前言
本書第一版于1975年問世時，主要的學術(shù)焦點仍然是主觀性，即感覺。這一焦點是20世紀60年代延續(xù)下來的，原本是對之前的理性主義和行為主義的必要反應。它實際上是在宣稱：“人不是機器。他們不僅僅是生理機能的總和。他們有希望、夢想和情感。人人皆不同——每個人都有其看待世界的特殊視角，有其感知世界的獨特方式。任何忽視人的主觀性的人類觀都是扭曲的”。
然而，盡管對感覺的重視有其價值，但這種重視卻過度了。與許多其他運動一樣，最初是反對極端，但后來自己卻成了極端。這種極端主義最終導致了對思考的忽視。本書旨在彌補這一忽視。第一版的序言對此作了如下解釋：
強調(diào)主觀性有助于糾正一種危險的過度簡化。但這種反應不免造成一種更糟糕的情形——對思考的忽視。之所以更糟糕，有兩個原因。首先，因為我們生活在一個容易被操縱的時代。大量唯利是圖的商人和蠱惑民心的政客掌握了豐富的心理學資源來操控我們的情緒和潛意識需求，誘導我們相信：膚淺就是深刻，有害就是有益，邪惡就是美德。而感覺特別容易受到這種操控。
其次，因為在現(xiàn)代生活的幾乎每一個重要領(lǐng)域——法律、醫(yī)學、政府、教育、科學、商業(yè)和社區(qū)事務——我們都被嚴重的問題和復雜的議題所困擾，需要認真收集和權(quán)衡事實和明智的意見，深思熟慮各種結(jié)論或行動，并審慎地選擇最佳結(jié)論或最合適的行動。
[今天的大學生]已經(jīng)習慣了高估主觀性，不是低估。因此，他不需要縱容自己的感覺。相反，他需要學會如何梳理自己的感覺，判斷這些感覺在多大程度上受外部因素影響，并在這些感覺相互之間或他人感覺發(fā)生沖突時，認真加以評估。總之，學生們需要學會批判性地思考。
許多人都有一種令人遺憾的傾向，他們認為感覺和思考是互斥的，強迫自己在二者之間作出選擇。在他們看來，如果我們選擇專注其中一個，那就必須拋棄另一個。然而，這種想法是錯誤的。感覺和思考是完美互補的。感覺更多的是自發(fā)的，是形成結(jié)論的良好開端。而思考更多是深思熟慮，為我們提供了辨別最佳和最適當感覺的方法。兩者都是自然的。
然而，思考不像感覺那樣自然而然。要想做好思考，我們需要系統(tǒng)化的方法和指導性的練習。
自20世紀70年代中期以來，人們對思維的總體態(tài)度發(fā)生了很大變化。認為批判性思維是一種重要技能，教育應該重視的觀點已不再是少數(shù)人的聲音。成百上千的人呼吁，要求在現(xiàn)有課程中增加批判性思維的教學內(nèi)容，甚至開設(shè)專門的思維類課程。幾乎毫無疑問，新千年的挑戰(zhàn)要求我們的思考能夠超越感覺，從而清晰、公正、批判性地解決問題和做出決策。
本版特色
本版《超越感覺》保留了前幾版的基本結(jié)構(gòu)。第一部分解釋了進行批判性思維的心理、哲學和社會等領(lǐng)域的背景，并描述如何培養(yǎng)批判性思維的習慣和態(tài)度。第二部分幫助學生認識并克服思維中的常見邏輯謬誤。第三部分提供了逐步解決這些謬誤的策略。
同時，我在保持全書整體結(jié)構(gòu)的情況下，也基于審稿人的有益反饋做了許多的調(diào)整。
?在第1章中，新增了“觀念的影響”一節(jié)。
?在第3章中，新增了“理解因果關(guān)系”一節(jié)。
?在第15章中，新增了“觀察價值”的實例。
?在第17章中，“評估信息來源”小節(jié)的內(nèi)容有所擴展。
?新增了一些“意見分歧”練習。
*1975年，“他"仍被認為是指男女兩性。
和過去一樣，我試圖遵循喬治-奧威爾的箴言：“如果能想到日常英語的對應詞，就不要使用外來詞、術(shù)語或行話”。這并非易事。當邏輯學家學會了諸如“人身攻擊謬誤（argumentum ad hominem）”、“不合邏輯的推論（non sequitur）”和“肯定后件（affirming the consequent）”等術(shù)語后，他們自然希望使用這些術(shù)語。他們這樣做的理由顯而易見：例如，“這些是最精確的術(shù)語。不要成為遷就者，不讓學生接觸這些術(shù)語?！痹谝庵静粓远〞r，我會經(jīng)受不住這種誘惑。（例如，在上一版本，我還使用了enthymeme（省略三段論法）一詞，罪過罪過……我又故態(tài)復萌了）。但這些術(shù)語的精確性確實是我想使用它們的真正原因嗎？難道我們教授們不是喜歡展示自己的知識，或者不愿讓學生們免于我們曾經(jīng)歷的艱難（我們受過苦，他們也該受苦）？依我之見，現(xiàn)代文化已經(jīng)為批判性思考增加太多障礙了，我們不應再增加更多障礙。
這種平實語言的做法是否會做過頭？是的，有些人會認為，我在刻意避免使用“推論”（inferences）而改用“結(jié)論”（conclusions）時，就已經(jīng)做過頭了。我不敢茍同。詞典編纂者指出，這些術(shù)語之間的差異極為細微，因此似乎更明智的做法是不要在這上面浪費時間。此外，出于不同的原因，我盡可能避免使用“價值觀”這個術(shù)語?！皟r值觀”與相對主義關(guān)系密切，以至于在這一語境下使用它，可能會削弱一個關(guān)鍵觀點，即不同的論證在質(zhì)量上存在差異。對許多學生來說，“價值觀”會引發(fā)這樣的想法：“每個人都有權(quán)擁有自己的價值觀；我的價值觀對我而言是正確的，雖然它們可能需要不時的‘闡明’，但它們永遠不應被質(zhì)疑?！边@種想法阻礙了批判性思考。
原文：
Preface
When the first edition of this book appeared in 1975, the dominant intellectual focus was still subjectivity, feelings. That focus, the legacy of the 1960s, was originally a necessary reaction to the rationalism and behaviorism that preceded it. It declared, in effect: “People are not robots. They are more than the sum total of their physiology. They have hopes, dreams, emotions. No two humans are alike—each has a special perspective, a unique way of perceiving the world. And any view of humanity that ignores this subjective side is a distortion.
Yet, despite its value, the focus on feelings went too far. Like many other movements, what began as a reaction against an extreme view became an extreme view itself. The result of that extremism was the neglect of thinking. This book was designed to answer that neglect. The introduction to the first edition explained its rationale as follows.
The emphasis on subjectivity served to correct a dangerous oversimplification. But it is the kind of reaction that cannot be sustained for long without causing an even worse situation—the neglect of thinking. Worse for two reasons. First, because we live in an age of manipulation. Armies of hucksters and demagogues stand ready with the rich resources of psychology to play upon our emotions and subconscious needs to persuade us that superficial is profound, harmful is beneficial, evil is virtuous. And feelings are especially vulnerable to such manipulation.
Secondly, because in virtually every important area of modern life— law, medicine, government, education, science, business, and community affairs—we are beset with serious problems and complex issues that demand careful gathering and weighing of facts and informed opinions, thoughtful consideration of various conclusions or actions, and judicious selection of the best conclusion or most appropriate action. . . .
[Today’s college student] has been conditioned not to undervalue subjectivity, but to overvalue it. And so he does not need to have his feelings indulged. Rather, he needs to be taught how to sort out his feelings, decide to what extent they have been shaped by external influences, and x PRFACE evaluate them carefully when they conflict among themselves or with the feelings of others. In short, he needs to be taught to think critically.*
There is an unfortunate tendency among many to view feeling and thought as mutually exclusive, to force a choice between them. If we focus on one, then in their view we must reject the other. But this is mistaken. Feeling and thought are perfectly complementary. Feeling, being more spontaneous, is an excellent beginning to the development of conclusions. And thought, being more deliberate, provides a way to identify the best and most appropriate feeling. Both are natural.
Thinking, however, is less automatic than feeling. To do it well demands a systematic approach and guided practice.
The general attitude toward thinking has changed considerably since the mid-1970s. The view that critical thinking is an important skill to which education should give prominence is no longer a minority view. Hundreds of voices have joined the chorus calling for the addition of critical thinking objectives to existing courses and even the creation of special courses in thinking. There is little disagreement that the challenges of the new millennium demand minds that can move beyond feelings to clear, impartial, critical problem solving and decision making.
Features of This Edition
This edition of Beyond Feelings retains the basic organization of previous editions. The first section explains the psychological, philosophical, and social context in which critical thinking takes place and describes the habits and attitudes that enhance such thinking. The second section helps students recognize and overcome common errors in thinking. The third section provides a step-by-step strategy for dealing with issues.
Within the overall design, however, I have made a number of changes, most in response to the helpful suggestions of reviewers.
? In Chapter 1, a new section—“The Influence of Ideas”—has been added.
? In Chapter 3, a new section—“Understanding Cause and Effect”— has been added.
? In Chapter 15, new examples of the value of observation have been added.
? In Chapter 17, the subsection “Evaluate your information sources.” has been expanded.
? A number of new “Difference of Opinion” exercises have been added.
*In 1975, “he” was still accepted as a reference to both sexes.
As in the past, I have attempted to follow George Orwell’s sage advice: “Never use a foreign phrase, a scientific word, or a jargon word if you can think of an everyday English equivalent.” This is not always easy. When logicians are taught terms such as argumentum ad hominem, non sequitur, and “affirming the consequent,” they naturally want to use them. Arguments for doing so urge themselves upon us: for example, “These are the most precise terms. Don’t join the ranks of the coddlers and deprive students of them.” In weak moments I succumb to this appeal. (Until the previous edition, for example, I included the term enthymeme. Mea culpa . . . there I go again.) But is the precision of such terms the real reason for my wanting to use them? Is it not possible that we professors enjoy parading our knowledge or that we are reluctant to spare our students the struggle we were forced to undergo (“We suffered, so they should too”)? It seems to me that modern culture already provides too many impediments to critical thinking for us to add more.
Is it possible to carry this plain language commitment too far? Yes, and some will think I have done so in avoiding the term inferences and speaking instead of conclusions. But I respectfully disagree. Lexicographers point out that the distinction between these terms is extremely subtle, so it seems more reasonable not to devote time to it. Also, I avoid using the term values whenever possible for a somewhat different reason.
The word value is so associated with relativism that its use in this context can undermine the crucial idea that arguments differ in quality. For many students, the word value triggers the thought, “Everyone has a right to his or her values; mine are right for me, and though they may need ‘clarification’ from time to time, they are never to be questioned.” This thought impedes critical thinking.
