精神的目標

Mind’s goal

現(xiàn)在我們將跳過《精神現(xiàn)象學》中一大部分內(nèi)容。We shall now pass over a huge chunk of the Phenomenology. 在略去的內(nèi)容當中，有些冗長而晦澀，另一些則在趣味性和重要性方面與我們討論過的內(nèi)容接近。Some of what we are missing is tedious and obscure; other sections come close to equalling in interest and importance those we have just discussed. 有時談論的話題正是我們希望在一部哲學著作中找到的那些，Sometimes the topics are just what one would expect to find in a philosophical work. 例如對費希特和康德形而上學思想的討論，There are discussions of the metaphysical ideas of Fichte and Kant. 對享樂主義或追求快樂的批判，There is a critique of hedonism, or the pursuit of pleasure. 還有對康德倫理學的討論，其反駁與我們討論《法哲學原理》時看到的那些類似。There is a discussion of Kant’s ethics, making objections similar to those we have already encountered in discussing the Philosophy of Right. 對于在他那個時代因浪漫主義運動而流行的那種道德情感，黑格爾也作了批判性的分析。Moral sentimentality of the type made popular in Hegel’s time by the Romantic movement also comes in for critical analysis.

另一些論題則更加獨特。Other topics are more unusual. 例如，有很長一節(jié)是討論相面術(shù)和顱相學的——這些偽科學基于這樣一種觀念，即從人的臉形（相面術(shù)）或頭蓋骨上的隆起（顱相學）可以識別人的性格。There is, for instance; a long section on physiognomy and phrenology – the pseudo-sciences based on the idea that one can tell people’s character from (in the case of physiognomy) the shape of their faces or (according to phrenology) the bumps on their skulls. 黑格爾反對這些東西，不是因為有證據(jù)說明它們是錯誤的，也不是因為其他什么世俗的理由，Hegel opposes these ideas, not because he has evidence of their inaccuracy, or any reason as mundane as that, 而是出于哲學上的理由：他認為不應把精神與臉或頭蓋骨這樣的物質(zhì)性的東西聯(lián)系在一起。but for the philosophical reason that mind is not to be tied to anything as material as a face or a skull.

另一個獨特的章節(jié)分析了建立在亞當·斯密及其學派的自由放任經(jīng)濟理論基礎(chǔ)上的社會。Another unusual section is an analysis of a society built upon the laissezfaire economic theory of Adam Smith and his school, 根據(jù)這一理論，人人都為自己積累財富而工作，但事實上卻通過勞動為整體的繁榮做出了貢獻。according to which each works to accumulate wealth for himself, but in fact contributes by his labours to the prosperity of the whole. 黑格爾的反駁是，由于鼓勵個人追求私利，這樣的經(jīng)濟制度使人認識不到他是更大集體的一部分。后來，自由企業(yè)經(jīng)濟學的批判者們（無論是否馬克思主義者）吸收了這一觀點并且非常重視。Hegel’s objection here – a point later to be taken up and made much of by both Marxist and non-Marxist critics of free-enterprise economics – is that by encouraging individuals to seek their own private interests, this economic system prevents individuals from seeing themselves as part of a larger community.

諸如此類的種種論題和其他許多論題一起構(gòu)成了黑格爾關(guān)于精神的絕對知識之路的構(gòu)想。These diverse topics, along with many others, are woven into Hegel’s conception of the path mind must travel in order to reach absolute knowledge. 我們已經(jīng)看到他堅持認為，沒有一個有自我意識的精神就不可能有充分的認識，以及自我意識是通過加工和改造世界而發(fā)展的。We have seen how he maintained that there could be no adequate knowledge without a self-conscious mind, and how self-consciousness was developed by working on the world and changing it. 從那里開始，黑格爾把整個人類歷史都看成精神的發(fā)展。From that point on, Hegel sees all of human history as the development of mind. 和在《歷史哲學》中一樣，古希臘、羅馬帝國、啟蒙運動和法國大革命等一些歷史時期在《精神現(xiàn)象學》中也有極其重要的意義，它們是精神朝著自由進步的諸階段。Historical periods such as Ancient Greece, the Roman Empire, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution have much the same significance as they do in the Philosophy of History.They are stages in the progress of mind towards freedom.? 黑格爾在《法哲學原理》中描述的有機社會的許多要素也是如此。So too are many of the elements of the organic community that Hegel described in the Philosophy of Right. 然而，盡管有這些廣泛的相似性，黑格爾在《精神現(xiàn)象學》中對這些材料的處理方式與他后來在《歷史哲學》和《法哲學原理》中的處理還是有區(qū)別的。這里我提三點。Despite these broad similarities, there are some differences between the way Hegel treats this material in the Phenomenology and his later treatment in the Philosophy of History and the Philosophy of Right. I shall mention three.

讀者立刻就能發(fā)現(xiàn)的區(qū)別是，《精神現(xiàn)象學》并沒有給出明確的國家、時期、日期、事件或人物。The difference that strikes the reader at once is that in the Phenomenology no specific countries, periods, dates, events, or people are named. 雖然其中談到的特定時期和事件通常都非常明顯（對于熟悉《歷史哲學》的讀者來說尤其如此），但一切都仿佛是作為一個一般過程的例子來處理的，精神受其尋求自我實現(xiàn)的內(nèi)在必然性的驅(qū)動而不得不經(jīng)歷這一過程。While the references to specific periods and events are usually obvious enough – especially to the reader familiar with the Philosophy of History – everything is dealt with as if it were an instance of a general process that mind is forced to pass through by the inner necessity of its drive to self-realization. 就好像如果談及具體的人物、時間或地點，那么就會暗示，一旦人物或環(huán)境不同，情況就會有所不同。It is as if references to specific people, times, or places would somehow suggest that things might have turned out differently if the people or circumstances had been different. 黑格爾設(shè)法給人這樣一種印象：即使精神的發(fā)展發(fā)生在火星，他所描述的過程也同樣會發(fā)生。Hegel manages to give the impression that the process he is describing would have occurred if the development of mind had taken place on Mars. 事實上，《精神現(xiàn)象學》是如此抽象、如此缺乏時間和地點的感覺，以至于即使精神已經(jīng)在火星上發(fā)展起來，黑格爾也不必改變?nèi)魏螙|西。Indeed, so abstract is the tone of the Phenomenology, so devoid of a sense of time and place, that if mind had developed on Mars, Hegel would not have had to change anything.

第二點區(qū)別是，《歷史哲學》和《法哲學原理》都以實現(xiàn)一個類似于普魯士形式的君主制國家為頂點，A second difference is that whereas both the Philosophy of History and the Philosophy of Right culminate in the achievement of a state resembling the Prussian form of monarchy, 而在《精神現(xiàn)象學》中，這種類型的國家甚至連提都沒提。this type of state is not even mentioned in the Phenomenology. 與《歷史哲學》類似的章節(jié)以法國大革命結(jié)束。The sections that parallel the Philosophy of History end with the French Revolution. 法國大革命是歷史的頂點，因為它代表著絕對自由狀態(tài)下的精神，知道能夠根據(jù)自己的意志來改變世界，塑造政治生活和社會生活。The French Revolution is a climax to history in the sense that it represents mind in a state of absolute freedom, aware of its ability to change the world and to mould political and social life according to its own will. 與《歷史哲學》中給出的理由類似，黑格爾說法國大革命的抽象自由不可避免地走向了自己的反面，走向了否定自由本身的恐怖和死亡。For reasons similar to those offered in the Philosophy of History, Hegel portrays the abstract freedom of the French Revolution as leading inevitably to its opposite, the negation of the free self that is terror and death; 但《精神現(xiàn)象學》并沒有給出更進一步的政治發(fā)展，but there is no further political development in the Phenomenology. 而是給出了精神走向更崇高層次的道路：先是走向康德、費希特和浪漫主義者所主張的道德世界觀，Instead the path of mind moves to more rarefied levels, first to the moral view of the world advanced by Kant, Fichte, and the Romantics, 然后走向宗教的精神狀態(tài)，最后走向由哲學來實現(xiàn)的絕對知識本身。then to the religious state of mind, and finally to absolute knowledge itself, which is achieved by philosophy.?

至于《精神現(xiàn)象學》為什么沒有提到普魯士國家，有一個顯而易見的解釋。There is an obvious explanation for the absence of references to the Prussian state in the Phenomenology. 黑格爾寫此書時正在耶拿教書，而不是在普魯士。When Hegel wrote it he was teaching not in Prussia, but at Jena. 況且又是在拿破侖戰(zhàn)爭時期寫的，當時法國是歐洲的主導力量，德意志諸國的未來無法預料。Moreover, he wrote during the period of the Napoleonic Wars, when France was the dominant power in Europe, and the future of the German states was unpredictable. 因此要想預見到普魯士國家的復興，并使之成為他的政治歷史的頂點，黑格爾必須有一種非凡的先見之明。So Hegel would have had to be remarkably prescient to anticipate the resurgence of the Prussian state and to make it the culmination of his political history. 由于未曾提及某個這樣的國家（這是可以理解的），認為黑格爾在后期著作中為了取悅其政治主子而放棄了真實想法的那些人自然會喜歡《精神現(xiàn)象 學》。The understandable absence of references to some such state has naturally made the Phenomenology popular with those who believe that in his later works Hegel compromised his true views in order to please his political masters.

《精神現(xiàn)象學》與后期著作的第三點主要區(qū)別是：在《歷史哲學》中，黑格爾把歷史過程描述為不過是自由觀念意識的進步；The third major difference between the Phenomenology and the later works is that in the Philosophy of History Hegel describes the course of history as nothing but the progress of the consciousness of the idea of freedom, 而在《精神現(xiàn)象學》中，如我們所見，則是強調(diào)朝著絕對知識的發(fā)展。whereas in the Phenomenology the emphasis is, as we have seen, on development towards absolute knowledge. 如果從日常含義來理解這些術(shù)語，黑格爾在這兩部著作中似乎持有互不相容的不同觀點。Taking these terms in their ordinary senses, it would seem that in the two works Hegel takes different and incompatible views. 當然，一個人可以很博學，卻被關(guān)在暴君的牢房里飽受煎熬；Surely one can be knowledgeable while languishing in a tyrant’s cell; 另一個人則可能對一切科學、政治和哲學一無所知，卻完全自由地生活在一個熱帶島嶼上。and one can live in total freedom on a tropical island in blissful ignorance of all science, politics, and philosophy. 但我們現(xiàn)在應該很了解黑格爾了，不會貿(mào)然從日常含義去理解他的術(shù)語。But by now we should know enough about Hegel to beware of taking his terms in their ordinary senses. 對黑格爾來說，絕對知識與真正的自由是不可分的。For Hegel, absolute knowledge and true freedom are inseparable. 就《精神現(xiàn)象學》而言，我們最后的任務是理解他所說的絕對知識是什么意思。Our final task, so far as the Phenomenology is concerned, is to understand what he means by absolute knowledge. 為此我們首先需要理解，為什么自由觀念意識的進步同時也是精神朝著絕對知識的發(fā)展。To do this we first need to understand why the progress of the consciousness of the idea of freedom is also the progress of mind towards absolute knowledge.

我們之前對黑格爾自由概念的考察表明，在他看來，只有當我們能夠不受他人、社會環(huán)境或自然欲望的強迫來作選擇時，我們才是自由的。Our earlier examination of Hegel’s conception of freedom revealed that for him we are free when we are able to choose uncoerced by other people, by social circumstances, or by natural desires. 在考察的最后我們曾經(jīng)許諾，一旦我們對黑格爾的整個思想體系有了一定認識，就會對這種觀點有更好的理解。That examination concluded with the promise that a better understanding of this view would emerge once we knew a little about his system of ideas as a whole. 現(xiàn)在我們已經(jīng)從《精神現(xiàn)象學》中了解到，黑格爾把整個人類歷史都看成精神發(fā)展的必然道路。We have now learnt from the Phenomenology that Hegel sees all human history as the necessary path of the development of mind. 他把精神當作歷史的推動力，這一事實表明了他為什么要堅稱，我們自己的欲望不論是自然的還是受社會影響的，都是對自由的限制。The fact that he takes mind as the driving force of history indicates why he insists that our own desires, whether natural or socially conditioned, are a restriction on freedom. 在黑格爾看來，自由并不是隨心所欲地行事，而在于有一個自由的精神。Freedom for Hegel is not freedom to do as we please; it consists in having a free mind. 精神必須控制其他一切，而且必須知道它在控制著。Mind must be in control of everything else, and must know that it is in control. 這并不意味著（就像對康德那樣）本性的非理智方面完全需要被壓抑。This does not mean (as it did for Kant) that the non-intellectual side of nature is simply to be suppressed. 就像賦予了傳統(tǒng)政治制度以位置一樣，黑格爾也賦予了我們的自然欲望和受社會影響的欲望以位置，Hegel gives our natural and socially conditioned desires their place, as he gives traditional political institutions their place; 不過這個位置始終處于一個受精神安排和控制的等級結(jié)構(gòu)之內(nèi)。but it is always a place within a hierarchy ordered and controlled by mind.

正如我們所看到的，黑格爾所認為的真正自由可見于理性選擇。The kind of freedom Hegel believes to be genuine is to be found, as we saw, in rational choice. 理性乃是理智的本質(zhì)特性。Reason is the essential nature of the intellect.不為任何強迫所阻礙的自由精神會輕而易舉地追隨理性，正如不受崇山峻嶺阻礙的河流會直奔大海。 A free mind, unimpeded by coercion of any sort, will follow reason as easily as a river unimpeded by mountains or hills would flow directly to the sea. 任何對理性的障礙都是對自由精神的限制。Anything that is an obstacle to reason is a limitation on the freedom of mind. 當一切都得到了理性安排時，精神就控制了一切。Mind controls everything when everything is rationally ordered.

我們還看到，黑格爾認為理性從本性上說就是普遍的。We also saw that Hegel regards reason as inherently universal. 如果理性是精神的重要手段，那么由此可以推出，精神從本性上說就是普遍的。If reason is the essential medium of mind, it follows that mind is inherently universal. 人類個體的特殊精神之所以相互聯(lián)系，是因為它們享有一個共同的普遍理性。The particular minds of individual human beings are linked because they share a common universal reason. 黑格爾會把話說得更加堅決：人類個體的特殊精神乃是某種本性上普遍的東西即精神本身的諸方面。Hegel would put this even more strongly: the particular minds of individual human beings are aspects of something inherently universal, namely mind itself. 理性地安排世界的最大障礙不過是，人類個體沒有意識到他的精神乃是這個普遍精神的一部分。The greatest obstacle to the rational ordering of the world is simply that individual human beings do not realize that their minds are part of this universal mind. 精神正是通過鏟除這個障礙而向自由前進的。Mind progresses towards freedom by chipping away at this obstacle. 我們還記得在《精神現(xiàn)象學》開篇，意識被局限于對純粹特殊的“這個”的認識，并且不得不接受隱含在語言中的普遍詞項。Remember how at the very beginning of the Phenomenology consciousness was limited to knowledge of the bare particular ‘this’, and was compelled to accept the universal terms implicit in language. 從那一點開始，每一步都是沿著曲折的道路走向一種精神，它越來越接近于把自己設(shè)想為某種既是理性的又是普遍的東西。From that point on, every step has been a step along a winding road that leads towards a mind closer to conceiving of itself as something both rational and universal. 這就是通向自由的道路，因為當個體的人類精神還囿于自身，而沒有認識到理性的力量或理性固有的普遍本性時，它們是無法在理性選擇中找到自由的。This is the road to freedom, because individual human minds cannot find freedom in rational choice when they are locked into conceptions of themselves that do not acknowledge the power of reason or its inherently universal nature.

一旦理解這一點，自由與認識之間的關(guān)聯(lián)就不難看出了。Once this is understood, it is not difficult to see a connection between freedom and knowledge. 我們只需要說，人類要想是自由的，就必須充分認識到其理智的那種理性的從而是普遍的本性。All that needs to be said is that for human beings to be free, they must be fully aware of the rational and hence universal nature of their intellect. 這種自我認識就是絕對知識。正如黑格爾在《歷史哲學》中所說：This self-awareness is absolute knowledge. As Hegel wrote in the Philosophy of History:

埃及人的“精神”以一個問題的形式呈現(xiàn)給他們的意識，這一點顯見于奈特女神圣廟中的著名銘文：“我是現(xiàn)在、過去和將來之所是；從未有人揭開過我的面紗。”That the mind of the Egyptians presented itself to their consciousness in the form of a problem is evident from the celebrated inscription in the sanctuary of the Goddess Neith: ‘I am that which is, that which was, and that which will be; no one has lifted my veil.’… ……在埃及的奈特那里，真理仍然是一個問題。In the Egyptian Neith, truth is still a problem. 希臘神阿波羅便是解答，他說：“人啊，認識你自己。”The Greek God Apollo is its solution; his utterance is: ‘Man, know thyself.’ 這句名言并不打算成為一種自我認識，要看出自己特殊的弱點和缺陷：In this dictum is not intended a self-recognition that regards the specialities of one’s own weaknesses and defects: 它并不是勸告?zhèn)€人去認識他的特性，而是號召一般人類去認識自己。it is not the individual that is admonished to become acquainted with his idiosyncrasy, but humanity in general is summoned to self-knowledge.

黑格爾很可能會補充說：與此同時，這一般的人類被召喚走向自由。Humanity in general, Hegel could well have added, is at the same time summoned to freedom.

絕對知識

Absolute knowledge

我們已經(jīng)看到，《精神現(xiàn)象學》的目標是絕對知識，這與歷史的目標是自由意識相關(guān)聯(lián)。We have seen that the goal of the Phenomenology is absolute knowledge, and that this is linked with the goal of history being the consciousness of freedom. 自我認識（self-knowledge）既是一種知識形式，又是黑格爾自由概念的基礎(chǔ)。Self-knowledge is both a form of knowledge and the basis of Hegel’s conception of freedom. 但為什么黑格爾要把自我認識稱為“絕對知識”呢？Why, though, does Hegel describe self-knowledge as ‘a(chǎn)bsolute knowledge’? 我們難道不應該說，自我認識是知識的一部分，但絕不是它的全部嗎？Should we not say that self-knowledge is part of knowledge, but by no means the whole of it? 畢竟，心理學只是諸多學科中的一種；Psychology, after all, is only one science among many; 即使我們加上人類學、生物學、歷史學、演化論、社會學以及其他所有能為認識我們自身做出貢獻的學科，and even if we add to it anthropology, biology, history, evolutionary theory, sociology, and all the other sciences that can contribute to our knowledge of ourselves, 也還會有許多知識領(lǐng)域完全超出這一范疇之外，或者至多與之有非常遠的聯(lián)系，比如地質(zhì)學、物理學、天文學等等。there will be many areas of knowledge entirely outside this category or at best very remotely linked to it: geology, physics, astronomy, and so on. 這些難道不也是絕對知識的一部分嗎？Are these not also part of absolute knowledge?

這一反駁包含著兩種誤解。其中一種很容易澄清。There are two misconceptions in this objection. One is easy to clear up. 黑格爾所說的“絕對知識”并不是指關(guān)于一切事物的知識。By ‘a(chǎn)bsolute knowledge’ Hegel does not mean knowledge of everything. 絕對知識乃是關(guān)于世界本身的知識，而不是關(guān)于純粹現(xiàn)象的知識。Absolute knowledge is knowledge of the world as it really is, in contrast to knowledge of mere appearances. 為了獲得絕對知識，我們不必知道一切可以知道的東西。To gain absolute knowledge we do not have to know all the facts it is possible to know. 越來越多地了解宇宙是科學家的任務。It is the job of scientists to learn more and more about the universe. 黑格爾的目標是哲學的目標，即表明真正的知識如何可能，而不是科學家的目標，即增加我們所擁有的知識。Hegel’s aim was the philosophical goal of showing how real knowledge is possible, not the scientist’s aim of increasing the knowledge we have.

第二種誤解只有在說明了黑格爾關(guān)于終極實在本性的立場之后才能消除。The second misconception can only be eliminated by an explanation of Hegel’s position on the nature of ultimate reality. 黑格爾自稱“絕對唯心主義者”。Hegel described himself as an ‘a(chǎn)bsolute idealist’. 哲學中的“唯心主義”（idealism）不同于它在日常語言中的含義，它與崇高理想或力求道德完善毫無關(guān)系?！甀dealism’ in philosophy does not mean what it means in ordinary language: it has nothing to do with having lofty ideals or striving to be morally perfect. 這一哲學術(shù)語其實應當是“觀念主義”（idea-ism），而不是“理想主義”（ideal-ism），The philosophical term should really be ‘idea-ism’ rather than ‘ideal-ism’, 因為它的含義是：構(gòu)成終極實在的是觀念，或者更寬泛地說是我們的精神、我們的思想、我們的意識。for its sense is that it is ideas, or more broadly our minds, our thoughts, our consciousness, that constitute ultimate reality. 與其對立的觀點是唯物主義，它主張終極實在是物質(zhì)的，而不是精神的。The opposed view is materialism, which contends that ultimate reality is material, not mental. （二元論者則相信，精神和物質(zhì)都是實在的。）(Dualists believe that both mind and matter are real.)

于是黑格爾認為，終極實在是精神而不是物質(zhì)。Hegel believes, then, that the ultimate reality is mind, not matter. 他還認為《精神現(xiàn)象學》已經(jīng)導出了這一結(jié)論。He also believes that the Phenomenology has led to this conclusion. 從感性確定性階段開始，認識獨立于精神的客觀實在的每一次努力都失敗了。From the stage of sense-certainty onwards, every attempt to gain knowledge of an objective reality independent of mind failed. 事實表明，在未納入意識所產(chǎn)生的概念系統(tǒng)之前，感官所得到的未加工材料是沒有意義的。The raw information received by the senses proved meaningless until it was brought under a conceptual system produced by consciousness. 在知識成為可能之前，意識必須理智地塑造世界，對它進行分類和整理。Consciousness had to shape the world intellectually, to classify and order it, before knowledge was possible. 所謂的“物質(zhì)對象”原來并不是完全獨立于意識而存在的東西，而是意識的構(gòu)造物，包括像“屬性”和“實體”這樣的概念。So-called ‘material objects’ turned out to be not things existing quite independently of consciousness, but constructs of consciousness, involving concepts like ‘property’ and ‘substance’. 在自我意識層面，意識開始認識到科學定律是它自己的創(chuàng)造，于是精神第一次把它自己作為審察的對象。At the level of self-consciousness, consciousness became aware of the laws of science as laws of its own creation, and so for the first time mind had itself as the object of its scrutiny. 也正是在這一階段，意識開始既從理智也從實踐上塑造世界，它把物質(zhì)對象拿來加工，按照自己想象的事物應該是什么樣子來塑造它們。It was also at this stage that consciousness began to shape the world practically as well as intellectually, by taking material objects and working on them, fashioning them in accordance with its own images of how they should be. 接著，自我意識也開始塑造它的社會世界，這一過程以發(fā)現(xiàn)理性是一切事物的統(tǒng)治者而達到頂點。Self-consciousness then began to shape its social world too, a process culminating in the discovery that reason is sovereign over everything. 換句話說，雖然我們開始時只是追溯精神認識實在的道路，但在這一道路的盡頭卻發(fā)現(xiàn)，我們一直在觀察著那個構(gòu)造實在的精神。In other words, although we set out merely to trace the path of mind as it comes to know reality, at the end of the road we find that we have been watching mind as it constructs reality.

只有基于實在是精神的創(chuàng)造這一觀念，黑格爾才能實現(xiàn)他在《精神現(xiàn)象學》導言中提出來的任務，Only on this conception of reality as the creation of mind can Hegel fulfil the undertaking he made in the introduction to the Phenomenology, 即表明我們可以擁有關(guān)于實在的真正知識。to show that we can have genuine knowledge of reality. 我們還記得，黑格爾大肆嘲諷所有那些把認識看成把握實在的某種工具，或者我們借以觀察實在的媒介的觀念。Remember how he poured scorn on all conceptions of knowledge as some kind of instrument for grasping reality, or as a medium through which we view reality. 他指出，所有這些觀念都把認識與實在割裂了。All these conceptions, he said, divide knowledge from reality. 康德顯然是這種批判的一個靶子，因為他的“自在之物”概念永遠超出了認識。Kant, with his notion of the ‘thing-in-itself’ as for ever beyond knowledge, was obviously one of the targets of this criticism. 黑格爾則保證，《精神現(xiàn)象學》將會達到一點，“在那里認識不再必須超越它自身”，實在將不再是不可知的“彼岸”，In contrast, Hegel promised that the Phenomenology would reach a point ‘where knowledge is no longer compelled to go beyond itself’, where reality will no longer be an unknowable ‘beyond’, 而是精神直接認識實在，并與之合為一體。but instead mind will know reality directly and be at one with it. 現(xiàn)在我們可以理解所有這一切的意義了：當精神認識到它所努力認識的東西就是它本身時，絕對知識就達到了。Now we can understand what all this meant: absolute knowledge is reached when mind realizes that what it seeks to know is itself.

這一點是理解整個《精神現(xiàn)象學》的關(guān)鍵。This point is the key to understanding the Phenomenology as a whole. 它可能是本書所試圖傳達的黑格爾所有思想中最深刻的，因此我們再來考察一下。It is probably the most profound of all the ideas of Hegel that I am attempting to convey in this book, so let us go over it again.

實在是精神構(gòu)造的。起初精神并沒有認識到這一點。Reality is constituted by mind. At first mind does not realize this. 它把實在看成某種獨立于它的東西，甚至是某種與它敵對或異己的東西。It sees reality as something independent of it, even as something hostile or alien to it. 在這一時期，精神與它自己的創(chuàng)造物相疏離。During this period mind is estranged or alienated from its own creation. 它試圖獲得對實在的認識，但這種認識并非真正的知識，因為精神并沒有認識到實在的本來面目，所以把實在當成某種無法把握的神秘的東西。It tries to obtain knowledge of reality, but this knowledge is not genuine knowledge because mind does not recognize reality for what it is, and so regards it as a mysterious thing beyond its grasp. 只有當精神領(lǐng)悟到實在就是它自己的創(chuàng)造物時，它才能放棄這種對“彼岸”的追求，才能認識到在它之外沒有任何東西。Only when mind awakens to the fact that reality is its own creation can it give up this reaching after the ‘beyond’.Then it understands that there is nothing beyond itself. 然后它認識實在就像它認識自己一樣直接和立即，它與實在合為一體。 Then it knows reality as directly and immediately as it knows itself.It is at one with it.? 正如黑格爾在《精神現(xiàn)象學》結(jié)尾所說：絕對知識是“精神在精神的形態(tài)中認識自己”。As Hegel puts it in the concluding section of the Phenomenology, absolute knowledge is ‘mind knowing itself in the shape of mind’.

就這樣，黑格爾使其鴻篇巨制得出了一個大膽的非凡結(jié)論。Hegel has thus brought his gigantic work to a bold and brilliant conclusion. 他給哲學的基本問題提出了一種驚人的解決方案，同時也表明為什么歷史必須沿著它事實上已經(jīng)走過的道路前進。He has produced a startling solution to the fundamental problem of philosophy, and at the same time shown why history had to move along the paths it has in fact travelled. 至于他的這座宏偉的大廈是否安穩(wěn)則是另外一個問題；Whether his vast edifice stands solidly is another question; 但即使它在我們眼前倒掉，我們也不禁要稱贊其設(shè)計的寬廣和原創(chuàng)。but even if it crumbles before our eyes, we cannot help admiring the breadth and originality of the design.

這一設(shè)計有一個特征，我作為向?qū)Ы蛔∠胫赋鰜?。There is one feature of the design that your guide cannot resist pointing out. 請問一下你自己，絕對知識什么時候能夠達到？回答當然是，一旦精神認識到實在是其本身的創(chuàng)造，它并沒有什么“彼岸”要去認識，絕對知識就達到了。Ask yourself when absolute knowledge is achieved. The answer is, of course, that it is achieved as soon as mind understands that reality is its own creation and there is no ‘beyond’ for it to know. 這是在什么時候發(fā)生的呢？鑒于這種實在觀念是黑格爾《精神現(xiàn)象學》的最后結(jié)果，它必定發(fā)生在黑格爾自己的精神把握了宇宙本質(zhì)的時刻。And when does this occur? Well, since this conception of reality is the upshot of Hegel’s Phenomenology, it must occur when Hegel’s own mind grasps the nature of the universe. 根據(jù)黑格爾的看法，當他黑格爾理解了實在的本質(zhì)時，精神就來到了它最終的棲身之地。On Hegel’s view, mind comes to its final resting-place when he, Hegel, understands the nature of reality. 對于一部哲學著作來說，幾乎不會有比這更宏大的結(jié)論了。There can scarcely be a more momentous conclusion to a work of philosophy. 《精神現(xiàn)象學》的最后幾頁不僅是對整個人類歷史頂點的描述，而且就是這個頂點。The closing pages of The Phenomenology of Mind are no mere description of the culmination of all human history; they are that culmination.

兩個問題

Two questions

黑格爾的哲學顯得如此恢弘壯麗，以至于質(zhì)疑它似乎顯得瑣碎而不重要。So magnificent is Hegel’s philosophical cheek that to question it seems petty. 但還是有許多問題可以追問。我將簡要討論兩個核心問題。Nevertheless there are many questions that virtually ask themselves. I shall briefly consider two central ones.

第一個問題與黑格爾的唯心主義有關(guān)。The first concerns Hegel’s idealism. 我們也許承認，沒有理智對感官所接收的未加工材料進行構(gòu)造，就不可能有知識。We may admit that there can be no knowledge without an intellect that structures the raw information received by the senses. 我們還可能承認，人類通過對世界起作用，從理論和實踐兩方面塑造著他們的世界。We may grant that human beings shape their world practically, as well as theoretically, by working on it. 但即使把這一切甚至更多的內(nèi)容考慮進去，也仍然會有一個頑固的信念揮之不去，那就是必定存在著某種“外在的”、獨立于我們經(jīng)驗的東西。But even when all this and more is taken into account, there remains the stubborn conviction that there must still be something ‘out there’ independently of our experience of it. 畢竟，說精神把它的范疇強加于它從感官獲得的未加工材料——強加于直接呈現(xiàn)于感性確定性層面的意識的“這個”——等于預設(shè)了存在著來自某個地方的未加工材料。After all, to say that mind imposes its categories on the raw information it receives from the senses – on the ‘this’ that is immediately present to consciousness at the level of sense certainty – is to presuppose that there is raw information coming from somewhere. 黑格爾可以否認這種未加工材料等于知識，但他無法否認這暗示有精神本身之外的某種東西存在。Hegel can deny that this raw information amounts to knowledge, but he cannot deny that it suggests the existence of something outside mind itself. 同樣的觀點甚至更明顯地適用于精神通過對世界起作用而實際塑造世界這一看法。The same point holds even more obviously for the view that mind shapes the world practically by working upon it. 米開朗琪羅也許是先想到了“大衛(wèi)”，然后取來一塊大理石，依照其思想把它變成了一尊雕像。Michelangelo may have thought of David, taken a lump of marble, and turned it into a statue that accorded with his thoughts; 但如果壓根就沒有大理石，他就不可能前進。but he would not have got far if there had been no marble in the first place.

這一思路引導康德（在理論領(lǐng)域而不是實踐領(lǐng)域）假定了他那不可知的“自在之物”。This line of thought (in the theoretical rather than the practical sphere) led Kant to postulate his unknowable ‘thing-in-itself’. 黑格爾對這種觀念作了一些敏銳的批判，但他真的表明沒有這個觀念也行嗎？Hegel has made some acute criticisms of this idea, but has he really shown that we can do without it?

第二個問題也來自黑格爾的唯心主義。The second question also flows from Hegel’s idealism. 有些唯心主義者是主觀主義者，他們堅持認為終極實在是人自己的思想和感覺。Some idealists are subjectivists. They maintain that what is ultimately real are one’s own thoughts and sensations. 不同的精神可能有不同的思想和感覺，如此一來，就不可能判定一個精神的內(nèi)容正確而另一個精神的內(nèi)容錯誤了——事實上，根據(jù)這種觀點，這些劃分是毫無意義的，因為他們錯誤地預先假定有一種客觀實在超出了個人精神的思想和感覺之外。Different minds may have different thoughts and sensations, and if they do, there is no possible way of judging the contents of one mind to be true and those of the other false – indeed on this view such classifications are meaningless, for they erroneously presuppose an objective reality beyond the thoughts and sensations of individual minds. 黑格爾拒絕接受這種對應于所存在的無數(shù)不同的精神就有無數(shù)不同的“實在”的觀點。Hegel rejects the view that there are countless different ‘realities’ corresponding to the countless different minds that exist. 他把這種形式的唯心主義稱為絕對唯心主義，以區(qū)別于主觀唯心主義。He calls his form of idealism absolute idealism to distinguish it from subjective idealism. 對黑格爾來說只有一個實在，因為最終只有一個精神。For Hegel there is only one reality, because, ultimately, there is only one mind.

現(xiàn)在我們就回到了一開始考察《精神現(xiàn)象學》時所提出的問題：Now we have returned to the question with which our investigation of the Phenomenology began. 如果黑格爾認為只有一個精神，那么他所說的“精神”（mind）到底是什么意思呢？If Hegel believes that there is only one mind, what on earth can he mean by ‘mind’? 他必定是指某種集體的或普遍的精神。那樣一來，帶有各種宗教含義的spirit難道不是一種更好的譯法嗎？He must mean some kind of collective or universal mind. In that case, would not ‘spirit’, with all its religious connotations, have been a better translation all along? 集體的精神從根本上說難道不是一種宗教觀念嗎？Is not the idea of a collective mind fundamentally a religious idea? 我們難道不應把它當作黑格爾的上帝觀念嗎？Should we not regard it as Hegel’s conception of God?

也許是這樣。但如果我們到頭來不得不接受這種看法，那么一開始就用spirit來翻譯，比現(xiàn)在用mind來翻譯可以更好地理解黑格爾思想中的含混不清和不明確之處。Perhaps; but if we are in the end forced to this view, it will be with a better understanding of the ambiguities and uncertainties of Hegel’s position than we would have had if we had opted for that translation from the start.

不可否認，黑格爾的精神概念仍然有不明確之處。That there remain uncertainties about Hegel’s conception of mind is undeniable. 一方面，他需要一個集體的或普遍的精神概念，不僅是為了避免一種主觀形式的唯心主義，也是為了證明其觀點的正確性，即精神逐漸把整個實在看成它自己的創(chuàng)造。On the one hand, he needs the conception of a collective or universal mind not only to avoid a subjective form of idealism, but also to make good his vision of mind coming to see all of reality as its own creation. 如果有無數(shù)個不同的個體精神，那么任何一個精神都不可能把大部分實在當作它自己的實際創(chuàng)造，因為大部分實在將由其他精神的實際創(chuàng)造所構(gòu)成。If there are millions of distinct individual minds, no single mind will be able to see much of reality as its own practical creation, for a large part of reality will consist of the practical creations of other minds. 精神在達到絕對知識之前構(gòu)想世界的方式——也就是把世界看成某種獨立于它甚至是與它敵對的東西——將經(jīng)常被證明并非欺騙，而是確確實實的事實。The manner in which mind conceives of the world before it has achieved absolute knowledge – as something independent of it and even hostile to it – will often prove to be no deception, but the literal truth. 所有這一切似乎都迫使我們不得不接受對黑格爾的一種解釋，即把黑格爾的“精神”理解成某種宇宙意識。All this seems to force upon us an interpretation of Hegel that would understand his term ‘mind’ as some kind of cosmic consciousness; 當然，這并非把上帝看成與宇宙分離的傳統(tǒng)觀念，而是與那些主張“萬物歸一”的東方哲學更為相近。not, of course, a traditional conception of God as a being separate from the universe, but rather as something more akin to those Eastern philosophies that insist that All is One.

另一方面，黑格爾自視為理性的徹底捍衛(wèi)者。On the other hand Hegel regarded himself as a thoroughgoing defender of reason. 這與他關(guān)于精神所說的話以及需要說的話能夠協(xié)調(diào)起來嗎？Can we reconcile this with what he says, and needs to say, about mind? 協(xié)調(diào)的一個辦法也許是認真考慮黑格爾在何種程度上相信意識必然是社會的。One way of doing so might be to take very seriously the extent to which Hegel believes consciousness to be necessarily social. 從《精神現(xiàn)象學》的第一部分開始黑格爾就強調(diào)，知識只有在能夠交流時才是知識。From the first section of the Phenomenology, Hegel insists that knowledge is only knowledge if it can be communicated. 語言的必要性將一種完全獨立的意識這一觀念排除在外。The necessity of language rules out the idea of an entirely independent consciousness. 意識要想發(fā)展成自我意識，就必須與其他意識發(fā)生相互作用。Consciousness must interact with other consciousnesses if it is to develop into self-consciousness. 最后，精神只有在一個合理組織起來的共同體中才能找到自由和自我理解，In the end, mind can only find freedom and self-understanding in a rationally organized community.所以諸精神并不是偶然聯(lián)系在一起的分離的原子。So minds are not separate atoms, linked together by the accidents of association.? 個體精神是一起存在的，否則就根本不存在。Individual minds exist together, or they do not exist at all.

黑格爾關(guān)于精神的社會理論很重要，特別是因為它對后來思想的影響，但也許這還不足以使我們把他所說的認識理解成精神與它自身相一致。Hegel’s social theory of mind is important, particularly for its influence on later thought, but it may not be enough to allow us to make sense of his idea of knowledge as mind at one with itself. 不過還有第二個要素可以拿來用，那就是他關(guān)于理性的普遍性的看法。There is still a second element to be drawn into service, however, and this is his idea of the universal nature of reason. 我們已經(jīng)看到，黑格爾把理性看成精神的根本原則，把理性看成本質(zhì)上普遍的。We have already seen how Hegel regards reason as the essential principle of mind, and sees reason as essentially universal. 因此他才能說：就個體精神真正是精神——而不是自私的或反復無常的欲望——而言，它們都會彼此和諧一致地思想和行為，都會彼此承認有同一個基本的本質(zhì)。He could therefore say: in so far as individual minds are truly mind – and not selfish or capricious desire – they really would all think and act in harmony with each other, they really would all recognize each other as having one and the same essential nature. 這個基本的本質(zhì)——這個“普遍精神”——既不是一個個體精神，也不是一個集體精神，而就是理性的意識。This essential nature – this ‘universal mind’ – is neither an individual mind, nor a collective mind, but simply rational consciousness.

這也許是對理性本質(zhì)和精神本質(zhì)的一種極端而片面的看法。This may be an extreme and one-sided view of the nature of reason and of mind. 它可能基于——正如我提到黑格爾的政治哲學可能基于——一種關(guān)于人類精神之間能否和諧的、受到誤導的樂觀主義看法。It may be based, as I suggested his political philosophy might be based, on a misguided optimism about the possibility of harmony between human minds. 但它并非退避到一種宇宙意識的神秘統(tǒng)一性中去。It is not, however, a retreat into the mystical unity of a cosmic consciousness. 至于它是否是對《精神現(xiàn)象學》核心要義的正確解釋，則是另一個問題。Whether it is an accurate interpretation of the central message of the Phenomenology is another question.