來(lái)源 ：?jiǎn)棠匪够c福柯之辯：人性、公正、權(quán)力
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論人性：公正與權(quán)力的對(duì)立
Human Nature: Justice versus Power
公正與權(quán)力的對(duì)立
ELDERS: Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the third debate of the International Philosophers' Project. Tonight's debaters are Mr. Michel Foucault, of the College de France, and Mr. Noam Chomsky, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Both philosophers have points in common and points of difference. Perhaps the best way to compare both philosophers would be to see them as tunnellers through a mountain working at opposite sides of the same mountain with different tools, without even knowing if they are working in each other's direction.
埃勒德：女士們、先生們，歡迎各位光臨國(guó)際哲學(xué)規(guī)劃大會(huì)的第三場(chǎng)討論會(huì)。今晚參加討論的有法蘭西學(xué)院的米歇爾·?？孪壬吐槭±砉W(xué)院的諾昂·喬姆斯基先生。這兩位哲學(xué)家的觀點(diǎn)既有相同之處也有分歧。或許我們可以把這種情況比做兩位開(kāi)鑿山洞的工人，他們手持不同的工具相向工作，并不清楚是否能在洞中相逢。
But both are doing their jobs with quite new ideas, digging as profoundly as possible with an equal commitment in philosophy as in politics: enough reasons, it seems to me for us to expect a fascinating debate about philosophy and about politics.
兩位學(xué)者以全新的思想指導(dǎo)自己的工作，在哲學(xué)和政治領(lǐng)域里力求開(kāi)鑿得盡可能地遠(yuǎn)。因此我們深信今晚的討論會(huì)一定會(huì)引人入勝。
I intend, therefore, not to lose any time and to start off with a central, perennial question: the question of human nature.
閑言少敘。我用一個(gè)永恒的、基本的問(wèn)題開(kāi)場(chǎng)，即人性問(wèn)題。
All studies of man, from history to linguistics and psychology, are faced with the question of whether, in the last instance, we are the product of all kinds of external factors, or if, in spite of our differences, we have something we could call a common human nature, by which we can recognise each other as human beings.
所有關(guān)于人的研究，從歷史到語(yǔ)言學(xué)、到心理學(xué)，都應(yīng)解決下面這個(gè)問(wèn)題：我們是由各種外部因素構(gòu)成的產(chǎn)物還是擁有一個(gè)共同的特性？由于此特性，我們才被視為人類(lèi)。
So my first question is to you Mr. Chomsky, because you often employ the concept of human nature, in which connection you even use terms like "innate ideas" and "innate structures". Which arguments can you derive from linguistics to give such a central position to this concept of human nature?
這個(gè)問(wèn)題是向您，喬姆斯基先生提出來(lái)的。因?yàn)槟?jīng)常使用人性這個(gè)概念，使用“天賦觀念”、“天賦結(jié)構(gòu)”等詞語(yǔ)。為了賦予人性概念以中心地位您從語(yǔ)言學(xué)中獲得了哪些論據(jù)？
CHOMSKY: Well, let me begin in a slightly technical way.
喬姆斯基：我先從略帶些技術(shù)性的方面來(lái)回答。
A person who is interested in studying languages is faced with a very definite empirical problem. He's faced with an organism, a mature, let's say adult, speaker, who has somehow acquired an amazing range of abilities, which enable him in particular to say what he means, to understand what people say to him, to do this in a fashion that I think is proper to call highly creative ... that is, much of what a person says in his normal intercourse with others is novel, much of what you hear is new, it doesn't bear any close resemblance to anything in your experience; it's not random novel behaviour, clearly, it's behaviour which is in some sense which is very hard to characterise, appropriate to situations. And in fact it has many of the characteristics of what I think might very well be called creativity.
一個(gè)對(duì)語(yǔ)言學(xué)研究感興趣的人會(huì)面對(duì)一個(gè)特別典型的經(jīng)驗(yàn)論問(wèn)題。他發(fā)現(xiàn)在他面前有一個(gè)有機(jī)體，即一個(gè)成年對(duì)話(huà)者。由于獲得了非凡的能力使得他能夠闡明自己的思想、理解別人的話(huà)語(yǔ)，并且以一種我認(rèn)為具有高度創(chuàng)造性的方式做出了這一切……因?yàn)橐粋€(gè)人在談話(huà)中所說(shuō)的大部分東西是新的，而我們所聽(tīng)到的大部分東西也是新的，只有極少一部分同我們的經(jīng)歷相類(lèi)似。這種行為決非偶然，它以一種難以描繪的方式適應(yīng)環(huán)境。事實(shí)上，它同被稱(chēng)之為創(chuàng)造性的東西有許多相同點(diǎn)。
Now, the person who has acquired this intricate and highly articulated and organised collection of abilities-the collection of abilities that we call knowing a language-has been exposed to a certain experience; he has been presented in the course of his lifetime with a certain amount of data, of direct experience with a language.
能夠駕駛這種復(fù)雜的、極清晰和有條理的整體，并具有我們稱(chēng)之為語(yǔ)言知識(shí)的人，便具有了一定的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。在他的人生歷程中，他曾置身于某些材料之中，有著語(yǔ)言的直接感受。
We can investigate the data that's available to this person; having done so, in principle, we're faced with a reasonably clear and well-delineated scientific problem, namely that of accounting for the gap between the really quite small quantity of data, small and rather degenerate in quality, that's presented to the child, and the very highly articulated, highly systematic, profoundly organised resulting knowledge that he somehow derives from these data.
如果我們觀察一下他最后擁有的基本概念（注：此句中的“最后”不知從何而來(lái)），我們就會(huì)面對(duì)一個(gè)十分確切的科學(xué)問(wèn)題：如何解釋橫在孩子獲得的質(zhì)差量少的材料與以某種方式從基本概念中派生出來(lái)的、經(jīng)過(guò)深層組織的、有系統(tǒng)的知識(shí)之間的距離呢？（注：這段和上段最后一句中的data，一會(huì)被翻為“材料”，一會(huì)被翻為“基本概念”，只看譯文的話(huà)實(shí)在不知所云）
Furthermore we notice that varying individuals with very varied experience in a particular language nevertheless arrive at systems which are very much congruent to one another. The systems that two speakers of English arrive at on the basis of their very different experiences are congruent in the sense that, over an overwhelming range, what one of them says, the other can understand.
進(jìn)一步說(shuō)，操著某種語(yǔ)言的、經(jīng)歷各異的不同個(gè)體最終仍會(huì)達(dá)到相互極為和諧的系統(tǒng)。兩個(gè)英語(yǔ)對(duì)話(huà)者從各自不同的經(jīng)歷出發(fā)會(huì)達(dá)互和諧的系統(tǒng)，從廣義來(lái)說(shuō)就是一個(gè)剛說(shuō)出話(huà)來(lái)，另一個(gè)便馬上會(huì)理解。
Furthermore, even more remarkable, we notice that in a wide range of languages, in fact all that have been studied seriously, there are remarkable limitations on the kind of systems that emerge from the very different kinds of experiences to which people are exposed.
而更令人注意的是，人們發(fā)現(xiàn)從語(yǔ)言的廣度來(lái)看，就是進(jìn)行過(guò)認(rèn)真研究的所有范圍來(lái)看，出自人們親身經(jīng)歷的系統(tǒng)服從于一些明確的限制。
There is only one possible explanation, which I have to give in a rather schematic fashion, for this remarkable phenomenon, namely the assumption that the individual himself contributes a good deal, an overwhelming part in fact, of the general schematic structure and perhaps even of the specific content of the knowledge that he ultimately derives from this very scattered and limited experience.
對(duì)這個(gè)令人矚目的現(xiàn)象，只存在一種可能的解釋。我簡(jiǎn)略地談一下。根據(jù)假設(shè)，一個(gè)人把大部分精力投于到整體結(jié)構(gòu)的轉(zhuǎn)換上，（注：“轉(zhuǎn)換”一詞也不知是如何譯出的）也許還投入到知識(shí)的特殊內(nèi)容上，這是從他零散的、有限的經(jīng)歷中最后得到的。
A person who knows a language has acquired that knowledge because he approached the learning experience with a very explicit and detailed schematism that tells him what kind of language it is that he is being exposed to. That is, to put it rather loosely: the child must begin with the knowledge, certainly not with the knowledge that he's hearing English or Dutch or French or something else, but he does start with the knowledge that he's hearing a human language of a very narrow and explicit type, that permits a very small range of variation. And it is because he begins with that highly organised and very restrictive schematism, that he is able to make the huge leap from scattered and degenerate data to highly organised knowledge. And furthermore I should add that we can go a certain distance, I think a rather long distance, towards presenting the properties of this system of knowledge, that I would call innate language or instinctive knowledge, that the child brings to language learning; and also we can go a long way towards describing the system that is mentally represented when he has acquired this knowledge.
掌握一種語(yǔ)言的人通過(guò)學(xué)習(xí)明晰、具體的模式便擁有了這種學(xué)問(wèn)，它起著某種類(lèi)似于法典的作用（“法典的作用”的表述有些含糊）。或者，用不那么準(zhǔn)確的話(huà)說(shuō)：孩子學(xué)習(xí)語(yǔ)言并不是從模仿聽(tīng)到的英語(yǔ)、法語(yǔ)或荷蘭語(yǔ)起步的，而是從明白這是一種明確的、須臾不可離的人類(lèi)語(yǔ)言開(kāi)始的。這是因?yàn)樗麖囊粋€(gè)既有條理又有約束的模式出發(fā)，因而有能力通過(guò)散亂、貧乏的材料達(dá)到高度條理化的知識(shí)。再補(bǔ)充一點(diǎn)，在知識(shí)體系的特性方面（我稱(chēng)之為天賦語(yǔ)言或本能知識(shí)，它是孩子學(xué)習(xí)語(yǔ)言時(shí)具有的能力），我們能夠走得更遠(yuǎn)。
I would claim then that this instinctive knowledge, if you like, this schematism that makes it possible to derive complex and intricate knowledge on the basis of very partial data, is one fundamental constituent of human nature. In this case I think a fundamental constituent because of the role that language plays, not merely in communication, but also in expression of thought and interaction between persons; and I assume that in other domains of human intelligence, in other domains of human cognition and behaviour, something of the same sort must be true.
我認(rèn)為，這種本能的知識(shí)，或更確切地說(shuō)，這種依據(jù)很不完全的材料獲得復(fù)雜知識(shí)的模式，是人性的基本構(gòu)成部分。說(shuō)它是基本構(gòu)成部分是因?yàn)檎Z(yǔ)言不僅在交際中起作用，在思想表達(dá)和個(gè)體之間的相互影響中都起作用。我設(shè)想在智慧、知識(shí)和人類(lèi)行為等其他領(lǐng)域也有相同的事情。
Well, this collection, this mass of schematisms, innate organising principles, which guides our social and intellectual and individual behaviour, that's what I mean to refer to by the concept of human nature.
這個(gè)模式整體，這些天賦組織原則，指導(dǎo)著我們的社會(huì)行為、智力行為和個(gè)人行為。這就是當(dāng)我涉及人性概念時(shí)要特別指出的。
ELDERS: Well, Mr. Foucault, when I think of your books like The History of Madness and Words and Objects, I get the impression that you are working on a completely different level and with a totally opposite aim and goal; when I think of the word schematism in relation to human nature, I suppose you are trying to elaborate several periods with several schematisms. What do you say to this?
埃勒德：那么，?？孪壬?，我想起您的《瘋狂史》或《詞與物》。我的感覺(jué)是您研究的層次與喬姆斯基先生不同，您的目標(biāo)也與之完全對(duì)立。我想，您試圖按階段為這個(gè)同人性有關(guān)聯(lián)的模式論增添色彩。對(duì)此您想說(shuō)什么呢？
FOUCAULT: Well, if you don't mind I will answer in French, because my English is so poor that I would be ashamed of answering in English.
?？拢喝绻銈儾粎挓┑脑?huà)，我要用法語(yǔ)回答問(wèn)題。因?yàn)槲业挠⒄Z(yǔ)很差，羞于使用它。
It is true that I mistrust the notion of human nature a little, and for the following reason: I believe that of the concepts or notions which a science can use, not all have the same degree of elaboration, and that in general they have neither the same function nor the same type of possible use in scientific discourse. Let's take the example of biology. You will find concepts with a classifying function, concepts with a differentiating function, and concepts with an analytical function: some of them enable us to characterise objects, for example that of "tissue"; others to isolate elements, like that of "hereditary feature"; others to fix relations, such as that of "reflex". There are at the same time elements which play a role in the discourse and in the internal rules of the reasoning practice. But there also exist "peripheral" notions, those by which scientific practice designates itself, differentiates itself in relation to other practices, delimits its domain of objects, and designates what it considers to be the totality of its future tasks. The notion of life played this role to some extent in biology during a certain period.
的確，我有些懷疑人性這個(gè)觀念，原因如下：我認(rèn)為一門(mén)學(xué)科能夠使用的概念或觀念并不具有同一設(shè)計(jì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。一般來(lái)說(shuō)，在科學(xué)討論中，它們既沒(méi)有相同的功能，也不屬同一可使用類(lèi)型。以生物學(xué)為例，某些概念具有分類(lèi)學(xué)功能，而另一些則有分化或分析功能；有些可以從組織角度使我們確定對(duì)象，而另一些如遺傳性則分離各個(gè)元素，還有一些起反射作用。（注：這句翻得走樣了）同時(shí)，有些因素在討論中以及在推理實(shí)驗(yàn)的內(nèi)在規(guī)律里都起作用。但同時(shí)還存在著邊緣觀念，科學(xué)實(shí)踐正是通過(guò)邊緣觀念得以確認(rèn)、得以區(qū)別于其他類(lèi)型的實(shí)踐、得以界定自己的領(lǐng)域及規(guī)劃出未來(lái)的總體任務(wù)。在既定的時(shí)期內(nèi)，生命觀念在生物學(xué)中便起著這種作用。
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the notion of life was hardly used in studying nature: one classified natural beings, whether living or non-living, in a vast hierarchical tableau which went from minerals to man; the break between the minerals and the plants or animals was relatively undecided; epistemologically it was only important to fix their positions once and for all in an indisputable way.
17、18世紀(jì)時(shí)，生命觀念在自然科學(xué)研究中幾乎不被使用。在從礦物到人的龐大分類(lèi)表中，人們只列出了有生命的自然物和非生命自然物體。那時(shí)礦物同植物或動(dòng)物的區(qū)分相對(duì)來(lái)說(shuō)是含糊的。從知識(shí)論的角度看，應(yīng)當(dāng)為它們一錘定音，唯一要注意的是以無(wú)可爭(zhēng)議的方式做這件事。
At the end of the eighteenth century, the description and analysis of these natural beings showed, through the use of more highly perfected instruments and the latest techniques, an entire domain of objects, an entire field of relations and processes which have enabled us to define the specificity of biology in the knowledge of nature. Can one say that research into life has finally constituted itself in biological science? Has the concept of life been responsible for the organisation of biological knowledge? I don't think so. It seems to me more likely that the transformations of biological knowledge at the end of the eighteenth century, were demonstrated on one hand by a whole series of new concepts for use in scientific discourse and on the other hand gave rise to a notion like that of life which has enabled us to designate, to delimit and to situate a certain type of scientific discourse, among other things. I would say that the notion of life is not a scientific concept; it has been an epistemological indicator of which the classifying, delimiting and other functions had an effect on scientific discussions, and not on what they were talking about:
18世紀(jì)末，由于先進(jìn)的工具和新技術(shù)的出現(xiàn)，對(duì)這些自然存在物的描寫(xiě)及分析展示出一個(gè)完整的課題領(lǐng)域，一個(gè)在對(duì)自然的認(rèn)識(shí)中使我們能夠確定生物學(xué)特征的程序和關(guān)系范圍。能肯定地說(shuō)對(duì)生命的研究最終構(gòu)成了生物學(xué)嗎？生命概念是生物學(xué)知識(shí)結(jié)構(gòu)的成因嗎？我不這么想。很有可能在18世紀(jì)末出現(xiàn)了生物知識(shí)的轉(zhuǎn)化。這歸功于出現(xiàn)了一系列科學(xué)詞匯構(gòu)成的新概念，而它們又導(dǎo)致像生命這類(lèi)觀念的誕生，這使我們能夠在其他事物中指明、界定和置放這類(lèi)詞匯。依我看，生命觀念不是一個(gè)科學(xué)概念，而是一個(gè)起分類(lèi)、區(qū)別作用的知識(shí)指示器，它的功能作用于科學(xué)詞匯而非客體。
Well, it seems to me that the notion of human nature is of the same type. It was not by studying human nature that linguists discovered the laws of consonant mutation, or Freud the principles of the analysis of dreams, or cultural anthropologists the structure of myths. In the history of knowledge, the notion of human nature seems to me mainly to have played the role of an epistemological indicator to designate certain types of discourse in relation to or in opposition to theology or biology or history. I would find it difficult to see in this a scientific concept.
我覺(jué)得人性觀念也屬這一類(lèi)型。語(yǔ)言學(xué)家并不是在研究人性時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)了協(xié)韻規(guī)律（注：consonant mutation是指輔音變化，怎么扯成“協(xié)韻”了），弗洛伊德的夢(mèng)幻分析原則、文化人類(lèi)學(xué)的神話(huà)結(jié)構(gòu)也都如此。在認(rèn)識(shí)史中，我感覺(jué)似乎人性觀念主要起了知識(shí)指示器的作用，同時(shí)用以指明某些類(lèi)型的詞匯與神學(xué)、生物學(xué)或史學(xué)有關(guān)聯(lián)或與之相對(duì)立，很難認(rèn)為它是一個(gè)科學(xué)概念。
CHOMSKY: Well, in the first place, if we were able to specify in terms of, let's say, neural networks the properties of human cognitive structure that make it possible for the child to acquire these complicated systems, then I at least would have no hesitation in describing those properties as being a constituent element of human nature. That is, there is something biologically given, unchangeable, a foundation for whatever it is that we do with our mental capacities in this case.
喬姆斯基：那么，首先，如果我們能用神經(jīng)元網(wǎng)術(shù)語(yǔ)詳細(xì)說(shuō)明人類(lèi)認(rèn)知結(jié)構(gòu)的屬性，它使兒童獲得復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)，我便毫不猶豫地認(rèn)同這些屬性是人性的構(gòu)成部分。世上存在一種無(wú)變化的生物元素，在此情況下這是我們的官能賴(lài)以運(yùn)作的基礎(chǔ)。
But I would like to pursue a little further the line of development that you outlined, with which in fact I entirely agree, about the concept of life as an organising concept in the biological sciences.
我想進(jìn)一步追述您的思想發(fā)展。生命概念在生物學(xué)科里是一個(gè)組織概念，對(duì)此我完全贊同。
It seems to me that one might speculate a bit further speculate in this case, since we're talking about the future, not the past-and ask whether the concept of human nature or of innate organising mechanisms or of intrinsic mental schematism or whatever we want to call it, I don't see much difference between them, but let's call it human nature for shorthand, might not provide for biology the next peak to try to scale, after having-at least in the minds of the biologists, though one might perhaps question this-already answered to the satisfaction of some the question of what is life.
我覺(jué)得我看不出人性概念、組織的天賦機(jī)理概念或者內(nèi)在精神模式概念之間的差別，我指的是將來(lái)而非過(guò)去。簡(jiǎn)言之就定為人性吧。在以某些人滿(mǎn)意的方式為生命下了定義后，它也不可能構(gòu)成生物學(xué)的未來(lái)階段。至少在一些生物學(xué)家看來(lái)，這一點(diǎn)還遠(yuǎn)未使人信服。
In other words, to be precise, is it possible to give a biological explanation or a physical explanation...is it possible to characterise, in terms of the physical concepts presently available to us, the ability of the child to acquire complex systems of knowledge; and furthermore, critically, having acquired such systems of knowledge, to make use of this knowledge in the free and creative and remarkably varied ways in which he does?
為了更準(zhǔn)確些，換個(gè)詞匯（注：通常都翻成“換句話(huà)說(shuō)”吧），難道不能用生物學(xué)或物理學(xué)方面的解釋?zhuān)侩y道不能根據(jù)我們所掌握的物理概念來(lái)描繪兒童獲取知識(shí)的復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)能力的特點(diǎn)？描繪兒童今后用一種自由的、創(chuàng)造性的、多要的方式運(yùn)用這種知識(shí)的能力？
Can we explain in biological terms, ultimately in physical terms, these properties of both acquiring knowledge in the first place and making use of it in the second? I really see no reason to believe that we can; that is, it's an article of faith on the part of scientists that since science has explained many other things it will also explain this.
能否用生物學(xué)詞匯，最終用物理學(xué)詞匯來(lái)解釋獲取知識(shí)和運(yùn)用知識(shí)的能力？我找不出理由認(rèn)為我們可以做到這一點(diǎn)。這涉及到科學(xué)家追求的信念問(wèn)題：既然科學(xué)已經(jīng)解釋了若干事物，它將同樣能夠解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題。
In a sense one might say that this is a variant of the body/mind problem. But if we look back at the way in which science has scaled various peaks, and at the way in which the concept of life was finally acquired by science after having been beyond its vision for a long period, then I think we notice at many points in history-and in fact the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are particularly clear examples-that scientific advances were possible precisely because the domain of physical science was itself enlarged. Classic cases are Newton's gravitational forces. To the Cartesians, action at a distance was a mystical concept, and in fact to Newton himself it was an occult quality, a mystical entity, which didn't belong within science. To the common sense of a later generation, action at a distance has been incorporated within science.
從某種意義上來(lái)自，可以說(shuō)這涉及人體－精神問(wèn)題的變種。如果回想一下科學(xué)跨越各個(gè)階段的方法和它最終獲得生命概念（這個(gè)概念曾長(zhǎng)斯被忽視）的方法，我們便會(huì)注意到在歷史的眾多階段科學(xué)的進(jìn)步十分明顯。17、18世紀(jì)尤為突出，物理學(xué)領(lǐng)域此時(shí)大為擴(kuò)展，牛頓萬(wàn)有引力的威力是典型事例。笛卡爾主義者認(rèn)為遠(yuǎn)距離作用是神秘概念，而在牛頓看來(lái)這是具有玄奧性、是不屬于科學(xué)的神秘實(shí)體。對(duì)于后來(lái)的科學(xué)家，遠(yuǎn)距離作用理所當(dāng)然屬于科學(xué)范疇。
What happened was that the notion of body, the notion of the physical had changed. To a Cartesian, a strict Cartesian, if such a person appeared today, it would appear that there is no explanation for the behaviour of the heavenly bodies. Certainly there is no explanation for the phenomena that are explained in terms of electro-magnetic force, let's say. But by the extension of physical science to incorporate hitherto unavailable concepts, entirely new ideas, it became possible to successively build more and more complicated structures that incorporated a larger range of phenomena.
認(rèn)為人體觀念是物理學(xué)范疇的時(shí)代已經(jīng)過(guò)去了。對(duì)于標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的笛卡爾主義者來(lái)說(shuō)——如果今日還存在這樣一位人士的話(huà)——天堂里人體的行為是不可解釋的。他肯定對(duì)用電磁力詞匯闡述一些奇異現(xiàn)象也無(wú)能為力。多虧物理科學(xué)的發(fā)展，它吸收了一些被排斥在外的概念、全新的思想，成為可以創(chuàng)立越來(lái)越復(fù)雜的結(jié)構(gòu)、包含越來(lái)越多的現(xiàn)象的學(xué)科。
For example, it's certainly not true that the physics of the Cartesians is able to explain, let's say, the behaviour of elementary particles in physics, just as it's unable to explain the concepts of life.
例如，笛卡爾主義者的物理學(xué)肯定不能解釋基本粒子的活動(dòng)，也不能解釋生命概念。
Similarly, I think, one might ask the question whether physical science as known today, including biology, incorporates within itself the principles and the concepts that will enable it to give an account of innate human intellectual capacities and, even more profoundly, of the ability to make use of those capacities under conditions of freedom in the way which humans do. I see no particular reason to believe that biology or physics now contain those concepts, and it may be that to scale the next peak, to make the next step, they will have to focus on this organising concept, and may very well have to broaden their scope in order to come to grips with it.
我想，同樣可以提出這樣一個(gè)問(wèn)題，即，我們今天所了解的物理科學(xué)，也包括生物學(xué)，能否吸收這樣的一些原則和概念，它們能闡述人類(lèi)天賦的智慧？更深入一步，就是分析在人類(lèi)享有自由的條件下使用這種能力的可能性。沒(méi)有任何理由認(rèn)為生物學(xué)或物理學(xué)包含這些概念。為了跨入未來(lái)階段，生物學(xué)和物理學(xué)可能應(yīng)該思考組織的概念并擴(kuò)展它們的領(lǐng)域以便最終占領(lǐng)它們。
FOUCAULT: Yes.
福柯：是的。
ELDERS: Perhaps I may try to ask one more specific question leading out of both your answers, because I'm afraid otherwise the debate will become too technical. I have the impression that one of the main differences between you both has its origin in a difference in approach. You, Mr. Foucault, are especially interested in the way science or scientists function in a certain period, whereas Mr. Chomsky is more interested in the so-called "what-questions": why we possess language; not just how language functions, but what's the reason for our having language. We can try to elucidate this in a more general way: you, Mr. Foucault, are delimiting eighteenth century rationalism, whereas you, Mr. Chomsky, are combining eighteenth-century rationalism with notions like freedom and creativity.
埃勒德：根據(jù)兩位的回答，我想提一個(gè)比較特殊的問(wèn)題。因?yàn)槲覔?dān)心討論會(huì)變得太技術(shù)化了。我的印象是你們兩位之間主要分歧之一源于解決的方式。您，?？孪壬饕獙?duì)科學(xué)或科學(xué)家在既定時(shí)期內(nèi)運(yùn)作的方式感興趣，而喬姆斯基先生更關(guān)注“為什么”這個(gè)問(wèn)題：為什么我們掌握語(yǔ)言？您關(guān)心的并不僅僅是語(yǔ)言如何運(yùn)作，而且關(guān)心基于何種原因我們得以享用它?？梢試L試用普通方法弄清這一點(diǎn)：您，?？孪壬?，界定一下18世紀(jì)的唯理主義，而喬姆斯基先生則把它同諸如自由和創(chuàng)造性等觀念協(xié)調(diào)起來(lái)。
Perhaps we could illustrate this in a more general way with examples from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
也許用17、18世紀(jì)的例子更能通俗地闡明這一點(diǎn)。
CHOMSKY: Well, first I should say that I approach classical rationalism not really as a historian of science or a historian of philosophy, but from the rather different point of view of someone who has a certain range of scientific notions and is interested in seeing how at an earlier stage people may have been groping towards these notions, possibly without even realising what they were groping towards.
喬姆斯基：首先聲明我對(duì)待古典唯理主義的態(tài)度有別于科學(xué)史學(xué)家或哲學(xué)史學(xué)家。作為一個(gè)個(gè)有某些科學(xué)觀念的人，我希望發(fā)現(xiàn)在歷史的一個(gè)階段人們用何種方法無(wú)意識(shí)地朝著這些觀念摸索前進(jìn)。
So one might say that I'm looking at history not as an antiquarian, who is interested in finding out and giving a precisely accurate account of what the thinking of the seventeenth century was-I don't mean to demean that activity, it's just not mine-but rather from the point of view of, let's say, an art lover, who wants to look at the seventeenth century to find in it things that are of particular value, and that obtain part of their value in part because of the perspective with which he approaches them.
可以說(shuō)我不像考古學(xué)家那樣對(duì)待歷史，他們期望能準(zhǔn)確地描繪出17世紀(jì)的思想。我決不想降低這種行為的價(jià)值，只不過(guò)說(shuō)明這不是我的做法。我像一個(gè)鐘愛(ài)藝術(shù)的情人（注：art lover分明是“藝術(shù)愛(ài)好者”，怎么變“情人”了），他研究17世紀(jì)是為了從中發(fā)現(xiàn)有特殊價(jià)值的事物，這是一種因他投去的目光而獲新生的價(jià)值。
And I think that, without objecting to the other approach, my approach is legitimate; that is, I think it is perfectly possible to go back to earlier stages of scientific thinking on the basis of our present understanding, and to perceive how great thinkers were, within the limitations of their time, groping towards concepts and ideas and insights that they themselves could not be clearly aware of.
與第一種解決方法不矛盾，我想我的觀點(diǎn)是在情理之中的，我認(rèn)為完全有可能以我們目前的理解能力重現(xiàn)科學(xué)思想的歷史階段，明白那些大思想家如何摸索著邁向這些概念和思想，他們對(duì)此幾乎沒(méi)有意識(shí)并受到時(shí)代的局限。
For example, I think that anyone can do this about his own thought. Without trying to compare oneself to the great thinkers of the past, anyone can. .
比如我想無(wú)論何人都可以借此方法分析自己的思想。并不是想同那些大思想家做對(duì)比、無(wú)論誰(shuí)都可以……
ELDERS: Why not?
埃勒德：為什么不能比呢？
CHOMSKY: ...look at...
喬姆斯基：考慮……
ELDERS: Why not?
埃勒德：為什么不呢？
CHOMSKY: All right [laughs], anyone can consider what he now knows and can ask what he knew twenty years ago, and can see that in some unclear fashion he was striving towards something which he can only now understand ... if he is fortunate.
喬姆斯基：很好，無(wú)論什么人都可以思索今天他明白的東西，琢磨20年前他懂得的事物和看到他曾模模糊糊地想搞清楚的事情直到現(xiàn)在才明白……如果他有此幸運(yùn)的話(huà)。
Similarly I think it's possible to look at the past, without distorting your view, and it is in these terms that I want to look at the seventeenth century. Now, when I look back at the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, what strikes me particularly is the way in which, for example, Descartes and his followers were led to postulate mind as a thinking substance independent of the body. If you look at their reasons for postulating this second substance, mind, thinking entity, they were that Descartes was able to convince himself, rightly or wrongly, it doesn't matter at the moment, that events in the physical world and even much of the behavioural and psychological world, for example a good deal of sensation, were explicable in terms of what he considered to be physics-wrongly, as we now believe-that is, in terms of things bumping into each other and turning and moving and so on.
同樣我想在保持正確觀念的情況下，我們可以看看過(guò)去。我就是抱著這種態(tài)度看待17世紀(jì)的。當(dāng)我轉(zhuǎn)向17、18世紀(jì)時(shí)，我被大思想家的探索方法深深吸引。比如笛卡爾和他的弟子們?cè)谡J(rèn)定精神是獨(dú)立于肉體的、能思想的物質(zhì)時(shí)的方法。如果分析一下他們假設(shè)精神為第二物質(zhì)、是能思想的物質(zhì)的理由時(shí)，顯然笛卡爾最終相信——對(duì)錯(cuò)與否并不重要——物理領(lǐng)域的事情以及行為和心理領(lǐng)域的大部分事物，尤其是感覺(jué)，是依據(jù)他心目中物理的模式表達(dá)出來(lái)的：相互移動(dòng)、碰撞的物體產(chǎn)生對(duì)抗等等?！裉煳覀冋J(rèn)為這是錯(cuò)誤的方法。
He thought that in those terms, in terms of the mechanical principle, he could explain a certain domain of phenomena; and then he observed that there was a range of phenomena that he argued could not be explained in those terms. And he therefore postulated a creative principle to account for that domain of phenomena, the principle of mind with its own properties. And then later followers, many who didn't regard themselves as Cartesians, for example many who regarded themselves as strongly anti-rationalistic, developed the concept of creation within a system of rule.
他相信這種機(jī)械原則能使他闡明某些現(xiàn)象。隨后，他發(fā)現(xiàn)并不能總是如愿以?xún)敚谑撬慵僭O(shè)了創(chuàng)造原則，即精神原則及其特性。在他之后，他的弟子們，其中不乏自稱(chēng)非笛卡爾主義者、堅(jiān)定的反唯理主義者，他們的規(guī)則體系內(nèi)發(fā)展了創(chuàng)造概念。
I won't bother with the details, but my own research into the subject led me ultimately to Wilhelm von Humboldt, who certainly didn't consider himself a Cartesian, but nevertheless in a rather different framework and within a different historical period and with different insight, in a remarkable and ingenious way, which, I think, is of lasting importance, also developed the concept of internalised form-fundamentally the concept of free creation within a system of rule in an effort to come to grips with some of the same difficulties and problems that the Cartesians faced in their terms.
我不細(xì)說(shuō)了。但對(duì)這方面的研究最后將我引向了威廉·馮·洪堡。當(dāng)然他也不認(rèn)為自己是笛卡爾主義者，但他以獨(dú)特的方式，在不同的歷史階段發(fā)展了內(nèi)在形式概念。他采用獨(dú)特的結(jié)構(gòu)、新穎的觀點(diǎn)，以工程師的方法——我認(rèn)為這是必不可少的和持久的方式——發(fā)展了這個(gè)概念，這就是在通常體系內(nèi)自由創(chuàng)造的概念。他努力地解決了一些笛卡爾主義者與之奮斗不息的困難和問(wèn)題。
Now I believe, and here I would differ from a lot of my colleagues, that the move of Descartes to the postulation of a second substance was a very scientific move; it was not a metaphysical or an anti-scientific move. In fact, in many ways it was very much like Newton's intellectual move when he postulated action at a distance; he was moving into the domain of the occult, if you like. He was moving into the domain of something that went beyond well-established science, and was trying to integrate it with well-established science by developing a theory in which these notions could be properly clarified and explained.
同我的許多同事相反，到目前為止，我認(rèn)為笛卡爾假設(shè)第二實(shí)體的選擇具有科學(xué)性，決不是形而上學(xué)。在許多方面這類(lèi)似于牛頓確定遠(yuǎn)距離作用時(shí)的理智選擇，但他進(jìn)入了玄奧領(lǐng)域——怎么說(shuō)都可以。他進(jìn)入了超越既定科學(xué)的領(lǐng)域，試圖發(fā)展一個(gè)理論，用這個(gè)理論恰如其分地、清晰地闡述這些概念，以便反它們納入科學(xué)領(lǐng)域。
Now Descartes, I think, made a similar intellectual move in postulating a second substance. Of course he failed where Newton succeeded; that is, he was unable to lay the groundwork for a mathematical theory of mind, as achieved by Newton and his followers, which laid the groundwork for a mathematical theory of physical entities that incorporated such occult notions as action at a distance and later electromagnetic forces and so on.
笛卡爾用類(lèi)似的方法確立了第二實(shí)體。當(dāng)然他在牛頓成功的地方失敗了。在建立精神數(shù)學(xué)理論的基礎(chǔ)方面他顯得無(wú)能為力。牛頓和他的弟子們建立了物理實(shí)體的數(shù)學(xué)理論基礎(chǔ)，這個(gè)基礎(chǔ)囊括了玄奧概念、遠(yuǎn)距離作用及后來(lái)的電磁力等。
But then that poses for us, I think, the task of carrying on and developing this, if you like, mathematical theory of mind; by that I simply mean a precisely articulated, clearly formulated, abstract theory which will have empirical consequences, which will let us know whether the theory is right or wrong, or on the wrong track or the right track, and at the same time will have the properties of mathematical science, that is, the properties of rigour and precision and a structure that makes it possible for us to deduce conclusions from assumptions and so on.
于是，不管怎么說(shuō)，我們負(fù)有發(fā)展精神數(shù)學(xué)理論的任務(wù)。在此，我的意思是一個(gè)結(jié)構(gòu)嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)、表達(dá)明確的抽象理論會(huì)有知識(shí)的結(jié)果，能夠使我們明白理論正確與否、方向正確與否，并同時(shí)具有數(shù)學(xué)科學(xué)的特性、嚴(yán)格性、精確性及結(jié)構(gòu)，使我們能從中獲得結(jié)論、假說(shuō)等等。
Now it's from that point of view that I try to look back at the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and to pick out points, which I think are really there, even though I certainly recognise, and in fact would want to insist, that the individuals in question may not have seen it this way.
基于這種觀點(diǎn)我嘗試著觀察17、18世紀(jì)，以便從中發(fā)現(xiàn)業(yè)已存在的一些概念。盡管必須承認(rèn)，我談到的有關(guān)人士并不這樣看待17、18世紀(jì)。
ELDERS: Mr. Foucault, I suppose you will have a severe criticism of this?
埃勒德：?？孪壬蚁肽獓?yán)厲地批評(píng)這些想法了？
FOUCAULT: No ... there are just one or two little historical points. I cannot object to the account which you have given in your historical analysis of their reasons and of their modality. But there is one thing one could nevertheless add: when you speak of creativity as conceived by Descartes, I wonder if you don't transpose to Descartes an idea which is to be found among his successors or even certain of his contemporaries. According to Descartes, the mind was not so very creative. It saw, it perceived, it was illuminated by the evidence.
?？拢翰弧瓋H僅在歷史問(wèn)題上有一兩處微不足道的看法。對(duì)您的分析我沒(méi)有相反意見(jiàn)，但我想補(bǔ)充一點(diǎn)：當(dāng)您談到類(lèi)似于笛卡爾構(gòu)思的創(chuàng)造性時(shí)，我想是否您把他的后繼者，甚至他的同代人的想法都?xì)w于笛卡爾了？笛卡爾認(rèn)為精神并不十分具有創(chuàng)造性。他觀察、思索（“他”應(yīng)為“它”，指的是精神），從顯而易見(jiàn)的事物中得到啟示。
Moreover, the problem which Descartes never resolved nor entirely mastered, was that of understanding how one could pass from one of these clear and distinct ideas, one of these intuitions, to another, and what status should be given to the evidence of the passage between them. I can't see exactly either the creation in the moment where the mind grasped the truth for Descartes, or even the real creation in the passage from one truth to another.
此外，笛卡爾從未解決或從未完全掌握的問(wèn)題是搞清楚人們?nèi)绾螐囊粋€(gè)明晰的思想過(guò)渡到另一思想，從一個(gè)直覺(jué)過(guò)渡到另一直覺(jué)，并賦予這種明顯的過(guò)渡以何種規(guī)則。不管是在笛卡爾認(rèn)為的精神掌握了真理的時(shí)刻，還是在從一個(gè)真理轉(zhuǎn)向另一個(gè)真理的過(guò)程中，我都看不到創(chuàng)造性。
On the contrary, you can find, I think, at the same time in Pascal and Leibniz, something which is much closer to what you are looking for: in other words in Pascal and in the whole Augustinian stream of Christian thought, you find this idea of a mind in profundity; of a mind folded back in the intimacy of itself which is touched by a sort of unconsciousness, and which can develop its potentialities by the deepening of the self. And that is why the grammar of Port Royal, to which you refer, is, I think, much more Augustinian than Cartesian.
相反，在同時(shí)期的帕斯卡或萊布尼茨處會(huì)找到非常接近您需要的東西。換句話(huà)說(shuō)，在帕斯卡那里以及基督教思想的奧古斯丁學(xué)說(shuō)里都能找到深邃的精神思想、隱藏在自身深處的精神思想。當(dāng)它被某種無(wú)意識(shí)觸及，便通過(guò)自身的深化可以發(fā)展它的潛在力量。因此您參用的波特羅亞爾的《語(yǔ)法》，據(jù)我看，與其說(shuō)它是笛卡爾主義的，不如說(shuō)是奧古斯丁學(xué)派的。
And furthermore you will find in Leibniz something which you will certainly like: the idea that in the profundity of the mind is incorporated a whole web of logical relations which constitutes, in a certain sense, the rational unconscious of the consciousness, the not yet clarified and visible form of the reason itself, which the monad or the individual develops little by little, and with which he understands the whole world.
另外，萊布尼茨那里肯定也有使您感興趣的東西：在精神深處含有一張邏輯關(guān)系網(wǎng)。從某種意義上來(lái)說(shuō)，它構(gòu)成了合理的無(wú)意識(shí)，構(gòu)成了看得見(jiàn)卻還模糊的理性形態(tài)，單子或個(gè)體逐漸地發(fā)展它，對(duì)整個(gè)世界的理解也依賴(lài)于它。
That's where I would make a very small criticism.
這是我的一點(diǎn)小意見(jiàn)。
ELDERS: Mr. Chomsky, one moment please.
埃勒德：?jiǎn)棠匪够壬?qǐng)稍等一下。
I don't think it's a question of making a historical criticism, but of formulating your own opinions on these quite fundamental concepts...
我不認(rèn)為有必要做歷史方面的評(píng)論。我們希望聽(tīng)到您對(duì)基本概念的看法。
FOUCAULT: But one's fundamental opinions can be demonstrated in precise analyses such as these.
福柯：可是我們的基本觀點(diǎn)需要在準(zhǔn)確的分析里被展示，就像剛才談到的那些。
ELDERS: Yes, all right. But I remember some passages in your History of Madness, which give a description of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in terms of repression, suppression and exclusion, while for Mr. Chomsky this period is full of creativity and individuality.
埃勒德：是的，很好。但我記得在您的《瘋狂史》里有幾處描寫(xiě)17、18世紀(jì)的段落，您使用了鎮(zhèn)壓、消滅和排斥等字眼；而在喬姆斯基先生看來(lái)，這是一個(gè)充滿(mǎn)創(chuàng)造力和人性的時(shí)期。
Why do we have at that period, for the first time, closed psychiatric or insane asylums? I think this is a very fundamental question...
為什么在這個(gè)時(shí)期開(kāi)始出現(xiàn)了拘留所？我想這是個(gè)重要問(wèn)題……
FOUCAULT: ...on creativity, yes!
福柯：……對(duì)于創(chuàng)造性來(lái)說(shuō)，是應(yīng)充分肯定的！
But I don't know, perhaps Mr. Chomsky would like to speak about it...
但我不清楚。也許喬姆斯基先生想就此談?wù)劇?/p>
ELDERS: No, no, no, please go on. Continue.
埃勒德：不，不，不，請(qǐng)您接下去說(shuō)。
FOUCAULT: No, I would like to say this: in the historical studies that I have been able to make, or have tried to make, I have without any doubt given very little room to what you might call the creativity of individuals, to their capacity for creation, to their aptitude for inventing by themselves, for originating concepts, theories or scientific truths by themselves.
福柯：我只想簡(jiǎn)單地說(shuō)一下。在我所能做的或我曾努力做的歷史研究中，毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)，在被你們稱(chēng)之為個(gè)體創(chuàng)造能力方面及他們發(fā)明概念、理論或科學(xué)真理的才能方面，我留下的地方很小。
But I believe that my problem is different to that of Mr. Chomsky. Mr. Chomsky has been fighting against linguistic behaviourism, which attributed almost nothing to the creativity of the speaking subject; the speaking subject was a kind of surface on which information came together little by little, which he afterwards combined.
我認(rèn)為構(gòu)的問(wèn)題與喬姆斯基先生的有所不同。他是反對(duì)語(yǔ)言行為主義的，因?yàn)檎Z(yǔ)言行為主義否定語(yǔ)言主體的創(chuàng)造性，認(rèn)為語(yǔ)言主體是承載逐漸匯集起來(lái)的信息并隨后加以組合的一種截面。
In the field of the history of science or, more generally, the history of thought, the problem was completely different.
在科學(xué)史領(lǐng)域內(nèi)，或更廣泛地說(shuō)，在思想史領(lǐng)域內(nèi)，問(wèn)題則完全不同。
The history of knowledge has tried for a long time to obey two claims. One is the claim of attribution: each discovery should not only be situated and dated, but should also be attributed to someone; it should have an inventor and someone responsible for it. General or collective phenomena on the other hand, those which by definition can't be "attributed", are normally devalued: they are still traditionally described through words like "tradition', "mentality", "modes"; and one lets them play the negative role of a brake in relation to the "originality" of the inventor. In brief, this has to do with the principle of the sovereignty of the subject applied to the history of knowledge. The other claim is that which no longer allows us to save the subject, but the truth: so that it won't be compromised by history, it is necessary not that the truth constitutes itself in history, but only that it reveals itself in it; hidden to men's eyes, provisionally inaccessible, sitting in the shadows, it will wait to be unveiled. The history of truth would be essentially its delay, its fall or the disappearance of the obstacles which have impeded it until now from coming to light. The historical dimension of knowledge is always negative in relation to the truth. It isn't difficult to see how these two claims were adjusted, one to the other: the phenomena of collective order, the "common thought", the "prejudices" of the "myths" of a period, constituted the obstacles which the subject of knowledge had to surmount or to outlive in order to have access finally to the truth; he had to be in an "eccentric" position in order to "discover". At one level this seems to be invoking a certain "romanticism" about the history of science: the solitude of the man of truth, the originality which reopened itself onto the original through history and despite it. I think that, more fundamentally, it's a matter of superimposing the theory of knowledge and the subject of knowledge on the history of knowledge.
認(rèn)識(shí)史長(zhǎng)斯以來(lái)致力于服從兩個(gè)需求。首先是授予的需求；每項(xiàng)發(fā)明不僅需要確定時(shí)間、地點(diǎn)，而且還要確定授予何人。它需要一位發(fā)明者，一位它的負(fù)責(zé)人。普通的或集體的項(xiàng)目由于不能授予的特性而自然貶值。通常都用類(lèi)似于“傳統(tǒng)”、“思想”和“方式”等字詞來(lái)描述，因而只能起到受抑制的負(fù)作用，根本無(wú)法與發(fā)明者的“獨(dú)創(chuàng)性”相比。簡(jiǎn)言之，這與認(rèn)識(shí)史上的主體至高無(wú)上原則有關(guān)。第二個(gè)需求，它不允許挽救主體，而要挽救真理。為了不讓真理被歷史左右，真理不必非在歷史中構(gòu)成不可，而僅僅在其中顯露而已。它蜷縮在陰影里，躲開(kāi)眾人的目光，令人一時(shí)難以接近，它等待著被揭示。真理的歷史主要的就是真理的姍姍來(lái)遲，它的失敗，或者去消滅目前仍阻擋它進(jìn)入光明的各種障礙。與真理相比，認(rèn)識(shí)史的重要性總是被否定的。不難看出這兩個(gè)需求緊密交錯(cuò)：類(lèi)型相同的現(xiàn)象、相同的思想、對(duì)一個(gè)時(shí)期幻想的偏見(jiàn)，構(gòu)成了諸多障礙。認(rèn)識(shí)科學(xué)應(yīng)當(dāng)克服這些障礙以便最終進(jìn)入真理，并應(yīng)當(dāng)位于中心位置之外以顯露自己。從某種程度上來(lái)說(shuō)，這似乎帶給科學(xué)史某種浪漫情調(diào)；掌握真理之人的孤獨(dú)、創(chuàng)造性不經(jīng)意地從歷史中尋到了它的根。我想，更基本的應(yīng)把認(rèn)識(shí)的理論和認(rèn)識(shí)的主體放進(jìn)認(rèn)識(shí)的歷史中。
And what if understanding the relation of the subject to the truth, were just an effect of knowledge? What if understanding were a complex, multiple, non-individual formation, not "subjected to the subject", which produced effects of truth? One should then put forward positively this entire dimension which the history of science has negativised; analyse the productive capacity of knowledge as a collective practice; and consequently replace individuals and their "knowledge" in the development of a knowledge which at a given moment functions according to certain rules which one can register and describe.
理解主體與真理的關(guān)系是否僅是認(rèn)識(shí)的作用呢？理解是不是一種復(fù)雜、多樣的構(gòu)成？是不是非個(gè)人的、獨(dú)立于主體及能夠產(chǎn)生真理的作用呢？那就該對(duì)它的重要性予以肯定，這一點(diǎn)是科學(xué)史曾予揚(yáng)棄的。應(yīng)該把知識(shí)的生產(chǎn)能力作為集體實(shí)踐來(lái)分析，并在知識(shí)發(fā)展中重新安排個(gè)體及他們的知識(shí)的位置。在既定時(shí)刻，知識(shí)發(fā)展依據(jù)某些規(guī)則運(yùn)作，人們可以記錄和描繪這些規(guī)則。
You will say to me that all the Marxist historians of science have been doing this for a long time. But when one sees how they work with these facts and especially what use they make of the notions of consciousness, of ideology as opposed to science, one realises that they are for the main part more or less detached from the theory of knowledge.
你們會(huì)說(shuō)馬克思主義的科學(xué)史學(xué)家早就做這項(xiàng)工作了。但當(dāng)看清他們是如何對(duì)待這些事實(shí)，尤其是他們用覺(jué)悟和意識(shí)形態(tài)同科學(xué)相對(duì)立的方法，大家就會(huì)清楚他們或多或少脫離了認(rèn)識(shí)理論。
In any case, what I am anxious about is substituting transformations of the understanding for the history of the discoveries of knowledge. Therefore I have, in appearance at least, a completely different attitude to Mr. Chomsky apropos creativity, because for me it is a matter of effacing the dilemma of the knowing subject, while for him it is a matter of allowing the dilemma of the speaking subject to reappear.
至于我，我尤為關(guān)注的是用理解轉(zhuǎn)換來(lái)替代認(rèn)識(shí)的發(fā)明史。這樣，至少在表面上我同喬姆斯基先生在對(duì)待創(chuàng)造性上有天壤之別。因?yàn)樵谖疫@里是消除認(rèn)識(shí)主體的窘?jīng)r，而他呢，是希望再現(xiàn)語(yǔ)言主體的窘?jīng)r。
But if he has made it reappear, if he has described it, it is because he can do so. The linguists have for a long time now analysed language as a system with a collective value. The understanding as a collective totality of rules allowing such and such a knowledge to be produced in a certain period, has hardly been studied until now. Nevertheless, it presents some fairly positive characteristics to the observer. Take for example medicine at the end of the eighteenth century: read twenty medical works, it doesn't matter which, of the years 1770 to 1780, then twenty others from the years 1820 to 1830, and I would say, quite at random, that in forty or fifty years everything had changed; what one talked about, the way one talked about it, not just the remedies, of course, not just the maladies and their classifications, but the outlook itself. Who was responsible for that? Who was the author of it? It is artificial, I think, to say Bichat, or even to expand a little and to say the first anatomical clinicians. It's a matter of a collective and complex transformation of medical understanding in its practice and its rules. And this transformation is far from a negative phenomenon: it is the suppression of a negativity, the effacement of an obstacle, the disappearance of prejudices, the abandonment of old myths, the retreat of irrational beliefs, and access finally freed to experience and to reason; it represents the application of an entirely new grille, with its choices and exclusions; a new play with its own rules, decisions and limitations, with its own inner logic, its parameters and its blind alleys, all of which lead to the modification of the point of origin. And it is in this functioning that the understanding itself exists. So, if one studies the history of knowledge, one sees that there are two broad directions of analysis: according to one, one has to show how, under what conditions and for what reasons, the understanding modifies itself in its formative rules, without passing through an original "inventor" discovering the "truth"; and according to the other, one has to show how the working of the rules of an understanding can produce in an individual new and unpublished knowledge. Here my aim rejoins, with imperfect methods and in a quite inferior mode, Mr. Chomsky's project: accounting for the fact that with a few rules or definite elements, unknown totalities, never even produced, can be brought to light by individuals. To resolve this problem, Mr. Chomsky has to reintroduce the dilemma of the subject in the field of grammatical analysis. To resolve an analogous problem in the field of history with which I am involved, one has to do the opposite, in a way: to introduce the point of view of understanding, of its rules, of its systems, of its transformations of totalities in the game of individual knowledge. Here and there the problem of creativity cannot be resolved in the same way, or rather, it can't be formulated in the same terms, given the state of disciplines inside which it is put.
他做到了這一點(diǎn)，因?yàn)檫@是可行的。長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)語(yǔ)言學(xué)家們分析語(yǔ)言如同分析具有共同價(jià)值的一個(gè)系統(tǒng)。理解作為規(guī)則的共同總體性允許這種或那種認(rèn)識(shí)進(jìn)入某個(gè)時(shí)期，但直到目前卻從未被研究過(guò)。但理解表現(xiàn)出了一些正面的特征，舉18世紀(jì)末醫(yī)學(xué)界為例。隨便翻開(kāi)一本1770年至1780年的醫(yī)書(shū)，讀上二十幾頁(yè)；然后再看二十幾頁(yè)1820年至1830年的一本醫(yī)書(shū)。經(jīng)過(guò)四、五十年后發(fā)生了巨大的變化。無(wú)論人們談及的內(nèi)容還是說(shuō)話(huà)的方式，當(dāng)然不僅僅是藥方，也不僅僅是疾病或疾病分類(lèi)，還有人們的眼界及看問(wèn)題的角度都有巨變。誰(shuí)對(duì)此變化負(fù)有主要責(zé)任？誰(shuí)是此變化的創(chuàng)造者？回答說(shuō)是比沙或是第一批支持臨床解剖學(xué)的人，則有些牽強(qiáng)附會(huì)。這是醫(yī)學(xué)認(rèn)識(shí)在實(shí)踐與規(guī)則里發(fā)生的復(fù)雜而共同的轉(zhuǎn)化，這個(gè)轉(zhuǎn)化不是消極現(xiàn)象。消除了消極性，鏟除了障礙，糾正了偏見(jiàn)，拋棄了空想，無(wú)理性信仰的退卻，最后總算自由地進(jìn)入了理性和體驗(yàn)。這表現(xiàn)出了柵欄作用。一個(gè)全新的、有篩選功能的柵欄；一個(gè)有自己的規(guī)則、決定和界限的，有自己內(nèi)部邏輯、參數(shù)和死路的，總之這是一個(gè)與最初相比具有引向變革特點(diǎn)的新工具。理解便蘊(yùn)涵在這種功能里。如果研究一下認(rèn)識(shí)史，便會(huì)看到兩種分析方向。依照第一種方向，應(yīng)該表示出理解在已形成的規(guī)則里如何，在何種條件下，及源于何種原因進(jìn)行著改變，并未經(jīng)過(guò)發(fā)現(xiàn)“真理”的原始“發(fā)明者”；依照第二種方向，應(yīng)該顯示出理解原則如何能夠在個(gè)體身上產(chǎn)生出新的、前所未有的認(rèn)識(shí)。此時(shí)，我的工作與喬姆斯基先生的計(jì)劃銜接上了。我的工作方法欠完善，方式也差。依賴(lài)某些明確的因素，一些從未出現(xiàn)過(guò)的、不被人們所知的總體性才能被人們揭示開(kāi)來(lái)。為了解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題，喬姆斯基先生應(yīng)把主體的窘境再引進(jìn)語(yǔ)法分析領(lǐng)域內(nèi)。在我的歷史范圍內(nèi)，為了解決一個(gè)類(lèi)似的問(wèn)題，卻要使用相反的方法：把理解觀點(diǎn)，它的規(guī)則，它的體系，它的總體性的轉(zhuǎn)化引進(jìn)個(gè)體認(rèn)識(shí)的運(yùn)作規(guī)則里。不管是哪種方法，創(chuàng)造性這個(gè)問(wèn)題不能用同一種方法解決，或者說(shuō)，不能用相同的詞語(yǔ)表達(dá)出來(lái)，因?yàn)樗鶎俚膶W(xué)科不盡相同。
