8 From the Phenomenology to the “System”:

Hegel’s Logic

第8章 從《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》到“體系“:(1)

黑格爾的《邏輯學(xué)》

Hegel’s Changing Conceptions of the Phenomenology in Nuremberg

黑格爾紐倫堡時(shí)期改變了《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》中的構(gòu)想

AS HEGEL ARRIVED IN NUREMBERG, the educational affairs of -/l-the city were in disarray, and although he was officially set to begin his teaching duties on December 12, 1808, he only learned in a letter from Paulus dated November 28, 1808 just exactly what it was that he was supposed to be teaching. Paulus instructed him that according to Niethammer’s “General Normative,” he would be teaching “Introduction to Philosophy alongside Logical Drills” for one class, and “Introduction to the Knowledge of the Universal Coherence of the Sciences” along with “Religion, Right, and Duties” for another class.' With virtually no time at all to prepare, Hegel did what he could by taking his recently published Phenomenology of Spirit, along with his compilations of notes having to do with his “system” and with the “Logic” on which he was so hard at work, and using them as the bases for his class dictations. However, this had an unintended result: Bringing his recently completed Phenomenologj/ of Spirit into play as an introduction to philosophy in the context of a reformed Gymnasium led Hegel to rethink again what he had just spent so much time working out in the first place, namely, the place of the Phenomenology in his proposed system of philosophy and the shape that system was supposed to take.

? ? 黑格爾抵達(dá)紐倫堡城時(shí),該城的教學(xué)事務(wù)處于混亂之中,他盡管受校方之命將于1808年12月12日開(kāi)始履行教學(xué)職責(zé),而只是從保盧斯寫給他的信中才獲悉應(yīng)該走上講臺(tái)的確切時(shí)間是1808年11月28日。保盧斯囑咐黑格爾,依據(jù)尼特哈默爾“通用標(biāo)準(zhǔn)“,黑格爾應(yīng)該將“哲學(xué)導(dǎo)論與邏輯人門“作為一門課程講授,把“科學(xué)的普遍一致知識(shí)導(dǎo)論“連同“宗教、權(quán)利和義務(wù)“作為另外一門課講授。由于實(shí)際上根本就來(lái)不及做準(zhǔn)備,黑格爾只能把自己新近發(fā)表的《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》,連同與他的“體系“有關(guān)的以及與他正在著力撰寫的《邏輯學(xué)》有關(guān)筆記匯集起來(lái),把它們用作他課程講義的基本內(nèi)容。但是這帶來(lái)一個(gè)非預(yù)期的結(jié)果:黑格爾利用他最近完成的《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》作為處在改革環(huán)境下高級(jí)中學(xué)哲學(xué)導(dǎo)論,這就致使黑格爾首先去重新思考他花了大量時(shí)間剛剛?cè)〉玫某晒?即《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》在他所計(jì)劃的哲學(xué)體系中的地位和該體系應(yīng)采取的形式。

As he tried to use the Phenomenology to introduce students to philosophy, Hegel found himself having to change his mind about how far the Phenomenology could take them, and no doubt some of the fortuitous circumstances surrounding his assumption of his duties had something to do with this.^ Because of all the confusion having to do with the reorganization, the school year had begun a couple of months late, and Hegel thus had much less time than normally to do both the required “Introduction to Philosophy’’ and the “Logical Drills.” It is thus quite probable that Hegel simply felt he did not have enough time to do the whole Phenomenology of Spirit in his classes. Perhaps he also found that the students were not following his presentation as well as he had hoped and came to the conclusion that changing things in midstream would be the pedagogically prudent route. It must also be remembered that he was not using the book itself (the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit) in his classroom; the course instead consisted in his giving the students dictations of one paragraph and then using that dictation as a basis for further discussion. Hegel thus had to boil down the complex content of the Phenomenology! of Spirit into a set of distinct, clear paragraphs to serve as a basis for elaboration of details in class discussion. As things turned out, Hegel found this procedure to fit his mature personal style much better, and after the publication of his Logic, he composed the rest of his major works as a series of numbered paragraphs that could serve as the basis for his more detailed exposition in lectures.

? ? 當(dāng)黑格爾設(shè)法用《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》向?qū)W生介紹哲學(xué)時(shí),他發(fā)覺(jué)必須改變他關(guān)于《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》可能使學(xué)生們感到多么云里霧里的想法,毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)他圍繞他的責(zé)任設(shè)想出的某些偶然境況與這種做法有點(diǎn)關(guān)系.由于與學(xué)校重新組建工作有關(guān)的所有混亂,這個(gè)學(xué)年晚了兩個(gè)月才開(kāi)始上課,因此黑格爾無(wú)法像往常那樣從容講授“哲學(xué)導(dǎo)論“和“逯輯人門“這兩門必修課。所以極有可能黑格爾簡(jiǎn)直感到他沒(méi)有足夠時(shí)間在課堂上完整地講授《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》。大概他同樣覺(jué)察到學(xué)生們沒(méi)有像他原本所期望的那樣吃透他的講課內(nèi)容,并斷定中途改變教學(xué)內(nèi)容在教育學(xué)上要謹(jǐn)慎從之。同樣必須記住的是他當(dāng)時(shí)在課堂上沒(méi)有使用這本書(1807年版《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)5);課程倒是改為他給學(xué)生口述一段,之后以此作為基礎(chǔ)進(jìn)一步進(jìn)行討論。黑格爾因此必須把《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》的復(fù)雜內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)化為一套清楚而明晰的段落、用作課堂討論中對(duì)一些細(xì)節(jié)進(jìn)行詳細(xì)解釋的基礎(chǔ)。結(jié)果表明,黑格爾發(fā)覺(jué)這種做法極為適合他成熟的個(gè)人風(fēng)格,并在他的《邏輯學(xué)》發(fā)表后,他將他其余主要著作組成一系列編有序號(hào)的段落,以便能夠用作他在講演中較為詳細(xì)閘述的基礎(chǔ)。

In any event, it seems clear that although Hegel at first intended to use the whole Phenomenology of Spirit as the basis for his introductory course, he changed his mind in 1808, and after introducing the concept of “reason” in his class (corresponding to the beginning of the long chapter on “Reason” in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit), he suddenly jumped to “Logic” rather than to the corresponding passages in the Phenomenology. The next year, 1809, he followed more or less the same plan, except that he jumped over not into “Logic” but into “Psychology,” which he then described in his dictation as the “authentic doctrine of spirit.”^ After 1809, he stayed with that line of instruction for his entire time in Nuremberg.

? ? 無(wú)論如何,看來(lái)好像十分清楚的是,黑格爾雖然起初有意用整部《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》作為他的導(dǎo)言課程的基礎(chǔ),但是他在1808年改變了主意,在課堂上介紹完“理性“這個(gè)概念(相當(dāng)于1807年版《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》中關(guān)于“理性“這篇幅龐大的一章的開(kāi)端)以后,他突然跳到了“邏輯學(xué)“而非《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》中相應(yīng)的段落。翌年即1809年,他或多或少地延續(xù)了之前的計(jì)劃,除了他不是跳到“逯輯學(xué)“而是跳到了“心理學(xué)“(“心理學(xué)“被他之后在講述中描述為“精神的本真學(xué)說(shuō)“)之外,。1809年以后,他在整個(gè)紐倫堡時(shí)期一直貫徹著這種教學(xué)思路。

That Hegel was rethinking the role of the Phenomenology of Spirit was already clear in the 1808 course. In that course he did not even refer to his introduction to philosophy as a “phenomenology” at all but instead as only a “doctrine of consciousness” - later writing in a copy of his dictations the word “Pneumatologie” (as another way of saying “doctrine of spirit”) to describe what he was doing. His marginal notes on the dictation show that he was hastily trying to give some kind of order to the whole thing, at one point characterizing it as a study of “modes of consciousness, knowing (Wissens) and cognizing (Erkennens)," but then, changing his mind, writing elsewhere on the manuscript “Doctrine of consciousness and doctrine of the soul” (by the latter, Hegel clearly meant something like a philosophical psychology)."^ The divisions that he made for the course - “A. Consciousness of abstract objects. B. Consciousness of the world of finite spirit. C. Consciousness of absolute spirit.” - seem to correspond at least roughly to the divisions of the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit. Even so, Hegel was also changing his terminology a bit: Instead of the chapters on “consciousness” and “self-consciousness,” he had a section called “consciousness of abstract objects”; instead of the chapters on “reason” and “spirit,” he included a section on “consciousness of the world of finite spirit,” and, finally, instead of the chapter on “religion,” he had a section called “consciousness of absolute spirit.”

? ? 黑格爾在重新思考《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》扮演的角色,這在1808年課程中已變得一清二楚。在1808年課程中,他甚至根本沒(méi)有提及將他的哲學(xué)導(dǎo)言作為“現(xiàn)象學(xué)“而倒是僅僅作為“意識(shí)論“一一之后在他的一本講義中寫下“Peneumatologie“這個(gè)詞(作為“精神論“的另一說(shuō)法)描述了他所正在講授的內(nèi)容。他寫在講義中的邊注表明他匆第8章_從《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》到“體系“:黑格爾的《邏輯學(xué)》忙地試圖賦予整個(gè)內(nèi)容某種順序,一方面他把它描繪為一種對(duì)“意識(shí)、認(rèn)識(shí)(WIsserzs)和認(rèn)知(Er&enzens)的模式“的研究,但另一方面,他改變了主意,在手稿中其他地方寫上“意識(shí)論與靈魂論“(借靈魂論黑格爾顯然想說(shuō)的是某種類似哲學(xué)心理學(xué)的東西)。他對(duì)1808年課程所做的這些劃分一一“甲、抽象對(duì)象的意識(shí)。乙、有限精神世界的意識(shí)。丙、絕對(duì)精神的意識(shí)?！耙灰凰坪踔辽倥c1807年版《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》中的劃分大致相符。雖然如此,黑格爾還是稍稍改變了他的術(shù)語(yǔ):他沒(méi)有把某些章節(jié)稱作“意識(shí)“和“自我意識(shí)“,而把一個(gè)部分稱作“抽象對(duì)象的意識(shí)“;他沒(méi)有把某些章節(jié)稱作“理性“和“精神“,而包含了關(guān)于“有限精神世界的意識(shí)“的部分,最終他沒(méi)有把其中一章稱作“宗教“,而把一部分稱作“絕對(duì)精神的意識(shí)“。

The central questions for Hegel throughout his deliberations about how to use his massive work seemed to involve two issues: (i) Was the Phenomenology the “authentic doctrine of spirit” or was that reserved for what was to have been the last part of the “system,” the doctrine of “real” spirit in its social and political forms? (2) Was the “introduction” to philosophy itself a “science” (a Wissenschaft), as he had clearly claimed in the 1807 Phenomenology., or was it merely a “nonscientific” way to introduce people to “science” proper?

? ? 對(duì)黑格爾來(lái)說(shuō),他關(guān)于如何使用他大量作品的全部思考的核心問(wèn)題似乎涉及下列兩個(gè)具體問(wèn)題,(11《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》代表“本真的精神論“嗎?或者說(shuō),《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》注定成為“體系“的最后一部或那具有社會(huì)形式和政治形式的“真正“精神論嗎?(2)哲學(xué)本身的“導(dǎo)論“是“科學(xué)“(Wisserscha/兒),像他早在1807年版《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》中就已明確主張的,或者說(shuō),哲學(xué)“導(dǎo)論“本身只是將人們引人真正“科學(xué)“的一條“非科學(xué)的“路徑因?

As of 1808-09, he still held to the notion that the Phenomenology was an independent “science” itself, in fact telling the students in the dictations for the class as much.^ But, even as Hegel was saying that, it was becoming increasingly unclear to him if the introduction to the system actually required the whole historical apparatus of the Jena Phenomenology., or if only the introductory chapters were sufficient for that purpose.

? ? 1808至1809年間,他在著述中依舊持有這樣的見(jiàn)解即《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》本身是獨(dú)立的“科學(xué)“,實(shí)際上他在課堂上也是這樣對(duì)學(xué)生講授的。但是,恰恰在這時(shí)黑格爾說(shuō),就連他自己也日益變得不清楚,體系的導(dǎo)言實(shí)際上是不是需要耶拿時(shí)期《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》的全部歷史結(jié)構(gòu),或是不是僅僅介紹性的章節(jié)就足以達(dá)到這個(gè)目的了呢?

This dilemma was brought to a head for him during his teaching duties in Nuremberg. Since exigencies of time and the demands to satisfy the terms of Niethammer’s “General Normative” forced him to cut short the “Introduction to Philosophy” and to move on quickly to the “Logical Drills.” He was also forced to cut short his dictation based on the Phenomenology, rapidly concluding with a section called “Universal Self-Consciousness” and a one-paragraph dictation that in his marginal notes he titled “Reason.” That notion made sense within his line of thought: The dialectics of “consciousness” and “self- consciousness” (faithfully rendered in the dictations) lead to the concept of what Hegel had called in the corresponding pages of the 1807 Phe~ nomenology of Spirit, “the / that is We, and the We that is /” - that is, a notion of “universal self-consciousness,” a term Kant himself had used to characterize the transcendental unity of apperception and which for both Kant and Hegel expressed the idea that in making judgments, in “getting it right” in general, agents are guided by the principles that would count for all other agents as “getting it right” in this case or “applying” the norms correctly.*’ Finding the elements of a more social conception of “universal self-consciousness” in Kant’s Critique of Judgment, Hegel had developed his own view of the nature of “universal self-consciousness” as consisting in social norms, and a view of rationality as having to do with those standards of evaluation that develop of the practices not only of making assertions but of coming to develop higher-order principles by which we could criticize those assertions and which, in a reflexive move, come to function as standards for selfcriticism, and, even more self-reflexively, of the criticism of the principles of criticism themselves. The putative independence and autonomy of reason, the great legacy of the Enlightenment, was thus no more than the autonomy of Geist itself, of the notion that nature imposes no authoritative normative structure on our “minded” activities, that no norms could count for us unless we collectively imposed them on ourselves.

? ? 這一難題,在他在紐倫堡執(zhí)教期間,已到了非解決不可的時(shí)候了。因?yàn)?時(shí)間緊迫且要求符合尼特哈黯爾術(shù)語(yǔ)“通常標(biāo)準(zhǔn)“,迫使他停止“哲學(xué)導(dǎo)言“的寫作并很快轉(zhuǎn)到“邏輯人門“的寫作。他同樣也被迫縮短他基于《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》的講授時(shí)間,并很快以這樣的內(nèi)容結(jié)束:一個(gè)稱作“普道的自我意識(shí)“部分與他的標(biāo)題為“理性“那一章邊注中的一段講義。下面這一看法在他的思路中是可以理解的:“意識(shí)“和“自我意識(shí)“的辯證法(如實(shí)地呈現(xiàn)在他的講授中)導(dǎo)致了黑格爾在1807年版《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》的相應(yīng)段落中所稱之的構(gòu)想,“我乃是我們,而我們即為我“,一一也就是說(shuō),“普道的自我意識(shí)“的觀念,一個(gè)康德本人早就用來(lái)描述統(tǒng)覺(jué)先驗(yàn)統(tǒng)一的特征的術(shù)語(yǔ),這個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ)在黑格爾和康德看來(lái)表達(dá)了一種想法:在作出755判斷時(shí),在通常“正確理解事物“時(shí),行動(dòng)者受一些原理的引導(dǎo),這些原理總是要求所有其他行動(dòng)者在這種情況下“正確理解事物“或正確地“運(yùn)用“標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。由于在康德《判斷力批判》中發(fā)現(xiàn)了“普道的自我意識(shí)“更具有社會(huì)性的元素,黑格爾閘發(fā)了他自己的存在于社會(huì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)中“普邋的自我意識(shí)“的本質(zhì)的觀點(diǎn),以及與一些評(píng)價(jià)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)有關(guān)的合理性觀點(diǎn),對(duì)這些評(píng)價(jià)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的閹發(fā)不但依據(jù)的是作出斷言的實(shí)踐,而且依據(jù)的是開(kāi)始發(fā)展較高秩序的原理的實(shí)踐,憑借較高秩序的原理,我們可以評(píng)論這些斷言,這些較高秩序的原理,在反思的活動(dòng)中,開(kāi)始起自我批評(píng)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)作用,甚至更加自我反思地,起對(duì)批評(píng)的原理本身的批評(píng)作用。一般認(rèn)定的理性的獨(dú)立性和自律,啟蒙運(yùn)動(dòng)的巨大遺產(chǎn),故而至多只不過(guò)是精神本身的自律而已,至多只不過(guò)是下面這種觀念的自律而已:自然沒(méi)有把任何權(quán)威的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)結(jié)構(gòu)強(qiáng)加于我們的“精神“活動(dòng),沒(méi)有什么標(biāo)準(zhǔn)能要求我們?nèi)フJ(rèn)同,除非我們共同地將標(biāo)準(zhǔn)強(qiáng)加于我們自身。

The issue then naturally suggested itself to Hegel that what was at stake in ‘‘‘‘Wissenschaft” as he now understood it had to do with whether any of these formations or gestalts of Geist could sustain our normative allegiance, could be the kinds of things in which agents could both selfconsciously situate themselves and sustain that kind of self-situating in light of the inherent “negativity” of such self-situating, its tendency to dissolve under the glare of self-reflection. However, raising that question in turn threw into question the status of the w itself. If the status of “reason” itself was what was at issue - or, rather, if the status of which among many competing conceptions of rationality was at stake then it might seem more straightforward to investigate rationality itself, to see if any of those principles that made up the sociality of the agents would be able to sustain a normative allegiance to itself and would not generate paradoxes and skeptical doubts about itself within its own terms. This in turn seemed to call for an investigation of whether certain particular conceptions of rationality were inherently self-undermining and others were not, and as Hegel had come to understand the term in his Jena period, this itself would be the task of a logic. “Logic” in this sense would investigate the structure of this kind of social thought wholly within its own terms, abstracting away from its social embodiment; “l(fā)ogic” would investigate the structure of thought purely in terms of its own inferential goodness, its avoidance (or lack thereof) of paradox and self-contradiction. But if “l(fā)ogic” in this sense could itself be a selfcontained “science,” then it was no longer clear, as it gradually became apparent to Hegel in Nuremberg, whether we in fact needed the long historical introduction to the “speculative standpoint” that the 1807 Phenomenology had offered - or at least whether we needed a separate “science” that would play that role. It thus also began to seem to Hegel in Nuremberg that at most one would need only the first part of the Phenomenology to introduce the “we,” after which it could be discarded in favor of a more purely “l(fā)ogical” investigation. It would be a ladder that one kicked away once one had arrived at the proper heights. His experiences in the classroom there only confirmed that notion for him.

? ? 這一問(wèn)題后來(lái)自然地使黑格爾聯(lián)想到“科學(xué)“中成問(wèn)題的東西,因?yàn)樗F(xiàn)已理解它必然關(guān)系到的是,精神的任何構(gòu)成或完形是不是能夠保持我們的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化的忠誠(chéng),是不是能成為某些種類的東西,由于這類東西,行動(dòng)者既能自覺(jué)地定位自己,也能根據(jù)這樣的自我定位固有的“消極性“來(lái)保持這種自我定位,這種自我定位趨向于在自我反思的光環(huán)下消解。不過(guò),提出了這一問(wèn)題依次使我們陷入另一問(wèn)題即我們本身的地位問(wèn)題。如果“理性“本身的地位是成問(wèn)題的一一或更確切地說(shuō),假如關(guān)于合理性的很多不相上下的構(gòu)想的地位是成問(wèn)題的一一那么似乎可以更加直截了當(dāng)?shù)厝パ芯亢侠硇员旧?去了解任何組成行動(dòng)者社會(huì)性的原則是不是總能保持對(duì)它自己的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化的忠誠(chéng),是不是有時(shí)產(chǎn)生悖論和用黑格爾自已話說(shuō)產(chǎn)生對(duì)自身的懷疑主義式懷疑。這轉(zhuǎn)而看來(lái)要求我們做這樣的研究,就是研究關(guān)于合理性的某些具體的構(gòu)想是不是生性自拆臺(tái)腳而其他構(gòu)想?yún)s并非如此,而像黑格爾在耶拿時(shí)期就開(kāi)始理解合理性這一術(shù)語(yǔ)那樣,合理性本身應(yīng)該是邏輯學(xué)的任務(wù)。從這個(gè)意義上說(shuō),“邏輯學(xué)“誠(chéng)然完全在它自己的術(shù)語(yǔ)領(lǐng)域來(lái)研究這種社會(huì)思想的結(jié)構(gòu),并被從它的社會(huì)體現(xiàn)中提升出來(lái);“邏輯學(xué)“應(yīng)該純粹根據(jù)它自己長(zhǎng)于推論、它自己避免俚論和自相矛盾(或缺乏這一點(diǎn))來(lái)研究思想結(jié)構(gòu)。但是,如果在這一意義上的“邏輯學(xué)“可能本身就是一獨(dú)立自足的“科學(xué)“,那么它就不再是清楚明白的,因?yàn)?對(duì)于紐倫堡時(shí)期黑格爾來(lái)說(shuō)逐漸變得顯而易見(jiàn)的是,我們實(shí)際上是不是需要由1807年版《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》所提供的“思辨觀點(diǎn)“的長(zhǎng)篇?dú)v史導(dǎo)論一一或至少我們是不是需要一門應(yīng)該扮演那個(gè)角色的獨(dú)立的“科學(xué)“。因此紐倫堡時(shí)期黑格爾同樣開(kāi)始意識(shí)到,至多我們應(yīng)該僅僅需要《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》作為整個(gè)體系的第一部分來(lái)引領(lǐng)“我們“,在這第一部分之后的內(nèi)容可棄之不用而贊同進(jìn)行一項(xiàng)更為純粹的“邏輯學(xué)的“研究。整個(gè)體系第一部分應(yīng)成為一部人們一且到達(dá)合適高度就一腳踢開(kāi)的梯子。他在紐倫堡課堂教學(xué)經(jīng)歷只是使他進(jìn)一步確認(rèn)了這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)。

Going directly to “l(fā)ogic” after a “phenomenology” was nonetheless not completely foreign to him; indeed, he had done much the same thing in his last lecture series at Jena in 1806.’ But the demands forced on Hegel by his teaching duties also forced on him a certain awareness of how his own work, so recently completed, was perhaps not quite in harmony with his original intentions. In his second repeat of the Phenomenology the following year, he stressed in his introductory dictation the theme of the objective and subjective points of view and how those two points of view needed to be combined into a conception of Geist.? As he dictated to the students, each point of view - the subjective and objective - considered on its own without the incorporation of the other point of view was only “one-sided”: The objective point of view leads one to a philosophy of realism., in which the objects are seen as having a determinateness on their own, which can only be “given” to consciousness; and the subjective point of view leads one to a philosophy of (subjective) idealism., in which consciousness is seen as positing the determinateness of the world itself** The truth of the matter is, of course, the social point of view of Geist itself, the unity within which the competing strands of “realism” and “subjective idealism” are united.

? ? 然而,在“現(xiàn)象學(xué)“之后直達(dá)“邏輯學(xué)“,這對(duì)黑格爾并不完全是陌生的;實(shí)際上他早在1806年耶拿最后系列講演中就已多次做過(guò)同樣的事情。但是由教學(xué)責(zé)任所強(qiáng)加于黑格爾的要求也迫使他在菪種程度上意識(shí)到他自己的工作,也即近來(lái)完成的工作,也許和他最初的意向有點(diǎn)不一致。在他次年重講《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》過(guò)程中,他在講授導(dǎo)言部分時(shí)強(qiáng)調(diào)了客觀觀點(diǎn)和主觀觀點(diǎn)這一主題以及這兩種觀點(diǎn)多么需要融人精神這一構(gòu)想中。像他對(duì)學(xué)生講授的,每一觀點(diǎn)一一主觀觀點(diǎn)和客觀觀點(diǎn)一一如果只考慮它自已而沒(méi)有考慮整合其他觀點(diǎn),就只不過(guò)是“片面的“而已:客觀觀點(diǎn)把我們引向?qū)嵲谡撜軐W(xué),在實(shí)在論那里,對(duì)象被看作具有獨(dú)立的自決性,而對(duì)象只能被“賦予“意識(shí);主觀觀點(diǎn)把我們引向一種(主觀)唯心主義哲學(xué),在主觀唯心主義那里,意識(shí)被當(dāng)作假定世界本身的自決性看待。物質(zhì)的真理誠(chéng)然就是精神本身的社會(huì)觀點(diǎn),就是一種在其中“實(shí)在論“和“主觀唯心主義“這兩種不相上下的哲學(xué)流派得以結(jié)合的統(tǒng)一性。

But in this 1809 repeat of the Phenomenology as an introduction to philosophy, Hegel made no effort to go through the whole system.? stopping this time quite self-consciously at “reason” and proceeding not to “l(fā)ogic” but instead to “psychology.” By 1809, he had thus decided that, in his words, the “authentic doctrine of spirit” clearly lay in philosophical psychology, and the “introduction to philosophy” thus required for its successor a course in “psychology,” by which he meant a consideration of the ways in which we necessarily individually and collectively organize our conscious and self-conscious lives in terms of certain basic norms through the processes of representing, imagining, feeling, and so on. That conception stayed with him, and in 1816, in the third volume of the Science of Logic, he referred to his Phenomenology of Spirit as having its “higher truth” in his philosophical psychology, which he there explicitly called, as he had done with his students in 1809, the “authentic doctrine of spirit.”^

? ? 可是,在1809年重新把《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》作為哲學(xué)導(dǎo)言時(shí),黑格爾并沒(méi)有花工夫去審視他的整個(gè)哲學(xué)體系,他這一次極其自覺(jué)地止于“理性“,沒(méi)有推進(jìn)到“邏輯學(xué)“而推進(jìn)至“心理學(xué)?！暗?809年,他故而決定,用他的話說(shuō),“本真的精神論“顯然在于哲學(xué)心理學(xué),“哲學(xué)導(dǎo)言“因此要求后接“心理學(xué),“借此說(shuō)法他意顯著一些思考方式,借助這些思考方式,我們必須個(gè)別且集體式地組織我們的意識(shí)和自我意識(shí)的生活,根據(jù)某些基本標(biāo)準(zhǔn)且通過(guò)描述、想象、感覺(jué)等過(guò)程來(lái)組織我們的意識(shí)和自我意識(shí)的生活。這一構(gòu)想與他形影不離,而一1806年,在《邏輯學(xué)》第3編中,他提到《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》在他哲學(xué)心理學(xué)中有著“更高的真理“,《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》在這里被他明確地稱作,像他在1809年對(duì)他的學(xué)生所稱作的,“本真的精神論“

This move away from “phenomenology” to “l(fā)ogic” and “psychology” fit nicely with another matter that had been forced on Hegel.? According to Niethammer’s “General Normative,” he was required to teach a course with the formidable title “Introduction to Knowledge of the Universal Coherence of the Sciences.” Hegel interpreted that to mean that he was to give an overview of how the various philosophical sciences fit together and how they in turn were related to the more specific empirical sciences. Lacking any text on which he could rely, Hegel was forced to come up with a short compendium of his own system, which he called an “encyclopedia.” By that he meant a rigorous theoretical {missenschaftlich) arrangement and derivation of the three philosophical sciences as he saw them, which, at least by the time of his required report to Niethammer in 1812 (roughly the time at which the first volume of the Logic appeared), he had clearly demarcated as 'Logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit."'^ But what place was the Phenomenology supposed to occupy in such an “encyclopedia”? At this time, Hegel was still holding on, however tenuously, to the thought that it was still to serve as the introduction to the whole encyclopedic system, but as he thought about it more, it increasingly seemed to him that any such “phenomenology” - especially as limited to the first two sections of the original 1807 Phenomenology (“consciousness” and “selfconsciousness”) and ending in “universal self-consciousness” and “reason” - could only be a part of the structure of the “doctrine” of spirit.

? ? 從“精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)“到“邏輯學(xué)“和“心理學(xué)“的推演,非常適合黑格爾被迫關(guān)注的另一問(wèn)題。根據(jù)尼特哈黯爾的“通用標(biāo)準(zhǔn),“他被要求用使人望而生畏的標(biāo)題“科學(xué)的普遍一致的知識(shí)引論“來(lái)教授課程。黑格爾解釋道,這就意昧著他應(yīng)該對(duì)其作出總的看法的是,各種不同的哲學(xué)科學(xué)如何共生共處和它們轉(zhuǎn)而又如何與更為具體的紡驗(yàn)科學(xué)相關(guān)聯(lián)。在無(wú)任何課本可依賴情況下,黑格爾被迫拿出他自己的體系綱要來(lái)救場(chǎng),這份體系簡(jiǎn)編被他稱為“百科全書“。借這一“百科全書“,他意昧著一個(gè)嚴(yán)格的理論上的(Wissezscha/tlich)安排和哲學(xué)科學(xué)三個(gè)部分的源泉,像他把它們看作的一樣,至少到1812年他被要求向尼特哈黯爾作匯報(bào)時(shí)(大體上時(shí)在《逯輯學(xué)》第1卷問(wèn)世),這三個(gè)部分已被黑格爾清想地劃分成“邏輯學(xué)、自然哲學(xué)、精神哲學(xué)“.。“但是《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》在這樣的一部“百科全書“里應(yīng)占有何種地位呢?在這時(shí),黑格爾仍然堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為、不管是何等含糊地認(rèn)為,它仍舊應(yīng)用作整部百科全書體系的導(dǎo)言,但是隨著他多次琢磨這一做法,他日益認(rèn)識(shí)到任何這樣的“現(xiàn)象學(xué)“一一特別是限于1807年初版《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》中的開(kāi)始兩個(gè)部分(“意識(shí)“和“自我意識(shí)“)以及結(jié)尾部分的“普遍的自我意識(shí)“和“理性“的“現(xiàn)象學(xué)“一一只能是精神“學(xué)說(shuō)“的結(jié)構(gòu)的一部分。

The exigencies of Hegel’s teaching situation thus forced him to come to terms with issues on which he had been working for years, and the contingent circumstances of his arrangements quite fortuitously fit into the ways in which he was coming to think of the structure of his own still-developing system. But it also increased his ambivalence about the 1807 Phenomenology^ an ambivalence that was to last his entire life. The Nuremberg “Phenomenology” itself became only a small part of the later Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences^ his magisterial presentation of the whole “system” for use in his lectures - “phenomenology” came to be a small portion of what he called in the Encyclopedia “subjective spirit,” which itself appeared for a few pages only after much longer sections on “anthropology” and before a longer section called “psychology.” Late in his career in Berlin, he was finally to admit in print that he had in fact ceased to regard the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit as the proper “introduction” to his system. Thus, the seemingly fortuitous jump to psychology necessitated by Hegel’s teaching duties eventually became a hard-and-fast feature of his mature system of philosophy.

? ? 因此,黑格爾為解教學(xué)上的燃眉之急,迫使他對(duì)他已從事研究多年的問(wèn)題作出讓步,而他這一神來(lái)之筆卻非常幸運(yùn)地符合某些方式,他正在開(kāi)始借以思考他自已的仍處在闡發(fā)中的體系結(jié)構(gòu)的方式。可是這也增加了他對(duì)1807年版《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》的矛盾態(tài)度,這種矛盾態(tài)度他終身未解。紐倫堡時(shí)期“現(xiàn)象學(xué)“本身只成為后來(lái)《哲學(xué)科學(xué)全書》的一小部分,成了他對(duì)講演中使用的整個(gè)“體系“的權(quán)威描述。一一“現(xiàn)象學(xué)“最終成為他在《哲學(xué)科學(xué)全書》中稱作的“主觀精神“的一小部分,它本身只占幾頁(yè)紙的篇幅,而在它之前的“人類學(xué)“部分和在它之后稱作的“心理學(xué)“部分卻占有很長(zhǎng)的篇幅。后來(lái)在他柏林時(shí)期的教研歲月里、他最終在著述中承認(rèn)實(shí)際上已不再把1807年版《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》看作他的體系的適合的“導(dǎo)言“。故而,當(dāng)初黑格爾應(yīng)教學(xué)之需跳到心理學(xué),似乎這偶然一跳最終變成了他成熟的哲學(xué)體系的不可違逆的特征。

However, the problem of the status of the “we” remained with him and remained one of the most problematic aspects of his overall system of thought. Hegel’s critics generally wanted to do one of three things with that “we,” each of which he rejected. Many wanted to turn Hegel’s conception of Geist into something more akin to Schelling’s conception of the “world soul.” Some wished to dissolve the study of the “we” into an empirical, introspective study of the processes of the social or psychological constitution of our experience of the world. Others wished to jettison the “we” entirely and study only the pure forms of thought.? Hegel wanted none of these, and he often found it difficult to convince his critics that his was indeed a viable fourth option. However, the difficulty of sustaining Hegel’s conception of Geist, coupled with the metaphorical descriptions he himself gave of it, allowed many of those who would otherwise have been critics to think that they were in fact explicating Hegel himself as they propounded doctrines of empirical history, psychology, logic, or metaphysics. This continued to make Hegel into someone around whom many different people could rally, all of them continuing to see themselves mirrored in his thought.

? ? 然而“我們“的地位這一問(wèn)題依然在纏繞著他,并仍舊是他全部思想體系中最難捉摸的方面之一。黑格爾的批評(píng)家們通常想要用“我們“去做的三件事,其中每一件都被他所拒給。許多人想將黑格爾對(duì)精神的構(gòu)想變?yōu)槟撤N更類似于謝林關(guān)于“世界靈魂“的構(gòu)想的東西。一些人希望將對(duì)“我們“的研究轉(zhuǎn)化成對(duì)從社會(huì)上或心理上構(gòu)造我們的經(jīng)驗(yàn)世界的過(guò)程之研究。另一些人希望完全把“我們“撒在一邊而只研究思想的純形式。黑格爾不接受這三種想法,而他常常發(fā)覺(jué)很難使批評(píng)者們確信,他自己的想法實(shí)際上是切實(shí)可行的第四種選擇。然而.要維持黑格爾關(guān)于帶有他所賦予精神的比喻性描述的精神的構(gòu)想,這種做法恐怕難以使許多可能獨(dú)具慧眼的批評(píng)家們認(rèn)識(shí)到他們?cè)陂l釋黑格爾本人時(shí)、就像他們提出經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義歷史學(xué)、心理學(xué)、邏輯學(xué)或形而上學(xué)的學(xué)說(shuō)一樣。這就繼續(xù)使黑格爾成為一位重要人物,各色等類的人們都能居于他的麼下、他們中所有人繼續(xù)將他們自己看作反春他的思想。

The Development of Hegel’s Science of Logic in Nuremberg

Hegel’s Nuremberg dictations on “l(fā)ogic” show more clearly than his final completed work just how much he was indebted to Kant and just how much he had in fact returned to Kant in working out his own system. Hegel’s own intellectual relationship to Kant was something that he was always ready to admit and equally ready to conceal; he quite obviously possessed a bit of anxiety of influence vis-a-vis Kant, and, in fact, quite revealingly, in the draft of an 1822 letter to a friend who had first become interested in Hegel’s views after reading Kant, confessed that “1 cut my teeth on Kant’s works,” but, apparently thinking better of admitting such a thing in writing, eliminated it from the final form of the letter he actually sent."

黑格爾紐倫堡時(shí)期《邏輯學(xué)》的發(fā)展

? ? 與他最終完成的著作相比,黑格爾紐倫堡時(shí)期講授的“邏輯學(xué)“恰恰更加清晰地表明,他受惠于康德和他其實(shí)在制定出他自己的體系過(guò)程中已回到康德的程度。黑格爾自己與康德的知識(shí)關(guān)系成了樹(shù)種他總是既爽快地承認(rèn)也易于隱藏的東西;極其明顯的是,他面對(duì)康德的影響總是有點(diǎn)感到焦慮,而且實(shí)際上頗具啟迪作用的是,在1822年寫給一位讀過(guò)康德作品后開(kāi)始對(duì)黑格爾見(jiàn)解感興趣的朋友信件草稿中,黑格爾承認(rèn)“我很小就開(kāi)始閱讀康德的著作了“,但是,他顯然經(jīng)過(guò)慎重考慮該不該以信件形式承認(rèn)這件事,因?yàn)樵谒罱K實(shí)際寄出的那封信中還是刪掉了這句話.“

In working out his Logic, Hegel was particularly concerned with Kant’s theory of the “Ideas” - a concern that had animated much of his thought in Jena but which had mysteriously vanished from virtually all of the Phenomenology/ except for the Preface. Kant had argued that reason, as a faculty of inference and of linking various parts of the complex web of knowledge with each other, is always pushed by its own internal dynamic to look for “first causes,” “beginnings in time,” “atoms by which everything is constituted,” “first premises” - in other words, for the conditions that would complete what would otherwise add up to an infinite series of conditions; Kant called the representations of such completeness the “Ideas” of reason. As Kant eloquently put it in the opening statement of the Critique of Pure Reason, “human reason has this peculiar fate that... it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer.”" Reason cannot succeed because in looking for such “wholes” it goes beyond the boundaries of possible experience and finds itself making claims that it cannot redeem. Worse, it finds itself asserting equally well grounded contradictory claims, which Kant labeled the “antinomies” of reason.

? ? 在寫作《邏輯學(xué)》期間,黑格爾特別關(guān)注康德的“理念“理論一一這個(gè)關(guān)注早就激發(fā)他在耶拿時(shí)期的許多思想,而該關(guān)注實(shí)際上在整個(gè)《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》(導(dǎo)論除外)中已神秘地消失了?？档罗q稱理性,作為一種推論的和把具有各種不同部分的復(fù)雜知識(shí)網(wǎng)連接起來(lái)的官能,總是受它自己內(nèi)在動(dòng)力的推動(dòng)去尋找“第一原因“,“時(shí)間的開(kāi)端“,“組成事物的原子“,“最初前提“一一換句話說(shuō),總是受它自已內(nèi)在動(dòng)力的推動(dòng)去尋找一些條件,這些條件應(yīng)該使不然可能成為附加的一系列無(wú)限的條件臻于完美;康德稱這種完全性的表象為理性的“理念“。像康德在《純粹理性批判》的開(kāi)篇所雄辯地論述道的,“人類理性有其特殊的命運(yùn)即-.....它受某些問(wèn)題的煩擾,這些問(wèn)題,作為理性自身的本性所描繪的東西,不能被理性所忽視,而這些問(wèn)題,作為超越理性的一切力量的東西,也不能為理性所回答.“理性之所以無(wú)法獲得成功,是因?yàn)樵谡覍み@類“整體“時(shí),它總是偉越經(jīng)驗(yàn)所可能具有的界限,并發(fā)覺(jué)它自己聲稱它不能踐諾。更為糟糕的是,它發(fā)覺(jué)它自己同樣極力堅(jiān)持建立在自相矛盾基礎(chǔ)上的主張,這些主張被康德貼上理性的“二律背反“的標(biāo)簽。

However, while still in Frankfurt, Hegel had come to believe that Kant’s own line of reasoning in his later works had undermined Kant’s rigid dualisms of “concept and intuition” and “spontaneity and receptivity,” and, like almost all the post-Kantians, he entirely rejected Kant’s central notion of an unbridgeable gulf between the world of appearance and the world of things-in-themselves. The notion of a realm of unknowable things-in-themselves was rejected as an empty notion, a “mere” thought, and Hegel had special reason to reject Kant’s claim that the “wholes” toward which reason was pushed could be (as Kant called them) “transcendental illusions.” Indeed, Hegel had come to think (at least after the Phenomenology if not before) that the “wholes” toward which reason was necessarily pushed were those in terms of which the individual judgments made by agents made sense in the first place; they were the inferential structure of a distinctive way in which Geist had structured itself in a particular historical period, and the “whole of these wholes” was human history itself.

? ? 不過(guò),黑格爾還在法蘭克福時(shí)期時(shí),就開(kāi)始相信康德自己的后期著作中理路已削弱了康德關(guān)于“概念與直覺(jué)“、“自發(fā)性與感受性“的僵硬的二元論、而且像幾乎所有后康德哲學(xué)家一樣,他完全摒棄了康德關(guān)于在現(xiàn)象世界與自在之物世界之間存在著一條不可道越的鴻溝這一核心思想。關(guān)于不可知的自在之物王國(guó)這種觀念之所以遭摒棄是因?yàn)樗褪且粋€(gè)空洞無(wú)物的觀念,就是一個(gè)“純“思想,而且黑格爾有著具體理由來(lái)駁斥康德的主張即理性所被推向的“整體“可能是(像康德所稱作的)“先驗(yàn)的幻像“。實(shí)際上黑格爾早已認(rèn)為(至少在《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》問(wèn)世以后如果說(shuō)不是在此之前的話)理性所必然被推向的“整體“是一些首先從由行動(dòng)者所作出的個(gè)人判斷具有意義來(lái)說(shuō)的整體;它們是一種獨(dú)特的方式所具有的推論式結(jié)構(gòu),在這種結(jié)構(gòu)中精神在一個(gè)具體的歷史時(shí)期中自我建構(gòu),而“這些整體之整體“乃是人類歷史本身。

This line of thought suggested to him a new way of developing the “l(fā)ogic” that he had unsuccessfully attempted to write during his Jena years. As Hegel came to see it, at least by the time he began his career in Nuremberg, if logic was still conceived as the “self-articulation of the absolute,” then it would have to be conceived as the self-articulation of the inferential structure of Geist, of “mindedness” itself. Hegel’s project for his “l(fā)ogic” thus began to take shape as a kind of completion and reworking of the structures both implicitly and explicitly at work in Kant’s three Critiques once one had jettisoned the Kantian dualisms of “concept and intuition” and “things-in-themselves and appearances.” His earliest versions of an attempt at this, in his 1808-09 class on “l(fā)ogic,” are far more tied down to Kantian notions than the Logic that finally emerged from it. Hegel organized his first dictations on logic by laying out his versions of the Kantian antinomies from the Critique of Pure Reason, ordering each of them into three of his own classifications, each of which in turn was labeled the “dialectic” of its particular region.? Thus, in Hegel’s provisional view of his logic in 1808-09, the divisions consisted in the “dialectic of being,” the “dialectic of essence” and the “dialectic of unconditioned relationships,” all of which were far more closely tied into the Kantian antinomies than his final Logic turned out to be. In the same year, Hegel also taught what he called “subjective logic” that consisted in the traditional logic of concepts, judgments, and syllogistic inference; and in the published program for the Gymnasium that year, Hegel even referred to this part as “authentic logic,” a term he later used in his dictations of the 1810-11 version of the course to characterize the same thing.

? ? 這一思路使他想到一條閘發(fā)他在耶拿歲月就試圖撰寫而卻以失敗告終的“邏輯學(xué)“的新路徑。當(dāng)他開(kāi)始看到“邏輯學(xué)“的時(shí)候,至少到他開(kāi)始紐倫堡時(shí)期事業(yè)時(shí),如果說(shuō)邏輯學(xué)仍舊被想象為“絕對(duì)自身的系統(tǒng)展現(xiàn)“的話,那么“邏輯學(xué)“將不得不被想象為精神和“思想“本身的推論性結(jié)構(gòu)的自我系統(tǒng)展現(xiàn)。黑格爾的“邏輯學(xué)“計(jì)劃因此開(kāi)始表現(xiàn)為一種對(duì)某些結(jié)構(gòu)的完成和重組,人們一旦摒棄康德關(guān)于“概念與直觀“、“自在之物與現(xiàn)象“的二元論,就會(huì)看到這些結(jié)構(gòu)在康德的三大《批判》中既起著含蓄的作用也起著明顯的作用。他對(duì)此所做的嘗試的最早版本,在他1808至1809年講授的“邏輯學(xué)“課上,更多的受到康德思想的牽制而非出之于“邏輯課“上的《邏輯學(xué)》。黑格爾撰寫最初邏輯學(xué)講義,借助的是展開(kāi)他對(duì)康德《純粹理性批判》二律背反的看法,并把每一二律背反列人他自己的三種分類中,每一種分類轉(zhuǎn)而貼上它具體領(lǐng)域的“辯證“標(biāo)簽。所以,在黑格爾關(guān)于他1808至1809年間邏輯學(xué)的臨時(shí)觀點(diǎn)中,這些劃分在于“存在的辯證法“、“本質(zhì)的辯證法“和“絕對(duì)關(guān)系的辯證法“,所有這三個(gè)部分都更加貼近康德的二律背反而非他最終完成的《邏輯學(xué)》在這同一年里,黑格爾還講授了他所稱作的“主觀邏輯學(xué)“,內(nèi)容包括傳統(tǒng)邏輯學(xué)中的概念、判斷、演繹推論;在那年為預(yù)科學(xué)校發(fā)布的綱要中,黑格爾甚至把這個(gè)部分說(shuō)成是“本真的邏輯學(xué),“這個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ)被他后來(lái)用在他1810至1811年課程講義中以描述相同事物的特點(diǎn)。“

By 1808—09, *^he overall structure of the “l(fā)ogic” that was to emerge gradually in three volumes in 1812, 1813, and 1816 had become clear to Hegel, even if it were true, as he told Niethammer in 1808, that he had hardly laid the foundation” for such a work in Jena (an indication, if nothing else, of how unsatisfied he had become with his very substan- tial earlier attempts at such a “l(fā)ogic” there).'’* Nonetheless, since he had to teach logic for the next few years in the Gymnasium^ he had more time to work out his ideas on the subject, and he apparently used virtually all of his free time to work on what would become the publishable form of his Science of Logic. His list of classes on “Logic” and the student dictations from that period show that he was immersed in working through the material and was developing his own views on the matter quite rapidly. After the very Kantian course in “Logic” in 180809, he again taught two logic classes in 1809-10: a lower division class (the Unterklasse, restricted to fourteen- to fifteen-year-olds) in which he taught a very simplified form of his own reconstruction of traditional syllogistic logic, mentioning only in passing his own understanding of what was at stake in his grander plan for a “Logic”; and a more advanced section for the highest class in the Gymnasium (the Oberklasse), which he described in the Gymnasium'’s program that year as a class in which “l(fā)ogic in its full extension would be treated, with however the exclusion of the objective or transcendental logic.

? ? 到1808至1809年間,在1812年、1813年、1816年逐漸出現(xiàn)在三編中的“邏輯學(xué)“的整體結(jié)構(gòu)黑格爾已成竹在胸,盡管的確如此,像他1808年告訴尼特哈黯爾的,他在耶拿時(shí)期他“很難“為這樣的一本著作“打下基礎(chǔ)“(言外之意是,如果沒(méi)有其他什么東西的話,他是多么不滿意自己早期對(duì)這樣一種“邏輯學(xué)“所作的實(shí)質(zhì)性嘗試)?！叭欢?既然他接下來(lái)幾年必須在預(yù)科學(xué)校講授邏輯學(xué),他就要拿出更多的時(shí)間來(lái)思考關(guān)于這門課的想法、而且顯然他實(shí)際上把他的全部空閑時(shí)間都用來(lái)撰寫將可以拿去發(fā)表的《邏輯學(xué)》上。他這一時(shí)期“邏輯學(xué)“課程表和學(xué)生名單表明,他在潛心搜集材料并且很快閘發(fā)他自己關(guān)于問(wèn)題的見(jiàn)解。在1808至1809學(xué)年講授康德的“邏輯學(xué)“課程之后,他在1809至1810學(xué)年再度講授兩個(gè)班級(jí)的邏輯學(xué):一個(gè)初級(jí)班(Urzterklasse,僅限于14至15歲學(xué)生),在這個(gè)班上他講授一種極其簡(jiǎn)單的他自己重組后的傳統(tǒng)演繹邏輯學(xué),只是提到他對(duì)于“邏輯學(xué)“宏大計(jì)劃中存在的問(wèn)題的理解;一個(gè)高級(jí)班(Operkliasse)即預(yù)科學(xué)校的頂級(jí)班,這個(gè)班被他在那年的預(yù)科學(xué)校計(jì)劃中描述為這樣一個(gè)班級(jí),在該班里“完全外延的邏輯學(xué)得到論述,但是客觀的或先驗(yàn)的邏輯學(xué)不在講授之列“?！?br>

By 1810-11, Hegel’s conception of his “l(fā)ogic” as central to his overall conception of the role of philosophy in modern life finally had emerged quite clearly in his dictation to his class, in which he contrasted the “heteronomous” conception of a “given” with the way in which (modern, “l(fā)ogical”) thought has for its object only “itself in an autonomous manner.”'* The analogy Hegel was drawing is obvious: The terms “heteronomy” and “autonomy” had been used by Kant to designate manners of action; and only autonomous action, so Kant had argued, was fully moral. Hegel thus conceived his “l(fā)ogic” as fulfilling an ethical mission for modern people; it taught them to think without “given” foundations, to accept only that which they could come to validate for themselves. By 1810 (if not earlier) Hegel had clearly come to believe that the discipline of logic in modern life had to be a self-founding enterprise (a view which contradicted his 1804-05 view that logic itself depended on something else that at the time he had called “metaphysics”). Indeed, as his thought matured, Hegel came to think that such a logic would be the very paradigm of modern self-founding practice, of thinking without anything except self-constructed foundations. The Logic and not the Phenomenology., therefore, would henceforth serve as the linchpin of his system of philosophy.

? ? 到1810至1811學(xué)年,黑格爾把他的“邏輯學(xué)“設(shè)想成哲學(xué)在現(xiàn)代生活中所扮演的角色全部構(gòu)想的中心,這種構(gòu)想最終在他的課堂講授中已經(jīng)呼之欲出,在課堂講授中,他將“他律的““給予“這一構(gòu)想與一種方式作比照,借助這種方式(現(xiàn)代“邏輯的“)思想對(duì)于它的對(duì)象來(lái)說(shuō)只是倬“它自己處在一種自治的形式“.“黑格爾在作出的類排是顯而易見(jiàn)的:“他律“和“自律“被康德用來(lái)指明行為的方式;因此康德堅(jiān)稱,只有自律的行為才是完全符合道德的。黑格爾因此把他的“邏輯學(xué)“設(shè)想為完成現(xiàn)代人的倫理使命,他的“邏輯學(xué)“教導(dǎo)現(xiàn)代人在沒(méi)有“給定的“基礎(chǔ)上去思考,去接受只對(duì)現(xiàn)代人自已有效的東西。到1810年(如果說(shuō)不是更早的話)黑格爾顯然已經(jīng)開(kāi)始認(rèn)為現(xiàn)代生活中邏輯學(xué)學(xué)科必須成為一項(xiàng)自我建構(gòu)的事業(yè)(這一看法同他1804至1805年的看法相抵特,那時(shí)他認(rèn)為邏輯學(xué)本身依賴其他某種東西、這種東西在那時(shí)被他稱作“形而上學(xué)“)。實(shí)際上,黑格爾開(kāi)始認(rèn)為這樣的一種邏輯學(xué)應(yīng)該成為現(xiàn)代自我建構(gòu)實(shí)踐的特有范式,應(yīng)該成為除了自我建構(gòu)基礎(chǔ)之外什么都不考慮的范式。邏輯學(xué)而非《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》故而從此之后應(yīng)該挑起他哲學(xué)體系的大梁。

By the middle of his sojourn in Nuremberg, Hegel’s “l(fā)ogic” had thus taken its shape as the key element of his own emerging philosophical system with which he wanted to provide the overall structure and legitimation of post-Napoleonic European life. If the university was to be the driving agent of reformed modern life, and if philosophy was to be the apex of the modern university, and if logic was the basic study at work in all philosophy, then logic itself had to be rethought in a nondogmatic fashion. Self-grounding “l(fā)ogic” would teach us how to think as free, enlightened moderns.

? ? 到他在紐倫堡逗留的中期,黑格爾的“邏輯學(xué)“因此初步成為他自己的形成的哲學(xué)體系中關(guān)鍵元素并且憑借“邏輯學(xué)“他想要提供后拿破侖歐洲生活全面結(jié)構(gòu)和合法性。如果說(shuō)大學(xué)通常是改革現(xiàn)代生活的推動(dòng)者,如果說(shuō)哲學(xué)是現(xiàn)代大學(xué)中至高無(wú)上的東西,如果說(shuō)邏輯學(xué)是在所有哲學(xué)中運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)的基礎(chǔ)學(xué)科,那么邏輯學(xué)本身就必須被以非教條的方式重新思考。以自我為基礎(chǔ)的“邏輯學(xué)“能夠教會(huì)我們?nèi)绾巫鳛樽杂傻?、文明的現(xiàn)代人來(lái)進(jìn)行思考。

The Science of Logic

Hegel began his Science of Logic with his characteristic bravado: Our modern era, he said, had a profound need for a philosophy to comprehend it, and his Logic, he said, was to be just that. Because, as he put it, “the complete transformation which philosophical thought among us has undergone in the last twenty five years and the higher standpoint reached by spirit in its self-consciousness have had but little influence as yet on the structure of logic,” he had been required “to begin once again at the beginning”'^ - strong stuff from a relatively unknown writer who was at the time still only a Gymnasium professor with unfulfilled aspirations for university employment.

《邏輯學(xué)》

? ? 黑格爾以他富有特征的宏大氣魄開(kāi)始了他的《邏輯學(xué)》:現(xiàn)時(shí)代,他說(shuō)道,深切地需要一種哲學(xué)以理解我們的時(shí)代,而他的《邏輯學(xué)》,他說(shuō)道,必將擔(dān)當(dāng)起這一大任。因?yàn)?像他論述的一樣,“我們哲學(xué)思想在過(guò)去25年所經(jīng)歷的完整的轉(zhuǎn)型,和由精神在自我意識(shí)中所達(dá)到的更高觀點(diǎn),對(duì)邏輯學(xué)結(jié)構(gòu)產(chǎn)生的影響依舊微乎其微“,他早就被要求“對(duì)邏輯學(xué)另起爐灶“一一豐富的資料來(lái)自于一個(gè)相對(duì)名不見(jiàn)經(jīng)傳的作家,一個(gè)那時(shí)仍然胸懷被大學(xué)聘用抱負(fù)的預(yù)科學(xué)校教師。