīng)表明他深知由公元三世紀(jì)懷疑論者塞克斯都·恩披里柯作出的對形式推論結(jié)構(gòu)的批判。按照塞克斯都的闡述，一個為大家所熟悉的推論，例如“每人都是動物，蘇格拉底是人，所以蘇格拉底是動物”，是個不適當(dāng)?shù)耐普?；這個推論自身所依靠的那些推論要么是不完整的——難道我們怎么知道每人都是動物直到我們對所有人都作了調(diào)查研究為止嗎？——要么是完整的且因此使這個推論成為循環(huán)論證——因?yàn)槿绻覀儗γ總€人都作了調(diào)查研究，那么我們也就對蘇格拉底作了調(diào)查研究，所以我們已經(jīng)知道蘇格拉底是動物，我們就已經(jīng)預(yù)先假定了“蘇格拉底是動物”這個結(jié)論，甚至我們在著手陳述這個推論時就已經(jīng)預(yù)先假定了“蘇格拉底是動物”這個結(jié)論。諸如此類的批判早在黑格爾自己的時代就已經(jīng)被說成是關(guān)于推論結(jié)構(gòu)的充足性問題。用吉爾伯特·賴爾所創(chuàng)造的當(dāng)代術(shù)語來描述推論結(jié)構(gòu)的充足性，成問題的是三段論中使用的推論許可；這個論證意味著我們不可能理解三段論的合法性直到我們證明推論許可自身的合法性為止（因?yàn)橥普撛S可不可能被包含在推論方式的前提中）。黑格爾不但斷言預(yù)先假定所有這些推論許可必須是形式的簡直是獨(dú)斷論的做法，而且斷言對判斷必須借以被分類的方式和推論自身合法性的證據(jù)的研究，表明整個三段論邏輯不可能根據(jù)一種純粹形式的研究來加以解釋。
Hegel’s treatment of syllogisms themselves in his 1804-05 “Logic” is very abbreviated. His general argument, though, is something like the following. The traditional explanation of the validity of syllogisms had to do with the way in which the subjects or predicates were said to be “distributed” as the middle terms of the inference. The syllogism, “All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal,” involves a major term (“mortal”), a minor term (“Socrates”), and a middle term (“man”) that “binds” the major and minor terms together in the conclusion. The invalidity of syllogisms such as “Socrates is white, white is a color, therefore Socrates is a color” was to be explained by the notion that the subject and predicate terms were not “distrib- uted” correctly in the premises (or were not “distributed” at all). The idea of “distribution” was traditionally explained in terms of what “fell under” the term and what did not.
? ? 黑格爾在他1804年至1805年的“邏輯學(xué)”中簡明扼要地論述了推論自身。盡管如此，他的推論代表著像下列一樣的東西。對推論合法性的傳統(tǒng)解釋涉及一種方式，借助這種方式，主詞或謂詞作為推理中項(xiàng)被說成是“周延的”。三段論“凡人皆有死，蘇格拉底是人，故蘇格拉底有死”，含有大項(xiàng)（“有死”）、小項(xiàng)（“蘇格拉底”）和中項(xiàng)“人”，中項(xiàng)使大項(xiàng)和小項(xiàng)在結(jié)論中得以結(jié)合。諸如“蘇格拉底是白的，白的是顏色，所以蘇格拉底是顏色”這樣的三段論的非法性應(yīng)該被用主項(xiàng)和謂項(xiàng)在前提中不是正確地“周延的”（或“完全不周延的”這一說法）加以解釋。“周延”這一說法傳統(tǒng)上通常被根據(jù)“列入”項(xiàng)的東西和不“列入”項(xiàng)的東西加以解釋。
Since, however, the understandings of the terms and their “distribution” were not themselves formal in nature, the determination of what counts as a valid syllogism cannot depend solely on resources internal to the formal structure of syllogisms themselves but must also depend on the material content of certain concepts; what counts as purely logical vocabulary (for example, connectives such as “and” and “or”) and what counts as “distributing” the terms depends on what counts as a substantive understanding of conceptual content in the first place. The very understanding of the validity of syllogisms themselves, he concluded, had to do with our implicit grasp of the larger “whole” of thought and being that gave sense to such judgments and their syllogistic connections in the first place.
? ? 然而，對推論中項(xiàng)及其“周延”的理解自身其實(shí)是形式上的理解，所以若要確定被算作的合法推論則不可能只取決于源自推論自身形式結(jié)構(gòu)固有的東西，而且必須取決于某些概念的物質(zhì)內(nèi)容；所以若要確定被算作的純邏輯詞匯（舉例來說，諸如“與”和“或”這樣的連接詞）和被算作的“周延”項(xiàng)，則取決于首先被算作的對概念內(nèi)容實(shí)體式的理解。正是對推論自身合法性的這一理解，他斷言，涉及我們含蓄地把握思維與存在的更大“整體”，這樣的“整體”首先賦予這些判斷及其推論的聯(lián)系以意義。
Metaphysics as the Completion of Logic
形而上學(xué)作為邏輯學(xué)的完成
Since the validity of the syllogism depends on the “distribution” of terms, any rigorous definition of the basic terms already presupposes some kind of “definition by essence,” the paradigm of which is that of geometrical procedure. The formal validity of syllogisms therefore depended, so Hegel reasoned in the 1804-1805 manuscript, on a more complex unity that would mediate between the “relationships of being” and the “relationships of thought.” This would be “metaphysics,” and the “totality” of such metaphysical definition and division would be a form of cognition {Erkennen)}^^
? ? 因?yàn)橥普摰暮戏ㄐ匝鲑囉陧?xiàng)的“周延”，所以任何對基本項(xiàng)的嚴(yán)格界定都已經(jīng)預(yù)先假定某種“本質(zhì)界定”，都已經(jīng)預(yù)先假定一種作為幾何學(xué)程序范式的范式。推論形式的合法性因此取決于，黑格爾在1804年至1805年的手稿里也推斷說，一個更加復(fù)雜的統(tǒng)一體，這個統(tǒng)一體應(yīng)該在“存在的關(guān)系”與“思想的關(guān)系”之間起著中介作用。這些應(yīng)該屬于“形而上學(xué)”范疇，這樣的形而上學(xué)界定和劃分的“總體”當(dāng)然屬于認(rèn)識（ **Erkenntnis** ）形式范疇。
“Metaphysics” conceived in this fashion would be articulation of the unity of “thought” and “being,” the “absolute,” the “l(fā)ogic,” that is, of what Holderlin had called “Being.” Metaphysics thus is the doctrine of the way in which what appear to be basic oppositions are conceptually articulated in terms of their deeper unity and connection with each other.The basic principles of such unities are those of identity and contradiction, the “principle of the exclusion of a third” (bivalence), and the “principle of sufficient reason.” These principles cannot be proved within syllogistic logic itself, since syllogistic logic presupposes them.
? ? 被以這種方式構(gòu)想的“形而上學(xué)”應(yīng)該是對“思想”與“存在”的統(tǒng)一、“絕對”、“邏輯學(xué)”的系統(tǒng)闡述，也即應(yīng)該是對荷爾德林稱作的“存在”的系統(tǒng)闡述。形而上學(xué)因此是關(guān)于一種方式的學(xué)說，由于這種方式，看來好像是那些基本對立物被概念上按照它們更深程度的統(tǒng)一和彼此的聯(lián)系作了系統(tǒng)闡述。這種統(tǒng)一的基本原則是同一與矛盾原則、“第三中項(xiàng)原則”（二值）和“充足理由原則”。這些原則不可能在三段論邏輯自身中得到證明，因?yàn)槿握撨壿嬵A(yù)先假定了這些原則。
Staying true to the inspiration of Holderlin, Hegel divides “meta- physics” into three main subdivisions: cognition as a system of principles, the “metaphysics of objectivity,” and the “metaphysics of subjectivity,” each of which have a deeper unity in the “absolute” that is prior to their division from each other. In the metaphysics of objectivity, we think of “cognition” (which Hegel identifies in the manuscript with the “absolute I”) as making objective claims about ourselves and the world. This necessarily leads to something like the classical pre-Kantian metaphysical conceptions of the soul, the world, and the “highest essence” (God), which themselves generate the paradoxes that motivated classical metaphysics and which eventually necessitated the Kantian revolution in philosophy, which is then itself grasped in an intuition of the “absolute” as the unity of this kind of “subjectivity” and “objectivity.”
? ? 在確實(shí)受到荷爾德林啟發(fā)后，黑格爾把“形而上學(xué)”劃分成三個主要部分：作為原理體系的認(rèn)識、“客觀性形而上學(xué)”和“主觀性形而上學(xué)”，這三個部分中每個部分都具有“絕對”的更深程度的統(tǒng)一，“絕對”先于這三個部分的彼此劃分。在客觀性形而上學(xué)那里，我們把（被黑格爾在這部手稿中認(rèn)為等同于“絕對自我”）的“認(rèn)識”看作提出關(guān)于我們自己和世界的客觀主張。這樣一來就必定導(dǎo)致某種像前康德古典形而上學(xué)關(guān)于靈魂、世界和“最高本質(zhì)”（上帝）的概念一樣的東西，這三個概念本身所產(chǎn)生的悖論激發(fā)了古典形而上學(xué)的動機(jī)并最終必然引起康德的哲學(xué)革命，康德哲學(xué)革命本身又被用這種“主觀性”與“客觀性”統(tǒng)一的“絕對”直觀加以把握。
The Articulation of the “Absolute” and the Early Philosophy of Nature
對“絕對”的系統(tǒng)闡述與早期的自然哲學(xué)
In 1802 and 1803, Hegel began to assemble clippings concerning natural science from various journals and newspapers, and he returned intensively to one of his earlier interests as a schoolboy in Stuttgart, the study of physics and mathematics, in an effort to gather material for a philosophy of nature that would mesh with his reflections on the possibility of human freedom. The philosophies of nature that he produced during these years display a detailed knowledge on his part of a good bit of what was going on in the natural science of the time. (Certainly Jena, with its collection of budding natural scientists, was a good place to learn about these things.) They vary quite a bit in detail - the two earlier drafts begin with the system of the sun, the movement of the planets, the earth, and then move to mechanics, whereas the final draft in 1805—06 begins with pure mechanics and derives things from that — but they all retain (as Rolf-Peter Horstmann has shown) the idea that the two basic factors in nature are what Hegel calls the “aether” and matter.? m nature as The “aether” is the way the absolute appears most basically unity, and it develops into “difference” in various ways (or as the “universal” that is differentiated into “particulars”); the aether develops itself into “matter,” and this “matter” then develops itself into the various appearances of nature.
? ? 在1802年和1803年，黑格爾著手收集各種不同報(bào)刊雜志上有關(guān)自然科學(xué)的活頁，他竭力回到他早年在斯圖加特中小學(xué)時代的一種興趣，研究物理學(xué)和數(shù)學(xué)，努力為構(gòu)建一種自然哲學(xué)而收集材料，這種自然哲學(xué)將和他對人類自由的可能性的反思融為一體。這被他在這些年間所提出的自然哲學(xué)，展示了他本人對當(dāng)時自然科學(xué)中研究的很多東西深入細(xì)致的了解。（當(dāng)然，耶拿由于云集一批初露頭角的科學(xué)家，成了獲悉自然科學(xué)中研究東西的好地方。）這些他在這些年間所提出的自然哲學(xué)內(nèi)容十分龐雜——兩部早期草稿從太陽系、行星運(yùn)行、地球開始，然后轉(zhuǎn)到力學(xué)，而1805年至1806年最后那部草稿從純力學(xué)開始并把某些東西的起源追溯到純力學(xué)——但這些他在這些年間所提出的自然哲學(xué)全都保留了（像羅爾夫-彼得·霍斯特曼已證明的）這樣的見解，這就是大自然中兩種基本因素是被黑格爾稱作的“以太”和“物質(zhì)”?！耙蕴睆母旧险f是絕對借以本質(zhì)上顯露自身作為“統(tǒng)一體”的方式，它也以各種不同的方式發(fā)展成為“差異”（或它作為“普適”發(fā)展成為具有差別的“特殊”）；以太自身發(fā)展成為“物質(zhì)”，“物質(zhì)”繼而發(fā)展成為自然的各種不同的現(xiàn)象。
The details of Hegel’s philosophy of nature in this period are notimportant here. Hegel himself abandoned and modified many of theideas he sketched out, and he certainly never saw fit to publish thosenotes, copious as they were. Their importance lies in the way in whichthey show the manner by which Hegel tried to flesh out his convictionthat he needed a nonreductionist and still non-naturalist account of thegenesis of spirit out of nature.
? ? 黑格爾這個階段自然哲學(xué)的細(xì)節(jié)在這里并不重要。黑格爾本人就放棄了且修改了他所勾勒出的很多想法，他當(dāng)然從未把那批筆記當(dāng)作適合發(fā)表的東西看待，盡管它們內(nèi)容翔實(shí)豐富多彩。它們的重要性在于這樣的方面，這就是它們表明借助特定方式黑格爾試圖使他自己更加確信，他需要對出之于自然的精神的形成作出一種非還原論和仍然非自然主義的闡述。
