8 From the Phenomenology to the “System”:
Hegel’s Logic
第8章 從《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》到“體系“:(2)
The Science of Logic was in a fundamental way Hegel’s elaboration once more of Holderlin’s central insight. Rejecting Fichte’s “subjective idealism,” which held that since nothing can count for the “I,” the “subject” of knowledge, unless it actively takes it up, Holderlin had argued that such judgmental activity on the part of the knowing agent already presupposes a unity of thought and being, a way of orienting ourselves that forms a “horizon” of all our conscious life without itself being an object of conscious life itself To make judgments, we must distinguish “subject” from “object,” but we should not take that division itself as primary, as being somehow bedrock. To do that is to fall onto the mistaken path that leads to the eternal see-sawing between “realism” and “subjective idealism” in modern philosophy. Indeed, on Holderlin’s view, that kind of fundamental orientation in terms of this primordial unity is prior to the divisions inherent in “consciousness” itself.
? ? 在《邏輯學(xué)》中黑格爾以一種基本方法再次詳細(xì)論述荷爾德林的核心見解。荷爾德林摒棄費希特的“主觀唯心主義“,因為這種唯心主義認(rèn)為沒有什么可以對“自我“和知識的“主體“有價值,除非它積極地去理解“自我“,繼而荷爾德林力主能知的行動者所作出的這樣的判斷活動已假定了一種思想與存在的統(tǒng)一,這種判斷活動已假定的一種引導(dǎo)我們自己的方式形成一種關(guān)于我們?nèi)坑幸庾R生活的“視域“而它自身沒有成為有意識生活自身的對象。為作出判斷,我們必須區(qū)分“主體“和“客體“,而我們不應(yīng)將區(qū)分本身看作第一位的,看作枸種方式的基礎(chǔ)。這樣做就會走上錯誤道路,就會導(dǎo)致現(xiàn)代哲學(xué)中“唯心主義“和“主觀唯心主義“的永次分裂。實際上,按照荷爾德林的看法,這種根據(jù)原始統(tǒng)一的基本定位優(yōu)先于“意識“本身內(nèi)在的區(qū)分。
What seems to have been part of Hegel’s development of Holderlin’s account had to do with his drawing the conclusion from Holderlin’s thoughts that for Holderlin truth itself had to be a totally primitive conception, not something that could itself be defined in any other terms and nonetheless was not the “object” of any sort of an “intellectual intuition.” Whereas Holderlin, however, had seen all judgment as a rupture of that fundamental unity, Hegel drew a quite different conclusion. In his view, the conception of truth as a “primitive” concept was in part correct, but already in the Phenomenology and in some of his earlier manuscripts, he had developed Holderlin’s insight into a conviction that the prior unity of thought and being of which Holderlin spoke in fact should be conceived as an intersubjective unity of mutually recognizing agents. We do not begin reflection as isolated individual agents, each of which would be encapsulated in his own experiences and would only apply conceptual form to his experiences or infer on the basis of them whether there is a world at all corresponding to them. Instead, we begin within a way of life, as “one among many,” and the selfconsciousness of each consists not only in his locating himself in that “social space” of shared norms, entitlements, and commitments, but in each also being self-conscious of the others’ self-conscious status. That necessity for understanding each other as different points of view within one social space necessarily introduced a kind of skepticism and rupture into that original, primordial sense of “truth.”
? ? 看來成為黑格爾對荷爾德林描述的發(fā)展內(nèi)容關(guān)系到他從荷爾德林想法中得出的結(jié)論,也就是說,在荷爾德林看來,真理本身必須是一種完全原始的構(gòu)想,而不是一種東西,這種東西本身不能被任何其他術(shù)語所定義,不過亦非任何種類的“理智直觀“的對象。然而,盡管荷爾德林早就把一切判斷都看作基本統(tǒng)一的斷裂,黑格爾卻得出個截然不同的結(jié)論。照他的看法,真理作為一種“原始“概念的構(gòu)想對錯參半,但是關(guān)于真理的構(gòu)想已見于《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》和他早期某些手稿中,在那里他已把荷爾德林的真知灼見發(fā)展為一種信念一一荷爾德林說的思想與存在的優(yōu)先統(tǒng)一,其實應(yīng)被設(shè)想為相互意識的行動者主體間的統(tǒng)一。我們不是作為離群索居的個體行動者開始反思的,我們每個人都總是圍于自已的經(jīng)驗并只是把概念的形式應(yīng)用于自己的經(jīng)驗,或在此基礎(chǔ)上推斷是不是存在一個完全和我們相對應(yīng)的世界。恰恰相反,我們憑借一種生活方式開始,我們作為“多中之一“開始,而每個人的自我意識不但在于每個人都要確定自己在共享的規(guī)范、權(quán)利和義務(wù)的“社會空間“地位,而且還在于每個人都要意識到其他自我意識的地位。我們必須在某一社會空間領(lǐng)域把彼此理解為具有不同的觀點,這就必然把一種懷疑主義和斷裂引人“真理“的原初或原始的意義。
Hegel’s major insight in his own .Logic had to do with the way in which he transformed Holderlin’s conception of a “unity” that preceded all acts of judgment into his own idiom, while remaining consistent with his views as they were articulated in the Phenomenology. Although understanding the nature of judgment as central, Hegel nonetheless began his Logic not with the notion of a judgment at all but with the more abstract conception, as he put it, of “pure knowing” itself The Logic thus began not so much with a judgment as with a general “thought” about the world, which showed by virtue of its own internal inadequacies the necessity for making discursive judgments at all (and, ultimately, the necessity for making certain kinds of discursive judgments).? Thus, famously, Hegel began his book with the category of ‘‘‘'being, pure being - without any further determination,” a “thought” that already included within itself Holderlin’s conception of the primordial unity of thought and being and of a “truth” that was prior to any particular articulation of some other set of truths.'**
? ? 黑格爾在《邏輯學(xué)》中主要見解關(guān)系到一種方式,借此方式他將荷爾德林關(guān)于一種先于所有判斷活動的“統(tǒng)一“的構(gòu)想變?yōu)樗约旱娘L(fēng)格特征,同時仍然與他自己在《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》中所表述的觀點相一致。黑格爾雖然將判斷的本質(zhì)理解為中心,卻根本不是以判斷的觀點來開始他的《邏輯學(xué)5》,而是以“純認(rèn)識“本身這一更為抽象的概念開始他的《邏輯學(xué)》,像他論述的一樣。因此《邏輯學(xué)》開端中的判斷沒有關(guān)于世界的一般“思想“多,邏輯學(xué)憑借它自已的內(nèi)在的非適當(dāng)性證明完全有必要作出推論性判斷(最終完全有必要作出某種推論性判斷)。所以,眾所周知,黑格爾以“存在,純存在一一無需作任何進(jìn)一步的規(guī)定“的范疇作為他《邏輯學(xué)》這部著作的開篇,這樣的范疇作為“思想“已經(jīng)包含在荷爾德林關(guān)于思想與存在原始統(tǒng)一的構(gòu)想本身中和包含在一種先于對某些其他一系列真理作任何具體系統(tǒng)閘述的“真理“中。|
Hegel’s argument was that the simple and primary act of thinking involved in trying to articulate that sense of the unity of thought and being - of “being, pure being” - immediately generated various paradoxes and tensions from within itself as we attempted to articulate it.? Hblderlin had thought that the rupture in that unity was somehow brought about by us; Hegel, on the other hand, argued that it was implicit in the very nature of the unity itself that our effort to think about it exposed those internal tensions in the thought itself The rupture, as it were, between thought and being, the way in which all our attempts at “getting it right” sometimes fail, is brought about by the act of judgment itself, which was itself required once “thought,” in Hegel’s idiom, understood itself to be generating such paradoxes. The air of great paradox with which Hegel began his Logic — the assertion that “Being” and “Nothing” were the same - was intended by Hegel to bring out just how paradoxical that primordial unity of thought and being actually is when taken on its own. What for Hblderlin had been a sense of “oneness” that is always and eternally there framing the essential discordances of our conscious lives was shown by Hegel to be not so harmonious, to be itself riddled with tensions that required us to undertake further judgmental commitments in order to make sense of the kinds of basic judgments that were required of us to be judging agents at all.
? ? 黑格爾所要論證的是,思想的簡單而最初活動涉及試圖清晰表述思想與存在的統(tǒng)一的意義一一“存在,純存在“的意義一一從思想自身中直接產(chǎn)生各種不同的悖論和張力,像我們試圖清晰表述的一樣。荷爾德林早就認(rèn)為統(tǒng)一中的斷裂從某種角度上說由我們造成;另一方面,黑格爾論證道,我們努力思考“存在“,此舉暴露思想自身中的那些內(nèi)在張力,這暗含于統(tǒng)一自身特有的本質(zhì)中。似乎,思想與存在之間的斷裂,或我們?yōu)榱藴?zhǔn)確理解事物所作的一切嘗試有時因其而前功盡棄的方面,是由判斷本身這一活動所引起的,判斷本身就需要曾經(jīng)的“思想“,以黑格爾的風(fēng)格,判斷本身就需要被理解為產(chǎn)生這樣的悖論。黑格爾在其《逯輯學(xué)》的開篇就大肆渣染悖論一一斷言“存在“與“虛無“是同一個東西一一意在表明思想與存在的原始統(tǒng)一在被孤立地理解時實際上恰總是多么荒謬絕倫。荷爾德林眼中作為“統(tǒng)一性“意識總是且始終限制我們意識生活的基本不和諧,這樣的意識被黑格爾證明不是十分和諧的,證明本身充滿著張力,這就要求我們承擔(dān)進(jìn)一步的判斷義務(wù)以搞清某類基本判斷,亦即我們所要求的對行動者作出全面判斷之判斷。
Very generally, Hegel thought that in trying to articulate that primordial unity of thought and being, the sense that we are always at some deep level “in touch” with the world and that the forces of skeptical doubt cannot forever undermine that for us, we come to comprehend that the reassurance that we necessarily seek - the reassurance that we really are in touch with the world, that thought and being really are not irrevocably divorced from each other — can only appear at the end of a logical development, that the reassurance comes in articulating the whole “space of reasons,” the “Idea,” within which our judgmental activity necessarily moves. What drives us to complete that “whole,” to develop the “space of reasons” within the terms it sets for itself, are the paradoxes that such attempts generate prior to their inclusion and resolution within that whole. Hegel’s term for that resolution was '‘‘'Aufhehung,^'’ since in German that word carried (almost paradoxically itself) the disparate meanings of “canceling,” “raising,” and “preserving.” His point in using the term was to highlight the way in which our commitments bring certain logical stresses and strains within themselves that are necessary when viewed from the standpoint of the totality of the “space of reasons,” that are also never fully abolished but always remain with us, and which finally do not prove to be destructive of the “whole” once their places and functions within that whole are properly understood.
? ? 通常,黑格爾認(rèn)為,在設(shè)法清想描述思想與存在的原始統(tǒng)一時,在試圖清楚描述我們總是在某種深層次“接觸“世界的意義時,在試圖清楚描述懷疑主義懷疑的力量在我們看來永遠(yuǎn)無法削弱這種“接觸“的意義時,我們就開始領(lǐng)悟我們所必然追尋的再保證一一我們所真正接觸世界的再保證,或思想與存在所真正無法避免地彼此分離的再保證一一只能出現(xiàn)在邏輯推演的結(jié)尾,這樣的再保證登場在于清晰描述全部的“理性空間“,清晰描述“觀念“,這些東西是我們的判斷活動所必須進(jìn)人的。促使我們?nèi)ナ埂罢w“臻于完美的,促使我們?nèi)ラl發(fā)在整體為自己設(shè)置的術(shù)語中的“理性空間“的,就是這樣一些悖論,它們由這樣些嘗試所生,先于它們的結(jié)論和解決辦法。黑格爾為了解決問題所用的術(shù)語就是“Axufhepxuzg“,因瑟〕牙」′」E毛逞菖奠i…′…【吾中菩量疊個i司(本身幾乎是悖論式地)含有“取消“》、“提出“和“保存“這些不同的意思。他運用這個術(shù)語的意圖在于凸顯一種方式,借此方式我們的義務(wù)自身帶來枸種邏輯上的強(qiáng)調(diào)和張力是必要的,當(dāng)這些強(qiáng)調(diào)和張力被從“理性空間“的總體性觀點來看待的時候,這些強(qiáng)調(diào)和張力同樣也絕不會被“整體“消除而總是與我們形影不離,而且這些強(qiáng)調(diào)和張力最終不會被證明是對“整體“有破壞性的,條件是它們在整體中的位置和作用被作出適當(dāng)?shù)睦斫狻?br>
Beginning with “being,” “pure being” generates the paradoxical, contradictory assertion that “being” and “nothing” are the same. The problem with the putatively “pure thought” of “pure, indeterminate being” is that it contains nothing within itself to distinguish that thought from the thought of “nothing.” That distinction is made only when one articulates the so-called “pure thoughts” of “being” and “nothing” and realizes in doing so that one is in fact speaking of “becoming,” of things coming-to-be and passing away.'^ Thus, when one tries to express the so-called thought of “pure being,” of the notion that the world just “is” even if we can say nothing else about it, one thereby also licenses an inference to the conception that being and nothing are the same. The attempt at making a judgment about the “pure thought” ends up licensing what looks like a self-contradiction.? That self-contradiction vanishes only when one makes explicit that one is in fact saying something more and something different than one originally expressed - one is asserting more than just “being,” that “the world is,” one is making the judgment that something, some one determinate thing or another, comes to be, remains, or passes away.
? ? 以“存在“、“純存在“為開端則產(chǎn)生悖論式的、自相矛盾的論斷即“存在“與“虛無“是同一個東西。關(guān)于“純粹、非規(guī)定存在“的推論式“純思想“的問題乃是它自身中沒有包含任何東西以區(qū)分思想和“虛無“思想。這種區(qū)分只有在下列時刻才會產(chǎn)生:人們清清楚地說明關(guān)于“存在“與“虛無“這些所謂“純思想“,并且意識到在這樣做過程中人們其實是在談及“變易“,在談及生成和逝去的東西,因此,當(dāng)人們試圖表達(dá)“純存在“的所謂思想時,當(dāng)人們試圖表達(dá)這樣的想法即世界僅僅“是“甚至對于它我們說不出任何其他東西時,我們因此同樣也是認(rèn)可一種關(guān)于存在與虛無是相同的東西這一構(gòu)想的推論。試圖作出關(guān)于“純思想“的判斷,這種嘗試終結(jié)了對看似自相矛盾東西的認(rèn)可。這種自相矛盾只有在人們弄清楚下面情況時才會消失:人們其實是在說更多的東西和不同的東西而非原初表述的東西一一人們在斷言的不只是“存在“和“世界是什么“,人們在作出判斷一一某物或某個被規(guī)定的東西生成、存在,或消逝。
The initial and core paradox that animates the “Doctrine of Being” is that which arises when we attempt to articulate the unity of thought and being, for it would seem that this “Being” taken simply as the prereflective “whole” of which Holderlin spoke is indistinguishable, at that level of articulation, from “nothing,” yet it is also just as clearly distinguishable from it. The difficulty in stating that distinction and articulation of the other commitments one implicitly undertakes in stating it begins the procedure by which the other structures of judgment are developed.
? ? 激起“存在論“的最初和核心的悖論乃是在我們試圖清想說明思想與存在的統(tǒng)一時所引起的東西,因為通常看起來好像這種“存在“被簡單地看作荷爾德林所說的前反思“整體“的“存在“是無法和虛無相區(qū)分的,然而在這種結(jié)合的層面上它也恰恰可與“虛無“清楚地相區(qū)分。困難在于區(qū)分和清楚地說明人們在論述存在時所潛在地承諾的義務(wù),這個困難開啟了其他判斷的結(jié)構(gòu)借以被閘發(fā)的程序.
Hegel divided his Logic into what he called three “books”: Being, Essence, and Concept. The rationale for the division was that there was a different “l(fā)ogic” - the normative structure of our entitlements, commitments, and the paradoxes they generate - depending on the kinds of judgmental relations of which we were speaking.
? ? 黑格爾把他的《邏輯學(xué)》分成他所稱作的三“編“:存在,本質(zhì),和概念。這種劃分的全部理由是存在一種不同的“遞輯學(xué)“一一我們的權(quán)利、義務(wù)和由兩者所產(chǎn)生的悖論的規(guī)范結(jié)構(gòu)一一這些取決于我們所論及的種種判斷關(guān)系。
The “Doctrine of Being” concerns itself with the kinds of judgments we make about finite entities that come to be and pass away, which itself includes commitments to three general types of judgments: Those relating to the qualitative aspects of things that come to be and pass away, those relating to the quantitative aspects of such things, and those relating to the ways in which our judgments about qualitative and quantitative things are combined (as when, for example, we say that streams grow larger and become rivers), which Hegel calls judgments of “measure.” In each of these types of judgment, we are orienting ourselves within a conception of a “whole,” the “infinite” that legitimates and guides our judgmental activities. In the section on “quality,” the infinite is specified as the world process as a whole, the way in which the coming-to-be and passing-away of the world is conceived as an infinite series of comings-to-be and passings-away. Taken as a whole, the world-process is thus self-contained; it is, in Hegel’s terms, a “being-for-itself,” not a being for something different from and outside of itself (such as a supernaturally conceived deity). This conception of “qualitative infinity” is also ideal. We never encounter the “whole” of the world-process within our own experience, but we must have a conceptual grasp of it (as “Idea,” in Hegel’s language) in order to be able to think about it in the first place. This constitutes, as Hegel puts it, the “ideality of being-for-itself as totality.”^’ “Ideality,” he says, “can be called the quality of infinity”;^^ or, as he also puts it, “the proposition, that the finite is ideal, constitutes idealism.
? ? “存在論“關(guān)心的是我們對處在生成與消逝中的有限實體所作出的各種判斷,這本身包含著對三種一般類型的判斷的承諾:那些關(guān)于生成和消逝的事物的定性方面判斷,那些關(guān)于這種事物的定量方面判斷,那些關(guān)于能將我們質(zhì)量上和數(shù)量上的判斷相結(jié)合的方式的判斷(警如,像當(dāng)我們說溪流變大且成為河流時一樣),這三類判斷被黑格爾稱作“尼度“的判斷。在這三類判斷的每一類中,我們在倬判斷合法化和指引判斷活動的“整體“和“無限“的構(gòu)想過程中自我引導(dǎo)。在關(guān)于“質(zhì)“的部分,無限被具體化成作為整體的世界過程,以這樣的方式,世界的生成和消逝被設(shè)想成為一系列無限的生成和消逝。由于被看作整體,世界進(jìn)程因此是自我包容的;用黑格爾術(shù)語說,它是一個“自為存在“,而非為不同于某物且它自身的枸物的存在(例如超自然地被構(gòu)想出來的神)?！百|(zhì)的無限“這一構(gòu)想同樣是理想化的:我們絕不會在我們自己的經(jīng)驗中碰到世界進(jìn)程的“整體“,而我們必須在概念上對它加以把握(把它理解為“觀念“,用黑格爾的語言說)以便能夠首先恩考它。這就構(gòu)成,像黑格爾論述的,“作為總體的自為存在的理想“.““理想“,他說道,“可稱為無限的質(zhì)“;“或者說,像他同樣論述的,“這一命題,即有限是理想,構(gòu)成了晶心主義“
The section on “quantity” shows how the conceptual grasp of the “infinite” in the differential and integral calculus in effect answers the charges (made among others by Kant) that we can have no conceptual grasp of the infinite that is not already founded in some kind of immediate experience of the infinite.^'* The quantitative infinite is thus also ideal., it is not an object - not even something like an “infinitesimal,” conceived as a quantity that is greater than zero and smaller than any natural number, an idea that Hegel sarcastically dismissed, alluding to D’Alembert, with the remark, “it seemed perfectly clear that such an intermediate state, as it was called, between being and nothing does not exist.The quantitative infinite is to be represented in the formulas of the calculus that express iterative operations, not “infinitesimals.” In Hegel’s idealism, there is simply nothing more to the quantitative infinite than what is expressed in such formulas, and the quantitative infinite is thus ideal, since it is never grasped in some individual experience of things but is comprehended fully and truly only in thought, in the formulas of the integral and differential calculus.
? ? 關(guān)于“量“的部分證明了微積分中從概念上把握“無限“實際上如何回答了(由康德等人所發(fā)出的)請難一一我們無法從觀念上把握無限,因為無限并非總是奠基于某種對于無限的直接經(jīng)驗.“這種量上的無限因此同樣也是理想化的;它不是一個對象一-甚至不是像“無限小“一樣的某種東西,甚至不是被設(shè)想為一種大于零而小于任何自然數(shù)的量的東西,量無限這一想法被黑格爾所摒棄并大加嘲諷,黑格爾提到達(dá)朗貝爾時作了這樣的評論,“似乎極其清楚的是,有與無之間不存在這種媒介狀態(tài),像它被稱作的一樣.“這種量上的無限應(yīng)以表達(dá)反復(fù)的運轉(zhuǎn)而非“無限小“的微積分公式來描述。在黑格爾的唯心主義那里,簡直就不存在比用這種微積分公式所表述的量上無限多的東西,而量上的無限因此是理想化的,因為它絕不能用個人對事物的某些經(jīng)驗來把握,而只能在思想中憑借微積分形式完全而真實地加以領(lǐng)悟。
In making such qualitative and quantitative judgments about the world as a whole and uniting them in judgments of “measure,” we seem to commit ourselves to a set of judgments different in normative structure from those articulated in the “Doctrine of Being.” The “Doctrine of Being” seems to commit us to a conception of a world that seems to be the substrate of such qualitative and quantitative features of itself without itself being either qualitative or quantitative “in itself.” These kinds of judgments are articulated in the “Doctrine of Essence,” which thus concerns itself with the normative structures of judgments that have to do with our distinguishing how the world appears to us from the way it really is. Indeed, the initial and the core paradox that motivates the development of the “Doctrine of Essence” is the skeptical assertion that what “seems to be” cannot be equivalent to what “really is the case,” since it apparently requires us to make judgments about what is the case all the while asserting that we cannot know what is the case. Such judgments thus always presume a grasp “in thought” of two elements, the appearance and that which is appearing; and without such a grasp of the “whole” in thought (a conception of the whole of “the world in itself as appearing to us”), we could not even begin to make the kinds of ordinary skeptical judgments that we do make (such as when we doubt whether something really is the way it looks).
? ? 在對作為整體的世界作出這樣的量的判斷和質(zhì)的判斷時,在用“尺度“的判斷來結(jié)合它們時,我們看來必須去論述一套有別于規(guī)范結(jié)構(gòu)中那些被“存在論“所詳細(xì)描述的判斷。“存在論“似乎要求我們?nèi)パ芯窟@樣一個構(gòu)想一一世界似乎成了它本身的這種質(zhì)上和量上的特征的基質(zhì),沒有了世界本身,也就不存在“自在“的質(zhì)上和量上的特征。這些種類的判斷在“本質(zhì)論“中得到系統(tǒng)地論述,“本質(zhì)論“因此關(guān)注判斷的規(guī)范化結(jié)構(gòu),這種判斷關(guān)系到我們區(qū)分世界如何呈現(xiàn)在我們面前和世界所真正具有的存在方式。實際上,促使“本質(zhì)論“推演的最初和核心的悖論是懷疑主義式的斷言一“似乎存在的東西“不能等同于“真實的情況“,因為顯然它要求我們作出關(guān)于真實情況的判斷,始終斷言我們無法知道真實情況。這樣的判斷故而總是假設(shè)“思想“把握了兩種元素,現(xiàn)象與顯現(xiàn)出來的東西;沒有思想對“整體“的這種把握(一種關(guān)于“作為顯現(xiàn)在我們面前的自在世界“的整體的構(gòu)想),我們甚至不能開始作樹些種類的日常懷疑主義的判斷,而我們確實作出了這類判斷(例如當(dāng)我們懷疑某物是不是確實是它看起來的樣子)。
What explains the way things “seem” to be is called the “essence” of the “appearance,” and the various paradoxes that arise in the “Doctrine of Essence” thus have to do with the problems encountered when we reflectively make the link between various appearances and that of which we take them to be appearances. Ultimately, so Hegel argued, such kinds of judgments presume a conception of the world as one substance that necessarily manifests itself to judging agents in certain typical ways, and this substance behaves according to “causal relationships” among the various “accidents” of the substance. However, Hegel went on to conclude, the Spinozistic notion of substance to which we become committed by virtue of making judgments about appearances and what appears - that to which Jacobi had always asserted that any rationalist metaphysics leads - itself generates various paradoxes about causality itself, such that the resolution of those paradoxes requires a doctrine of the “whole” as a self-sufficient system of interactive, reciprocal causation.
? ? 解釋事物“似乎“存在的樣式稱作“現(xiàn)象“的“本質(zhì)“,“本質(zhì)論“所提出的各種不同的悖論因此關(guān)系到我們有時碰到的某些問題,其時我們反思式地弄清各種不同的現(xiàn)象與我們把它們看作現(xiàn)象的東西之間的聯(lián)系。最終,所以黑格爾論證道,這些種類的判斷假定了世界作為枸種實體的構(gòu)想,這種實體必然以某些典型的方式展現(xiàn)在能夠作出判斷的行動者面前,這種實體是根據(jù)實體各種不同“偶性“之間的“因果關(guān)系“運作的。然而,黑格爾繼續(xù)斷定,斯賓諾莎的實體概念本身產(chǎn)生了關(guān)于因果性本身的各種不同的悖論,所以那些悖論的解決需要“整體“論充當(dāng)交互的、相互作用的因果關(guān)系自我滿足的體系,斯賓諾莎的實體概念被我們憑借對現(xiàn)象與顯露出來的東西作出判斷而加以承認(rèn)一一斯賓諾莎的實體概念總是被雅科比斷言是由理性主義形而上學(xué)導(dǎo)致的。
The “Doctrine of Being” and the “Doctrine of Essence” are concerned with the normative structure of those judgments about the coming-to-be and passing-away of things in the world, and the normative structure of the reflective judgments by which we distinguish appearance from reality in that world of coming-to-be and passing-away. What they cannot account for, however, is the judging activity itself. The norms governing our judging activities are not themselves established by the world that comes to be and passes away, and the distinction itself between appearance and reality is already a judgmental distinction that “we” have necessarily imported into our experience.
? ? “存在論“和“本質(zhì)論“關(guān)注的是關(guān)于世界中的生成與消逝的那些判斷的規(guī)范化結(jié)構(gòu),而通過這種反思判斷的規(guī)范化結(jié)構(gòu)我們區(qū)分生成和消逝的世界中的現(xiàn)象和現(xiàn)實。但是,它們不能說明的乃是判斷活動本身。那些支配著我們判斷活動的規(guī)范本身并未被生成和消逝的世界所確立,而現(xiàn)象與現(xiàn)實之間的區(qū)分本身已成了一個判斷式的區(qū)分即“我們“,有必要加進(jìn)我們的經(jīng)驗。
The normative structure of our own judgmental activities thus form the third “book” of the Logic, the “Doctrine of the Concept.” This is the structure of the types of judgments that we make within the ways of life that Hegel calls Geist. The structure of “the concept” therefore is the structure of intersubjective self-consciousness itself. In particular, it concerns the normative structure of how we make judgments about particular things as having certain general features. Since there are no direct, “given” encounters with particular objects - our epistemically crudest and most basic perceptions are, as the Phenomenologjf showed, infused with judgmental norms - this structure can be worked out purely conceptually without having to rely, as Kant did, on “pure intuitions.” In making judgments, we articulate, quite literally, the original unity of experience and the world; judgment is thus as Holderlin said (making a play on the German term) a primordial division, an ‘‘‘'Ur-Teilung.''’ The demonstration that a Spinozistic conception of substance requires a conception of a thinking subject that itself cannot understand itself as explained by such a substance constitutes, Hegel proudly asserted, the “unique and truthful refutation of Spinozism.”^* Jacobi’s worries, so Hegel thought, had been finally laid to rest.
? ? 我們自己的判斷活動的規(guī)范化結(jié)構(gòu)故而形成了《邏輯學(xué)》中第三“編“,“概念論“。這乃是我們在黑格爾稱作的精神生活方式領(lǐng)域所作出的判斷類型結(jié)構(gòu)?！案拍睢暗慕Y(jié)構(gòu)因而是主體間的自我意識本身的結(jié)構(gòu)。特別是,它所關(guān)注的是關(guān)于我們?nèi)绾螌哂心承┕餐卣鞯木唧w事物作出判斷的規(guī)范化結(jié)構(gòu)。因為不存在直接地、“給定式地“遭遇具體對象一一我們在認(rèn)識論上最樸實最基本的感覺是,像《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》表明的,灌輸判斷的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)一一所以這一結(jié)構(gòu)能夠被純粹概念化地制定出來而不用依賴任何“純直觀“,正像康德所做的一樣。在作出判斷過程中,我們十分正確地,明確表達(dá)了經(jīng)驗與世界的原初的統(tǒng)一;判斷因此是像荷爾德林所說的(用德語術(shù)語說)一個原始的區(qū)分,“ILTeilung“。我們可以證明,斯賓莎諾主義實體概念需要能思的主體概念,而能思的主體本身不能將它自己理解為由這樣的一種實體所解釋的東西,這種證明構(gòu)成對“斯賓諾莎主義獨特的和真實的駁斥““黑格爾驕傲地斷言。因此,黑格爾認(rèn)為,雅科比的擔(dān)憂終于被消除了。
What we encounter in our experiences of a world - that the world is coming to be and passing away, and that we distinguish appearance from reality - are unified experiences of particular things embodying general features, experiences of “this-suches” as having their place in a “whole.” Various judgments articulate the “this-such” entities we encounter against the complex background of the world as a whole and the kinds of things at stake in “Being” and “Essence.” Individual judgments themselves, however, call for grounds for their assertion, and, if one follows that out far enough - Hegel’s arguments in the text are quite complex and rest on some of the same points made in his 1804-05 “Logic” about how formal classification of judgments presupposes a prior material, content-laden classification of them — one is committed to the notion that understanding what counts as “getting it right” in individual judgments has to do with the kinds of concealed inferences at work in them. Individual judgments, that is, are the kinds of things that make sense only in a larger pattern of inferences, and, likewise, that inferential pattern itself cannot be purely formally determined; material notions about what counts as logical and “pure” are brought in from outside the formal structures themselves, and thus any doctrine of formal inferential structure has to give an account of the rational structure of what those other considerations might be.
? ? 我們在世界的經(jīng)驗中所遇到的東西一一世界在生成和消逝,我們區(qū)分現(xiàn)象和現(xiàn)實一一所有這些都被體現(xiàn)共同特征的具體事物的經(jīng)驗連成一體,都被在“整體“中占有一席之地的“諸如此類之物“的經(jīng)驗達(dá)成一體。不同的判斷系統(tǒng)地論述了我們在作為整體世界的復(fù)雜背景下所遭遇的“諸如此類“的實有,系統(tǒng)地論述了在“存在“和“本質(zhì)“中成問題的各種類似的東西。不過,個別判斷本身需要為它們自已的主張尋找理由,并且,如果一個人將此進(jìn)行到底一一黑格爾在原文中的論證極為復(fù)雜且依賴于他在1804至1805年《邏輯學(xué)》中提出的一些相同觀點,這些觀點涉及判斷的正式分類如何假定一種先天的材料,或它們具體的內(nèi)容豐富的分類一一那么一個人就會接受這樣的想法,即理解在個別判斷中被描述為“正確理解事物“的東西關(guān)系到樹些種類在個別判斷中仍然起作用的潛在推論。也就是說、個別判斷是某些種類僅僅在大的推論模式中才有意義的東西,并且,同樣,推論模式本身不能純粹地正式地被決定;關(guān)于被認(rèn)為是邏輯和“純粹“東西的物質(zhì)觀念是從外部形式上的結(jié)構(gòu)本身引進(jìn)的,因此任何形式上的推論結(jié)構(gòu)學(xué)說都必須對那些其他思考可能具有的內(nèi)容的理性結(jié)構(gòu)給予說明。
This amounts to giving an account of what Geist’s basic interests are in sorting out things in the world the way that it does, what Geist requires in order to reassure itself about the unity of thought and being, and, so Hegel had long since concluded, Geist’s most basic interest lay in its securing for itself the conditions for the realization of its own autonomy. Securing that autonomy, moreover, requires first of all (and almost paradoxically) that we understand the world as having a rational structure that is independent of ourselves, which Hegel calls “objectivity,” which itself is divided into the ideas of mechanical, chemical, and teleological systems - roughly, into systems in which the elements are identifiable independent of the laws governing the system (such as gravitational systems); systems in which each of the elements has an “affinity” for combining with other elements (as in chemical affinities); and systems in which the elements are what they are only in terms of their functioning as organs of a “whole” (as is the case with all living things).
? ? 這相當(dāng)于描述了精神的基本興趣在于挑選出某些東西,它們是在世界中精神的存在方式和精神需要的東西,為的是使精神自身確保思想和存在的統(tǒng)一,因此黑格爾早就斷定,精神的最基本的興趣在于它確保它自己實現(xiàn)自決的條件。再者,要保證自決,首先(幾乎是悖論式地)要求我們把世界理解為具有一種獨立于我們自己之外的理性的結(jié)構(gòu)、這種理性結(jié)構(gòu)被黑格爾稱作“客觀性“,客觀性本身被劃分為機(jī)械系統(tǒng)、化學(xué)系統(tǒng)和目的論系統(tǒng)的思想一一粗略地,在這樣的系統(tǒng)中,菪些要素被確認(rèn)獨立于支配系統(tǒng)(警如萬有引力系統(tǒng))的規(guī)律;系統(tǒng)中每種要素都具有結(jié)合其他要素的“親和力“(像在化學(xué)親和力中的情況一樣);在系統(tǒng)中要素是僅僅根據(jù)它們起著“整體“器官作用的東西(像所有生物的情況一樣)。
That this is a rational characterization of the “objective” systems of the world presupposes that we have good grounds for making such divisions, and thus a demonstration of the rationality of this more “subjective” notion of systems of classification is also required. The idea of the “true,” of our getting our judgments about the world “right,” is bound up with our idea of the “good,” of the basic interests guiding our formulating and testing such judgments, of what ends we are trying to achieve in making such judgments. What is ultimately, however, “good” in that scheme is that we exercise our own free judgmental powers so that we do “get it right,” that we learn to discipline our judgmental activities according to principles that we alone impose on ourselves, since the world does not impose those principles on us. What is rational in all this is only what can survive this internal critique of itself.
? ? 說上述就是世界的“客觀系統(tǒng)“的理性特征,這就假定了我們有著充分理由作出這樣的劃分,因此這也就需要去證明這種更為“主觀的“分類系統(tǒng)概念的合理性。“真“觀念或?qū)κ澜缱鞒觥皽?zhǔn)確“判斷的觀念,是與我們下面這些觀念或想法密切相關(guān)的:“善“的觀念,引導(dǎo)我們形成和檢驗這類判斷的基本興趣的觀念,關(guān)于終結(jié)我們在試圖達(dá)到作出這類判斷的東西的想法。但是,最終在這個圖式中“善“的東西是我們行使我們自己的自由判斷權(quán)利,所以我們的確“正確地認(rèn)識了事物“,所以我們學(xué)著根據(jù)我們獨自加于我們自己的原則來鍛煉我們的判斷行為,因為世界沒有把那些原則強(qiáng)加給我們。所有這些東西中合理的只是那些能夠幸免于自身內(nèi)在批評的東西。
The “true” and the “good” - the theoretical and the practical - are thus bound up with each other within a larger whole. This larger “whole” within which all judgmental activity goes on is the totality of the “space of reasons,” or the “Idea,” as Hegel calls it. Hegel’s long and complex argument in the Logic was intended to establish that this is not merely a game that thought plays with itself but a way of articulating the original unity of thought and being that is present and active in Geist, spirit, even though that original unity must itself rupture and divide itself, producing the kind of “negativity” at work in the Logic. As developed in this way, the “space of reasons” offers the reassurance that outside of itself there is nothing of normative significance and that it has generated its own structure and content in a way that both preserves the original unity of thought and being and develops it in more determinate ways so that it finally reestablishes itself at the end of that otherwise “negative” development. More concretely, the “Idea,” the “space of reasons,” is the idealized normative structure of a rational form of “social space” and forms the “pure normative structure” of the manners of reciprocal recognition that make up Geist. As having nothing outside of itself of normative significance and as selflegitimating, the “space of reasons” is thus the absolute Idea. It is “absolute” as having nothing outside of itself to account for its legitimacy; and it is the reassurance after the long path of “negativity” that the unity of thought and being, so abstractly articulated by Holderlin, the notion that we are really in touch with things as they metaphysically are, can be vouchsafed only by the kind of skeptical, “negative” development of our judgmental activities found in the Phenomenology and the Logic. Returning to his earlier Schellingian formulations, Hegel noted that “this identity has therefore been rightly determined as the subjectobject., for it is as well the formal or subjective concept as it is the Object as such.”^'^
? ? “真“和“善“一一理論和實踐一一因此在更大的整體中是彼此密切相關(guān)的。這在其中一切判斷活動得以進(jìn)行的更大的“整體“乃是“理性空間“的全體,或乃是“觀念“的整體,像黑格爾所稱作的一樣。黑格爾在《邏輯學(xué)》中所作的冗長而復(fù)雜的論證,意在確立這不僅僅是思想親自玩耍的一場游戲,而是系統(tǒng)地閘述思想與存在的原初統(tǒng)一的一種方式,這種原初統(tǒng)一存在于且進(jìn)行于精神中,盡管原初的統(tǒng)一必然出現(xiàn)斷裂,必然自我劃分,必然產(chǎn)生在《邏輯學(xué)》中起作用的一種“否定性“。以此方式向前推演,“理性空間“保證做到,在它自身之外不存在規(guī)范重要意義,它以某種方式產(chǎn)生了它的結(jié)構(gòu)和內(nèi)容,這種方式既保留了思想與存在的原初統(tǒng)一,同樣以更為確定的方式發(fā)展了思想與存在的原初統(tǒng)一,所以它最終在另類的“消極“發(fā)展的結(jié)尾重新確立了自身。更具體地說,“觀念“或“理性空間“,被理想化為“社會空間“理性形式的規(guī)范性結(jié)構(gòu),并形成了構(gòu)成精神的相應(yīng)認(rèn)知形式的“純粹規(guī)范性結(jié)構(gòu)“。因為“觀念“在它外部不具有規(guī)范化重要性的東西且因為“觀念“是自我合理化的,所以“觀念“是絕對觀念。它是“絕對“,因為在它外部沒有說明它的合理性的東西;它在走過漫長的“否定性“道路后復(fù)又確保的是:思想與存在的統(tǒng)一,被荷爾德林作了極其抽象地系統(tǒng)論述的思想與存在的統(tǒng)一,關(guān)于我們真正地接觸形而上學(xué)地存在的事物的觀念,所有這些都只能被一種對我們的判斷活動的推演所給予,而東這樣的推演是帶有懷疑性的和“消極性的“,我們的判斷活動可在《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》和《邏輯學(xué)》中找得到。回到黑格爾早期謝林式的表述,黑格爾注意到“這種同一因此被正確地規(guī)定為主體一客體,因為它也是形式和主觀的概念,像它是客體本身一樣““
The absolute Idea is thus the “space of reasons” giving an account of itself; it is reason submitting itself to its own self-critique and demonstrating that it need not go outside of itself to ratify itself The Logic has shown, Hegel thought, that being a reason for we “l(fā)ike-minded” agents is all that there can be to being a reason; there is no supernatural rationality outside of our own against which we measure our own rationality.
? ? 絕對觀念故而是給予它自身的描述的“理性空間“;它作為理性使它自己服從于它自己的自我批評和證明它不需要超越它自己以便認(rèn)可它自已。《邏輯學(xué)》已經(jīng)表明,黑格爾認(rèn)為,存在就是一切,存在是我們“類似精神的“代理人的理性,一切對于存在作為理性來說能夠存在的東西;我們本身之外不存在超自然的我們借以估量我們自已合理性的合理性。
The absolute Idea, while always implicit in human thought, is nonetheless the logical expression of the “we” of modern humanity, since only in modern thought have the claims of reason been able to become fully explicit. Prior ages, to be sure, had their own versions of the “Idea,” but whereas their cultures and ways of life rested on authoritative norms that they simply had to accept dogmatically as given, as lying simply “in the nature of things” and thus having to be “revealed” to humanity, the modern age has the absolute Idea, since modern life has come to show that it can live without some dogmatic bedrock on which to stand, that it is capable of constructing its own scaffolding as it goes along. Moreover, any attempts to articulate the absolute Idea must be circular in the sense that they must occur within the web of norms that make up who “we moderns” are. Thus, Hegel thought he had fulfilled his task to create a modern logic.
? ? 絕對觀念,盡管總是人類思想中固有的,卻是“我們“現(xiàn)代人類的邏輯表述,因為只有在現(xiàn)代思想中理性的主張才能變得完全清想。誠然,先前的年代同樣有著它們自己對“觀念“的看法,不過,雖然,先前年代的文化和生活方式仰賴于權(quán)威的規(guī)范,先前年代簡直必須教條式地認(rèn)為權(quán)威的規(guī)范是給定的,認(rèn)為權(quán)威的規(guī)范只不過在于事物的“本質(zhì)“,因此必須展現(xiàn)給人類,但是,現(xiàn)時代卻具有絕對觀念,因為現(xiàn)代生活開始表明它照樣能夠存在,即使沒有一些它能夠存在所必須依賴的教條的基礎(chǔ),因為現(xiàn)代生活開始表明它能夠一如既往地建構(gòu)自己的舞臺。而且,試圖清晰地說明絕對觀念,從枸種意義上說任何這樣的嘗試必然是循環(huán)的,這里的樹種意義在于這些嘗試必然在由“我們現(xiàn)代人“是誰所組成的規(guī)范之網(wǎng)領(lǐng)域進(jìn)行。因此黑格爾認(rèn)為他已完成了他要創(chuàng)造一種現(xiàn)代邏輯學(xué)的任務(wù)。
The Logic had finally given Hegel a structure within which he could develop his other thoughts on the possibilities for modern life in the investigation of nature, of social life, of art, religion, philosophy, and history. Just as importantly, the publication of the Logic established Hegel in the minds of the philosophical public as a thinker in his own right. The Phenomenology had somewhat puzzled that public, since it seemed to them to be a Schellingian work that was also strikingly unSchellingian in character. With the Logic, however, Hegel’s position as the non-Schellingian successor to the post-Kantians began to be secured.^**
? ? 《邏輯學(xué)》最終提供黑格爾一種結(jié)構(gòu),借助這結(jié)構(gòu)他能夠在研究自然、研究社會生活、研究藝術(shù)、宗教、哲學(xué)和歷史過程中閘發(fā)他關(guān)于現(xiàn)代生活發(fā)展前途的其他思想。恰好與此相同,十分重要的是,《邏輯學(xué)》的發(fā)表確立了黑格爾在哲學(xué)讀者心目中成為一位理所當(dāng)然的思想家地位?！毒瘳F(xiàn)象學(xué)》多少有些使哲學(xué)讀者感到茫然失措,因為在他們看來它似乎是一部謝林主義著作,同時又是一部明顯帶有非謝林主義特點的著作。不過,由于《邏輯學(xué)》的問世,黑格爾作為非謝林主義者的后康德主義者接替人的地位開始變得穩(wěn)固起來。“
